The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 EDISON GATLIN, et al., Case No. 21-cv-00370-SI
8 Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING COUNTY
9 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
10 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, et al.,
Re: Dkt. No. 212
11 Defendants.
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13 On April 29, 2025, the Court denied County defendants’ motion for judgment on the
14 pleadings as to the case plan claims contained in the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in plaintiffs’
15 Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 188. On July 10, 2025, County defendants moved for leave
16 to file a motion for reconsideration, arguing a change in the law based on the Supreme Court’s June
17 26, 2025 decision in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 2219
18 (2025). Dkt. No. 204. The Court granted County defendants leave to move for reconsideration and
19 set a briefing schedule. Dkt. No. 208. The matter is now fully briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 212, 222,
20 225.
21 County defendants argue that, following Medina, foster children such as plaintiff Edison
22 Gatlin no longer have a private right of action to enforce the case planning provisions of the federal
23 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (“CWA”), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16) and
24 675(1). The Ninth Circuit first recognized such a right in Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991 (9th
25 Cir. 2012).1 County defendants argue that the rationale underlying the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
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1 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the case plan provisions of the CWA are an example
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of a “spending statute[.]” Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1006. The State “agree[s] to administer its foster
1 Henry A. is no longer viable after Medina.
2 To understand the context for this motion, the Court summarizes the relevant Supreme Court
3 jurisprudence regarding whether a federal statute creates an individual right enforceable via 42
4 U.S.C. § 1983. In Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997), the Supreme Court
5 articulated a “three-prong test for determining whether a federal statute creates an individual right.”
6 Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1005. The test required: “1) that Congress intended the statutory provision to
7 benefit the plaintiff; 2) that the asserted right is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement
8 would strain judicial competence; and 3) that the provision couch the asserted right in mandatory
9 rather than precatory terms.” Id. (quoting Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006)).
10 In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). That
11 case examined whether the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, enacted through
12 Congress’s spending power, conferred upon individual students a federal right to enforcement in
13 damages suits under Section 1983. Gonzaga emphasized that “unless Congress speaks with a clear
14 voice, and manifests an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions
15 provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983.” Id. at 280 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &
16 Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The
17 Supreme Court explained, “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical
18 remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action
19 for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Id.
20 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28). Gonzaga clarified that Blessing should not be read to allow
21 “plaintiffs to enforce a statute under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within the general zone of
22 interest that the statute is intended to protect[.]” Id. at 283. Looking to the language of § 1983, the
23 Gonzaga Court explained, “it is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may
24 be enforced under the authority of that section.” Id. It was after Blessing and Gonzaga that the
25 Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in the Henry A. case on the case planning statute in question here.
26 Two years ago, in Talevski, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that
27 “Spending Clause statutes do not give rise to privately enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[.]”
1 on to analyze whether the two provisions of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) in
2 that case did indeed create privately enforceable rights. The Court explained, “our precedent sets a
3 demanding bar: Statutory provisions must unambiguously confer individual federal rights.” Id. at
4 180 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280). Talevski affirmed the viability of the method used in
5 Gonzaga “for ascertaining unambiguous conferral” of individual enforcement rights. See id. at 183;
6 see also Medina, 145 S. Ct. at 2234 (“Talevski reaffirmed that ‘Gonzaga sets forth our established
7 method’ for determining whether a spending-power statute confers individual rights.”) (citing
8 Talevski, 599 U.S. at 183). The Talevski Court concluded that the provisions at issue there,
9 contained in that part of the statute “which expressly concerns ‘[r]equirements relating to residents’
10 rights” exemplified the atypical case in which a spending power statute created an individually
11 enforceable right under Section 1983. 599 U.S. at 184.
12 This year, the Supreme Court clarified that, post-Gonzaga, courts should no longer apply the
13 so-called “Blessing test” because “Gonzaga rejected any reading of our prior cases that would permit
14 anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under
15 § 1983.” Medina, 145 S. Ct. at 2234 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S at 283) (internal quotation marks
16 and brackets omitted). At issue in Medina was a provision of the Medicaid Act known as the “any-
17 qualified-provider” provision, which the Supreme Court found did not confer a right enforceable
18 under § 1983.
19 Having reviewed the analysis in Henry A., the Supreme Court jurisprudence, and the statutes
20 at issue in this and in the Supreme court cases, the Court will deny County defendants’ motion for
21 reconsideration of its prior ruling on the case plan claims. The Court asks whether “the reasoning
22 or theory of . . . prior circuit precedent is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of
23 intervening higher authority” such that the Court should treat “the prior circuit opinion as having
24 been effectively overruled.” See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003). “This is a
25 high standard.” Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013)
26 (quoting Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012)). “It is not enough for there to be
27 ‘some tension’ between the intervening higher authority and prior circuit precedent, . . . or for the
1 (citations omitted).
2 Although it is a close call, the Court disagrees with County defendants that the Ninth
3 Circuit’s ruling on the case planning provisions of the CWA has been “effectively overruled” by or
4 is “clearly irreconcilable” with Medina. Medina emphasized that the test articulated in Gonzaga is
5 the one that courts are to apply and that the Blessing test is overruled. In finding the case planning
6 provisions of the CWA privately enforceable under § 1983, the Ninth Circuit in Henry A. applied
7 both Blessing and Gonzaga. The Henry A. court cited Gonzaga as having “clarified that the first
8 prong of the Blessing test is meant to determine whether Congress ‘unambiguously conferred’ a
9 federal right.” See Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283). The Henry A.
10 court further used the language of Gonzaga in finding that “Section 671(a)(16) unambiguously
11 requires the State to provide for the development of a case plan ‘for each child’” and that “rights-
12 creating language is readily discernible in § 671(a)(16) because it expresses a clear mandate by
13 using the term ‘shall’ and discusses how the state must distribute benefits to each child.” Id. at
14 1006-07 (quoting Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142, 171 (D. Mass. 2011))
15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while the Ninth Circuit applied the Blessing test, it also
16 integrated Gonzaga into its analysis. Though there may be “some tension” between the Henry A.
17 reasoning and Medina, it does not rise to the level that the former is “clearly irreconcilable” with
18 the latter. See Lair, 697 F.3d at 1207 (citations omitted).
19 Lastly, County defendants challenge whether the case plan provisions may be enforceable
20 against a municipality such as the County rather than against the State. The County already made
21 this argument, albeit in less detail, in its reply brief to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
22 The Court has already rejected this argument, see Dkt. No. 188 at 7-8, and agrees with plaintiffs that
23 County defendants improperly seek to relitigate this argument on a motion for reconsideration.2
24 For the reasons stated above, the motion for reconsideration of the Order Denying County
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26 2 The County is also incorrect in its assertion that “Henry A. did not concern a claim for
monetary damages[.]” See Dkt. No. 225 at 8. Though the case planning claim in Henry A. was for
27 injunctive relief, the plaintiffs also brought a claim for damages under the “records provisions” of
1 Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. No. 188, is DENIED.
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3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 || Dated: August 26, 2025 Stn Ml ee
5 eeaeaoeene ees
SUSAN ILLSTON
6 United States District Judge
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