Daniel Quinn v. Southern California Edison Company

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8 United States District Court

9 Central District of California

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11 DANIEL QUINN, Case № 2:25-cv-02624-ODW (KSx)

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v.

MOTION TO REMAND [13]; AND

14 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

15 COMPANY et al., MOTION TO DISMISS [10]

Defendants.

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18 I. INTRODUCTION

19 Plaintiff Daniel Quinn filed this action in state court against his former

20 employers, Defendants Southern California Edison Company and Edison International

21 (collectively, “SCE”). (Declaration Robert S. Blumberg ISO Notice Removal Ex. A

22 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”), ECF No. 1-2.) SCE removed the action. (Notice

23 Removal (“NOR”), ECF No. 1.) Quinn now moves to remand, (Mot. Remand

24 (“MTR”), ECF No. 13), and SEC moves to dismiss the Complaint, (Mot. Dismiss

25 (“MTD”), ECF No. 10). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Quinn’s

26 Motion to Remand and GRANTS SCE’s Motion to Dismiss.1

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28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the motions, the Court deemed the

matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

1 II. BACKGROUND2

2 Quinn was employed by SCE as a Nuclear Technical Specialist at SCE’s San

3 Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (“SONGS”) from 1979 until his retirement in

4 2009. (Compl. ¶ 25.)

5 SCE provided a written employment benefit discount to eligible employees and

6 retirees. (Id. ¶ 26.) For SCE employees and retirees residing outside of SCE service

7 territories, SCE provided a twenty-five percent reimbursement for their electric

8 service (the “Electric Service Reimbursement Benefit” or “ESR Benefit”). (Id. ¶ 27.)

9 Quinn received the ESR Benefit while he was employed with SCE pursuant to his

10 employee benefits plan and following his retirement pursuant to his written retirement

11 benefits plan. (Id. ¶¶ 30–31.) Quinn relied upon the ESR Benefit to mitigate his

12 electric service costs. (Id. ¶ 41.) On or about October 22, 2022, SCE notified Quinn

13 that the ESR Benefit would be discontinued effective January 1, 2023. (Id. ¶ 32.)

14 Based on these allegations, Quinn initiated this action against SCE in state

15 court. (Compl.) Quinn asserts eight causes of action, for: (1) age discrimination

16 under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (2) unpaid wages in violation

17 of California Labor Code (“Labor Code”) section 200, et seq., (3) breach of contract,

18 (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

19 dealing, (6) civil penalties under California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”),

20 Labor Code section 2698, (7) unfair business practices in violation of California

21 Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., and (8) declaratory relief. (Id.

22 ¶¶ 50–103.) SCE then removed the action to this Court. (NOR.)

23 Quinn now moves to remand, and SCE moves to dismiss the Complaint.

24 (MTR; MTD.) The motions are fully briefed. (Opp’n MTR, ECF No. 18; Reply ISO

25 MTR, ECF No. 20; Opp’n MTD, ECF No. 12; Reply ISO MTD, ECF No. 17.)

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2 All factual references derive from Quinn’s Complaint or attached exhibits, unless otherwise noted,

28 and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

1 III. MOTION TO REMAND

2 The Court must have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider SCE’s Motion to

3 Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court first addresses Quinn’s Motion to Remand.

4 A. Legal Standard

5 Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by the

6 Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

7 Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed

8 to federal court only if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the

9 suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). One avenue to federal original jurisdiction is an action that

10 arises under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. Id. § 1331.

11 There is a strong presumption that a court is without jurisdiction until

12 affirmatively proven otherwise. Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d

13 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970); see Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)

14 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal

15 in the first instance.”). When an action is removed from state court, the removing

16 party bears the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. Corral v. Select

17 Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017). Removal is strictly

18 construed, and any doubt as to removal is to be resolved in favor of remand. Id.

19 at 773–74.

20 B. Discussion

21 SCE removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on alleged federal

22 enclave jurisdiction and complete preemption under the Employee Retirement Income

23 Security Act (“ERISA”) § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). (NOR ¶¶ 11–19.) The Court

24 begins, and ends, its jurisdictional analysis by addressing whether Quinn’s state law

25 claims are preempted by ERISA.

26 To remove a case based on ERISA preemption, a removing party “must show

27 either that the state-law causes of action are completely preempted by § 502(a) of

28 ERISA, or that some other basis exists for federal question jurisdiction.” Marin Gen.

1 Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 2009). “Even

2 where a complaint alleges only state law claims, if these claims are entirely

3 encompassed by § 502(a), the complaint is converted from a state common law

4 complaint into a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.”

5 McGill v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2015). “When a

6 federal statute[, such as ERISA,] wholly displaces the state-law cause of action

7 through complete pre-emption, the state claim can be removed.” Aetna Health Inc. v.

8 Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207–08 (2004) (cleaned up).

9 Quinn first argues that SCE cannot remove the action based on an affirmative

10 defense such as federal preemption. (MTR 4–5.) While a preemption defense may

11 not ordinarily give rise to removal jurisdiction, it does in this instance as “Congress

12 has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of the civil

13 enforcement provisions of [ERISA] removable to federal court.” Metro. Life Ins. Co.

14 v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987). Accordingly, “[c]ommon law claims filed in state

15 court that are preempted by ERISA are subject to removal to federal court under the

16 well-pleaded complaint rule.” Crosby v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1074,

17 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 67).

18 Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil

19 action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights

20 under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of

21 the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The Supreme Court, in Davila, established a

22 two-prong test “to determine whether an asserted state-law cause of action comes

23 within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B).” Marin, 581 F.3d at 946. Under this two-prong

24 test, “a state-law cause of action is completely preempted if (1) ‘an individual, at some

25 point in time, could have brought [the] claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),’ and

26 (2) ‘where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s

27 actions.’” Id. “A state-law cause of action is preempted by § 502(a)(1)(B) only if

28 both prongs of the test are satisfied.” Id. at 947.

1 In its Notice of Removal, SCE broadly contends that Quinn’s state law claims

2 are preempted by ERISA because Quinn seeks benefits “due under an ERISA plan.”

3 (NOR ¶¶ 15–19.) Quinn argues that his state law claims are not preempted by ERISA.

4 (MTR 11–15.) In response, SCE now contends that it properly removed the action

5 because Quinn’s third to fifth causes of action for breach of contract, breach of

6 fiduciary duty, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “stem

7 from ‘a written retirement benefits plan,’ i.e., an ERISA plan such as the retirement

8 plans SCE sponsors.” (Opp’n MTR 9, 11 (“Plaintiff’s Claims for Breach of a Written

9 Retirement Benefits Plan Relates to ERISA.”).) As SCE bears the burden of

10 establishing that removal jurisdiction is proper and, in its opposition, specifies that

11 only the breach claims support removal through complete preemption, the Court need

12 not address whether Quinn’s other claims are completely preempted by ERISA. See

13 Corral, 878 F.3d at 773.

14 1. First Davila Prong

15 Under the first Davila prong, a plaintiff could have brought a claim under

16 § 502(a)(1)(B) if the following four elements are satisfied: “(1) there is a relevant

17 ERISA plan; (2) [p]laintiff has standing to sue under that plan; (3) the [d]efendant is

18 an ERISA entity; and (4) the complaint seeks compensatory relief akin to that

19 available under § 502(a).” McGill, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 1117 (citing Butero v. Royal

20 Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 1999)). Courts look to the

21 plaintiff’s complaint, the statute on which the plaintiff’s claims are based, and the plan

22 documents to determine whether a cause of action falls within the scope of

23 § 502(a)(1)(B). Davila, 542 U.S. at 211. Here, neither party submits copies of

24 Quinn’s employee and retirement benefits plan. Accordingly, the Court looks to the

25 allegations in Quinn’s Complaint.

26 The first element is met. ERISA defines an “employee pension benefit plan” as

27 “any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or

28 maintained by an employer . . . to the extent that by its express terms . . . provides

1 retirement income to employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). Quinn advances his

2 breach claims against SCE for breaching the written retirement benefits plan. (Compl.

3 ¶¶ 71, 75, 81.) Quinn also alleges that he received the ESR Benefit “in accordance

4 with provisions of” his employee benefits plan and the written retirements benefits

5 plan with SCE. (Compl. ¶¶ 30–31, 39.) As Quinn asserts a breach of his retirement

6 benefits plan with SCE, there is a valid ERISA plan.

7 The second and third elements are also met. ERISA defines a “participant” as

8 “any former employee of an employer . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a

9 benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). Quinn is a

10 “participant” because he became eligible to receive retirement benefits following his

11 retirement and per the written retirement benefits package. (Compl. ¶¶ 69, 80.) And

12 SCE, as the employer providing the retirement benefits plan, is considered a

13 “traditional ERISA entit[y].” Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters

14 of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2007); McGill, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 1117 n.3

15 (“Among the entities governed by ERISA are ‘employer[s] any of whose employees

16 are covered’ by an employee benefit plan.” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(C)).

17 Finally, the last element is met. Section 502(a) provides that a plan participant

18 can bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to

19 enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits

20 under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). This is precisely the redress

21 Quinn seeks through his breach claims. Quinn seeks damages “including but not

22 limited to the loss of retirement benefits to which he is entitled, and loss of use of the

23 promised retirement benefits.” (Compl. ¶¶ 72, 77, 83.) Accordingly, Quinn seeks the

24 type of relief available under § 502(a).

25 Based on the foregoing, the first Davila prong is satisfied.

26 2. Second Davila Prong

27 Under the second Davila prong, courts determine whether “there is no other

28 independent legal duty that is implicated by defendant’s actions.” Marin, 581 F.3d

1 at 949. A claim is not completely preempted under § 502(a)(1)(B) “[i]f there is some

2 other independent legal duty beyond that imposed by an ERISA plan.” Id.

3 Quinn broadly asserts that “a state contract claim . . . creates independent

4 duties.” (MTR 12.) But Quinn provides no legal support for this assertion nor point

5 to any allegations showing a different contract duty outside of those arising from his

6 retirement benefits plan. Rather, in his Complaint, he contends that he is owed his full

7 retirement benefits “per the written retirement benefits package,” that SCE owed a

8 fiduciary duty to him as a “retiree” who met all conditions to receiving the retirement

9 benefits, and that the written retirement benefits plan implied a covenant of good faith

10 and fair dealing. (Compl. ¶¶ 69–70, 74–75, 79.) Accordingly, as pleaded, the breach

11 claims do not provide a duty independent of the retirement plan terms. See, e.g.,

12 Davila, 542 U.S. at 213 (finding no independent legal duty when “interpretation of the

13 terms of [plaintiffs’] benefit plans forms an essential part of their” claim and potential

14 liability “derives entirely from the particular rights and obligations established by the

15 benefit plans”). Therefore, the second Davila prong is also satisfied.

16 3. Conclusion

17 Based on the above, removal is proper as Quinn’s third to fifth causes of action

18 for breaches of the retirements benefit plan are completely preempted by ERISA.

19 C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

20 Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “state and federal

21 claims . . . derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of

22 Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Ninth Circuit

23 has held that “a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that

24 are brought in conjunction with” preempted claims. Brown v. Brotman Med. Ctr., Inc.,

25 571 F. App’x 572, 576 (9th Cir. 2014).

26 As discussed above, Quinn’s breach claims are completely preempted by

27 ERISA. Quinn’s remaining state law claims all arise from the same nucleus of

28 operative fact as the preempted claims—they all seek redress for SCE’s cancellation

1 of the ESR Benefit. Accordingly, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over

2 Quinn’s remaining state law claims. See, e.g., Trs. of Constr. Indus. & Laborers

3 Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925

4 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding supplemental jurisdiction appropriate when the state law

5 claims seek recovery for “the same ERISA-related debt” as plaintiff’s federal claims);

6 Force v. Advanced Structural Techs., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02219-DMG (AGRx),

7 2020 WL 4539026, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020) (exercising supplemental

8 jurisdiction over state law claims that “all appear to arise out of the same facts that

9 underlie” plaintiff’s ERISA and FMLA claims).

10 As the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Quinn’s remaining causes

11 of action, it need not reach federal enclave jurisdiction. Accordingly, Quinn’s Motion

12 to Remand is DENIED.

13 IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

14 SCE moves to dismiss all causes of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

15 Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (MTD 5–19.)

16 A. Legal Standard

17 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable

18 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal

19 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To

20 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading

21 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v.

22 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to

23 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

24 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual

25 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal,

26 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

27 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a

28 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

1 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the

2 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as

3 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

4 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept

5 conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences.

6 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

7 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide

8 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.

9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d

10 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court

11 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

12 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture

13 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly

14 denied . . . if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San

15 Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).

16 B. Request for Judicial Notice

17 SCE requests the Court judicially notice that SONGS is a federal enclave and

18 has been since 1942. (Req. Judicial Notice, ECF No. 11.) This request is unopposed.

19 Courts may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute as they

20 are “generally known” in the community or “can be accurately and readily determined

21 from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

22 Evid. 201(b). “SONGS is located within a federal enclave, acquired by the United

23 States in 1941 when it established Camp Pendelton.” Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,

24 170 F. App’x. 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished)3; Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F.

25 Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (taking “judicial notice of the fact that SONGS

26 is located within the federal enclave of Camp Pendleton, which was acquired by the

27

28 3 Unpublished decisions of the Ninth Circuit, issued before January 1, 2007, may be cited for factual

purposes. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(c)(ii).

1 United States no later than December 31, 1942”); Abikar v. Bristol Bay Native Corp.,

2 300 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1102 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (same). As it is well-established that

3 SONGS is located within a federal enclave, the Court GRANTS SCE’s request.

4 C. Discussion

5 SCE argues that dismissal is required because each of Quinn’s claims are

6 preempted under either ERISA or the federal enclave doctrine. (MTD 5–18.) Quinn

7 contends that his claims are not preempted.4 (Opp’n MTD 9–20.)

8 1. Preemption: ERISA

9 SCE argues that Quinn’s claims are preempted by ERISA because he seeks

10 “benefits in accordance with the provisions of the written retirement benefits plan.”

11 (MTD 11.) As discussed above, the Court finds that Quinn’s third through fifth causes

12 of action, as pleaded, are completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a).5 Quinn seeks

13 leave to amend to “refine his claims to avoid any unintended triggers of ERISA” and

14 broadly states that his claims do not “implicate the terms of any ERISA plan or the

15 provisions of ERISA.” (Opp’n MTD 22–23.) But Quinn’s bare assertion is not

16 sufficient. Even in his opposition, Quinn does not indicate a breach of any contract

17 provision other than those arising from his employee and retirement benefits plans

18 with SCE. Accordingly, an amendment could not possibly cure the deficiency. See

19 Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401. The Court therefore DISMISSES Quinn’s third through

20 fifth causes of action WITH PREJUDICE. See, e.g., Leonard v. MetLife Ins. Co.,

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4 Quinn also argues that “[a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion cannot be used to raise an affirmative defense.”

23 (Opp’n MTD 6, 13.) Contrary to Quinn’s assertion, “a motion to dismiss may be granted based upon

an affirmative defense where the complaint’s allegations, with all inferences drawn in [p]laintiff’s

24

favor, nonetheless show that the affirmative defense ‘is apparent on the face of the complaint.’”

25 Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2014); see Scott v.

Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Ordinarily affirmative defenses may not be raised

26 by a motion to dismiss, . . . but this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed issues of

fact.”).

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5 The Court need not reach SCE’s ERISA preemption arguments as to Quinn’s remaining causes of

28 action as it finds those claims are preempted by and subject to dismissal under the federal enclave

doctrine.

1 No. 2:12-cv-10003-SVW (SSx), 2013 WL 12210177, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013)

2 (dismissing state law claims that were completely preempted by § 502(a)).

3 2. Preemption: Federal Enclave Doctrine

4 The Court has taken judicial notice that SONGS is located within the federal

5 enclave of Camp Pendleton and has been a federal enclave since 1942. Quinn alleges

6 that he was employed at SONGS, a federal enclave, from 1979 until 2009. (Compl.

7 ¶ 25.) SCE moves to dismiss Quinn’s first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action

8 on the grounds that they arose from Quinn’s employment at SONGS and are barred by

9 federal law. (MTD 8–11.) In response, Quinn argues the injury—revocation of the

10 ESR Benefit—did not occur in a federal enclave. (Opp’n MTD 9–12.)

11 Federal law preempts state law within federal enclaves. Snow v. Bechtel Const.

12 Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1986) (“Only federal law applies on

13 a federal enclave under exclusive federal jurisdiction (except to the extent Congress

14 has otherwise provided).”). To determine whether federal enclave jurisdiction exists,

15 the court looks to whether “the locus in which the claim arose” is a federal enclave. In

16 re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2012)

17 (citing Alvarez v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir. 1975). There must be a “direct

18 connection between the injury and the conduct” that is not “too attenuated and

19 remote.” City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco, LP, 39 F.4th 1101, 1111 (9th Cir.

20 2022).

21 Quinn alleges he is eligible for the ESR Benefit because of his employment

22 with SCE at SONGS from 1979 to 2009 and pursuant to SCE’s benefits plans for its

23 employees and retirees. (See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, 31.) Quinn asserts employment-based

24 claims for unpaid wages and age discrimination under FEHA (first cause of action),

25 California Labor Code (second cause of action), and PAGA (sixth cause of action).

26 (Id. ¶¶ 51, 60, 86.) Quinn also asserts an unfair business practices claim under

27 California Business and Professions Code section 17200 (seventh cause of action) for

28 failure to pay his wages. (Id. ¶ 90.) For these employment-based claims, his “place of

1 employment [i]s the significant factor in determining where [his] employment claims

2 arose under the federal enclave doctrine.” Abikar, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 1102 (citing

3 Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1459–60 (2009)); Kimber on behalf of

4 Cal. v. Sports Basement, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (finding

5 federal enclave jurisdiction over plaintiff’s employment claims by looking to “where

6 each aggrieved employee worked the most”). Accordingly, the pertinent events

7 giving rise to Quinn’s employment-based claims stem from conduct that occurred

8 where he worked—at SONGS.

9 Quinn argues that the injury he alleges did not occur at SONGS. Instead, he

10 contends that his alleged injury occurred after he retired and no longer worked at

11 SONGS, when Quinn lived in San Diego, California and SCE was headquartered in

12 Rosemead, California. (Opp’n MTD 11–12.) These arguments are unavailing.

13 Although Quinn alleges that the injury occurred in early 2023—when SCE cancelled

14 the ESR Benefit after he retired and no longer worked at SONGS—his employment

15 with SCE availed him to the ESR Benefit. Quinn refers to the ESR Benefit as

16 “wages” for “labor performed” under Labor Code section 200(a) and alleges he lost

17 these “unpaid wages” throughout the Complaint. (Compl. ¶¶61, 66, 86, 90.)

18 Assuming arguendo that the ESR Benefits are “wages” as Quinn contends, all

19 relevant labor for which such wages are owed occurred at SONGS. Therefore, the

20 pertinent and material events giving rise to his employment-based claims arose from

21 his work performed at SONGS because SCE provided the ESR Benefit, or “wages,”

22 only to its employees and retirees. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) The locus of the injury thus

23 occurred at SONGS notwithstanding Quinn’s argument that he was living in San

24 Diego, California when he learned SCE was terminating the ESR Benefit. See, e.g.,

25 Stiefel, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1147–48 (finding the locus of terminated employee’s FEHA

26 and Labor Code claims to be a federal enclave notwithstanding terminated employee’s

27 claim that he was at home when he learned that defendant refused to re-employ him).

28 That SCE made employment decisions—i.e., terminated the ESR Benefit—at its

1 headquarters also does not change the conclusion. See Abikar, 300 F. Supp. 3d

2 at 1102 (“Whether an employer made certain employment decisions outside of the

3 federal enclave is not pertinent to the applicability of the federal enclave doctrine.”);

4 see also Geib v. Jacobs Tech. Inc., No. 23-cv-00169-AMO, 2024 WL 4351867, at *4

5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024) (“The location where decisions concerning [the plaintiff’s]

6 employment were made does not alter the conclusion” that the plaintiff’s claims arose

7 on a federal enclave because “the decision reflects [d]efendant’s employment practice

8 on the enclave.”).

9 Based on the above, the Court finds the locus of Quinn’s first, second, sixth,

10 and seventh causes of action is SONGS. “Since these claims are subject to the federal

11 enclave doctrine, any of the claims based on state law enacted after” SONGS became

12 a federal enclave “are inapplicable in the federal enclave unless they come within a

13 reservation of jurisdiction by California or are adopted by Congress.” Stiefel, 497 F.

14 Supp. 2d at 1148. In contrast, “preexisting state law not inconsistent with federal

15 policy becomes federal law and remains in existence until altered by national

16 legislation.” Snow, 647 F. Supp. at 1521.

17 SCE moves to dismiss Quinn’s first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action

18 on the grounds that each cause of action is barred by federal law either because it is

19 inconsistent with state law, or because the state law was enacted after SONGS became

20 a federal enclave. (MTD 8–11.) In response, Quinn substantively opposes these

21 arguments only as to his second and sixth causes of action. (Opp’n MTD 12–13.)

22 a. First Cause of Action

23 In his first cause of action, Quinn asserts a claim for age discrimination in

24 violation of FEHA. (Compl. ¶¶ 50–58.) SCE argues that this cause of action is barred

25 because FEHA was enacted in 1980, after SONGS became a federal enclave.

26 (MTD 8–9.)

27 “FEHA was not enacted until 1980.” Stiefel, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. Quinn

28 does not oppose or even respond to this argument. (See generally Opp’n MTD.)

1 “Where a party fails to oppose arguments made in a motion, a court may find that the

2 party has conceded those arguments or otherwise consented to granting the motion.”

3 Star Fabrics, Inc. v. Ross Stores, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-05877-PA (PLAx), 2017 WL

4 10439691, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017). Accordingly, as Quinn’s age

5 discrimination claim is based on FEHA and he fails to oppose this argument, it is

6 barred by the federal enclave doctrine and fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the

7 Court DISMISSES Quinn’s first cause of action WITH PREJUDICE.

8 b. Second Cause of Action

9 In his second cause of action, Quinn seeks unpaid wages under Labor Code

10 section 200. (Compl. ¶¶ 59–67.) SCE argues that Labor Code section 200 is

11 inconsistent with the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and thus barred.

12 (MTD 9.) Quinn argues only that, since Labor Code section 200 was in effect before

13 SONGS became a federal enclave, it continues to operate as federal law; he does not

14 respond to SCE’s inconsistency argument. (Opp’n MTD 12–13.)

15 Congress permits state laws existing at time the federal enclave ceded to the

16 federal government to continue “except insofar as they are inconsistent with the laws

17 of the United States or with the governmental use for which the property was

18 acquired, unless they are abrogated by Congress, so that no area may be left without a

19 developed legal system for private rights.” Stiefel, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1147; see

20 County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 749 n.4 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[S]tate

21 law that previously governed the territory ‘remain[s] operative as federal law’ so long

22 as it is consistent with federal law.” (quoting Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124

23 (5th Cir. 1952)). Quinn fails to address whether Labor Code section 200 is

24 inconsistent with federal law. (See id.) As Quinn does not substantively oppose this

25 argument, he effectively concedes it. See Star Fabrics, 2017 WL 10439691, at *3.

26 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Quinn’s second cause of action WITH

27 PREJUDICE.

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1 c. Sixth Cause of Action

2 In his sixth cause of action, Quinn seeks civil penalties under PAGA. (Compl.

3 ¶¶ 84–87.) SCE argues that this cause of action is barred because PAGA was enacted

4 in 2004, after SONGS became a federal enclave. (MTD 9–10.)

5 PAGA was enacted in 2003 and became effective on January 1, 2004. Cal. Lab.

6 Code § 2698. Quinn does not dispute this. (See generally Opp’n MTD.) Rather, he

7 argues that PAGA is a “procedural device” for him to recover for violations of Labor

8 Code section 200 and is “not the substantive violation that [he] seeks to redress.” (Id.

9 at 14.) To the extent Quinn argues this is not a stand-alone cause of action, but one

10 derivative of his Labor Law cause of action, that cause of action is preempted as

11 described above. Quinn does not cite to any legal authority permitting a PAGA claim

12 to survive as a “procedural device” when challenged under the federal enclave

13 doctrine. In contrast, SEC provides several cases wherein courts dismissed PAGA

14 claims as a matter of law under the federal enclave doctrine. (MTD 9–10); see, e.g.,

15 Cabrales v. BAE Sys. S.D. Ship Repair, Inc., No. 21-cv-02122-AJB-DDL, 2023 WL

16 8458247, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2023) (granting summary judgment and finding

17 plaintiff’s PAGA claim inapplicable on the federal enclave because PAGA was

18 enacted after the federal government acquired the federal enclave); Geib, 2024 WL

19 4351867, at *7 (same). Quinn’s PAGA claim is thus barred by the federal enclave

20 doctrine. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Quinn’s sixth cause of action WITH

21 PREJUDICE.

22 d. Seventh Cause of Action

23 In his seventh cause of action, Quinn asserts a claim for unfair business

24 practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et

25 seq. (Compl. ¶¶ 88–99.) SCE argues that this cause of action is barred because

26 California Business and Professions Code section 17200 was enacted in 1977, after

27 SONGS became a federal enclave. (MTD 10); see Welch v. S. Cal. Edison, No. 8:08-

28 cv-00770-CJC (RNBx), 2008 WL 11411478, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2008)

1 || (dismissing plaintiff’s state law claim under California Business and Professions Code

2 || section 17200 as barred by the federal enclave doctrine). Quinn does not oppose this

3 || argument. (See generally Compl.) Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Quuinn’s

seventh cause of action WITH PREJUDICE.

5 3. Eighth Cause of Action

6 Based on the above, Quinn’s first through seventh causes of action are

7|| preempted by federal law and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to both

8 | Defendants. As Quinn’s remaining eighth cause of action for declaratory relief is

9 || derivative of the dismissed claims, the Court also DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE

10 || the eighth cause of action.

11] D. Conclusion

12 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS SCE’s MTD.

13 Vv. CONCLUSION

14 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Quinn’s Motion to

15 || Remand, (ECF No. 13), and GRANTS SCE’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 10). The

16 || Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall close

17 || the case.

18

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 □□

21 August 22, 2025 Ns.

Ye Chih

3 OTIS D. GHT, II

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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