CONCEPCION v. RUSSEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JORGE CONCEPCION, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-4479

:

KYLE A. RUSSELL, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, J. AUGUST 25, 2025

Jorge Concepcion, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Lehigh County Jail (“LCJ”),

brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of medical

and dental care at the facility and alleging retaliation. He also moved to proceed in forma

pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Concepcion leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his Complaint in part.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Public dockets reflect that Concepcion has been incarcerated at LCJ since April 17, 2025,

in connection with probation revocation proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Concepcion, No.

CP-39-CR-0003331-2020 (C.P. Lehigh). It appears that the probation violation relates to new

criminal charges recently filed against Concepcion in Montgomery County. Commonwealth v.

Concepcion, No. CP-46-CR-0002400-2025 (C.P. Montgomery). On July 10, 2025, Concepcion

pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas to one of those charges and

1 The following allegations are taken from the Complaint, documents attached to the Complaint,

and public dockets of which this Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch.

Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied to

the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

was sentenced to six months in jail. Id. He is awaiting his probation revocation hearing in

Lehigh County. In the present civil case, Concepcion names the following Defendants, all of

whom are employed at LCJ: (1) Warden Kyle A. Russell; (2) Deputy Warden of Security Robert

McFadden; (3) RN Snyder; (4) Grievance Investigator Cliff Knappenberger; (5) Director of

Nursing Vicky Brealey; (6) Assistant Director of Nursing Rhonda Gaetaniello; (7) RN Klein; (8)

David Kneal; and (9) Lt. Kowol. (Compl. at 1-2.) His constitutional claims can be grouped into

three general categories.

First, Concepcion alleges that two nurses at LCJ—RN Snyder and RN Klein—have been

denying him three prescribed blood pressure medication. At 1:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025, when

Concepcion “approached the medication cart to get [his] morning and noon medications,” RN

Snyder asked why he missed his morning dose. (Id. at 5.) Concepcion explained that he is

“partially deaf” and has tinnitus, suggesting that he often misses the call for medication due to

hearing problems, and that this is why he did not receive his morning medication. (Id. at 5, 11.)

RN Snyder allegedly “became bel[l]igerant and disrespectful” in response to Concepcion and

denied him three “vital blood pressure medications that are crucial to [his] health.” (Id. at 5.)

Concepcion alleges that this is the second time Snyder denied his medications despite being told

of his hearing problems. (Id.) He also experienced “the same identical issue” with RN Klein,

even though “every other RN simply gives [him his] meds with no problem.” (Id.)

In a grievance about the incident, which Concepcion attached as an exhibit to his

Complaint, he explained that the July 4 incident was one of one of “a couple of incidents”

relating to Concepcion’s non-receipt of his blood pressure medication, and the third time he “had

a confrontation with nurses over this issue.” (Compl. at 11.) The grievance, which Concepcion

notes was not his first addressing this issue, further explains that Concepcion occasionally misses

the call for medication because he does not have his hearing aids “and all [he] hear[s] is noise in

[his] head.” (Id.)

Concepcion “experienced tightness of chest, severe headache and anxiety attack” from

missing his blood pressure medication “as a result of Nurse Snyder and Nurse Klein’s

negligence.” (Id. at 6.) He notified an unidentified nurse, who told him to “fill out a sick call

request” but otherwise ignored his symptoms. (Id.) On or about July 11, 2025, Concepcion did

not receive his blood pressure medication for three days,2 causing him to be “rushed to medical

with a blood pressure reading of 180-100, tightness of chest, headache and panic attack and chest

pain.” (Id.) Concepcion attempted to address the issues with his medication by writing

“requests” and grievances to the “medical department” and Defendants Brealey and Gaetaniello

“to no avail.” (Id.) He also sent grievances to Defendant Knappenberger, the grievance

investigator, (id.), but claims his grievances were “frivolously and maliciously denied, rejected

or simply go missing,” (Id. at 4). Additionally, Concepcion’s fiancé “left numerous messages”

for Defendant Warden Russell, without receiving a response, and also tried discussing the matter

with other nurses or supervisors at LCJ, who stopped taking her calls. (Id. at 6.)

The second impetus for Concepcion’s claims is an interaction he had on July 8, 2025,

with Dr. Kneal, a dentist who was scheduled to extract Concepcion’s molar. (Id. at 7.) During

the appointment, Dr. Kneal told Concepcion to sit in the dental chair and anesthetized the

location where the surgery was going to occur. (Id.) Concepcion alleges he was “a bit

concerned because at no time did [the dentist] provide protective wear to absorb the saliva, blood

or [anesthesia] that was over flowing from [his] mouth” and, rather, instructed Concepcion to

2 It is unclear whether the three-day period to which Concepcion refers began on July 11 or

ended on that date. Either way, this would appear to be at least the fourth time Concepcion did

not receive his blood pressure medication.

swallow. (Id.) Concepcion describes this as “uncommon and unethical” and outside the relevant

standard of care. (Id.) When he asked about it, the dentist allegedly told him that he had “no

rights,” was in jail, and to do what he was told, or the dentist would not extract his tooth. (Id.)

Concepcion complied but “was angry and teared up.” (Id.) He claims that he “was sick with

nausea and vomiting for two days” after the procedure and was “traumatized” by this experience.

(Id.)

Third, Concepcion alleges he is being “targeted” by Defendant Kowol for “filing

grievances and [his] concerns about Mr. Kowol.” (Id. at 8.) In that regard, Concepcion alleges

that he has observed Kowol abuse his authority and notes that Kowol “has a number of pending

cases against him for excessive force.” (Id.) During the second week of June, Kowol allegedly

directed another correctional officer to enforce a “disciplinary action” against Concepcion. (Id.)

When Concepcion “went to Montgomery county” on July 9, 2025, he was told he could not bring

his bible or legal work. (Id.) When he returned to LCJ, he claims his “1983 complaint” and

other documents pertaining to that complaint were gone (it is unclear if Concepcion is referring

to a blank form or a completed complaint). (Id.) Concepcion also asserts that Kowol, Deputy

Warden McFadden, and Warden Russell “are no strangers to allegations of excessive force,

covering up for each other and civil suits against them.” (Id.) Concepcion filed a request on July

14, 2025, asking for another form complaint, and a notation on the request reflects that a “1983

form [was] provided” to him. (Id. at 10.)

Based on these allegations, Concepcion alleges that the Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his First Amendment rights.3 (Id. at 6, 7, 8.)

He seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages in unspecified amounts. (Id. at 5.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Concepcion leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.4 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted). At the screening stage, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the pro se

Complaint as true, draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and asks only whether

the complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v.

3 Concepcion also alleges that there is a “systemic problem at LCJ” and notes there is a

“significant racial disparity between officials and detainees.” (Compl. at 6 (cleaned up).) To the

extent Concepcion intended to pursue an Equal Protection claim based on this allegation, which

is not clear, he falls far short of stating a plausible claim. See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839

F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (to establish an equal protection violation, a prisoner must allege “that

he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment

was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class”);

Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining

that plaintiffs pursuing an equal protection claim must allege that they were purposefully

discriminated against, in that “they received different treatment from that received by other

individuals similarly situated.”).

4 However, as Concepcion is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the $350 filing fee in

installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by

Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Concepcion is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations

liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

Concepcion brings his constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution

and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To establish

individual liability in a § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged

constitutional violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each

individual defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[s]uits against high-

level government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.”

Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). A supervisor may be liable if he or she

“‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice

or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766

F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822

(2015). (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d

Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)). “[A] supervisor may [also] be personally liable under § 1983

if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as

the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional

conduct.” Id.

A. Claims Based on the Denial of Blood Pressure Medication

Concepcion claims his constitutional rights were violated when he was denied his blood

pressure medication on several occasions.5 To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to

provide medical treatment, a prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835

(1994). “A medical need is serious, . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834

F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). A prison official is not deliberately

indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a

prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary

medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving

needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.

1999). Allegations of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding proper medical

5 Regardless of whether Concepcion is considered pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner

during the relevant events, and thus whether the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment governs his

conditions claims, the standard is the same. See Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 F. App’x

132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[W]e agree with the District Court and find no reason to

apply a different standard here as we have applied the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in

cases involving prisoners, and pretrial detainees” (citations omitted)); Gagnon v. PBPP/DOC,

No. 24-6566, 2025 WL 209182, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2025) (“The standard under the

Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment for claims related to a prisoner’s medical needs

is essentially the same for purposes of the analysis.”).

treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d

218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

Concepcion has stated a basis for a claim against RN Snyder and RN Klein because he

alleges that they repeatedly withheld his blood pressure medication from him—on one occasion

for three days—causing him to be “rushed to medical with a blood pressure reading of 180-100,

tightness of chest, headache and panic attack and chest pain.” (Compl. at 5.) “[Withholding]

medication needed to control a prisoner’s blood pressure for no medical reason” may

demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103,

109 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Barner v. Mackie, No. 17-1608, 2017 WL 5633399, at *2 (6th Cir.

Nov. 2, 2017) (“Barner’s statements that he had high blood pressure, along with medications to

treat it, could lead one to reasonably infer that a physician diagnosed him as needing treatment

for high blood pressure—a serious medical need.”). Further, Concepcion alleges that he

repeatedly attempted to address this issue by filing requests and grievances with supervisory

staff, and having his fiancé reach out on his behalf, but that the Defendants whom they

contacted—Russell, Brealey, Gaetaniello, and Knappenberger—did not take action despite being

informed of the problem.6 Reading the Complaint liberally in a light most favorable to

6 Although Concepcion alleges that he or his fiancé contacted Defendants Russell, Brealey,

Gaetaniello, and Knappenberger to resolve the issues with the blood pressure medication, he

does not raise any specific allegations against Defendant McFadden, who is the Deputy Warden

of Security. Rather, he generally alleges that McFadden, along with the other Defendants, was

“either directly or indirectly deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs” and generally

“reject[ed] and denied grievances that were filed on 5-19-25 – 7-08-25 and several other

occasions.” (Compl. at 6.) Since these allegations are pled generally, Concepcion has not

adequately pled McFadden’s personal involvement in events related to his non-receipt of blood

pressure medication. Further, to the extent Concepcion is bringing claims against McFadden or

any other Defendant based solely on the grievance process, those claims are meritless because

issues pertaining to the grievance process itself do not translate to a constitutional violation. See,

e.g., Gerholt v. Wetzel, 858 F. App’x 32, 34 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[P]risoners do not

Concepcion, his allegations support an inference of deliberate indifference sufficient to survive

screening against those officials who allegedly took no action despite having been informed of

an ongoing problem with nurses failing to provide Concepcion with his blood pressure

medication. See Wiertella v. Lake Cnty., Ohio, 141 F.4th 775, 783 (6th Cir. 2025) (agreeing that

defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Eighth Amendment claim when they were

“were aware that [plaintiff] had been taking several essential medications for serious medical

conditions, and they knew that he did not have access to these medications in the Jail. Yet they

intentionally chose not to provide those medications in a timely manner”); Carter v. Broward

Cnty. Sheriff Off., 710 F. App’x 387, 391 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (vacating dismissal of

claim on screening where “[p]rison officials were subjectively aware of Carter’s serious medical

needs because he repeatedly complained about not receiving his medication on time or at all and

explained that he experienced chest pains and shortness of breath as a result. Carter’s allegations

also show that prison officials disregarded that risk by failing to ensure that his medication was

distributed as prescribed.”); King v. Busby, 162 F. App’x 669, 671 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)

(“King identified which defendants were responsible for the missed medication: he grieved

repeatedly to Chief Jailer Theresa Bonner, Chief Deputy Sheriff Robert Cooper, and Jail

Administrator Robert Harper about missed doses of his blood-pressure and pain medication.

These grievances tend to show that Bonner, Cooper, and Harper were aware of King’s missed

medication and may have failed to take corrective action because King continued to miss

medication doses.”); Haltiwanger v. Mobley, 230 F.3d 1363, 2000 WL 1371098, at *1 (8th Cir.

2000) (reversing the dismissal of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim where

have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures.” (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d

641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) and Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam))).

defendant Goldman “periodically refused” to give plaintiff his medication and two other officials

“failed to rectify this situation, despite [plaintiff’s] repeated grievances, in that Goldman

continued to deprive him of his medication”); Folks v. Danberg, No. 09-103, 2009 WL 1530170,

at *4 (D. Del. June 1, 2009) (prisoner who wrote to commissioner and warden about inadequate

care could proceed past screening because “in the present case Folks alleges that he is not

receiving any medical care and made that fact known” to those defendants).

B. Claims Based on Dental Visit

Concepcion’s claims based on his July 8, 2025 dental procedure are also governed by the

standards for deliberate indifference to medical needs claims. “[P]rison authorities are accorded

considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991

F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993). Where a prisoner is afforded inadequate care, the distinction between

medical negligence and deliberate indifference often turns on the provider’s intent, i.e., whether

the inadequacy resulted from an error in professional judgment or whether another motive drove

the treatment decision. Id. at 69; see also Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 541 (3d

Cir. 2017) (finding a basis for deliberate indifference where nurse not only deviated from the

standard of care but “repeatedly ignored [plaintiff’s] requests for treatment based on non-medical

reasons,” which suggested a non-medical motive and a “pattern of disinterested conduct”). To

plead deliberate indifference in the course of a medical or dental procedure, a plaintiff generally

must allege that the defendant “maliciously intended to cause [the plaintiff] pain or otherwise

performed the procedure in a way that he knew would create a substantial risk of complications.”

McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 2010). Additionally, “[n]eedless suffering

resulting from the denial of simple medical care, which does not serve any penological purpose,

violates the Eighth Amendment.” Talbert v. Corr. Dental Assocs., 731 F. App’x 145, 150 (3d

Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003)).

Concepcion alleges that Dr. Kneal performed the molar extraction in a manner that

deviated from the standard of care by directing him to swallow blood, saliva, and anesthesia.

When Concepcion objected, Dr. Kneal allegedly told him that he had “no rights” because he was

“in jail,” and that he had to swallow if he wanted the dentist to perform the procedure. (Compl.

at 7.) Concepcion reluctantly complied and for two days thereafter experienced nausea and

vomiting. Deliberate indifference is a high threshold and is hard to establish in the context of a

tooth extraction, but such claims have been permitted to proceed past screening when the

procedure greatly deviated from the standard of care, the treatment decisions were not grounded

in medical judgment, and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result. Compare King v. United States,

536 F. App’x 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding, in affirming dismissal of a deliberate

indifference claim at screening over dissent, that the “failure to take common-sense steps before

performing the procedure” to prevent unnecessary dental procedure on incorrect inmate who

“tried to inform” staff of error did not “rise to the level of deliberate indifference.”); McGowan,

612 F.3d at 641 (affirming dismissal of claim against dentist on screening where plaintiff alleged

that he saw the dentist use “something that looked to him like an ice pick” to dig splinters of

fractured tooth from his gums, but reversing as to claims predicated on delay of treatment for

complications from surgery); Gillespie v. Hogan, 182 F. App’x 103, 105 (3d Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (dismissing appeal as baseless where plaintiff brought deliberate indifference claim

against dentist who left behind fragments of plaintiff’s tooth and failed to take his medical

history prior to the procedure); Finnegan v. Maire, 405 F.3d 694, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam) (affirming dismissal of deliberate indifference claim at screening over dissent, where

plaintiff alleged the defendant who extracted his tooth “was not qualified as an oral surgeon, that

he failed to recognize he had punctured an artery, and that, despite [plaintiff’s] extensive

bleeding, [the defendant] merely sutured and covered the area where he had removed two teeth”

even though he provided medical attention after the procedure); Carter v. Sims, No. 10-2596,

2012 WL 2863424, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012) (“At most, a botched tooth extraction is ‘only

negligence, perhaps gross negligence,’ because there is nothing in the record ‘suggesting that

[the dentist] maliciously intended to cause [the plaintiff] pain or otherwise performed the

procedure in a way that he knew would create a substantial risk of complications.’” (quoting

McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640)) with Echols v. Craig, 855 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Nothing

at this [screening] stage conclusively rebuts Echols’ plausible allegation that suturing the drill bit

and gauze into his mouth was far afield of accepted professional medical standards or the

inference that it was so far afield that a jury might infer the action was not merely negligent,

which would not violate the Eighth Amendment, but reflected deliberate indifference, which

would”); Gaffney v. Perelmuter, No. 16-3196, 2017 WL 4127922, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 2017)

(vacating dismissal of deliberate indifference claim against a dentist on screening based on a

botched tooth extraction); Szemple v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 451 F. App’x 187, 191

(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal of deliberate indifference claims on screening

where plaintiff alleged that doctor performed tooth extraction without sedation despite knowing

of plaintiff’s heart condition causing plaintiff’s “heart rate to increase, chest pains, and shortness

of breath,” continued with the procedure despite plaintiff’s complaints of pain and profuse

bleeding, and discharged plaintiff while he was still bleeding). Given Concepcion’s allegation

that he was needlessly subjected to harm (i.e., two days of nausea and vomiting) when the doctor

deviated from the standard of care, it is at least arguable that Concepcion has alleged sufficient

factual matter to raise an inference of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, at this early stage of

the case, the Court will permit this claim to proceed past screening.7

C. First Amendment Claims

The Court understands Concepcion to be bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim

against Defendant Kowol for “targeting” him. (Compl. at 8.) To state a plausible First

Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally

protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct

was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d

330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). A prisoner’s filing of a lawsuit or grievance constitutes constitutionally

protected conduct. See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. Horn,

318 F.3d 523, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2003). “An adverse consequence ‘need not be great in order to be

actionable[;]’ rather, it need only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting

McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing placed in

lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued misconduct charges are more

than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68, 70 (3d Cir.

2020) (per curiam) (quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at 170). The timing of the allegedly retaliatory

behavior relative to the constitutionally protected conduct can establish a causal link between the

7 There is no basis for Concepcion to proceed against any other Defendant in connection with

this claim, even those who may have been involved in handling his grievances about the

extraction after it occurred. See Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per

curiam) (“The District Court properly determined that Defendants . . . who participated only in

the denial of [the plaintiff]’s grievances – lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the

conduct at issue].”); Folk v. Prime Care Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam)

(“Although some of these defendants were apparently involved in responding to some of [the

plaintiff]’s prison grievances, there are no allegations linking them to the underlying incidents

and thus no basis for liability based on those later grievance reviews.”).

two. See Watson, 834 F.3d at 422. “To establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff

usually must prove either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected

activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to

establish a causal link.” Ruttle v. Brady, No. 22-3000, 2023 WL 5554648, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug.

29, 2023) (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Concepcion’s allegations are far too vague and generalized to state a retaliation claim

against Kowol or any other Defendant for several reasons. Concepcion alleges that he filed

grievances about Kowol, but he does not provide any details about when he filed those

grievances, what specific conduct they concerned, and whether Kowol (or any other Defendant)

was aware of those grievances. (Compl. at 8.) He adds that excessive force cases have been

filed against Kowol, but he does not claim that he filed or plans to file an excessive force case

against Kowol. To the extent Kowol directed enforcement of an unspecified “disciplinary

action” against Concepcion, (id.), there are no specific facts linking this incident with

Concepcion’s grievances or any other protected conduct. See Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180,

195 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Absent supporting facts that make it reasonable to draw an inference of

retaliation, these conclusory assertions of a cause-and-effect relationship between specific

protected activities and a later adverse action are insufficient to plead causation.”). Similarly,

Concepcion has not linked his allegation that his “1983 complaint and other documents

pertaining to [his complaint] disappeared,” (Compl. at 8), with his filing of grievances or other

protected conduct in a manner suggestive of a retaliatory motive. Indeed, it is not clear that any

of the named Defendants were actually responsible or somehow involved with the missing form

since Concepcion relies exclusively on conclusory speculation that Defendants Kowol,

McFadden and Warden “cover[] up for each other” to allege their involvement. (Id.) In sum,

Concepcion’s allegations fall far short of stating a plausible retaliation claim against any of the

Defendants.8 See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that legal conclusions and

“unadorned, the-defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are insufficient to state a

claim). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Concepcion’s First Amendment claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Concepcion leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, permit him to proceed on his deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Kneal and his

deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Snyder, Klein, Russell, Knappenberger,

Brealey, and Gaetaniello pertaining to his blood pressure medication. The Court will dismiss the

balance of the Complaint without prejudice. Concepcion will be given an option to either

proceed on his remaining deliberate indifference claims or to file an amended complaint if he

seeks to amend his dismissed claims. If he files an amended complaint, he must reassert all

claims upon which he seeks to proceed, including any claims that have not been dismissed,

because an amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint and becomes the governing

pleading in the case that dictates the contours of the claims at issue. Garrett v. Wexford Health,

938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). An appropriate Order follows, which provides further

instructions as to Concepcion’s options for proceeding.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Michael M. Baylson

__________________________________________

MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.

8 To the extent the Complaint can be understood to assert a claim for denial of access to the

courts based on the missing “1983 complaint,” (Compl. at 8), that claim also fails because

Concepcion has not described any actual injury—i.e., the loss of a nonfrivolous underlying

claim—that he suffered due to the loss of this and related documents, nor has he alleged the

absence of any other remedy apart from a denial of access suit. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536

U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).