The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRADLEY JOSEPH LAWRENCE SAVOY CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 25-660
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL. SECTION: “A” (3)
ORDER
The plaintiff, Bradley Joseph Lawrence Savoy, filed this lawsuit in proper person
claiming that he has endured repeated violations of his constitutional rights through the
nonconsensual administration of psychotropic medication.1 On August 15, 2025, this
civil action was reassigned when the previous district judge recused herself. (Rec. Doc.
64). Eighteen motions were pending when the Court received the case and fifteen of
those motions were filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has filed four additional motions so twenty-
two motions are now pending.
The first incident is alleged to have occurred in September 2024 when Plaintiff
sought assistance at Tulane Hospital. He was mocked so he refused treatment and left
the building to head to an RTA bus stop. At the bus stop the Tulane University Police
detained him where with the assistance of EMS and Acadian Ambulance he was
injected against his will and transported to UMC where he was later released. (Rec.
Doc. 51, Amended Complaint ¶ 3(a)). Plaintiff complains that RTA staff should have
1 Plaintiff currently resides in transition housing in Locust Grove, Oklahoma. Plaintiff advises
that he was a resident of New Orleans at the time of the incidents giving rise to his lawsuit.
The record contains a copy of a mental health order entered in response to a 2021
criminal charge against Plaintiff in Oklahoma. Plaintiff was examined by a doctor and found
to be incompetent and mentally ill and in need of treatment. (Rec. Doc. 26-1). The charge in
that case was assault and/or battery on an emergency medical technician and assault with
a dangerous weapon.
intervened to protect his rights and having failed to do so bears responsibility under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶ 3(f)).
The second incident is alleged to have occurred on January 2, 2025, when a
private security guard near Bourbon Street falsely accused Plaintiff of praising the
Bourbon Street terrorist attack. Plaintiff was detained by NOPD, handcuffed, and
transported to UMC, where he was undressed by two women while two men watched.
Plaintiff alleges that he was held for several days without consent. (Amended Complaint
¶ 3(c)).
Then in February 2025, Plaintiff alleges that he had gone to his storage unit
where he was approached by NOPD. He asked for Narcan due to possible poisoning
but he was mocked by EMS and denied care. Even though Plaintiff was clear in that he
refused treatment, Tulane PD forcibly held him down while a hospital nurse
administered an unwanted injection. (Id. ¶ 3(d)).
Finally about 9 months ago, a family member drove Plaintiff to Ochsner Baptist
where the staff mocked him, undressed him, and injected him. A CT scan of his brain
was conducted even though he had presented for diarrhea.2 (Id. ¶ 3(e)).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts three claims: 1.) violation of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, 2.) medical battery, and 3.) negligence.
2 The foregoing allegations are taken from Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which is the
subject of a pending motion for leave to file (Rec. Doc. 51). The original complaint contains
only vague allegations of non-consensual medical treatment (injection of psychotropic
medication) at unspecified times between 2024 and January 2025, by various unspecified
medical professionals assisted by various unspecified law enforcement officers and/or
security personnel who allegedly restrained the plaintiff.
Defendants University Medical Center (“UMC”) and LCMC Health Emergency
Care Downtown, improperly named as Tulane University Hospital (“LCMCHEC”), have
filed a meritorious motion to dismiss all state law claims asserted against them.
Defendants point out that the state law claims are premature given that Plaintiff’s claims
of medical battery and negligence sound in medical malpractice yet Plaintiff did not first
present his claims to a medical review panel as required under Louisiana law. La. R.S.
§ 40:1231.8, et seq. Thus, the state law claims against these defendants must be
dismissed without prejudice.
Further, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against these defendants is not viable because
the conduct by the moving defendants does not involve state action, which is a
necessary component of a § 1983 claim. See White v. City of New Orleans, No. 19-
11911, 2020 WL 2844845, at *6 (E.D. La. May 29, 2020) (Vitter, C.J.). Thus, the federal
claims against these defendants must be dismissed with prejudice.3
Defendant Ochsner Clinic Foundation, improperly named in the complaint as
Ochsner Hospital, has filed a meritorious motion to dismiss all state law claims asserted
against Ochsner. Ochsner points out that the state law claims are premature given that
Plaintiff’s claims of medical battery and negligence sound in medical malpractice yet
Plaintiff did not first present his claims to a medical review panel as required under
Louisiana law. La. R.S. § 40:1231.8, et seq. Thus, the state law claims against this
defendant must be dismissed without prejudice.
Further, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against this defendant is not viable because the
conduct by the moving defendant does not involve state action, which is a necessary
3 The Court notes that any attempt to amend the complaint to restate the claims against the
moving defendants would be futile.
component of a § 1983 claim. See White v. City of New Orleans, No. 19-11911, 2020
WL 2844845, at *6 (E.D. La. May 29, 2020) (Vitter, C.J.). Thus, the federal claims
against this defendant must be dismissed with prejudice.4
Defendant the City of New Orleans has filed a meritorious motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the City. Under federal law, a municipality cannot be
held liable for a civil rights violation simply because it employs a tortfeasor. Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Instead, a plaintiff
seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must identify a municipal
policy or custom that was the cause of his injury. Bd. of County Commr’s v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480-81 (1986); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). Locating a
“policy” ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting
from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts
may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a “custom” that has not been formally approved
by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the
theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law. Id. (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91).
It is not enough, however, for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct
properly attributable to the municipality. Id. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that
4 The Court notes that any attempt to amend the complaint to restate the claims against the
moving defendants would be futile. For the same reason, an opposition memorandum
would have made no difference to the outcome of Ochsner’s motion to dismiss. The Court
makes this point because Ochsner’s motion has a scheduled submission date of September
3, 2025.
through its deliberate conduct the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury
alleged. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the
municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of
federal rights. Id.
Plaintiff alleges no facts from which an inference may be made the City has
adopted a policy that its police officers participate in the non-consensual administration
of medications. Under federal law the City is not vicariously liable for the acts of its
police officers. Thus, the federal claims against the City of New Orleans must be
dismissed with prejudice.5 The City may however be liable under state law for the state
law torts of its employees.
On July 25, 2025, the magistrate judge entered a Report and Recommendation
addressing Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Rec. Doc. 18). The magistrate
judge recommended that the motion be denied. (Rec. Doc. 32). The Court agrees and
denies the motion.
Plaintiff has filed three motions to stay this matter while he gathers his resources
to pursue litigation. The Court will grant those motions. The litany of motions that the
plaintiff has pending will be dismissed as premature.
Accordingly and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 14) filed by University
Medical Center and LCMC Health Emergency Care Downtown, improperly named as
5 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint contains no new allegations
to support the existence of a policy for purposes of a Monell claim.
Tulane University Hospital, is GRANTED. The state law claims are dismissed without
prejudice and the federal claims are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 46) filed by
Ochsner Clinic Foundation, improperly named in the complaint as Ochsner Hospital, is
GRANTED. The state law claims are dismissed without prejudice and the federal claims
are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by
the City of New Orleans and the New Orleans Police Department is GRANTED IN
PART insofar as the federal claims against the City of New Orleans are dismissed with
prejudice. The motion is DENIED as to the state law claims against the City of New
Orleans. All claims against the New Orleans Police Department are dismissed with
prejudice.6
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court, having considered the pleadings, the
record, the applicable law, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge, hereby approves the Report and Recommendation of the United
States Magistrate Judge (Rec. Doc. 32) and adopts it as its opinion in this matter. The
plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Rec. Doc. 18) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions to Stay (Rec. Docs. 67, 68, 69)
filed by the plaintiff are DENIED insofar as the Court has determined that the stay
should not apply to the meritorious motions to dismiss that have been addressed above.
6 In the CM/ECF system the City’s motion to dismiss included the New Orleans Police
Department as a movant but the motion itself does not mention the New Orleans Police
Department. Nonetheless, it is well recognized that as a matter of law the New Orleans
Police Department is not a juridical entity capable of being sued. Winn v. City of New
Orleans, 919 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. La. 2013) (citing cases).
The motion is GRANTED as to the remaining aspects of the case. The Clerk of Court is
instructed to administratively close this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's pending motions (Rec. Docs. 25 31
37 41 42 48 49 51 57 58 60 61 65 66 71 74) are DISMISSED as premature.
August 22, 2025
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UNITE ATES JUDGE
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