Parrish v. Muldrow

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Donte Darrell Parrish CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-00670

Plaintiff,

(Judge Munley)

v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)

Mike Muldrow, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

Donte Darrell Parrish, a pro se incarcerated plaintiff, brought suit against

Mike Muldrow, who Plaintiff identified as “York City Chief of Commissioner,”1

Jennifer Clancy, a magisterial district judge in York County, and the York County

Municipality. While the Complaint is not a model of clarity, it appears that Parrish

was charged with an array of offenses including multiple firearms charges. He was

arraigned on April 19, 2022, and denied bail. He claims that Commissioner

Muldrow had a conversation with Judge Clancy prior to arraignment, and that this

call influenced her decision to deny him bail. Parrish now brings suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws. Plaintiff also includes an Equal Protection

1 Per the Defense’s Motion, his actual title is Commissioner of the York City Police

Department.

Claim, asserting that York County has a habit of holding Black inmates while other

inmates receive bail. Because the Defendants are entitled to their respective

immunities and Plaintiff has failed to state any viable claims, it will be

recommended that both Defendant Clancy and Defendant Muldrow’s Motions to

Dismiss be GRANTED.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this case on April 18, 2024, by filing a pro se Complaint

against Defendants Mike Muldrow, Jennifer Clancy, and York County2

Municipality. (Doc. 1). In that Complaint, Plaintiff details his grievances that stem

from his Arraignment on April 19, 2022. A letter requesting to proceed in forma

pauperis was initially filed on April 18, 2024 (Doc. 2), however, as it was not the

correct in forma pauperis form, Plaintiff was given thirty days to pay the filing fee

or file a correct, signed application. (Doc. 4). Plaintiff subsequently filed the

certified motion on May 6, 2024 (Doc. 5), which Magistrate Judge Arbuckle

granted by order May 28, 2024, deeming the Complaint filed. (Doc. 7).3

2 It appears from the docket that Defendant York County has not been served. By

separate order, we have directed service upon this Defendant.

3 The case was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Arbuckle to Magistrate Judge

Caraballo on February 13, 2025. A consent form was sent to all parties on April 15,

2025 (Doc. 34); however, the deadlines terminated without parties returning the

form. Therefore, the case was reassigned to Judge Munley on May 19, 2025, and

Defendants are proceeding separately from each other. On September 13,

2024, Defendant Clancy filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 22)

along with a brief in support of that motion. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff filed his brief in

opposition on September 30, 2024 (Doc. 26), and Defendant Clancy replied with

her own brief on October 15, 2024. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff filed a sur-reply brief on

November 21, 2024, without seeking leave of court. (Doc. 32).

On September 16, 2024, Defendant Muldrow filed a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 25) along with a brief in

support of that motion on September 30, 2024. (Doc. 28). Plaintiff filed his brief in

opposition on October 2, 2024 (Doc. 29), and Defendant Muldrow filed a reply on

October 16, 2024. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff filed a sur-reply brief on November 21,

2024, again without seeking leave of court. (Doc. 33).

On May 22, 2025, Judge Caraballo filed an Order directing that Plaintiff’s

sur-replies be stricken as they were filed without Plaintiff seeking leave of court

pursuant to Local Rule 7.7. In response, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File

Sur-Replies on June 6, 2026 (Doc. 37), which was granted by undersigned on June

referred to Judge Caraballo. The case was thereafter referred to the undersigned on

June 10, 2025.

16, 2025. (Doc. 38). Plaintiff’s sur-replies were accepted as filed. The Motions to

Dismiss are ripe for disposition.

III. Background

This case began when Plaintiff was brought before York County Magisterial

District Judge Jennifer Clancy for Arraignment on April 19, 2022, facing charges

of: 1) Prohibited Possession of a Firearm; 2) Aggravated Assault; 3) Receiving

Stolen Property; 4) Carrying a Firearm Without License; 5) Simple Assault; 6)

Recklessly Endangering Another Person; 7) Strangulation; 8) Driving Under the

Influence; 9) Driving While Operating Privileges Suspended or Revoked; 10)

Accident with Damage to Unattended Vehicle or Property; and 11) Failure to

Notify Police of Accident or Damage to Vehicle. (Doc. 23, p. 2). At this initial

hearing, Plaintiff was denied bail. He inquired as to why bail was not set, and the

Judge allegedly told him that it was “because [Commissioner] Mike Muldrow

called down to the station and told them [Parrish] was a threat to the community.”

(Doc. 1, p. 2).

Plaintiff asserts that his rights were violated when he was denied bail

without proper evidence presented or procedure followed. He also avers that he has

noticed a pattern in the York County legal system where Black arrestees are

consistently denied bail while their non-Black counterparts, sometimes charged

with more serious crimes, are granted bail. Plaintiff therefore brings legal claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his due process rights, civil

conspiracy to deny due process, violation of his equal protection rights, and,

although not explicitly stated, violation of his Eighth Amendment right to bail.

(Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff also brings state law claims of negligence and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 29, ¶ 11). He requests unspecified monetary

damages and does not request injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, p. 3).

Defendant Clancy, represented by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania

Courts, filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) and supporting brief. (Doc. 23). The

Brief argues four reasons why the claims against Defendant Clancy should be

dismissed: (1) The Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as it fails to state a claim and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) as

the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the claims are barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity; (3) the claims are barred by judicial immunity; and (4) the

tort claims are subject to state law immunity. Plaintiff responded with a Brief in

Opposition (Doc. 26) and asserts that Defendant Clancy is not entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity because York County has received federal funding—which

he incorrectly believes abrogates immunity for § 1983 claims—and that Defendant

Clancy was also not entitled to judicial immunity, as she lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction, and the denial of bail was a non-judicial act.

Defendant Muldrow filed his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

(Doc. 25) and supporting brief. (Doc. 29). Muldrow presents numerous arguments

in his initial brief coupled with his reply brief: (1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

and Due Process claims fail; (2) Plaintiff’s negligence claim fails; (3) Plaintiff fails

to plead a § 1983 conspiracy against Defendant Muldrow; (4) Plaintiff’s Equal

Protection claim fails; (5) Defendant Muldrow is entitled to qualified immunity;

and (6) Defendant Muldrow is entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania

Political Subdivision Torts Claims Act. Plaintiff responded with a Brief in

Opposition on October 2, 2024. (Doc. 29). Both Motions to Dismiss have been

fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

IV. Standard of Review

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the proper mechanism to raise Eleventh

Amendment immunity as a bar to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Blanciak v.

Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d

67 (1984)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction when challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). See Kehr Packages, Inc.

v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991).

A defendant may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in

one of two fashions: it may attack the complaint on its face or it may attack the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, relying on evidence beyond the

pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.

2000); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.

1977). A district court must first determine, therefore, whether a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion presents a “facial” attack or a “factual” attack on the claim at issue, because

that distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed. In re Schering

Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d

at 891).

Where a defendant attacks a complaint as deficient on its face, “the court

must consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at

891. “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court may only consider the

allegations contained in the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint;

matters of public record such as court records, letter decisions of government

agencies and published reports of administrative bodies; and ‘undisputably

authentic’ documents which the plaintiff has identified as a basis of his claims and

which the defendant has attached as exhibits to his motion to dismiss.” Medici v.

Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2344, 2010 WL 1006917, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 16, 2010). However, when a motion to dismiss attacks the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction in fact, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

plaintiff's allegations,” and “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy

itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at

891.

Here, the Defense make a facial attack, as they “assert they are immune from

Plaintiff’s claims as pled.” Hicks v. NJ Dep’t of Corr., No. CV 16-0927, 2017 WL

168917, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2017); Garcia v. Knapp, No. 219CV17946, 2020

WL 2786930, at *4 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020) (“Defendants, by asserting Eleventh

Amendment immunity, raise a facial 12(b)(1) challenge. In so doing, Defendants

do not necessarily dispute the facts asserted by [Plaintiff], but rather rely on

immunity that the claims asserted bar this Court from jurisdiction.”). Therefore,

only the allegations in the Complaint and any documents referenced therein will be

considered, and any inferences will be construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a claim must

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requires the Plaintiff to put forth

evidence that, “when taken as true, suggest[s] the required elements of a particular

legal theory.” McNeilly v. City of Pittsburgh, 40 F.Supp.3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa.

2014). The Plaintiff must state “sufficient factual allegations which ‘nudge’ its

claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). The

purpose is to ensure “fair notice of the factual basis of a claim while raising a

‘reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary

element.’” Id. at 651.

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to

move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This means that a complaint may be dismissed if

it does not present sufficient facts to support a plausible claim: “Under Rule

12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren

Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929

(2007)).

The court must accept both the Plaintiff’s allegations and any reasonable

inferences that can be drawn as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).

However, it need not accept “‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted

inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Morrow v.

Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d

187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Reciting the elements that make up a cause of action and

supporting them with “mere conclusory statements” is insufficient to give those

statements the presumption of truth. McNeilly, 40 F.Supp.3d at 650 (citing Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937).

When faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court should

conduct a two-part analysis: (1) separate the factual and legal elements of a claim;

and (2) “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show

that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.” Id. (internal citation removed).

The court may consider facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as

“documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a

court may take judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551

U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). This analysis requires the

court to look at the claims on a case-by-case basis and rely both “on its judicial

experience and common sense.” McNeilly, 40 F.Supp.3d at 650. The court will not

be reaching legal conclusions, but instead is merely determining “whether the

plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence in support of the allegations.” Id.

(citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Furthermore, a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held

to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only

be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support a viable claim for relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520–21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

V. Discussion

We first address Defendant Clancy’s argument that the Complaint should be

dismissed because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity

and then her argument that she is shielded from suit by judicial immunity. Next, we

consider Defendant Muldrow’s arguments for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), based upon qualified immunity. Lastly, we will consider Plaintiff’s state

law claims against both Defendants Clancy and Muldrow.

A. Defendant Clancy is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity or,

Alternatively, Judicial Immunity

It is unclear whether Plaintiff is proceeding against Defendant Clancy in her

individual or official capacity. (See generally, Doc. 1). Defendant Clancy argues

that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed based upon Eleventh Amendment

immunity, which applies only to claims against state officials sued in their official

capacity. (Doc. 23, pp. 6–8). Alternatively, she argues that the claims should be

dismissed based upon judicial immunity, which applies only to claims against state

officials sued in their individual capacity. (Id. at 8–9). Each defense will be

considered in turn.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

A claim against a defendant who is a state official, being sued in their

official capacity for monetary damages, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27, 112 S. Ct. 358, 362, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1991). The

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes private

individuals from bringing suit against a state in federal court. U.S. Const. amend.

XI; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct.

900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). Such immunity may also extend to suits brought

against “arms of a state.” Patterson v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 915 F.3d

945, 950 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512–13 (3d

Cir. 2018)); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Edu. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280,

97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (same). A party is considered an “arm of the

state” for immunity purposes “when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in

interest.’” Patterson, 915 F.3d at 950 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of

Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945), overruled

on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,

623, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002)).

Eleventh Amendment immunity “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives

federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction,” and may be properly considered by

way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir.

1996). “This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought,”

including suits brought by plaintiffs in equity. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100 (citing

Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27, 54 S. Ct. 18, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933)).

However, Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute. There are three

narrow exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: “1) congressional

abrogation, 2) state waiver, and 3) suits against individual state officers for

prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.” MCI Telecomm.

Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The third exception

is referred to as the Ex parte Young doctrine and applies to suits for prospective

declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers, sued in their official

capacities, to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law. See MCI

Telecommunications Corp., 271 F.3d at 507. “[A] suit against a state officer

seeking prospective relief designed to end a continuing violation of federal law is

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the theory that the action is not

against the state because the alleged violation of federal law strips the officer of his

official authority.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310,

323 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60; Pennhurst, 465

U.S. at 103).

With respect to claims brought pursuant to § 1983, where a suit is brought

against a person in their official capacity, it is not seen as a suit against that person,

“but rather [as] a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Essentially, the official “assume[s] the identity of

the government that employs them.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27. For this reason, courts

have held that suits against state officials in their official capacity will be treated as

suits against the state itself. Id. Therefore, while state officials are, of course, literal

people, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are

‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

“[T]he state courts that comprise Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system,

including the courts of common pleas, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity.” Harr v. Buczak, No. CV 21-1555, 2024 WL 4064139, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

Sept. 5, 2024) (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240–41 (3d

Cir. 2005)). Magisterial judges fall within this judicial system. Bradley v. Sayre,

No. 23-2854, 2024 WL 489281, at *1–2 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2024) (finding immune a

magistrate judge who had issued an arrest warrant, accepted a criminal complaint,

held the arraignment proceeding, and set bail). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment

immunity will apply to Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Clancy unless one of the

three exceptions—congressional abrogation, state waiver, or suits against state

officials for injunctive and declaratory relief for an ongoing violation of federal

law—apply. See MCI Telecommunications Corp., 271 F.3d at 503.

“Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit

in federal court, and Congress has not abrogated this immunity in enacting 42

U.S.C. § 1983.” Harr, 2024 WL 4064139, at *4 (citing Conklin v. Anthou, 495 F.

App’x 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2012); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b)). Thus, the first two

exceptions are inapplicable. Additionally, Plaintiff is seeking “monetary damages”

(Doc. 1, p. 3), so the Ex parte Young doctrine likewise does not apply. Judge

Clancy, being sued under § 1983 in her official capacity for monetary claims, is

shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Plaintiff asserts that York County has received “federal funding to build the

new local courthouse and it’s [sic] York County Drug Task Force which is made up

of state, federal and local officers recieve [sic] federal funding.” (Doc. 26, p. 2). He

further asserts that states lose their immunity “when they accept federal funding

under the Rehabilitation Act and others.” (Id.). However, Plaintiff has not sued

Defendants under the Rehabilitation Act, but rather under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—

which is the correct avenue for pursuing claims of federal civil rights violations.

Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27–28. As the Defense notes, it is therefore not relevant for

purposes of § 1983 whether York County did, in fact, receive federal funding. See

Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.

Further, Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity via § 1983.”).

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to maintain a claim against Defendant

Clancy in her official capacity, Defendant Clancy is shielded by Eleventh

Amendment Immunity.4

2. Judicial Immunity

Unlike state officials sued in their official capacity, state officials who are

sued in their individual capacities are considered persons within the meaning of §

1983, and “come to court as individuals.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31, 27. Accordingly,

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not shield state actors sued in their individual

4 To the extent Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 1983 are dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s pendent state tort claims must be dismissed as well unless

there is an affirmative justification for maintaining jurisdiction over those claims.

See Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2012) (“where

the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before

trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless

considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties

provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”). No such justification exists

here. In any event, even if such justification existed, as set forth infra, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for negligence or

intentional infliction of emotional distress and so, both claims are subject to

dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

capacity. See Adams v. Dep’t of Corr., 348 F.R.D. 410, 418 (M.D. Pa. 2025)

(Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies, state departments, and

state officials sued in their official capacity, but not to state officials sued in

individual capacity).

For a plaintiff to establish personal liability under § 1983, he or she must

“show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a

federal right.” Id. at 25 (internal quotation and citation removed). And because a

defendant is being sued in their individual, rather than official capacity, he or she

may assert immunity defenses. Id.

Taking Plaintiff’s suit against Judge Clancy as one against her in an

individual capacity, she may – and has – asserted a judicial immunity defense.

(Doc. 23, p. 8). In short, there is long-standing precedent indicating that judges are

immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages from their

judicial acts. Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir.

2000) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 287, 116 L.Ed.2d 9

(1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–27, 108 S. Ct. 538, 543–44, 98

L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56, 98 S. Ct. 1099,

1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Judges handle complicated cases with complex and

polarizing issues: without judicial immunity, courts would anticipate an “avalanche

of suits” and that it may lead to judges shying away from difficult rulings, which

would “detract from independent and impartial adjudication.” Id. (quoting

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226–27). If a judge committed procedural mistakes,

exceeded his or her authority, or even acted maliciously, there is nevertheless

absolute immunity from liability for judicial acts. Id. at 769, 771.

As both the Plaintiff and Defense’s briefs correctly indicate, there are two

circumstances in which a plaintiff can overcome judicial immunity. First, immunity

will be overcome if the challenged action was a nonjudicial act, that is, one taken

outside of the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Forrester,

484 U.S. at 227–29; Stump, 435 U.S. at 360). In determining whether an act is

“judicial,” there are two factors to consider: (1) the nature of the act, namely

whether it is a type of function that a judge usually performs, and (2) the

expectations of the parties, that is, whether they interacted with the judge in his or

her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S at 362.

The second way in which judicial immunity can be overcome is if the act

was judicial in nature, but “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. If immunity is subject to a jurisdictional challenge, “the

scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly.” Stump, 435 U.S. at

356. In Stump v. Sparkman, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a state

judge had acted outside of his jurisdiction because he had failed “to comply with

elementary principles of procedural due process.” Id. at 359. On appeal, the U.S.

Supreme Court explained that this ruling “misconceive[d] the doctrine of judicial

immunity”, and that the judge—despite “the commission of grave procedural

errors” which resulted in a young woman being sterilized without her knowledge

or consent—was nevertheless entitled to absolute immunity from liability for his

judicial act. Id. at 359–60.

Plaintiff argues that judicial immunity does not apply to Judge Clancy’s act

of denying him bail on April 19, 2022, and that both grounds for overcoming

judicial immunity apply. First, Plaintiff argues that the denial of bail was a

nonjudicial act because the conversation between Judge Clancy and Commissioner

Muldrow took place prior to his arraignment: he asserts that “Clancy[’s] judicial

capacity started once the arraignment process started,” (Doc. 32, p. 1), and the fact

that the conversation was pre-arraignment rendered it administrative rather than

judicial. Second, he argues that Judge Clancy lacked jurisdiction because he “was

denied bail without process.” (Doc. 32, p. 2). Plaintiff states that “bail must be set

for all bailable offenses and can only be denied with the proper requirements.

Outside the proper elements being supplied the judge is lacking as it pertains to

jurisdiction to deny bail.” (Id.). We will address each argument in turn.

Considering both the nature of the act and the expectations of the parties

results in the conclusion that Judge Clancy’s denial of bail was a judicial act.

Pennsylvania's magisterial district judges . . . are vested with jurisdiction

over summary offenses (except those arising out of delinquent acts involving

a juvenile), and “to preside at arraignments, fix and accept bail, except for

offenses ... [ ]relating to murder[ ] and ... [ ]voluntary manslaughter[ ] ... and

to issue warrants and perform duties of a similar nature, including the

jurisdiction of a committing magistrate in all criminal proceedings.”

Harr, 2024 WL 4064139, at *8 (quoting 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. §§ 1515(a)(1) &

(4)). The act of deciding whether to grant Plaintiff bail therefore clearly fell under

the jurisdiction of Judge Clancy in her position as a magisterial district judge. It

need not be decided whether proper procedures were followed at the arraignment

on April 19, 2022, because even if the denial of bail “was done maliciously,

negligently, or contrary to law, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity would

still bar [Parrish’s] lawsuit against [Judge Clancy].” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff’s

bail was denied by the Judge while she presided over an arraignment proceeding:

she unquestionably was acting in her official capacity. See McAlester v. Brown, 469

F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972) (at the time of the act, the judge “was not in his

judge's robes, he was not in the courtroom itself, and he may well have violated

state and/or federal procedural requirements regarding contempt citations.

Nevertheless, we discern . . . that Judge Brown was acting ‘in his judicial

jurisdiction’”).

Plaintiff does not seem to deny that Defendant Clancy had authority to

conduct an arraignment proceeding; instead, he argues that proper procedure was

not followed, and that her decision was influenced by Defendant Muldrow. (Doc. 1

at 2). As noted above, it need not be decided whether Judge Clancy followed

adequate procedure before denying Plaintiff bail; however, assuming arguendo that

she did improperly deny Plaintiff bail, that does not strip her of her judicial

immunity. And even if Defendant Muldrow’s call did influence her decision to

deny Plaintiff bail, “our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged

action, without inquiry into such ‘specifics’ as the judge’s motive or the

correctness of his or her decision.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769 (emphasis added).

Essentially, it is the act that the judge partook in that must be evaluated, not the

outcome. For these reasons, and the fact that Judge Clancy, as a magisterial district

judge, has jurisdiction to preside over an arraignment proceeding, she is entitled to

judicial immunity.

3. Recommendation as to Defendant Clancy

Regardless of whether Defendant Clancy is proceeding against Judge Clancy

in her official capacity or individual capacity, Judge Clancy is shielded by

immunity. To the extent Plaintiff is proceeding against her in her official capacity,

she is shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity; to the extent Plaintiff is

proceeding against her in her individual capacity, she is protected by judicial

immunity. Therefore, we recommend that the claims against Defendant Clancy in

her official capacity be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) without

prejudice.5 It is recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Clancy in

her individual capacity be dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.

6 Bright v. Hoebich, No. CV 24-9625 (RK) (TJB), 2025 WL 1311401, at *4 (D.N.J.

May 6, 2025) (“The Third Circuit has approved of dismissal with prejudice on

judicial immunity grounds. See, e.g., Williams v. Stack, No. 23-2685, 2024 WL

3548766, at *1 (3d Cir. July 26, 2024) (per curiam) (approving a district court's

5 A dismissal for lack of standing—or any other deficit in subject-matter

jurisdiction—must be one without prejudice, as a court that lacks jurisdiction has

no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(b); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505, 121 S. Ct.

1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

93–94, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Interstate Petroleum Corp. v.

Morgan, 249 F.3d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see also Brereton v.

Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ismissals for lack

of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having determined

that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a disposition on

the merits of the underlying claims.”); Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d

437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction cannot also be

dismissed ‘with prejudice’; that's a disposition on the merits, which only a court

with jurisdiction may render. . . . ‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’ are

mutually exclusive.” (internal citation omitted)); In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw”

Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997) (“If a court then determines

that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot decide the case on the merits. It

has no authority to do so.”); Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2023)

(“[A] dismissal with prejudice on a threshold ground [such as lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction] should ordinarily be vacated and remanded with instructions

for the claim to be dismissed without prejudice.”).

6 Because we recommend that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Clancy be

dismissed based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity or, alternatively, judicial

immunity, we need not address Defendant Clancy’s additional arguments for

dismissal.

dismissal with prejudice when claims are dismissed on judicial immunity grounds);

Renchenski v. Ammerman, No. 23-2519, 2024 WL 885120, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 1,

2024) (per curiam) (agreeing that amendment of complaint would be futile where

the complaint is dismissed on immunity grounds); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

541 F. App'x 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2013) (summarily affirming dismissal with

prejudice on judicial immunity grounds); Waris v. Frick, No. 06-5189, 2007 WL

954108, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2007) (“[T]he settled doctrine of absolute judicial

immunity requires the dismissal with prejudice.”)).

B. Claims Against Defendant Mike Muldrow Are Subject to Dismissal

An issue may arise when, as here, a plaintiff has failed to indicate in their

complaint whether they intended to sue an official in their individual or official

capacity. In that case, the court must determine whether the defendant was on

notice that he or she was being held personally liable. To do this, courts “consider

the nature of the plaintiff’s claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages,

and the nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, particularly

claims for qualified immunity, to determine whether the defendant had actual

knowledge of the potential for individual liability.” Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d

587, 594 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). If a plaintiff requests

monetary damages, that “provides some notice of [his or] her intent to hold

Defendant personally liable.” Id. at 594. And if a defendant “move[s] for summary

judgment on the issue of qualified immunity,” that serves as another indicator that

the plaintiff intended to sue in an individual capacity, and that the defense was on

notice. Id.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff did not indicate whether he was proceeding

against Defendant Muldrow in his individual or official capacity, and therefore the

intent must be construed by looking at the nature of the claims and defenses. First,

Plaintiff is only requesting monetary damages rather than injunctive or declaratory

relief (Doc. 1, p. 3), indicating an intent to hold Commissioner Muldrow

personally liable. Second, Defendant Muldrow demonstrated his awareness that he

was being sued in a personal, rather than official, capacity because he only moved

for qualified immunity rather than Eleventh Amendment immunity. For those

reasons, the claims against Commissioner Muldrow will be addressed from the

lens of individual capacity. We turn now to Defendant’s arguments for dismissal as

to each of Plaintiff’s claims.

1. Claim of Eighth Amendment Violation

The predominant violation alleged against Defendant under § 1983 is an

Eighth Amendment violation for interference with Plaintiff’s right to bail. Because

Defendant Muldrow is entitled to qualified immunity, the claims against him

should be dismissed.

The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII. This can result in a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. for

violation of the right to reasonable bail. Harrison v. Abraham, No. CIV.A. 96-4262,

1997 WL 256970, at *20 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1997), aff’d, 151 F.3d 1025 (3d Cir.

1998) (citing Harvin v. Post, No. 95-7888, 1997 WL 116985, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

March 7, 1997)). Not only does the Eighth Amendment protect the right to

reasonable bail, but “this reasoning logically leads to the conclusion that bail may

not be arbitrarily denied . . . The constitutional right to be free from excessive bail

thus shades into a protection against a denial of bail.” Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d

64, 70 n.23 (3d Cir. 1981). That said, the Eighth Amendment “does not create an

absolute right to be free on bail.” Barrick v. Perry Cnty. Prison, No. 1:22-CV-1432,

2023 WL 4631658, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2023) (citing United States v Salerno,

481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (“the Eighth Amendment ‘says nothing about whether

bail shall be available at all.’”)).

As discussed supra, it is the judge’s responsibility to make bail

determinations; however, it is “possible to allege a valid Eighth Amendment

excessive bail claim against an individual that lacks authority to set bail.” Quiero v.

Muniz, No. 3:14-CV-00225, 2015 WL 13738994, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2015).

To do so, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant played a significant role in or

manipulated the bond decision. Rosado v. Figge, No. 3:15CV275, 2015 WL

4356803, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2015) (citing James v. York Cnty. Police Dep’t,

160 F. App’x 126, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F.

Supp. 3d 403, 427 (E.D. Pa. 2020), aff’d, No. 22-1960, 2023 WL 4418213 (3d Cir.

July 10, 2023) (“[t]herefore, it is possible to state a claim for excessive bail against

a police officer who manipulated, helped to shape, or exercised significant

influence over the bond decision.” (internal citation and quotation removed));

Sheffer v. Ctr. Cnty., No. 4:18-CV-2080, 2019 WL 2621836, at *11 (M.D. Pa. May

23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., aff’d sub nom. Sheffer v.

Ctr. Cnty., 818 F. App’x 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[a] claim of excessive bail under the

Eighth Amendment requires an assertion that a defendant played a significant role

in the failure to set a reasonable bail.”).

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and interpreting them in the light

most favorable to him, Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205, Parrish asserts that the

Commissioner of the York City Police Department placed an ex parte call to the

magisterial district judge presiding over his arraignment and advocated for him to

be held without bail.7 Plaintiff alleges specific information in his claim, including

the caller’s identity and the general substance of the conversation. (Doc. 1, pp. 2–

7 The nature or capacity of Defendant’s role as law enforcement is unknown from

Plaintiff’s complaint or Defense’s brief.

3). Plaintiff also avers that Defendant indicated the call did play a role in her

decision to deny bail. (Doc. 33, p. 1). Notably, Defendant Muldrow does not seem

to deny that this call took place, but rather, “viewing Plaintiff’s factual allegations

as stated, Commissioner Muldrow contacted Judge Clancy about Plaintiff’s bail

out of his concern for public safety.” (Doc. 28, p. 11).

However, it need not be decided whether Muldrow’s actions violated

Parrish’s Eighth Amendment rights, as Muldrow is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity attempts to balance “the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly” with “the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.

Ed. 2d 565 (2009). Therefore, an official sued under § 1983 will be found to be

immune unless the actor “(1) violated a constitutional right that (2) was clearly

established when he acted.” Stringer v. Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 85 (3d Cir.

2025). For a right to be considered clearly established, a reasonable official must

know that his actions violate that right: either because “existing precedent [] placed

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011), or, it is a

“patently obvious constitutional violation.” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85. If “the law

was not clearly established or a reasonable official could have believed the actions

to be lawful, the official is entitled to immunity.” Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156,

163 (3d Cir. 2001).

Because qualified immunity grants an official immunity from suit, this

defense should be raised “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson, 555

U.S. at 232 (internal citation omitted). That said, it may be difficult to come to such

a decision at the pleading stage, as qualified immunity determination is a fact-

intensive inquiry. Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85. Immunity will therefore only be upheld

on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “when the immunity is established on the face of

the complaint.” Id. at 86 (quoting Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d

Cir. 2006)). As all affirmative defenses, the burden rests on the defense to

adequately plead qualified immunity. Thomas, 463 F.3d at 292 (citing Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(c)). Long-standing precedent holds “that a plaintiff has no pleading burden to

anticipate or overcome a qualified immunity defense, and a mere absence of

detailed factual allegations supporting a plaintiff’s claim for relief under § 1983

does not warrant dismissal of the complaint or establish defendants’ immunity.”

Thomas, 463 F.3d at 289.

We then approach the two-part inquiry. Even if Plaintiff were to have met

the first prong by stating an Eighth Amendment bail interference claim, the second

prong bars Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds of qualified immunity. The second

prong asks whether the right violated is one that was clearly established. This

inquiry may “present[] unique difficulties at the pleading stage,” however,

“qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion” where “immunity is

established on the face of the complaint.” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85–86. See, e.g.,

Leveto, 258 F.3d at 166 (despite asserting a valid Fourth Amendment claim, the

Complaint was dismissed because the agents were entitled to qualified immunity:

the court held that a reasonable officer could have believed patting down the

Plaintiff was permitted under the Fourth Amendment); Weimer v. Cnty. of Fayette,

Pennsylvania, 972 F.3d 177, 191 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding law enforcement entitled

to qualified immunity because a single district court case cannot be the basis to

show that the right was clearly established).

Here, the right to be free from a police commissioner offering his bail

opinion to a magistrate judge is not one that was clearly established at the time of

Defendant Muldrow’s action. The Defendant calling Judge Clancy did not

constitute an act that every reasonable officer would understand to be violating

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. The purpose of qualified immunity is to

protect officials from personal liability when they inevitably err—including

situations when the errors may have the unfortunate result of violating someone’s

constitutional rights. A law enforcement officer providing his input into a bond

decision is an act that a reasonable officer could believe was lawful. It is therefore

recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to the Eighth Amendment

violation, as Defendant Muldrow has established qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s

claim should be denied with prejudice, as amendment would be futile due to

Defendant Muldrow’s immunity.

2. Claim of Conspiracy

To properly plead a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must

prove that persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to

deprive him of his constitutional rights.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d

280, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150–

52, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). Once a plaintiff establishes that the

object of the conspiracy was to deprive him of a federally protected right, the

plaintiff “must provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements

of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Id. at 295. Agreement, which

has been held to be the sine qua non of conspiracy, consists of a meeting of the

minds, such that the state actors reached a common understanding to deny plaintiff

his rights. Panayotides v. Rabenold, 35 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d,

210 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2000).

The courts understand that due to the inherent secretive nature of

conspiracies, direct evidence may be rare and therefore plaintiffs may “rely on

circumstantial inferences at the dismissal stage.” Burke v. Bachert, 702 F. Supp. 3d

347, 364 (E.D. Pa. 2023). Nevertheless, a “plaintiff must make factual allegations

of combination, agreement, or understanding among all or between any of the

defendants or coconspirators to plot, plan, or conspire to carry out the alleged chain

of events.” Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (internal

citation and quotation removed).

The heart of the alleged conspiracy in this case is the phone call between

Commissioner Muldrow and Judge Clancy, where they “conspired to deny the

Plaintiff his constitutional right to bail.” (Doc. 33, p. 2). Even though Judge Clancy

is immune from suit, Plaintiff can still assert a § 1983 cause of action “alleging a

conspiracy involving the defendant and Judge [] to violate his constitutional

rights.” Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1019–20 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

However, in construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it

cannot be said that he has sufficiently stated a cause of action. The allegation of a

phone call is insufficient to show that there was a meeting of the minds amongst

both Judge Clancy and Commissioner Muldrow to deny Mr. Parrish bail. Even if

the Complaint were able to be construed as stating a bail interference claim, that

does not establish that Judge Clancy intended to enter into any sort of agreement or

conspiracy. Therefore, it is recommended that this claim be dismissed without

prejudice, giving Plaintiff leave to amend.

3. Claim of Due Process Violation

The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

Plaintiff asserts that Commissioner Muldrow violated his due process right to bail:

“ . . . Pennsylvania establishes a right to bail for bailable offenses and has a process

in place for the denial of bail. With that said the Plaintiff was denied due process

because of Muldrow’s actions” (Doc. 33 at 1). However, as discussed in depth

supra, “Pennsylvania law reserves bail-setting authority to the magisterial district

judge (MDJ) or other judge that has jurisdiction over the case. Pa. R. Crim. P.

103.” Bell v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:08-CV-01563, 2010 WL 5559503, at *12

(M.D. Pa. June 28, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08-CV-

01563, 2011 WL 66114 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2011), aff’d, 457 F. App’x 164 (3d Cir.

2012).

While Plaintiff has averred that Defendant Muldrow interfered with the

ultimate bail decision by placing the phone call to Judge Clancy, Plaintiff has failed

to state how, specifically, the Defendant interfered with his due process rights—

especially considering that a Police Commissioner is not responsible for the

arraignment process or bail hearing. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

with respect to Defendant Muldrow, and it is recommended that Plaintiff’s claims

be dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend. See, e.g., Dukes v. Demarco,

No. CV 23-3899, 2024 WL 2151244, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2024) (“Plaintiffs

argue that their constitutional right to bail was violated in some fashion due to the

application or enforcement of New Jersey's Bail Reform Act. However, they fail to

state when and how each of the two named Defendants specifically violated his

constitutional rights.”) (emphasis in original).

4. Claim of Equal Protection Violation

The Equal Protection Clause is a section of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution, which instructs that no state shall “deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To

state a viable § 1983 claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiff must

present facts that show “purposeful discrimination” and “demonstrate that they

received different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly

situated.” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. Of Philadelphia Bd of Educ.,

587 F.3d 176, 196 (3d Cir. 2009). This required alleging three elements: (1)

Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) Plaintiff was similarly situated to

members of an unprotected class, and (3) Plaintiff was treated differently from

members of that unprotected class. Green v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 89 F. Supp.

3d 682, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d sub nom. A.G. v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 655

F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2016).

Mr. Parrish avers that Black criminal defendants are denied bail at a higher

rate than their non-Black counterparts who are charged with similar, or even more

serious, crimes. (Doc. 29, p. 2). While this may sufficiently state the elements that

constitute an equal protection violation under § 1983, Commissioner Muldrow is

not a proper defendant. The Complaint does not state why or how Defendant

Muldrow specifically violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. The only

allegation that Plaintiff made against Defendant Muldrow is that he made one

phone call in one case: he does not allege that Muldrow plays a wider role in bail

determinations in York County, or that he has any authority over the process. See

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil

rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”). Because

Plaintiff has not provided any allegation of Defendant Muldrow’s personal

involvement, the claim should be dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.

VI. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Any State Law Violations

Under a section of his Complaint entitled “Legal Claims,” Plaintiff lists

“violation of due process, civil conspiracy to deny due process, negligence,

violation of equal protection.” (Doc. 1, p. 3). The following section of the

complaint is entitled “Injury” and states “loss of liberty and intentional infliction of

emotional distress.” (Id.). Given the allegations in the sparse body of the

Complaint, as discussed above, it appears that the Plaintiff is seeking to raise

federal civil rights complaints under § 1983 as well as for a conspiracy to violate

his civil rights. The Complaint contains no allegations regarding either a

negligence claim or a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under

state law—namely, Plaintiff failed to allege who the defendants would be and how

their actions would support either of his claims. Nonetheless, Defendants

attempted to respond to Plaintiff’s claims in their briefs. Plaintiff, in his brief,

stated he is seeking to assert a state law negligence claim although he makes no

allegations in support of that claim. Accordingly, to the extent that the Complaint is

construed to assert a state law claim for negligence and for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, those claims should be dismissed, and Plaintiff be granted thirty

days in which to file an Amended Complaint consistent with the requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.

VII. Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that:

Defendant Clancy’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) be GRANTED as follows:

claims against Clancy in her official capacity dismissed based upon Eleventh

Amendment Immunity without prejudice; claims against Clancy in her individual

capacity be dismissed based upon judicial immunity with prejudice.

Defendant Muldrow’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) be GRANTED as

follows:

1. The Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim be GRANTED

with prejudice,

2. The Motion to Dismiss the Conspiracy claim be GRANTED without

prejudice,

3. The Motion to Dismiss the Due Process claim be GRANTED without

prejudice,

4. The Motion to Dismiss the Equal Protection claim be GRANTED

without prejudice,

5. And the Motion to Dismiss the State Law claims be GRANTED without

prejudice.

Plaintiff should be granted thirty days to file any Amended Complaint for

the claims of conspiracy, due process violation, equal protection violation, and any

state law violations, under the condition that it complies with Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated: July 24, 2025 /s/ Leo A. Latella

Leo A. Latella

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Donte Darrell Parrish CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-00670

Plaintiff,

(Judge Munley)

v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)

Mike Muldrow, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the

forgoing Report and Recommendation dated July 24, 2025.

Any party may obtain review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant

to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a

prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and

serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall

specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations

or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The

briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new

hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may

consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her

own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive

further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate

judge with instructions.

Dated: July 24, 2025 /s/ Leo A. Latella

Leo A. Latella

United States Magistrate Judge