A “bare criminal statute,” state or federal, does not 3 create a private cause of action.
How later courts described this case
- A “bare criminal statute,” state or federal, does not 3 create a private cause of action.
- liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal
- “Section 1332 requires complete 11 diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 12 each of the defendants.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 FROY DIAZ BRITO, Case No. 2:25-cv-1230-DJC-CSK
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 CORONA POLICE DEPARTMENT, et
al.,
15 (ECF Nos. 1,2)
Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff Froy Diaz Brito is representing himself in this action and seeks leave to
18 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) For the
19 reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied, and the
20 Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.
21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement,
23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person
24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security
25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the
26
1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.
27 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). As discussed in more detail below, it is not clear
whether Plaintiff Brito is attempting to name an additional plaintiff in his Complaint. See
28 Compl. at 2 (ECF No. 1) (naming Malina Diaz in the Plaintiff(s) section).
1 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient
2 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo,
3 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient
4 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of
5 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis
6 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some
7 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department
8 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not
9 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service
10 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines).
11 Here, Plaintiff has made the required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See
12 ECF No. 2. However, the Court will recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied
13 because the action is facially frivolous and without merit because it fails to state a claim
14 and lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in
15 forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that
16 the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115
17 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir.
18 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir.
19 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to
20 proceed IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's
21 action is frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965)
22 (“It is the duty of the District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in
23 forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it
24 appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion
25 seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because it appears from the face of
26 Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is frivolous and is without merit as discussed in more
27 detail below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP motion be denied.
28 / / /
1 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
2 Even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff’s IFP application, Plaintiff’s Complaint
3 warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s required pre-answer screening.
4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis
5 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to
6 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a
7 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,
8 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an
9 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In
10 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual
11 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and
12 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27;
13 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir.
14 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).
15 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
16 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal).
17 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable
18 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d
19 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does
20 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);
21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
22 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough
23 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
24 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
25 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the
27 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be
28 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80
1 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
2 III. THE COMPLAINT
3 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Corona Police Department, “Navy,
4 Air force, Marine Base,” “FEMA,” and the “CIA.” Compl. at 2-3. Plaintiff alleges the
5 following as causes of action: (1) “Chapter 77 infringed on College Students;”
6 (2) “Chapter 77 on correctional Juvenile facilities federal workers;” and (3) 18 U.S.C.
7 § 1203. Compl. at 4. The entirety of the allegations in the Complaint are as follows:
8 Local Police of Corona had resigned the use of criminal
justice for unwritten follow throughs which involved the
9 human trafficking across the 52 states not only California and
but of those who had become students of the Justice System
10 between the years of 2007-2025.
11 Compl. at 5. For relief, Plaintiff states “[a] breach on the student body of California from
12 the Southern Section of California’s Criminal Justice and the Armed forces in which it
13 resulted on internment camps, young adults trafficked and in some cases found in other
14 states removed, or personally trafficked in conjunction with Silicone Valley and San
15 Bernardino County.” Compl. at 6.
16 IV. DISCUSSION
17 A. Pro Se Plaintiff Cannot Represent Another Individual
18 It is not clear from review of the Complaint whether Plaintiff Brito is attempting to
19 name an additional plaintiff, Ms. Malina Diaz. See Compl. at 2. However, Ms. Malina
20 Diaz has not signed the Complaint and the Complaint does not name her as a plaintiff in
21 other sections. See Compl. at 1 (naming Plaintiff Froy Diaz Brito only), 4 (identifying
22 Plaintiff Froy Diaz Brito only for diversity jurisdiction purposes), 6 (signature line naming
23 only Plaintiff Froy Diaz Brito and signed only by Plaintiff Froy Diaz Brito); see also ECF
24 No. 1-1 (civil cover sheet naming Plaintiff Froy Diaz Brito only). In addition, Ms. Malina
25 Diaz has not submitted an in forma pauperis application. See Docket. If Plaintiff Brito is
26 attempting to bring this action on behalf of Ms. Malina Diaz, this is improper as Plaintiff
27 Brito is pro se and cannot represent another individual. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 183(a)
28 (“Any individual who is representing himself or herself without an attorney must appear
1 personally or by courtesy appearance by an attorney admitted to the Bar of this Court
2 and may not delegate that duty to any other individual, including husband or wife, or any
3 other party on the same side appearing without an attorney.”) Federal Rule of Civil
4 Procedure 11(a) also require that if a party is not represented by an attorney, "[e]very
5 pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed" by the party personally. As
6 such, the Court will disregard Ms. Malina Diaz in its review of the Complaint.
7 B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
8 The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Federal courts are
9 courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases authorized by federal law.
10 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Jurisdiction is a threshold
11 inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary
12 appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir.
13 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)); see
14 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380
15 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the merits of a case
16 or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. A federal
17 court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions arising under federal
18 law or those between citizens of different states in which the alleged damages exceed
19 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or
20 forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte” subject matter jurisdiction
21 even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
22 The Complaint does not establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See
23 Compl. The Complaint states federal question and diversity jurisdiction as the basis for
24 federal court jurisdiction. See Compl. at 3. However, Plaintiff appears to assert federal
25 criminal statutes as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. See Compl. at 4. Plaintiff’s
26 citations to “Chapter 77” appear to be referencing criminal statutes but it is unclear and
27 difficult for the Court to decipher based on these bare references. Moreover, 18 U.S.C.
28 § 1203, also known as the Hostage Taking Act, is a federal criminal statute and there is
1 no indication a private right is created. See Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank,
2 N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (A “bare criminal statute,” state or federal, does not
3 create a private cause of action.). Accordingly, no federal civil cause of action is
4 asserted, and no federal civil claims are suggested by the facts, to the extent the facts
5 are discernible.
6 The Complaint also fails to establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not state
7 an amount in controversy and Plaintiff does not establish complete diversity of
8 citizenship. On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff and Defendant Corona Police
9 Department appear to be citizens of California. Compl. at 4-5; see Morris v. Princess
10 Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires complete
11 diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than
12 each of the defendants.”). Because there is no amount in controversy alleged and no
13 diversity of citizenship established here, the Court finds that it also lacks subject matter
14 jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court recommends this action
15 be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
16 C. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
17 Plaintiff’s Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim
18 as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims
19 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of
20 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.
21 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the Complaint does not contain facts
22 supporting any cognizable legal claim against Defendants. The Complaint consists of
23 vague and conclusory allegations that fail to establish Plaintiff’s causes of action. Plaintiff
24 also fails to allege causes of action that establish a private right of action. Because the
25 Complaint is unintelligible, granting leave to amend in this case would not be fruitful.
26 In addition, in a separate action, Plaintiff has alleged similar facts relating to
27 human trafficking in the “Southern Sections of CA” and a claim for “Chapter 77” that
28 currently has pending Findings and Recommendations recommending dismissal. See
1 Brito v. NATO, 2025 WL 2098583, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (recommending
2 dismissal without leave to amend for failure to state a claim). Although the Federal Rules
3 adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se litigant’s complaint must give fair notice
4 and state the elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev.
5 Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim
6 on which relief may be granted and is subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84
7 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot
8 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with
9 enough detail to guide discovery”).
10 D. Leave to Amend
11 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court finds that the
12 Complaint is without merit and consists entirely of allegations with no basis in law. See
13 generally Compl. The Complaint does not contain facts supporting any cognizable legal
14 claim against Defendants. In light of the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
15 Complaint’s deficiencies, granting leave to amend would be futile. The Court further
16 notes that Plaintiff has filed other complaints in this district court that are pending
17 dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Brito, 2025 WL 2098583, at *2 (discussing the
18 complaint’s allegations as “fanciful and delusional”); Brito v. TSA, 2025 WL 1293440, at
19 *2 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2025) (recommending dismissal of the complaint as “frivolous”
20 without leave to amend). The Complaint should therefore be dismissed without leave to
21 amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06
22 (9th Cir. 1995).
23 V. CONCLUSION
24 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that:
25 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED;
26 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend;
27 and
28 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
1 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
2 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
3 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file
4 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should
5 || be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any
6 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14
7 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time
8 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,
9 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
10
11 Dated: August 18, 2025 C iy S \U
12 CHI SOO KIM
43 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14 || 4, brit1230.25
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28