Castor v. City of Plantation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-61960-MARTINEZ/VALLE

CLEMENT CASTOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF PLANTATION, a political

subdivision of the State of Florida;

RYAN DUTY; THOMAS MARTINO III;

BASIL MULLINGS; BRETT O’ HARA;

NICHOLAS PELOSI; JEFFERY

VENTURA, sued in their individual

capacities,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Entry of Satisfaction

of Judgment (ECF No. 17) (the “Motion”). United States District Judge Jose E. Martinez has

referred the Motion to the undersigned to take all necessary and proper action as required by law

with respect to post-judgment matters. (ECF No. 19).

Having reviewed the Motion (ECF No. 17), Plaintiff’s response (ECF No. 18), Defendants’

Replies (ECF Nos. 20, 21), and being otherwise fully advised in the matter, the undersigned

respectfully recommends that the Motion be DENIED AS PREMATURE for the reasons set forth

below.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying litigation was short and simple. In October 2024, Plaintiff filed a

Complaint against the City of Plantation and its officers, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and related state-law

causes of action. See generally (ECF No. 1). On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of

Acceptance of Offer of Judgment and Request for Clerk’s Entry of Judgment. (ECF No. 14).

Shortly thereafter, the Court entered an Order on Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment and

Directing Clerk’s Entry of Judgment. (ECF No. 15). On April 16, 2025, the Clerk entered the

following Judgment:

Judgment is in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants City of Plantation, Ryan

Duty, Thomas Martino III, Basil Mullings, Brett O’Hara, Nicolas Pelosi, and

Jeffrey Ventura pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedures (68) in the total

amount of $115,000.00, plus any applicable accrued interest at the statutory legal

rate from the date of judgment until the judgment is fully satisfied.

(ECF No. 16) (the “Judgment”).

Within days, however, the parties disputed the process for delivery of the Judgment

proceeds, leading to the instant Motion. According to Plaintiff, Defendants were required to pay

post-judgment interest, accruing at a rate of $12.57 per day from the date of the Judgment. (ECF

Nos. 18 at 2, 18-1 at 1). Defendants, in turn, requested that Plaintiff complete a W-9 “for tax

purposes in order to facilitate processing of [the] check.” (ECF No. 18-1 at 2). According to

Defendants, in the days that followed, Plaintiff did not properly complete the W-9. (ECF No. 17

at 2-3). Ultimately, on April 21, 2025, Plaintiff executed and returned a completed W-9. Id. at 3.

On April 28, 2025, Defendants mailed Plaintiff’s counsel a check for $115,000—the amount of

the Judgment. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel received Defendants’ check on May 2, 2025, but did not

cash it because, according to Plaintiff, “the check was neither certified nor inclusive of the post-

judgment interest that had accrued pursuant to the Court’s judgment.” (ECF No. 18 at 4). The

check remains uncashed and the Judgment outstanding. The instant Motion followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment is Premature

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for several reasons, including that the

judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “Rule 60(b)(5) is

generally invoked when a party seeks entry of satisfaction of judgment because no

acknowledgment of satisfaction has been delivered due to an ongoing dispute over the judgment

amount.” Zelaya/Cap. Int’l Judgment, LLC v. Zelaya, 769 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2007)); Tosto v. Zelaya, No. 06-CV-21213,

2012 WL 12850141, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Zelaya/Cap. Int’l Judgment,

LLC v. Zelaya, 769 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2014).

Relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) provides that:

[a] money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court directs

otherwise. The procedure on execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the

state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.

Thus, Florida’s procedure for satisfaction of judgment applies. Pursuant to Florida law:

(1) All judgments and decrees for the payment of money rendered in the courts of

this state and which have become final, may be satisfied at any time prior to the

actual levy of execution issued thereon by payment of the full amount of such

judgment or decree, with interest thereon, plus the costs of the issuance, if any, of

execution thereon into the registry of the court where rendered.

(2) Upon such payment, the clerk shall execute and record in the official records a

satisfaction of judgment upon payment of the recording charge prescribed in s.

28.24(13). Upon payment of the amount required in subsection (1) and the

recording charge required by this subsection and execution and recordation of the

satisfaction by the clerk, any lien created by the judgment is satisfied and

discharged.

§ 55.141, Fla. Stat. Therefore, a judgment may be satisfied by a judgment debtor’s payment of the

full amount of the judgment, plus interest, into the Court Registry. Id.; Zelaya, 769 F.3d at 1304;

Weaver v. Stone, 212 So. 2d 80, 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (citing Fla. Stat. § 55.141). Notably,

there is no requirement that Plaintiff consent to the satisfaction. Zelaya, 769 F.3d at 1304; Weaver,

211 So. 2d at 81.

Nonetheless, a personal check is insufficient to satisfy a judgment and does not toll interest.

DCC Constructors, Inc. v. Yacht Club Se., Inc., 839 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (noting

that a judgment creditor has the right to refuse a personal check to satisfy a judgment and insist on

payment by cash or certified funds); In re Est. of Woodruff, 647 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA

1994) (same). Proffer of a personal check is not the equivalent of cash or a certified check. Keanie

v. Goldy, 698 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). A personal check, for example, does not

offer a guarantee that the funds will be honored, and a judgment creditor may lawfully refuse a

personal check. DCC Constructors, 839 So. 2d at 734; Woodruff, 647 So. 2d at 1046 (confirming

that judgment creditor would unquestionably be entitled to insist on cash or certified funds). That

said, a judgment creditor’s acceptance of a personal check, without objection or conditions,

precludes any further obligation on the debt claimed, if the check is honored. Keanie, 698 So. 2d

at 1268.

Here, Defendants tendered a personal check for the full amount of the Judgment twelve

days after the Clerk’s entry of Judgment—i.e., the days between April 16, 2025 and April 28,

2025. Because the tendered personal check did not include the then-minimal post-judgment

interest amount, Plaintiff had the right to refuse Defendants’ tender. See DCC Constructors, 839

So. 2d at 734; see also Rissman v. Kilbourne, 643 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (noting

that tender of a personal check is “at best conditional payment” because it is not final payment);

Woodruff, 647 So. 2d at 1046 (holding that judgment creditor was entitled to interest on judgment,

which accrued after delivery of check and for the number of days it took check to clear).

Accordingly, because Defendants failed to comply with the statutory procedure and legal

precedent requiring that payment of the Judgment: (i) include post-judgment interest; and (ii) be

in the form of cash, certified check, or be deposited into the Court Registry, Defendants are not

entitled to a satisfaction of Judgment at this time.1

B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Post-Judgment Interest

Having found that Defendants are not entitled to a satisfaction of judgment at this time, the

undersigned next considers whether Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest. As discussed

above, because Plaintiff lawfully refused to accept payment of the Judgment by personal check,

post-judgment interest has continued to accrue from the date of Judgment (i.e., April 16, 2025) to

the date of payment. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961(b); § 55.03(3), Fla. Stat.; see also Zelaya, 769 F.3d

at 1304; Keanie, 698 So. 2d at 1268 (holding that post-judgment interest on a personal check stops

accruing when the tender of the full amount of payment plus interest is accepted by the judgment

creditor); DCC Constructors, 839 So. 2d at 734 (concluding that post-judgment interest continues

to accrue on a final judgment until the full amount is properly tendered). Thus, Defendants

currently owe the Judgment amount ($115,000), plus interest, which continues to accrue until

Defendants tender either cash, a certified check, or deposit funds into the Court Registry.2

1 Relatedly, Defendants’ request that Plaintiff complete a W-9 has no bearing on whether

Defendants have satisfied the Judgment. Rather, § 55.141 mandates a judgment debtor to satisfy

the judgment by tendering the final judgment (plus accrued interest) into the Court Registry.

See § 55.141, Fla. Stat. There is no requirement that the judgment creditor comply with paperwork

(e.g., a W-9 tax form). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s failure to complete and return the W-9 for tax

purposes does not support Defendants’ request for relief.

2 Defendants’ claims to the contrary are unavailing and Defendants have provided no legal

authority to support their request. See generally (ECF No. 17).

To calculate the post-judgment interest amount, the Court looks to 28 U.S.C.A § 1961.

Bryant Motors, Inc. v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 06-CV-353(CAR), 2009 WL 1796001, at *3 (M.D.

Ga. June 22, 2009) (“Pursuant to § 1961(a), post-judgment interest “shall be allowed on any money

judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.”). Section 1961(a) provides that “[post-

judgment] interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to

the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the

judgment.” See also Signature Fin. LLC v. Motorcoach Class “A” Transportation, Inc., No. 21-

CV-729-PGB-DCI, 2022 WL 3646103, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 18495247 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2022). Here, the Judgment was

entered on April 16, 2025; therefore, the week preceding was Monday, April 7, through Friday,

April 11. See (ECF No. 16).

Date Daily Interest Rate

04/07 3.86

04/08 3.83

04/09 4.03

04/10 3.97

04/11 4.04

The applicable post-judgment interest rate is therefore 3.95%, based on the weekly average

of the listed rates: (3.86 + 3.83 + 4.03 + 3.97 + 4.04) ÷ 5 = 3.946%. See also

http://postjudgmentinterest.com/index.php (last visited July 22, 2025). Further, the daily interest

amount is based on multiplying the Judgment ($115,000) times the rate (0.0395), divided by 365

days in the year = $12.45 per day. See 28 U.S.C.A § 1961; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DAILY

TREASURY PAR YIELD CURVE RATES, https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-

center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value=2025

(last visited July 22, 2025). Accordingly, Plaintiff is owed the Judgment amount, plus post-

judgment interest at a daily rate of $12.45. See Zelaya, 769 F.3d at 1304. Interest will stop

accruing on the date Defendants either pay by cash, certified check, or deposit the funds into the

Court Registry (based on $115,000, plus interest (at a rate of $12.45/day)).3

Lastly, to facilitate prompt resolution of this dispute without further delay, the undersigned

recommends that Defendants deposit the Judgment (plus post-judgment interest) into the Court

Registry as soon as practicable. Upon deposit of the proper amount into the Court Registry,

Defendants would be entitled to satisfaction of judgment upon further motion to the District Judge.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Entry of Satisfaction of Judgment (ECF No. 17) be

DENIED AS PREMATURE; and

2. Unless otherwise mutually agreed to by the parties, as soon as practicable,

Defendants must deposit the amount of the Judgment (plus post-judgment interest) into the Court

Registry, with post-judgment interest calculated as set forth above.

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”), any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and

recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this District. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D.

Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). Subsequently, within 14 days, a party may respond to objections, if any, filed

to this R&R. Failure to timely object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s

3 To illustrate, if Defendants deposit the funds into the Court Registry today (July 22, 2025), the

calculation yields $1,207.18 in interest on the $115,000 Judgment, for a total deposit of

$116,207.18. See http://postjudgmentinterest.com/index.php (last visited July 22, 2025).

order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this R&R. 11th Cir. R. 3-

1 (2024); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

Lastly, if counsel do not intend to file objections, they shall file a Notice of Non-Objection

within 7 days of this R&R.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on July 22, 2025.

Cle, Vee

ALICIA O. VALLE eee

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ce: U.S. District Judge Jose E. Martinez

All counsel of record