Opinion

Nelton v. Farmers Property and Casualty Insurance Company

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Aug 22, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROBERT J. NELTON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-6066

FARMERS PROPERTY AND CASUALTY SECTION: “G”(4)

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendant Farmers Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s

(“Farmers”) Motion for Summary Judgment.1 This litigation involves property damage allegedly

caused by Hurricane Ida. Farmers seeks summary judgment in its favor, arguing that because it

paid Plaintiff Robert J. Nelton (“Plaintiff”) a total of $93,300.48 pursuant to the Appraisal Award

provision, Plaintiff cannot maintain claims for breach of contract and bad faith adjusting penalties.2

Considering the motion, the opposition, the reply memorandum, the record, and the applicable law

the Court grants the motion as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims and denies the motion as to

Plaintiff’s claim for bad faith adjusting penalties.

I. Background

Plaintiff owns immovable property located at 4401 Bayouside Drive, Chauvin, Louisiana

70344.3 Defendants Farmers Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Metropolitan

Property and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, “Defendants”) issued a policy of

1 Rec. Doc. 21.

2 Id.

3 Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 2.

homeowners insurance to Plaintiff under policy number 1691508271 covering Plaintiff for

damages to the dwelling, other structures, and contents located on the property resulting from

perils, including hurricanes.4 On or about August 29, 2021, Hurricane Ida made landfall in

Louisiana, allegedly causing damages to the property.5 Plaintiff reported the loss to Defendants

and took steps to mitigate damages.6

On or about September 24, 2021, Defendants inspected the property and documented the

damages.7 The petition states that the inspection constituted satisfactory proof of loss.8 On or about

September 2, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel sent Defendants a demand letter requesting the amount of

$250,120.15.9 On or about February 15, 2023, Plaintiff invoked the appraisal provisions of the

policy.10 On or about March 7, 2023, Defendants named the appraiser.11 According to the petition,

Plaintiff had not received the appraisal award when this litigation was filed.12 The petition states,

despite being provided with satisfactory proof of loss, Defendants failed to timely and adequately

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 3.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id.

tender payment to Plaintiff.13 Plaintiff alleges the failure of Defendants to pay the claim was

arbitrary, capricious, and/or without probable cause in violation of Louisiana law.14

On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a petition against Defendants in the 32nd Judicial

District Court for the Parish of Terrebonne.15 Plaintiff brings claims for breach of insurance

contract, violations of Louisiana Revised Statute §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973, intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent claims adjusting.16

On March 10, 2025, Farmers filed the instant motion.17 On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an

opposition to the motion.18 On April 11, 2025, Farmers filed a reply memorandum in further

support of the motion.19

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Farmers’ Arguments in Support of the Motion

Farmers seeks summary judgment in its favor, arguing it timely paid Plaintiff the appraisal

award for the contractual damages due under the policy, and thus, it did not breach the contract.20

Farmers explains Plaintiff first provided notice of the alleged loss following Hurricane Ida on or

about September 3, 2021.21 According to Farmers, it initiated loss adjustment and inspected the

13 Id.

14Id. at 4.

15 Rec. Doc. 1-2.

16 Id. at 4–8.

17 Rec. Doc. 21.

18 Rec. Doc. 24.

19 Rec. Doc. 17.

20 Rec. Doc. 21.

21 Id. at 2.

property on September 24, 2021, and on October 6, 2021, Farmers issued a timely payment totaling

$31,992.65.22

Farmers explains on October 12, 2021, Plaintiff contacted Farmers expressing

dissatisfaction with the insurance adjuster and the estimate.23 On October 22, 2021, Farmers

contends Plaintiff called and advised that additional damages were found and requested a

reinspection, to which Farmers explained the supplemental process and requested that Plaintiff

submit contractor bids/estimates and supplemental documentation.24 Between March 23, 2022 and

March 29, 2022, Farmers states that Plaintiff submitted several receipts and invoices confirming

replacement of and repairs to the property, and on April 5, 2021, Farmers issued supplemental

payment totaling $23,254.20.25

On September 19, 2022, Farmers states it received a demand letter and public adjuster

estimate from Plaintiff’s attorney totaling $250,120.15, which did not account for Plaintiff’s

deductible and payments previously made by Farmers.26 According to Farmers, Plaintiff’s counsel

invoked appraisal on February 15, 2023, and on April 6, 2023, an appraisal inspection was

performed.27 Farmers explains that the appraisal estimate totaled $100,816.47.28 After accounting

for Plaintiff’s $7,516 policy deductible and Farmers’ prior payments totaling $55,246.84, Farmers

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 3.

25 Id.

26 Id. at 4.

27 Id.

28 Id.

contends the unpaid portion of the award totaled $38,053.63.29 Farmers states it issued a

supplemental payment to Plaintiff in this amount on August 23, 2023.30 Farmers avers that, in

compliance with the policy, it timely paid Plaintiff the amount awarded pursuant to the appraisal

award, and thus, no additional contractual damages can be sought.31 Farmers argues that because

it is not in breach of the insurance contract, Plaintiff’s claims for statutory penalties and attorney’s

fees should also be dismissed since there was no bad faith in handling Plaintiff’s alleged losses.32

B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion

In opposition, Plaintiff explains that on September 24, 2021, Farmers conducted its first

inspection of the property, and on October 6, 2021, Farmers tendered initial payments in amounts

of $16,043.78 for Coverage A and $15,948.86 for Coverage B.33 Plaintiff contends he demanded

a reinspection immediately thereafter, but Farmers did not conduct the reinspection as requested.34

On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff contends his counsel submitted a demand letter to Farmers and

enclosed a repair estimate in the amount of $233,673.86 for Coverage A and $16,442.29 for

Coverage B, which was denied by Farmers on September 30, 2022.35 Plaintiff avers Farmers never

retained an engineer or otherwise attempted to determine causation, and this constitutes bad faith.36

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 6.

32 Id. at 7.

33 Rec. Doc. 24 at 2.

34 Id. at 2–3.

35 Id. at 3.

36 Id.

According to Plaintiff, Farmers did not take any other action on the claim until Plaintiff

invoked the appraisal provision on February 15, 2023.37 Plaintiff alleges the appraisal award

tendered by Farmers was $38,000 short.38 Plaintiff contends there are questions of material fact in

dispute regarding Farmers’ refusal to pay the full value of Plaintiff’s claims that pre-date the

appraisal award.39 Plaintiff explains that Farmers’ duty under Louisiana law is to adjust and

investigate Plaintiff’s claims and this duty is not satisfied simply because Farmers requested

additional documentation.40 Plaintiff posits that Farmers had sufficient information to apprise the

full value of Plaintiff’s claim following the inspection on September 24, 2021, and on September

2, 2022, when Plaintiff’s counsel sent Farmers a demand letter including repair estimates.41

Plaintiff refutes the appraisal award, arguing it is missing damage allegedly caused by Hurricane

Ida, and the appraisal award excludes contents and recoverable depreciation.42 Plaintiff avers there

is a dispute of fact of whether the appraisers performed their duties required of them per the

policy.43

Plaintiff contends he has not yet completed depositions of Farmers’ corporate

representatives or experts.44 Plaintiff explains he wishes to depose Farmers’ desk field adjusters

37 Id. at 4.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 4–5.

41 Id. at 5.

42 Id. at 6.

43 Id. at 13.

44 Id. at 7.

involved with the claim, as well as the appraisers.45 Plaintiff requests that the Court defer

consideration of Farmers’ motion for summary judgment until Plaintiff has the benefit of

conducting depositions.46

Plaintiff contends Farmers cannot meet its burden of proving it properly adjusted Plaintiff’s

claim as a matter of law.47 Plaintiff asserts this Court should deny Farmers’ motion for summary

judgment.48

C. Farmers’ Arguments in Further Support of the Motion

In further support of the motion, Farmers contends Plaintiff fails to demonstrate which

facts would become available through discovery to warrant a deferral of the Court’s ruling on this

motion.49 Farmers avers there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute.50 While Plaintiff

contends the appraisers did not perform their duties per the policy, Farmers avers Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate what duties were required by the policy that the appraisers failed to perform.51

Farmers explains that the contact states “if the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement

to us, the amount agreed upon amount will be the amount of the loss,” and the award became

45 Id. at 8.

46 Id.

47 Id. at 15.

48 Id. at 19.

49 Rec. Doc. 25 at 1.

50 Id. at 2.

51 Id. at 3.

binding when the appraisers mutually agreed on the appraisal award, regardless of Plaintiff’s

disagreement with the award.52

According to Farmers, it timely paid what was owed for the claim prior to the appraisal

award.53 Farmers contends it issued supplemental payments after receiving satisfactory proof of

loss.54 Farmers explains it did not reinspect the property because Plaintiff chose to go through the

supplemental claims process.55 Farmers avers it timely and appropriately adjusted Plaintiff’s claim

in good faith.56

Following the September 3, 2022 demand letter from Plaintiff’s counsel, Farmers

explained it reasonably disputed the amounts of damages and causation.57 While Plaintiff argues

that Farmers used requests for additional information as an attempt to avoid its duty of good faith,

Farmers contends this assertion is unfounded.58

Farmers argues it is not liable to Plaintiff under Louisiana Revised Statute §§ 22:1892 or

1973.59 Farmers contends the undisputed facts demonstrate that Farmers had reasonable grounds

52 Id. at 4.

53 Id. at 5.

54 Id.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Id.

59 Id. at 6.

to dispute making additional payments and to request more information.60 Farmers contends it did

not act in bad faith, rather there was a reasonable dispute with the customer.61

Farmers argues the appraisal award is evidence Farmers was correct in disputing the

amount of damages claimed by Plaintiff in the demand letter.62 Farmers points out that the

appraisal award was closer to the amount of damages Farmers initially estimated, $62,762.84.63

Farmers contends this supports its refusal to pay the damages claimed by Plaintiff in the amount

of $250,120.15.64 Farmers avers that Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the appraisal

process does not create a triable issue, and the Court should grant the motion for summary

judgment.65

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

demonstrate “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.”66 To decide whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court

considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations

or weighing the evidence.”67 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving

60 Id.

61 Id. at 7.

62 Id.

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 Id. at 9.

66 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

67 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

party.68 Yet “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and

conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”69

If the entire record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then

no genuine issue of fact exists and, consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.70 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings.71 Instead, the nonmoving

party must identify specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that

evidence establishes a genuine issue for trial.72

The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of showing the

basis for its motion and identifying record evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.73 “To satisfy this burden, the movant may either (1) submit evidentiary

documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent’s claim or defense,

or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at

trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the

opponent’s claim or defense.”74 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to

the nonmoving party to “identify specific evidence in the record, and to articulate” precisely how

68 Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at

150).

69 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

70 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of

Ariz. v. Cites Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

71 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

72 See id.; Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).

73 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

74 Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted).

that evidence supports the nonmoving party’s claims.75 The nonmoving party must set forth

“specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component

of its case.”76

The nonmovant’s burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied

merely by creating “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by conclusory allegations,

by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”77 Moreover, the nonmoving party

may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.78

IV. Analysis

A. Outstanding Discovery

As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that additional discovery is necessary to develop

material facts and this Court should deny the instant motion as premature. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 does not require that any discovery take place before summary judgment can be

granted; if a party cannot adequately defend such a motion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)

is his remedy.79 The Fifth Circuit has long recognized that a plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery

prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not unlimited, and may be cut off when the

75 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Morris

v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).

76 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012).

77 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

78 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380.

79 New America Shipbuilders, Inc. v. United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Reflectone, Inc.

v. Farrand Optical Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 841, 843–44 (11th Cir. 1989); American Nurses Association v. State of

Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 729 (7th Cir. 1986); Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1081 (10th Cir. 1985); United

States of America, acting Through the Small Business Association v. Light, 766 F.2d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1985).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) was recodified without substantial change in the 2010 amendments as Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed by the plaintiff

to withstand a motion for summary judgment.80

The protection afforded by Rule 56(d) is an alternative to a response in opposition to

summary judgment under Rule 56(e) and is designed to safeguard against a premature or

improvident grant of summary judgment.81 To obtain a Rule 56(d) continuance, the nonmovant

must present specific facts explaining his inability to make a substantive response as required by

Rule 56(e) and by specifically demonstrating “how postponement of a ruling on the motion will

enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a

genuine issue of fact.”82 The nonmovant may not simply rely on vague assertions that discovery

will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.83

Plaintiff here did not file an affidavit or declaration. The Fifth Circuit has observed that

“[w]hile a party’s failure to comply with Rule 56(d) procedure does not preclude consideration of

the motion, some equivalent statement, preferably in writing ... is to be expected.”84 Assuming,

that Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery in the opposition memorandum constituted a

request for a Rule 56(d) continuance, the Court finds that Rule 56(d) may not be invoked by the

mere assertion that discovery is incomplete; the opposing party must demonstrate “how the

80 Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 694 F.2d 1017, 1029–30 (5th Cir. 1983). See Fisher v.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 895 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1990) and Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir.

1989).

81 10A Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2740 (1983).

82 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spence & Green Chemical Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th

Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082, 101 S.Ct. 866, 66 L.Ed.2d 806 (1981) (quoting Willmar Poultry Co. v.

Morton–Norwich Products, Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915, 96 S.Ct. 1116, 47

L.Ed.2d 320 (1976)).

83 Gossett v. Du–Ra–Kel Corp., 569 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1978).

84 Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986).

additional time will enable him to rebut the movant’s allegations of no genuine issue of fact.”85

Plaintiff’s casual reference to the existence of outstanding discovery falls short of showing how

additional time would enable it to meet its burden in opposing summary judgment. As such, the

Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument and will consider Farmers’ motion on the merits.

B. Plaintiff’s Contractual Claims

Farmers argues the contractual damages under the insurance policy at issue are set at

$100,816.47 based on the August 8, 2023 Appraisal Award, which was timely paid by Farmers on

August 23, 2023, and thus, no additional contractual damages can be sought. In opposition,

Plaintiff argues that the appraisal award was improper, payment was insufficient under the

contract, and the delay in payment constitutes a breach of the contract.

“Under Louisiana law, ‘[a]n insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should

be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil

Code.’”86 “Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties.”87

“When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further

interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.”88 “Courts lack the authority to alter

85 Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1083 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Patty Precision v. Brown &

Sharpe Mfr. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 1984)). In Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d

828, 833 (10th Cir. 1986).

86 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cadwallader v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 848 So. 2d 577, 580 (La. 2003)).

87 La. Civ. Code art. 2045.

88 Id.

the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual interpretation when the policy’s

provisions are couched in unambiguous terms.”89

The insurance policy’s “Appraisal” provision provides:

If you and we fail to agree on the amount of the loss, either you or we can make a

written demand for an appraisal of the loss. Each party will select a competent

appraiser and notify the other within 20 days of the appraiser’s identity. The two

appraisers will select a competent and impartial umpire. If the two appraisers are

unable to select an umpire within 15 days, you or we can request that the choice of

an umpire be made by a judge or court of record in the state where the residence

premises is located.

The appraisers will separately set the amount of loss determining the full

replacement cost and actual cash value for each item as needed. If the appraisers

submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will the

amount of the loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the

umpire. The written award by two of these three people for any item will set the

amount of loss and is binding on you and us when filed with us.

You will pay the appraiser selected by you. We will pay the appraiser selected by

us. You and we will split the other expenses of appraisal and the fee of the umpire.90

Contractually specified appraisal awards are presumed accurate.91 Further, as the policy

explicitly states that “[t]he written award by two of these three people for any item will set the

amount of loss and is binding on you and us when filed with us.” The burden of demonstrating

that the award should not be confirmed must fall upon the party challenging it.92

89 Cadwallader, 848 So. 2d at 580.

90 Rec. Doc. 21-3 at 32.

91 See In re Waters, 93 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir.1937) (surveying cases from numerous jurisdictions to

determine that “every reasonable intendment and presumption is in favor of an award of appraisers selected to

determine the value of property lost”).

92 See La. Civ. Code arts. 1983, 2045–46; St. Charles Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. United Fire & Cas.

Co., 681 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2010).

First, Plaintiff argues the appraisal award is invalid because Plaintiff’s selected appraiser

did not sign the appraisal award. However, a review of the record indicates the Appraisal Award

was signed by two appraisers, Bobby Foote and Tim May.93 Plaintiff further argues contents were

not included in the Appraisal Award, however, a review of the Appraisal Award indicates that the

amount of $4,200 was awarded for the actual cash value for “Contents.”94 As stated above, the

appraisal provision provides that “[t]he written award by two of these three people for any item

will set the amount of loss and is binding on you and us when filed with us.” Plaintiff has not

provided any evidence disputing the agreed upon Appraisal Award amount. Reasonable

differences in opinion are not sufficient to overturn a binding appraisal award.95 It is undisputed

that Plaintiff received a total of $93,300.48, minus the $7,516 deductible, in accordance with the

Appraisal Award amount of $100,816.47. The Appraisal Award is binding on the parties. For these

reasons, the Court grants summary judgment in Farmers’ favor as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Bad Faith Claims

Farmers seeks summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s bad faith claims pursuant to

Louisiana Revised Statute §§ 22:1892 and 22:1973. Section 1892 is titled “Payment and

adjustment of claims, policies other than life and health and accident; personal vehicle damage

claims; extension of time to respond to claims during emergency or disaster; penalties; arson-

related claim suspension.” That section provides in relevant part:

93 Rec. Doc. 24-9.

94 Id.

95 See Island Concepts, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2014 WL 5524379 (E.D. La. Oct.

31, 2024).

All insurers issuing any type of contract ... shall pay the amount of any claim due

any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the

insured or any party in interest. . . . Except in the case of catastrophic loss, the

insurer shall initiate loss adjustment of a property damage claim within thirty days

after notification of loss by the claimant. . . . All insurers shall make a written offer

to settle any property damage claim, including third-party claim, within thirty days

after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss of that claim. . . . [F]ailure to make such

payment within thirty days after receipt of such satisfactory written proofs and

demand therefor or failure to make a written offer to settle any property damage

claim, including a third-party claim, within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory

proofs of loss of that claim . . . when such failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious,

or without probable cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty, in addition to the

amount of the loss. . . .96

Section 1973 is entitled “Good faith duty; claims settlement practices; causes of action;

penalties.” It provides, in relevant part:

An insurer . . . owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer

has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a

reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any

insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages sustained as a

result of the breach. . . . Any one of the following acts, if knowingly committed or

performed by an insurer, constitutes a breach of the insurer's duties imposed in

Subsection A of this Section:

. . .

(5) Failing to pay the amount of any claim due any person insured by the contract

within sixty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the claimant when

such failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.

(6) Failing to pay claims pursuant to R.S. 22:1893 when such failure is arbitrary,

capricious, or without probable cause.97

“One who claims entitlement to penalties and attorney fees [under these statutes] has the

burden of proving the insurer . . . was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable case.”98 The

plaintiff must show that the insurer willfully refused to pay, and this refusal was not based on a

96 Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1892.

97 Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:1973.

98 Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003–0107 (La.10/21/03); 857 So.2d 1012, 1020.

good-faith defense.99 If there is a reasonable and legitimate dispute regarding the extent of the

insurance claim, the court should not infer bad faith from an insurer’s failure to pay within the

time limits provided by statute.100

Farmers argues Plaintiff’s claims for bad faith penalties should be dismissed because it

timely paid Plaintiff pursuant to the appraisal award.101 Plaintiff contends there are questions of

material fact in dispute regarding Farmers’ refusal to pay the full value of Plaintiff’s claims that

pre-date the appraisal award.102 Having carefully considered the law and facts in the record, the

Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, which preclude summary

judgment. “When the insured claims penalties for refusal to pay a claim timely, the inquiry usually

focuses on whether the insurer acted reasonably in its adjustment of the claim based on the facts

known or that should have been known by the insurer. Normally, the reasonableness of the

insurer’s claims handling will be a factual issue, and cases involving this issue will be fact

specific.”103 For these reasons, it would be inappropriate to grant summary judgment on these

issues. Accordingly,

99 Reed, 857 So.2d at 1021.

100 Id.

101 Id.

102 Id.

103 15 William Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, III, La. Civ. L. Treatise: Insurance Law and Practice

§ 11:15 (4th ed. 2020); see also Goree v. Lincoln Parish Detention Center Com'n, No. 09-745, 2010 WL 4295328, at

*3 (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2010) (citing Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 641 (5th Cir.

1985) (rev'd on other grounds)).

IT HEREBY ORDERED that Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to the claim for breach of

contract. The motion is DENIED as to the claim for bad faith adjusting penalties.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 22nc_ day of August, 2025.

Ne nag hed Grown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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