Wilson v. Escambia Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JASMINE WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV.ACT. NO. 1:24-cv-168-TFM-M

)

ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Cabaniss’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

(Doc. 29, filed 12/02/24). Plaintiff filed her response and Defendant filed her reply. Docs. 31, 34.

For the reasons detailed below, Defendant Cabaniss’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 29) is DENIED.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)

because a substantial part of the events that gave rise to the claims in this matter occurred in this

judicial district.

No party contests jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate support for both.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case arises out of the alleged rape of Plaintiff Jasmine Wilson (“Plaintiff” or

“Wilson”), a former student at Escambia County High School, by her former teacher, Kasuan

Bullard (“Bullard”).1 See Doc. 26. At the time of the alleged rape, Bullard taught drivers

education and health at Escambia County High School and was the defensive coordinator for the

football team and head coach of the baseball team. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that Bullard engaged

with female students in an inappropriate and sexualized manner that was open and observable to

students, teachers, and staff. Id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that Bulland began grooming her in the tenth

grade, and that the acts of grooming were open and observed by teachers, staff, and students. Id.

at 7.

Bullard’s classroom was next to that of another teacher’s classroom, Rosa Howard

(“Howard”). Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that Howard gave Bullard unfettered access to isolate

Plaintiff. Id. On May 21, 2021, Plaintiff states that she was in Howard’s classroom to complete

make up work. Id. at 9. Bullard went to Howard’s classroom and requested Plaintiff ride in the

car for one of Bullard’s drivers’ education students. Id. at 10. Howard sent Plaintiff with Bullard

and a male student for the male student to do a driving session. Id. After the test was over, Plaintiff

asserts that Bullard told the students he needed assistance with something in the new gym. Id.

Plaintiff states that she went to the new gym and hid in the bathroom until she thought the other

student would have also arrived, but when she came out the other student was not there. Id.

Bullard then asked Plaintiff to go with him to get some boxes and led her through a door into the

new girls’ locker room where he raped her. Id. Plaintiff recalls as follows: “Once inside the locker

room, Bullard started touching Plaintiff. He grabbed Plaintiff by her neck, choked her, and pulled

her hair. Bullard unbuttoned her pants, forced Plaintiff to turn around, bent her over the countertop,

and raped her. Plaintiff was terrified, unable to move or fight back.” Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff states

1 Plaintiff was a student at Escambia County High School at the time of the events at issue in the

Complaint, but she has since graduated and is over the age of majority. Bullard died prior to the

filing of the Complaint.

that she was crying and that Bullard forced her to put her clothes back on. Id. at 11.

Plaintiff further states that in the aftermath of the rape, her mental health declined, and she

engaged in self-harm. Id. at 11. She also states that, though she was enrolled in summer school,

she was terrified to attend as Bullard was there and she often skipped school out of fear that he

would rape her again. Id. In mid-June, Plaintiff told her sister about the rape and her sister reported

it to Defendant Amy Cabaniss (“Cabaniss”), the school principal. Id. Cabaniss called Plaintiff to

come to campus and make a report, which Plaintiff did. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff asserts that Cabaniss

did not provide her with any information about the school’s Title IX policy, reporting procedures,

supportive measures, or her right to report the incident to the U.S. Department of Education or

Department of Justice. Id. at 12. Cabaniss only told Plaintiff that she would make a police report

and there would be an investigation. Id.

Prior to coming to the school to report the rape, Plaintiff took a handful of pills. Id. at 11.

After Plaintiff reported the rape, she began to feel dizzy and disclosed that she took the pills before

coming in. Id. at 12. The school nurse drove her to Atmore Community Hospital. Id. The same

day, other students began bullying her online. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the only people who knew

what happened were teachers and administrators at the school, Plaintiff’s best friend, and

Plaintiff’s sister. Id. Plaintiff does not believe her sister or friend would have told anyone. Id.

Plaintiff experienced trouble sleeping and concentrating, flashbacks to the rape, and panic attacks.

Id. She required inpatient psychiatric treatment. Id.

Plaintiff states that no one from the school updated her about what was happening as a

result of her reporting the rape. Id. at 13. Ultimately, the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office issued

arrest warrants for Bullard for rape in the first degree and sexual contact with a student under the

age of nineteen. Id. The day Bullard was supposed to surrender himself to the Sheriff’s office, he

died in a car crash. Id.

Following Bullard’s death, the bullying continued. Id. at 14. Plaintiff alleges that Howard

also began harassing her. Id. Before the fall semester began, Plaintiff approached Cabaniss about

the bullying. Id. at 15. She requested to attend school virtually, noting that she did not wish to go

back to the site of her rape. Id. Cabaniss denied the request and told her she either had to come

in person or attend another high school, also in person. Id. Cabaniss suggested Plaintiff be placed

in classes with students she would be comfortable with and took the names of such students from

Plaintiff. Id. However, when school started, Plaintiff states she did not have supportive students

in a majority of her classes. Id. Plaintiff was placed in classes that required her to go down the

hallway near her rape site, and she would often skip classes requiring that route and cry in the

bathroom. Id. The harassment and bullying continued from students, while teachers and

administrators also gossiped about Plaintiff. Id. at 16. Plaintiff reported the bullying and

harassment to Cabaniss, but it continued. Id. After her therapist met with Cabaniss, Plaintiff was

finally permitted to attend school virtually. Id. at 16-17. Despite counseling, Plaintiff still

struggles with emotional distress, rumination, embarrassment, humiliation, and trauma, which she

states is exacerbated by the repeated harassment from her classmates and teachers. Id. at 18.

B. Procedural Background

On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed her original complaint with this Court. Doc. 1. The

Escambia County Board of Education (“BOE”) filed an answer on June 24, 2024. See Doc. 8.

Howard filed her answer on June 20, 2024. See Doc. 6. On July 3, 2024, Cabaniss filed her motion

to dismiss the original complaint. See Doc. 11. Then, on July 16, 2024, Howard filed a motion

for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. 16. On November 5, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file

an amended complaint. Doc. 25. Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on November 18, 2024,

which became the operative complaint. Doc. 26.

As to Cabaniss, Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts claims for denial of equal

protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment (Count VIII). This is the only

count asserted against Cabaniss.

Both BOE and Howard filed answers to Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Docs. 27, 28.

Howard filed another motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. 30. Cabaniss filed the instant

motion to dismiss. Doc. 29. Plaintiff filed her response to Cabaniss’ motion to dismiss, and

Cabaniss filed her reply. Docs. 31, 34. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review, and the

Court finds oral argument unnecessary.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint on the

basis that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);

see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’ [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556.”). Because a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) motion questions the

legal sufficiency of a complaint, in assessing the merits of the motion, the court must assume that

all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert,

499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990); but see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,) (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept

as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.”). Moreover, all factual allegations shall be construed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1382, 103

L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989). Obviously, therefore, a district court may not resolve factual disputes when

adjudicating a motion to dismiss. Page v. Postmaster Gen. and Chief Exec. Officer of the U.S.

Postal Serv., 493 F. App’x 994, 995 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing, among other cases, Lawrence, 919

F.2d at 1529, for the proposition that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the existence of disputed

material facts precludes a district court from granting a motion to dismiss). “‘When considering a

motion to dismiss . . . the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and all exhibits attached

thereto.’” Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)); see

also Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2012)

(“Because the Ellis law firm’s dunning letter and enclosed documents were attached to the Reeses’

complaint as an exhibit, we treat them as part of the complaint for [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

purposes.”).

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Cabaniss argues that the claim asserted against her (Count VIII) is due to be dismissed

because it contains insufficient factual allegations and fails to state a claim for relief. Specifically,

Cabaniss argues that, other than Howard who Plaintiff admits was fired the day after the rape,

Plaintiff fails to allege the identity of any students that harassed her, the dates upon which the

harassment took place, the dates that the reports of harassment were made to Cabaniss, the number

of times the harassment took place and the specifics of any alleged harassment that was allegedly

reported to Cabaniss. Doc. 29 at 10. Cabaniss also argues there is no allegation that the harassing

remarks took place when such individuals would be in a position to be disciplined by Cabaniss,

nor is there a sufficient description of what the alleged harassment was. Id.

Further, Cabaniss argues that Plaintiff fails to state a viable equal protection claim against

Cabaniss because the allegations against Cabaniss do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

Id. at 12. Rather, Cabaniss counters that the matter was timely reported to law enforcement and

an investigation was undertaken and arrest warrants were issued against Bullard, Plaintiff was

permitted to finish most of her coursework at home over the summer, Cabaniss offered Plaintiff

the option of attending another high school before the school year started, and about one month

after the school year began Cabaniss allowed Plaintiff to attend school virtually. Id. at 13.

Plaintiff counters that she has plausibly alleged that students and teachers harassed her

following the rape, that Cabaniss knew of the harassment and was deliberately indifferent to it,

that Cabaniss knew the harassment posed a great risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety but

disregarded that risk, that Cabaniss’ response to the harassment was unreasonable, and that in

“doing nothing,” Cabaniss deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to continue attending school. See

Doc. 31.

“To establish that a defendant is liable under Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause, a

plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent.” Adams v. Demopolis City Sch., 80 F.4th 1259, 1273

(11th Cir. 2023). “[A] school district engages in intentional discrimination . . . when it is

deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student . . . harassment.” Id.; see also Hill v.

Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A government official . . . may be held liable under

section 1983 upon a showing of deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment.”). The

Eleventh Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a principal “effectively did nothing” in

response to sexual harassment. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th

Cir. 2010).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the bullying and harassment of Plaintiff related to the rape

continued, and despite notifying Cabaniss of the continuous harassment, Cabaniss did nothing to

stop it. While Cabaniss may have offered to put Plaintiff in classes with supportive students or

ultimately allowed Plaintiff to attend school virtually, the harassment continued, and Plaintiff

asserts that Cabaniss took no action to address the harassment with the harassing students or

teachers. At this early stage, Plaintiff has alleged enough to trip over the bar established by Rule

8 to survive a motion to dismiss. This ruling in no way precludes a review of the issue at the

summary judgment stage. In fact, both parties cite to Adams, 80 F.4th 1259, which was on

summary judgment standard, not a motion to dismiss. That applies a very different standard of

review after robust discovery and allows the consideration of evidence. The Court must stick with

what has been alleged and will not raise the standard to unreasonable specificity when pleading

with particularity is not required here.

Thus, Defendant Cabaniss’ motion to dismiss Count III for failure to state a claim is due to

be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant Cabaniss’ motion to dismiss (Doc.

29) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2025.

/s/ Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE