Sarabia v. Noem

Case: 24-50750 Document: 56-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/22/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________

FILED

August 22, 2025

No. 24-50750

____________ Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Enrique Villegas Sarabia,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Kika

Scott, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, USCIS,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:23-CV-964

______________________________

Before Wiener, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:

In 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant Enrique Villegas Sarabia applied to the

United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for a

certificate of citizenship. USCIS rejected his claim, and he appealed to the

Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”). The AAO dismissed his appeal

and subsequently denied his timely motion to reconsider and reopen the

appeal. Almost five years later, he filed this lawsuit pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1503(a) seeking a declaration that he is an American citizen. The district

court dismissed his suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that

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No. 24-50750

the statute of limitations had expired. But § 1503(a)’s procedural time bar is

nonjurisdictional, and Villegas’s suit was timely. We accordingly

REVERSE the district court’s judgment of dismissal and REMAND for

further proceedings.

I

A

We begin with Villegas’s relevant family history. Villegas’s mother is

a Mexican citizen. His father was born in Eagle Pass, Texas, in 1955, and

lived in the United States for the first five years of his life. He then moved to

Mexico in 1960, but returned to the United States in 1965, at which time he

became a migrant farm worker. He has remained in the United States ever

since. Villegas was born in Mexico in 1976, by which time his father had been

present in the United States for a cumulative total of sixteen years, seven of

which were after he turned fourteen. His parents were not married at the

time of his birth. They subsequently married in Eagle Pass, Texas, in 1977.

The Immigration and Nationality Act allows individuals to apply to

USCIS for a certificate of American citizenship. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1452.

When determining whether to recognize citizenship, USCIS considers “the

statute in effect at the time of the child’s birth.” Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d

419, 423 (5th Cir. 2013). Villegas, as an individual born abroad to a citizen

father and noncitizen mother, falls within 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7), which, in

1976, recognized the claimant’s citizenship if the citizen father “was

physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period

or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after

attaining the age of fourteen years.” 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1976).

Individuals who believe they meet these requirements can file an

Application for Certification of Citizenship—Form N-600—with USCIS.

8 U.S.C. § 1452; 8 C.F.R. §§ 106.2(b)(7), 341.1. The claimant must establish

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their citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 341.2(c). If

they fail to do so, or if their application is otherwise denied, they may

administratively appeal the determination within thirty days of service. 8

C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(i).

Appeals are considered by the AAO. 1 If the AAO dismisses the

appeal, or an administrative denial otherwise finalizes, the claimant can,

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), petition a federal district court for a

declaration. That section provides:

If any person who is within the United States claims a right or

privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such

right or privilege by any department or independent agency, or

official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the

United States, such person may institute an action under the

provisions of section 2201 of title 28 against the head of such

department or independent agency for a judgment declaring

him to be a national of the United States, except that no such

action may be instituted in any case if the issue of such person’s

status as a national of the United States (1) arose by reason of,

or in connection with any removal proceeding under the

provisions of this chapter or any other act, or (2) is in issue in

any such removal proceeding. An action under this subsection

may be instituted only within five years after the final

administrative denial of such right or privilege and shall be filed

in the district court of the United States for the district in which

such person resides or claims a residence, and jurisdiction over

such officials in such cases is conferred upon those courts.

_____________________

1

Although some regulations refer to this entity as the “Administrative Appeals

Unit,” defined as “the appellate body which considers cases under the appellate

jurisdiction of the Associate Commissioner, Examinations,” 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iv), the

“Administrative Appeals Office” issued the opinion in this case. We follow that document,

the parties’ briefs, and the district court in referring to it as the “AAO.”

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8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).

B

Villegas complied with this framework and filed an application with

USCIS in July 2012. In March 2013, USCIS requested evidence that his

father was physically present in the United States for ten years prior to

Villegas’s birth. Villegas provided “his father’s written statement, a

statement from his paternal grandfather, his father’s Texas state birth

certificate, his [paternal uncle’s] 1956 birth certificate showing his birth in

Texas, his grandfather’s 1963 registration for the selective service,” and

other evidence, such as affidavits from his mother and family friends, his

father’s social security earnings in the years preceding Villegas’s birth, and

photographs of his father in the United States prior to Villegas’s birth.

Nevertheless, the San Antonio Field Office denied his application on March

27, 2015, concluding that he did not submit adequate proof that his father was

in the United States for the required time period. 2 USCIS did not interview

Villegas’s father, who was in prison at the time.

On April 28, 2015, Villegas timely appealed the decision to the AAO,

arguing that the evidence demonstrated his father’s physical presence in the

United States. Nearly three years later, on February 22, 2018, the AAO

dismissed his appeal, finding that he failed to demonstrate his father’s

physical presence for the statutorily required period. On April 2, 2018,

Villegas filed a motion to reconsider and reopen the AAO’s decision on the

basis that his father had become available to interview, and attached a more

detailed affidavit from his father. The AAO denied this motion on

September 14, 2018. On August 4, 2023, almost five years after the denial of

_____________________

2

It also denied his petition because Villegas failed to demonstrate that his father

was, in fact, his biological father. Villegas has since established paternity.

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the motion, Villegas petitioned the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas for a declaration of his citizenship pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1503.

C

The district court judge referred all pretrial matters to the magistrate

judge, and the Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(“R&R”) finding that § 1503(a) waives sovereign immunity and specifically

limits subject-matter jurisdiction to a five-year window, and that this court

has previously held that § 1503(a)’s limitations period is jurisdictional.

Nevertheless, the R&R compared § 1503(a)’s language to that of statutes in

both Supreme Court cases and a recent Eleventh Circuit case before

concluding that, because the reference to jurisdiction is in the same sentence

as the procedural time bar, Congress intended for the limitation to be

jurisdictional.

The R&R then determined that the AAO’s dismissal of Villegas’s

appeal on February 22, 2018, started the time bar’s clock, not the denial of

the motion to reopen, based on its interpretation of our decision in Gonzalez

v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 2019). Since Villegas’s complaint was not

filed within five years of the dismissal of his appeal, the magistrate judge

found the complaint untimely and recommended dismissal for want of

jurisdiction.

Villegas objected, arguing that (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)’s time bar is not

jurisdictional; (2) even if the time bar is jurisdictional, his complaint was

timely; and (3) the evidence in his motion to reopen was qualitatively

different from that in his appeal, and the time bar therefore should equitably

toll. The district court “conducted an independent review of the entire

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record,” denied his objections, and dismissed the complaint without

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Villegas timely appealed.

II

We review a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.

Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759, 769 (5th Cir. 2011).

We first consider whether the time bar in § 1503(a) is jurisdictional before

turning to the timeliness of Villegas’s suit.

A

1

Attaching the “jurisdictional” tag to a procedural time bar carries

great weight. “When Congress enacts a jurisdictional requirement, it

‘mark[s] the bounds’ of a court’s power: A litigant’s failure to follow the rule

‘deprives a court of all authority to hear a case.’” Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense,

601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024) (alteration in original) (first quoting Boechler v.

Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022); and then quoting

United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 409 (2015)). Therefore, “a

court must enforce the rule even if no party has raised it. And a court must

adhere to the rule ‘even if equitable considerations would support’ excusing

its violation.” Id. (quoting Wong, 575 U.S. at 409); see also Boechler, 596 U.S.

at 203 (“Jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited, must be

raised by courts sua sponte, and, as relevant to this case, do not allow for

equitable exceptions.”). On the other hand, “nonjurisdictional rules govern

how courts and litigants operate within those bounds” by “seek[ing] to

promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take

certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Santos-Zacaria v.

Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023) (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v.

Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)).

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Over the past twenty years—and increasingly in the past five—the

Supreme Court has revisited its approach to whether procedural time bars in

statutes of limitations are jurisdictional. 3 Due to the “risk of disruption and

waste that accompanies the jurisdictional label,” courts should “not lightly

apply it to procedures Congress enacted to keep things running smoothly and

efficiently.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 158 (2023). Instead, they

should conduct a “clear statement” test, under which a time bar is

jurisdictional only when “traditional tools of statutory construction . . .

plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional

consequences.” Id. (quoting Wong, 575 U.S. at 410). This approach

“‘leave[s] the ball in Congress’[s] court,’ ensuring that courts impose harsh

jurisdictional consequences only when Congress unmistakably has so

instructed.” Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 416–17 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)); accord Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190,

2201–02 (2025) (“[O]ur pattern of recent decisions shows that we will not

categorize a provision as ‘jurisdictional’ unless the signal [from Congress] is

exceedingly strong.”). While “Congress need not ‘incant magic words’” to

impose jurisdictional consequences, Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203 (quoting

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)), “[w]here

multiple plausible interpretations exist—only one of which is jurisdictional—

it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading is clear.” Santos-

Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 416 (alteration in original) (quoting Boechler, 596 U.S. at

205).

_____________________

3

The Supreme Court issued another such opinion during the pendency of this

appeal, finding that the 30-day time bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is not jurisdictional. See

Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025).

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2

Our court has previously touched on whether § 1503(a)’s time bar is

jurisdictional, but without conducting the Supreme Court’s sanctioned

analysis. In Gonzalez, the claimant, Margarita Gonzalez, filed a motion to

reconsider the cancellation of her certificate of citizenship in 2008. 926 F.3d

at 187. USCIS denied her motion. Id. Then, in 2014, she filed a motion to

reopen. Id. In 2016, USCIS denied this motion, too. Id. She then filed a §

1503(a) petition. Id. at 187–88.

The Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, “arguing the suit was barred by Section 1503(a)’s limitations

provision because Gonzalez failed to bring her claim within five years of the

2008 Denial—the 2016 Denial did not restart the limitations clock.” Id. at

188. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Gonzalez’s suit for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Gonzalez appealed.

On appeal, we considered whether a subsequent administrative denial

restarts the time bar’s clock. But we off-handedly referenced § 1503(a)’s

“further jurisdictional requirements,” including that a suit “may be

instituted only within five years after the final administrative denial of such

right or privilege.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)). We also noted that “a

plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies.” Id. at 188 n.7. We

ultimately held that the phrase “final administrative denial” refers to the

“first final administrative denial,” and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id.

at 190. Later panels have since cited this interpretation. E.g., Flores v.

Hartnett, No. 21-50139, 2022 WL 101978, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (per

curiam) (“We stated that ‘an action brought under Section 1503(a) must

comply with . . . jurisdictional requirements,’ including the five-year statute

of limitations period that begins to run after a final administrative denial as

well as the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (alteration in original)

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(quoting Gonzalez, 926 F.3d at 188)); Cambranis v. Blinken, 994 F.3d 457, 463

(5th Cir. 2021) (“But the person must bring the [§ 1503(a)] action ‘within

five years after the final administrative denial of such right or privilege,’

otherwise the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the

claim.” (citation omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)) (citing Gonzalez, 926

F.3d at 188)).

Consequently, the Government hangs its hat on a “‘long line’ of cases

from the Fifth Circuit that have repeatedly interpretated the limitations [sic]

as jurisdictional.” In addition to the above cases, it cites Flores v. Pompeo, 936

F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2019), in which we concluded that § 1503(a)’s residence

requirement is jurisdictional. Id. at 276 n.2. We explicitly confined our

holding and analysis to “the residence requirement.” Id. But that holding

does not turn the entire provision jurisdictional. 4

Moreover, our statement in Gonzalez regarding the time bar was

dictum. “A statement is dictum if it ‘could have been deleted without

seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding’ and ‘being

peripheral, may not have received the full and careful consideration of the

court that uttered it.’” Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 721

(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 n.11 (5th Cir.

2000)); see also Obiter dictum, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)

(defining dictum as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial

opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore

not precedential”). “A statement is not dictum if it is necessary to the result

_____________________

4

Although Flores premised its conclusion on the fact that the jurisdictional clause

is appended to the remainder of the provision, it did not otherwise conduct a true “clear

statement” test as we do below. See 936 F.3d at 276 n.2. We therefore decline to adopt

that same reasoning here. Nevertheless, the Flores panel correctly concluded that the

residency requirement is jurisdictional. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.

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or constitutes an explication of the governing rules of law.” Bray, 372 F.3d

at 721. In Gonzalez, we focused on the meaning of “the final administrative

denial.” 926 F.3d at 188–90. We merely assumed, without holding, that the

time bar itself was jurisdictional. See id. We did not give the issue “the full

and careful consideration of the court.” Bray, 372 F.3d at 721 (quoting

Gochicoa, 238 F.3d at 286 n.11). 5 Nor did we conduct a clear statement test

in either Hartnett or Cambranis when citing back to Gonzalez. This renders

our statement of jurisdiction dictum, and it is therefore nonbinding. See

Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 799 F.3d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 2015) (“While ‘[i]t is

well-established in this circuit that one panel of this Court may not overrule

another,’ that rule does not apply to dicta.” (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. Segura, 747 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2014))).

Even if we were to strike new ground on our treatment of dicta and

view the jurisdictional nature of the time bar as necessary to the court’s

ultimate disposition (because it dismissed for want of jurisdiction), the

Gonzalez opinion’s lack of analysis on this matter renders it non-precedential.

“If a decision simply states that ‘the court is dismissing “for lack of

jurisdiction” when some threshold fact has not been established,’ it is

understood as a ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]’ that receives ‘no

precedential effect.’” Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 160 (alteration in original)

(quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511). Drive-by jurisdictional rulings “contain[]

no discussion of whether the provision was ‘“technically jurisdictional”’ or

what in the case would have ‘turn[ed] on that characterization.’” Id. (second

alteration in original) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 512). Instead, “[t]here

is nothing more than an ‘unrefined dispositio[n]’ stating that a ‘threshold

fact’ must ‘b[e] established’ for there to be ‘jurisdiction.’” Id. (first

_____________________

5

Indeed, the parties’ briefs in Gonzalez assumed that the time bar was jurisdictional

without further discussion.

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alteration added) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511); accord Riley, 145 S. Ct.

at 2202 (describing drive-by jurisdictional statements as “loosely stat[ing]

that ‘jurisdictio[n]’ was lacking without considering whether the defect

really concerned a limitation on the court’s capacity to decide as opposed to

a threshold requirement that a party had to satisfy in order to go forward”

(second alteration in original) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511)). Such is

the case in Gonzalez, which conducted no analysis of the statute’s

jurisdictional nature, especially as it related to the time bar. 6 We decline to

attribute precedential value to this assumption of jurisdictional

consequence. 7

We therefore analyze § 1503(a)’s procedural time bar under the clear

statement test.

_____________________

6

This is not the first time that a court improperly attributed the “jurisdictional”

tag to a statutory provision. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161

(2010) (“While perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between jurisdictional conditions

and claim-processing rules can be confusing in practice. Courts—including this Court—

have sometimes mischaracterized claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action

as jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that characterization was not central to the

case, and thus did not require close analysis.”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–55

(2004) (“Courts, including this Court, it is true, have been less than meticulous . . . ; they

have more than occasionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time

prescriptions in rules of court. . . . ‘Classifying time prescriptions, even rigid ones, under

the heading “subject matter jurisdiction”’ can be confounding. Clarity would be facilitated

if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only

for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the

persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” (citation

modified) (citations omitted) (quoting Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 434 (1996))).

7

We have previously recognized the doctrine of drive-by jurisdictional rulings,

albeit in a slightly different context. See USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d

274, 283 (5th Cir. 2011).

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3

The clear statement test, by its very name, requires us to scrutinize

the statutory text. While the entire provision is important, the time bar itself

falls within the final sentence:

An action under this subsection may be instituted only within

five years after the final administrative denial of such right or

privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United

States for the district in which such person resides or claims a

residence, and jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is

conferred upon those courts.

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The provision has no immediately clear jurisdictional

reading. In other words, it does not explicitly divest a court of jurisdiction

where the filing is made outside of the five-year filing requirement.

Accordingly, a more robust statutory analysis is required. We address the

district court’s reliance on waiver of sovereign immunity before conducting

a clear statement test and discussing the Government’s counterarguments.

i

The R&R concluded that § 1503(a) waives sovereign immunity by

“specifically creat[ing] a cause of action for declaratory relief for persons

within the United States asserting a right or privilege of citizenship against

the heads of any federal agency denying said right or privilege.” That is

correct. But it then stated: “Although § 1503(a) specifically confers subject

matter jurisdiction upon the courts, it specifically limits that jurisdiction to a

five-year window . . . . Because § 1503(a) acts as a condition limiting the

Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, it is jurisdictional in nature.”

This contravenes Supreme Court precedent.

In Wilkins v. United States, the Court considered whether the Quiet

Title Act’s twelve-year statute of limitations period is jurisdictional. 598

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U.S. at 155. After concluding that Congress did not clearly imbue the time

bar with jurisdictional consequences, the majority addressed an argument

urged by both the Government and the dissent: that “conditions on waivers

of [sovereign] immunity [are] subject-matter jurisdictional.” Id. at 161. The

majority disagreed. “If associating time limits with waivers of sovereign

immunity clearly made those limits jurisdictional, equitable exceptions would

be just as clearly foreclosed.” Id. Instead, “‘the terms of the United States’

waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction’

and . . . ‘“a statute of limitations constitutes a condition on the waiver.”’”

Id. at 162–63 (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S.

834, 841 (1986)); accord Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 416 (noting that

“nonjurisdictional rules govern how courts and litigants operate within [the]

bounds” of a court’s adjudicatory authority). We therefore do not attribute

any weight to the statute’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

ii

The question remains: What does the statute really say? The sentence

containing the term “jurisdiction” establishes (1) a five-year time bar after

final administrative denial; (2) venue in the district of the petitioner’s

residence; and (3) jurisdiction over “such officials” in specific courts. 8

U.S.C. § 1503(a). The jurisdictional clause is set off and refers back to other

phrases throughout the provision: jurisdiction is conferred upon “those

courts” over “such officials” in “such cases.” Id. Which courts? “[T]he

district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides

or claims a residence.” 8 Id. Which officials? We look back to the first

sentence: “the head of [any department or independent agency]” that denied

_____________________

8

The clear statement test thus reinforces our determination in Flores that the

residency requirement is jurisdictional. See 936 F.3d at 276 n.2.

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the petitioner a claimed “right or privilege as a national of the United

States.” Id. Which cases? Those filed by the claimant against the head of

the department or agency. See id. No aspect of the jurisdictional clause

clearly refers back to the five-year time bar. That does not amount to a clear

statement that the time bar itself is jurisdictional. See Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2202

(“[The time bar] tells [claimants] what they must do if they want judicial

review, but it provides no directives to courts.” (emphasis in original)).

While this approach may seem unduly reductive, we find support in

the Supreme Court’s opinion in Boechler. There, the Court considered a

provision of the Tax Code that reads as follows: “The person may, within 30

days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review

of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect

to such matter).” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 204 (quoting I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1)).

The Court, deciding whether the provision imbued jurisdictional

consequences upon the time bar, stated that “[t]he answer depends on the

meaning of ‘such matter,’ the phrase marking the bounds of the Tax Court’s

jurisdiction.” Id. To determine the meaning of that phrase, it invoked the

“clear antecedent” rule, searching for a noun or noun phrase that would

clearly attach to the reference. Id. While the statute in Boechler had no clear

antecedent, § 1503(a) has clear antecedents for each of “such officials,”

“those courts,” and “such cases.” But none of those terms reasonably or

clearly refers back to the time bar.

It matters not “that the jurisdictional grant and filing deadline appear

in the same provision, even the same sentence.” Id. at 206. Indeed, “[a]

requirement ‘does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a

section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions.’” Id. at 206–

07 (quoting Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 155). This would not be the first time a court

“parsed a single statutory sentence to distinguish between its jurisdictional

and nonjurisdictional elements.” Id. at 207. Nor is it relevant that the

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language defining the procedural requirement is rigid or harsh. See Harrow,

601 U.S. at 483 (noting that, while procedural requirements typically “read

as categorical commands (e.g., a person ‘shall file in this court,’ ‘shall file by

that time,’ ‘shall include the following documents’)[,] . . . Congress legislates

against the backdrop of judicial doctrines creating exceptions, and typically

expects those doctrines to apply”). The precedent is clear: rather than focus

on proximity of the jurisdictional clause or rigidity of the procedural time bar,

we must search for “a clear tie between the deadline and the jurisdictional

grant.” Boechler, 596 U.S. at 207. This clear tie is plainly missing in §

1503(a).

Boechler also provided an example of a statute where the jurisdictional

element is clear: “[T]he Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction under this

paragraph to enjoin any action or proceeding unless a timely appeal has been

filed under subsection (d)(1).” Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 6330(e)(1)). That “clear

statement” can only be read one way. Such is not the case with § 1503(a).

At best, if there is another reasonable interpretation supporting the

“jurisdictional” reading, it is one of multiple. See Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S.

at 416 (“[W]here multiple plausible interpretations exist—only one of which

is jurisdictional—it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading

is clear.” (quoting Boechler, 596 U.S. at 205)).

iii

The Government insists that Boechler is distinguishable. It argues that

the Supreme Court “noted that when a ‘long line’ of decisions ‘left

undisturbed by Congress’ has treated similar requirements as jurisdictional,

. . . the Supreme Court presumes that Congress intended to follow that

course. No such ‘long line’ of authority exist[ed] regarding” the statute at

issue in Boechler. Moreover, the Government claims that the ambiguous

phrases in § 1503(a) “have an obvious antecedent”—those described

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above—and that the terms are clearer and reasonably defined in the same

subsection. None of these arguments turns Boechler distinguishable.

As the Government concedes, Boechler is “difficult at first glance to

reconcile with [the Government’s] arguments.” So, in an effort to

distinguish the case, it claims that “the analysis remains very much statute

specific.” While we agree that the issue is certainly “statute specific”—it

must be, as a matter of statutory interpretation—the Supreme Court’s

approach in Boechler is highly applicable, especially given the similar nature

of a proximate reference to jurisdiction without an explicit link to the time

bar. And, although the Fifth Circuit’s line of cases may have considered

various phrases in this statutory provision, none of them performed a true

clear statement analysis, especially regarding the time bar. Further, our line

of cases differs greatly from the “long line” contemplated by the Supreme

Court. See Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2202–03 (considering John R. Sand & Gravel

Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008), which relied on “decisions going

back more than a century” that “had held that the provision in question and

its predecessors were truly jurisdictional” (emphasis added)). These

arguments fail.

The Government also cites Sloan v. Drummond Co., 102 F.4th 1169

(11th Cir. 2024), in which the Eleventh Circuit court considered whether the

time bar in 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) is jurisdictional. That statute reads, in

pertinent part:

Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of

the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States

court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred, by

filing in such court within sixty days following the issuance of

such Board order a written petition praying that the order be

modified or set aside. . . . Upon such filing, the court shall have

jurisdiction of the proceeding . . . .

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33 U.S.C. § 921(c). The court identified three factors to consider when

conducting such an analysis: “the text, the statutory context, and the degree

of flexibility afforded to potential claimants.” Sloan, 102 F.4th at 1174–75.

Specifically, it looked for references to jurisdiction, whether the language was

in the jurisdictional section of the statute, and whether the scheme was

designed to be strict on litigants. Id. at 1175.

As an initial matter, this tripartite test contradicts Supreme Court case

law, and we therefore reject it. Boechler concluded that “[a] requirement

‘does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a

statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions.’” 596 U.S. at 206–07

(quoting Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 155). Moreover, if the Supreme Court’s recent

run of opinions tells us anything, it is that we do not consider whether a

statute of limitations “places strict requirements on [claimants].” Sloan, 102

F.4th at 1175. Regardless of how categorical a demand the time bar is,

“Congress legislates against the backdrop of judicial doctrines creating

exceptions, and typically expects those doctrines to apply.” Harrow, 601

U.S. at 483. We only focus on whether the statutory language clearly imbues

jurisdictional consequences to the time bar. See, e.g., Wong, 575 U.S. at 409–

10; Boechler, 596 U.S. at 203–04; Harrow, 601 U.S. at 483–84; Santos-

Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 417–18; Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 157–58; Riley, 145 S. Ct. at

2201–02.

Regardless of this test’s incompatibility with Supreme Court doctrine,

a brief analysis shows that the statute in Sloan is readily distinguishable. 33

U.S.C. § 921(c) notes that “the court shall have jurisdiction of the

proceeding” only “[u]pon such filing.” What filing? The clear antecedent

rule brings us back to the only other reference: “filing in such court within

sixty days following the issuance” of the Board’s order. Id. Whether that is

a “clear statement” may be for reasonable minds to debate, and we take no

stance on that matter. But it is more likely that Congress intended for

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jurisdictional limitations to apply in the Sloan statute than to § 1503(a). As

the Government itself noted, “the analysis [is] very much statute specific.”

Sloan does not compel a different conclusion.

* * *

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) does not clearly tie its jurisdictional provision to its

procedural time bar. The time bar is therefore a nonjurisdictional claims-

processing rule, and we proceed to Villegas’s specific facts to determine

whether he timely filed his petition.

B

Villegas argues that he timely filed his lawsuit under § 1503(a), which

demands that a claimant file their lawsuit “within five years after the final

administrative denial of such right or privilege.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). We

previously considered the “final administrative denial” language in

Gonzalez: “While the text is silent regarding duplicative denials, in defining

a limitations period, Congress expressed its interest in finality. Implicitly

authorizing a series of duplicative claims would frustrate that interest.

Section 1503(a)’s reference to ‘the final administrative denial’ means the

first final administrative denial.” 926 F.3d at 190. In other words,

Gonzalez’s suit could not advance because she filed the action in response to

the AAO’s second administrative denial of the same claim. Although her

motion to reconsider was denied in 2008, she did not file suit until 2017, after

her second, untimely motion to reopen was denied. Id. at 187–88. The

statute of limitations began after the 2008 denial. See id. Therefore, we ask

which denial constituted the first final administrative denial: the dismissal of

the appeal, or the timely denial of the motion to reopen?

The Government reads Gonzalez narrowly, arguing that, since “the

AAO decision is sufficiently final to trigger § 1503(a) jurisdiction, . . . it is

necessarily the ‘first final administrative denial’ under § 1503(a).” This

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reading is overly restrictive. True enough, the regulatory scheme shows that

an AAO denial of an appeal is, on its own, sufficient to file a suit under

§ 1503(a). After all, the statute “does not require noncitizens to give the

agency an opportunity to consider an objection using every mechanism

available,” Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original), so the

denial of an appeal is sufficient for administrative exhaustion. But the

regulatory scheme also provides for motions to reopen and to reconsider that

continue the proceedings.

8 C.F.R. § 341.5, entitled “Decision,” requires that applicants be

furnished with reasons for denial and advised of their right to appeal. 8

C.F.R. § 341.5(d). The claimant then has thirty days to file such an appeal.

8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(i). 9 Once a decision is issued, the applicant has thirty

days to file a motion to reconsider or reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i). 8

C.F.R. § 103.5 describes such motions. “A motion to reopen must state the

new facts to be provided in the reopened proceeding and be supported by

affidavits or other documentary evidence.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). The

applicant must also provide, alongside the motion, “a statement about

whether or not the validity of the unfavorable decision has been or is the

subject of any judicial proceeding and, if so, the court, nature, date, and status

or result of the proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(iii)(C). In other words,

the regulation contemplates instances in which an individual filed a § 1503(a)

action directly following the denial of their appeal. Therefore, relevant

_____________________

9

Untimely appeals shall be rejected, and a motion to reopen or to reconsider must

then be filed. 8 C.F.R. § 341.5(e).

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regulations consider the denial of an appeal by the AAO a final administrative

denial. 10

It is also true that “the limitations period [of § 1503(a)] is not reset ‘by

means of a follow-on denial.’” Cambranis, 994 F.3d at 463 (quoting

Gonzalez, 926 F.3d at 189). But that statement, to which the Government

clings, considered vastly different circumstances. In Cambranis, the claimant

had filed six separate passport applications. See id. at 460. And in Gonzalez,

the claimant filed her § 1503(a) suit not after the first administrative denial in

2008, but after the second in 2016. See 926 F.3d at 187–88. When we held in

Gonzalez that § 1503(a) only permits suits following the first final

administrative denial, we did not mean the very first time an appeal could

possibly be filed. We sought to prevent duplicative applications for the same

relief from reopening the courthouse doors upon denial. As we have

explained under similar circumstances:

If [the Government’s position] was our reality, it would be

“immensely resource intensive” as numerous noncitizens

would file premature petitions for review. For example, “[i]t

would lead to an increase in filings, as petitioners would

inevitably have to file a petition for review to preserve the

possibility of judicial review, even when unsure if they would

need to, or even choose to, challenge the decision in the

future[,]” which in turn “would require our court to dedicate

resources to tracking and closing moot or abandoned

petitions” and “to establish a system of holding petitions for

review in abeyance for years at a time.”

_____________________

10

We have suggested as much, too. See Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506 F.3d 393, 397

(5th Cir. 2007) (“If the [application for citizenship] is denied, [the applicant] can appeal to

the [Administrative Appeals Unit (“AAU”)] . . . . If the AAU affirms, the person can seek

a judicial declaration of citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

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Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F.4th 698, 706 n.5 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039, 1053 (5th Cir. 2023)), overruled on

other grounds by Riley, 145 S. Ct. 2190. 11

Therefore, we interpret Gonzalez as focusing on the reasonable finality

of a particular claim’s proceedings, not searching for the first possible

instance of finality. See 926 F.3d at 189 (“While, ‘[s]tanding alone, [the

statute] might appear to indicate that any “final administrative denial,”

irrespective of whether another denial has occurred before it, counts,’ such

an approach would allow ‘an individual . . . indefinitely [to] prolong the

period . . . by continuing to file applications.’” (emphasis altered) (alterations

_____________________

11

While the Supreme Court recently discussed similar circumstances in Riley, this

case is distinguishable. There, the Supreme Court considered whether a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying deferral of removal is a final order of removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2197–98. That provision provides for

direct judicial review by courts of appeals of final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The

Court thus endeavored to “identify which order concluded that Riley is ‘deportable’ and

commanded his deportation.” Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2198. It concluded that the final

administrative review order issued by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

controlled because it “held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from

the United States.” Id. This, it said, was “the Executive’s final determination on the

question of removal,” in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Id. That regulatory

scheme does not mirror that at issue here.

In so holding, the Court addressed “legitimate practical concerns,” including that

the petition to the relevant court of appeals may be complete by the time the BIA considers

the desired relief of withholding. Id. at 2200. The majority stated that the Government, in

such circumstances, could request that the court of appeals hold the matter in abeyance

while the BIA expeditiously disposes of the withholding relief request. Id. But that

suggestion stemmed from the Court’s dedication to “follow[ing] the statutory text” and

its prior precedents, both of which required that the filing be premised on DHS’s order,

not the BIA’s. Id. We adopt the logical conclusion when permitted by the statute and our

precedent: “One should not be required to appeal an order before it exists.” Id. at 2206

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part). We therefore stand by our interpretation that the

motion is attached to the overall proceedings and constitutes part of the first final

administrative denial, as such a course of action is not foreclosed by precedent or statutory

text.

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in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Henry v. Quarantillo, 684 F. Supp. 2d

298, 306–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010))); see also id. at 187, 189 (referring to the

dismissal of Gonzalez’s 2008 motion to reconsider as “the 2008 Denial” and

asking “whether Section 1503(a) permits Gonzalez to seek a declaration in

connection with the 2016 Denial given USCIS’s prior denial in 2008”).

Villegas identifies three decision points from which an individual

could institute the § 1503(a) action: (1) USCIS’s initial denial of the Form

N-600; (2) the AAO’s denial of the appeal; and (3) the denial of the motion

to reconsider or reopen. He correctly notes that USCIS’s first denial,

decision point one, cannot trigger a claim under § 1503(a), because a claimant

must exhaust administrative remedies under Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506

F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2007). He then acknowledges that an AAO dismissal

is sufficient to initiate an action under § 1503(a). But he also claims that “the

regulations provide for more procedure.” As he sees it, the ultimate denial

of the motion to reopen, should the applicant elect to file one, becomes the

“last and ‘final administrative denial’ from the administrative process

allowed by federal regulations,” and should therefore become the first final

administrative denial under Gonzalez.

We agree with Villegas that a motion to reconsider or reopen extends

the time to file a § 1503(a) proceeding when timely filed. Individuals need not

file a motion to reopen or reconsider. Indeed, many never do. And while a

motion to reopen must be filed within thirty days of the decision that the

motion seeks to reopen, “failure to file before this period expires[] may be

excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the

delay was reasonable and was beyond the control of the applicant or

petitioner.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i). Without limiting the rule to timely

motions, the time bar’s clock could be started well after the denial of the

appeal, if USCIS excuses the delay. This could extend the clock into

perpetuity, contravening Gonzalez’s statement that “Congress expressed its

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interest in finality” in § 1503(a) and its holding that Gonzalez’s 2016 motion

to reopen was a second administrative denial. 926 F.3d at 190. We therefore

hold that a denial of a timely motion to reconsider or motion to reopen may

serve as the final administrative denial on a particular claim. If the motion is

untimely, then the AAO decision is final. Cf. id. at 189–90 (concluding the

2008 denial of a motion to reconsider, without an appeal, a final

administrative denial and the 2016 denial of a motion to reopen, with an

appeal, a second final administrative denial of that same claim).

This approach comports with Gonzalez, which sought to prevent

additional duplicative claims, denied by USCIS, from triggering jurisdiction

under § 1503(a). Because the parties agree that the motion was timely filed,

Villegas’s suit was timely because he filed it within five years of the first final

administrative denial of a claim. 12 Accordingly, we do not consider his

argument that his motion to reopen is “qualitatively different” from his

previous claim or whether that test, as described in Villareal-Salinas v. Limon,

549 F. Supp. 3d 624, 631 (S.D. Tex. 2021), comports with our precedent.

III

The clear statement test reveals that 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)’s procedural

time bar is nonjurisdictional. Moreover, our precedent blocks only untimely

follow-on denials of the same applications, not timely filings affiliated with

_____________________

12

We pause to note that the record is unclear as to whether Villegas timely filed his

motion to reopen. The AAO sent a letter informing him of his denial on February 22, 2018.

But it sent another letter with identical information on March 1, 2018. He then filed his

motion on March 30, 2018. A “[d]ay, when computing the period of time for taking any

action provided in this chapter . . . including the taking of an appeal, shall include Saturdays,

Sundays, and legal holidays,” except that the period may not end on such a day. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1.2. Thirty-nine days elapsed between the dates he provided in his complaint: February

22, 2018, and April 2, 2018. Nevertheless, the Government concedes that Villegas “timely

filed with the AAO a discretionary Motion to Reopen and Reconsider.” We therefore

accept that his filing is timely.

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the same administrative proceeding. Villegas filed his lawsuit within five

years of the denial of his timely motion to reconsider or reopen. We therefore

REVERSE the district court’s judgment dismissing the action for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction and REMAND for further proceedings.

24