The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-11909
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
THOMAS CHARLES BRIDGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00082-TFM-B-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11909
Before JORDAN, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Bridges appeals his 96-month sentence for conspir-
acy to commit bank fraud. He argues (1) that the District Court
clearly erred in finding that he continued to engage in bank fraud
while on pretrial release, (2) that the Government breached his plea
agreement by informing the District Court of his continued crimi-
nal conduct, and (3) that the District Court clearly erred when it
applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for having a leader-
ship role in the conspiracy. We affirm.
I.
Bridges was indicted for conspiracy to commit bank fraud,
substantive bank fraud, and possession of counterfeited or forged
securities. He was arrested, arraigned, and released on conditions
requiring him to refrain from committing “any offense in violation
of federal, state or local law while on release.” Bridges ultimately
pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge under a written plea agree-
ment. Under that agreement, the Government would dismiss all
other charges and recommend a sentence at the low end of the ap-
plicable Guidelines range. The agreement also stated that “because
Bridges recruited others to participate in the scheme, a two-level
role enhancement should apply pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)”
and that both parties were “free to allocute fully at the time of sen-
tencing.” Further, the corresponding factual resume stated that
Bridges engaged in various acts in furtherance of the scheme,
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24-11909 Opinion of the Court 3
including depositing checks, “acquir[ing] a printer and magnetic
ink,” and “exchang[ing] numerous text messages” with co-con-
spirators.
While on pretrial release, Bridges allegedly continued his
fraudulent conduct. According to the Government’s sentencing
memorandum and supporting exhibits, a local school placed four-
teen checks in the U.S. mail, which were subsequently stolen, al-
tered and forged, and deposited into the bank accounts of various
individuals who were not authorized to deposit the checks and
who were not associated with the school. A bank then submitted
one of the checks for inspection, and latent fingerprint analysis
identified Bridges’s fingerprint on the check. An inspector also
found messages sent from an iCloud account bearing Bridges’s
name, sent while Bridges was on pretrial release, that discussed
fraudulent check activities.
Bridges’s presentence investigation report calculated a total
offense level of 24 based on a base offense level of 25, a two-level
enhancement for being a leader in the criminal activity, and a re-
duction of three levels because Bridges accepted responsibility. The
report also calculated a criminal history category of I, a Guidelines
imprisonment range of 51–63 months, and a Guidelines range of
supervised release of 2–5 years.
At the sentencing hearing, Bridges objected to the two-level
role enhancement to his base offense level because he merely re-
cruited people into the scheme, claiming that recruitment is differ-
ent from leadership. The Government maintained not only that
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11909
Bridges agreed to the two-level role enhancement in his plea agree-
ment but also that recruitment into a sophisticated scheme is active
leadership. The District Court concluded that the enhancement
was warranted.
Bridges also asserted that the District Court should not con-
sider any evidence related to his conduct while on pretrial release.
He argued that such evidence should be considered only as it re-
lates to the three-level sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-
sibility, so, because the Government was not contesting whether
Bridges accepted responsibility, it should not be considered at all.
Bridges further argued that the Government presenting such evi-
dence was inconsistent with its obligations under the plea agree-
ment to recommend a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines
range.
The Government responded that the evidence was relevant
to the District Court’s determination of an appropriate sentence,
particularly to show both that Bridges should be remanded to cus-
tody immediately and that there was no basis for a downward de-
viation from the Guidelines range. The Government also main-
tained that the plea agreement expressly allowed both parties to
allocute fully at sentencing. The District Court accepted the evi-
dence, explaining that the plea agreement was not binding as to
sentencing and that sentencing is “the one inescapable task that
judges cannot give to anyone else.” The Court also explained that
the Government had a duty of candor to report such evidence to
the Court and that, except for constitutional constraints, a district
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24-11909 Opinion of the Court 5
court could consider “virtually anything a defendant has done” at
sentencing. The District Court sentenced Bridges to 96 months im-
prisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release. The Court
explained that this deviation was necessary to achieve “the sentenc-
ing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation” be-
cause Bridges “just continue[d] in the same conduct” after pleading
guilty.
Bridges timely appeals.
II.
A.
Bridges first argues that the District Court clearly erred in
finding that he continued to engage in criminal conduct while on
pretrial release.
We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear er-
ror. United States v. Little, 864 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2017) (cita-
tion omitted). “For a factual finding to be clearly erroneous, this
court, after reviewing all of the evidence, must be left with a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“When a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of his
sentence . . . the Government has the burden of establishing the
disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v.
Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 890 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). This burden is met when the court
finds, based on evidence bearing some indicia of reliability, that the
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11909
existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence. United
States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
The District Court’s finding that Bridges continued his crim-
inal conduct while on pretrial release is supported by multiple
sources of reliable evidence. Bridges’s fingerprint was found on one
of the altered checks, and messages from an iCloud account bear-
ing his name discussed fraudulent check activities. The check was
altered and the messages were sent while Bridges was on pretrial
release. Taken together, this evidence supports the District Court’s
finding of Bridges’s continued criminal conduct by more than a pre-
ponderance. The District Court did not clearly err.
B.
Bridges next argues that the Government breached his plea
agreement by informing the District Court of his continued crimi-
nal conduct while on pretrial release. Bridges maintains that the
Government’s disclosure of that information was inconsistent with
its simultaneous recommendation of a sentence on the low end of
the Guidelines range and was, thus, a breach of his plea agreement.
We review de novo whether the Government breached a
plea agreement. United States v. Tripodis, 94 F.4th 1257, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). “The government is bound by any
material promises it makes to a defendant as part of a plea agree-
ment that induces the defendant to plead guilty.” United States v.
Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 370 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 (1971)). However, “[t]he
solemnization of a plea agreement does not preclude the
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government from disclosing pertinent information to the sentenc-
ing court.” United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir.
1992). And virtually all information is pertinent. See 18 U.S.C. §
3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). Moreover,
where the Government reserves in the plea agreement the right to
provide the court relevant information at sentencing, it does not
breach the agreement when it does so. United States v. Carrazana,
921 F.2d 1557, 1569 (11th Cir. 1991). Though, the Government may
breach a plea agreement when it makes the promised sentencing
recommendation but then unequivocally expresses that such sen-
tence would be inadequate. See United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th
1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding that the Government breached
a plea agreement when it promised to make a certain sentencing
recommendation, made that recommendation, but then stated
that the recommended sentence “was not enough and that [the de-
fendant] deserved a sentence two or three times higher,” because
such a statement was “at war with its ‘recommendation’”). In
short, “the government achieves the correct balance between its
duty of candor to the sentencing court and its duty to honor com-
mitments under a plea agreement when the government makes the
necessary disclosures to the sentencing court, but nevertheless con-
tinues to advocate for the acceptance of the agreement.” Id. at 1330
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Block, 660 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (“A
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-11909
prosecutor has a duty to insure that the court has complete and
accurate information concerning the defendant, thereby enabling
the court to impose an appropriate sentence. Thus if an attorney
for the Government is aware that the court lacks certain relevant
factual information or that the court is laboring under mistaken
premises, the attorney . . . has the duty to bring the correct state of
affairs to the attention of the court.” (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
The Government did just that. It did not object to the Guide-
lines calculation in the presentence investigation report, and it rec-
ommended a sentence at the low end of that range. At the same
time, it informed the District Court of evidence that Bridges com-
mitted additional criminal conduct while on pretrial release. This
was not a renunciation of the Government’s sentence recommen-
dation; it was an exercise of the Government’s right to allocute and
its duty to provide the Court with complete and accurate infor-
mation related to the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).
Bridges likens his case—in which the Government promised
to provide a recommendation at the low end of the Guidelines
range, provided that recommendation, and provided other infor-
mation about Bridges’s conduct along with it—to a case in which
the Government promised not to make a sentencing recommen-
dation at all and then made one. This comparison is unfounded.
Promising not to make a sentencing recommendation and then
making one is a breach of a plea agreement. See Santobello, 404 U.S.
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at 262 (holding that a prosecutor breached a plea agreement when
he made a sentencing recommendation where the plea agreement
promised that the prosecutor would make no recommendation).
Providing additional information with a sentencing recommenda-
tion, while still maintaining that the recommended sentence is ad-
equate, is not. A promise to recommend a specific sentence is not
a promise to stay silent about everything else. It does not require
the Government to ignore or minimize aggravating information,
especially when the plea agreement expressly preserves the right to
present such information.
We find no error.
C.
Finally, Bridges argues that the District Court erred in im-
posing a two-level enhancement for his role as a leader in the con-
spiracy. The District Court’s imposition of an aggravating role en-
hancement is a factual finding we review for clear error. United
States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 10 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing United States
v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1025 (11th Cir. 2009).
“When the government seeks to apply an enhancement un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines over a defendant’s factual objection,
it has the burden of introducing sufficient and reliable evidence to
prove the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). A district court can base its deter-
mination on “facts admitted by the defendant’s guilty plea, undis-
puted statements in the [presentence investigation report], or
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-11909
evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Mat-
thews, 3 F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court may also
rely on “reasonable inference[s]” at sentencing but not inferences
that are “speculative to the point of being clearly erroneous.”
United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009).
A defendant earns a two-level enhancement if he “was an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in the crime. U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(c). Whether a defendant qualifies depends on many factors,
including
(1) the exercise of decision making authority, (2) the
nature of participation in the commission of the of-
fense, (3) the recruitment of accomplices, (4) the
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, (6) the nature and scope of the
illegal activity, and (7) the degree of control and au-
thority exercised over others.
United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) (altera-
tion adopted); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4. A defendant
need not meet every factor to warrant the enhancement, but he
ultimately must exert “some degree of control, influence, or lead-
ership.” Martinez, 584 F.3d at 1026 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Bridges argues that recruitment alone does not meet that
standard, pointing to cases in which the defendant engaged in more
than just recruitment and consequently received the leadership
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enhancement. While recruitment coupled with additional actions
did qualify the defendants in those cases for the enhancement, re-
cruitment alone qualifies as well. Enticing someone to join a
scheme is, at bottom, exerting influence over them. It implies deci-
sion making authority, planning, and control. It is leadership, so it
satisfies the requirements for the leadership enhancement. This is
especially so where the defendant agreed, in his plea agreement,
that he recruited others into a conspiracy and that that alone war-
ranted the leadership enhancement. Even still, Bridges did more
than simply recruit members: he also texted co-conspirators about
the operation, obtained materials necessary to print counterfeit
checks, and deposited such checks at banks multiple times. The
District Court did not clearly err in concluding that Bridges was a
leader in the conspiracy.
III.
The District Court did not clearly err in finding that Bridges
continued to engage in criminal conduct while on pretrial release
or in imposing a two-level enhancement for his leadership role in
the conspiracy, nor did the Government breach his plea agree-
ment. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.