Andrea Jaye Mosby v. Reaves Law Firm PLLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

ANDREA JAYE MOSBY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:23-cv-02099-SHM-tmp

)

REAVES LAW FIRM, PLLC, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER AWARDING FRONT PAY, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, AND PREJUDGMENT

INTEREST AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE

ORDER ON JURY VERDICT

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Front

Pay, Liquidated Damages, and Prejudgment Interest (ECF No. 66) and

Defendant’s Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (ECF No. 72), which seeks relief

from the Court’s Order on Jury Verdict. For the reasons that

follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion for

Relief from a Judgment or Order is DENIED.

I. Background

On May 5, 2025, this case came before the Court for trial by

jury. (ECF No. 60.) On May 7, 2025, the jury announced a verdict

in favor of Plaintiff Andrea Jaye Mosby and against Defendant

Reaves Law Firm, PLLC on each of Plaintiff’s three claims of

retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and the Equal

Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206. (Id.) The jury awarded Plaintiff

Andrea Jaye Mosby $258,269.27 as and for back pay, $516,538.54 as

and for compensatory damages, and $2,500,000.00 as and for punitive

damages. (Id.)

On May 8, 2025, the Court entered the Order on Jury Verdict.

(Id.) The Order provided greater detail and announced that a

telephonic scheduling conference would be set to discuss post-

trial matters. (See id.) On May 14, 2025, the Court held a status

conference with trial counsel for the parties and set a schedule

for post-trial motions. (ECF No. 62.)

Defendant was represented at trial by Jonathan C. Hancock and

Dean J. Shauger of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, & Berkowitz,

P.C. (ECF No. 60.) On June 20, 2025, Hancock and Shauger filed a

motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendant after Defendant filed

a professional negligence action against them in this District

based on their alleged conduct in this case. (See ECF No. 67.) On

June 27, 2025, new counsel filed a notice of appearance for

Defendant. (ECF No. 71.)

On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Motion for an Award of

Front Pay, Liquidated Damages, and Prejudgment Interest. (ECF No.

66.) Defendant responded in opposition on June 27, 2025. (ECF No.

73.) Plaintiff replied on July 10, 2025. (ECF No. 75.) Because

Plaintiff seeks additional damages, judgment has not been entered.

On June 27, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Relief from

the Court’s Order on Jury Verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b). (ECF No. 72.) Plaintiff responded in opposition

on July 10, 2025. (ECF No. 74.)

II. Law and Analysis

Plaintiff seeks awards of front pay, liquidated damages, and

prejudgment interest on her awards of back pay and compensatory

damages. (See ECF No. 66.) Defendant argues as a threshold matter

that Plaintiff’s motion is not ripe because of Defendant’s Rule 60

Motion, which Defendant filed after Plaintiff’s motion for

additional damages. (See ECF Nos. 72, 73.) For the reasons

explained below, Defendant’s Rule 60 motion is without merit. See

infra Part II.D. Defendant also opposes Plaintiff’s three

requested awards on the merits. (See ECF No. 73.)

A. Front Pay

An award of front pay in a Title VII suit is an equitable

remedy committed to the discretion of trial courts, awarded “only

when the preferred remedy of reinstatement...is not appropriate or

feasible.” See Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir.

1995); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 42 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate an award of front pay. Suggs v.

ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1996).

In awarding front pay, courts consider:

(1) the employee's future in the position from which she

was terminated; (2) her work and life expectancy; (3)

her obligation to mitigate her damages; (4) the

availability of comparable employment opportunities and

the time reasonably required to find substitute

employment; (5) the discount tables to determine the

present value of future damages; and (6) “other factors

that are pertinent in prospective damage awards.”

Suggs, 72 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Fite v. First Tenn. Prod.

Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 1988)).

Plaintiff argues that reinstatement would be inappropriate

given the hostility between the parties and seeks an award of front

pay in the amount of $30,000.36, which would compensate her for

three years of lower pay in her new job, without interest. (See

ECF No. 66 at 2–5.) Defendant objects, arguing that there was: “no

documentation entered into evidence proving that Plaintiff was

actually making less per week in her new job”; “no documentation

entered into evidence showing that Plaintiff attempted to mitigate

her damages in seeking alternative, comparable work”; and “no

evidence presented that conclusively demonstrated that comparable

employment opportunities were unavailable.” (ECF No. 73 at 1–2.)

The Court concludes without difficulty that reinstatement

would be inappropriate in this case. See Schwartz, 45 F.3d at 1023.

The hostility between the parties was apparent to all present at

trial. To contest a front pay award, Defendant appears to rely on

the third and fourth Suggs factors. See Suggs, 72 F.3d at 1234.

(See ECF No. 73 at 1–2.)

In response, Plaintiff cites her trial testimony about her

efforts to secure comparable employment after she was fired and

trial exhibit 8, roughly 50 pages documenting her job application

process. (See ECF No. 66 at 4–5.) Plaintiff testified that she

applied for more than 100 jobs over the 15 months following her

termination, eventually accepting another job although it meant

moving from Memphis to Atlanta and creating a child custody

dispute. (See ECF Nos. 64 at 85–89.) Plaintiff’s testimony included

a discussion of her work experience and the job market that

explained why finding a comparable job was difficult. (Id.)

Plaintiff also testified that her current job pays her $192.31 a

week less than she made while working for Defendant. (Id. at 90–

91.)

The trial evidence Plaintiff cites adequately rebuts

Defendant’s contentions. Although documentation such as paystubs

was not entered into evidence, Plaintiff testified to the penny

about how much less a week she makes at her new job. (Id.) Contrary

to Defendant’s contentions, Plaintiff entered evidence at trial

that showed her mitigation efforts and supplemented those records

with testimony explaining the length of time and number of

rejections she received before she was able to secure comparable

employment. (Id. at 85–91.)

Plaintiff seeks front pay, not for the remainder of her

anticipated working years, but for three years. It is not

unreasonable to expect that it may take three years for Plaintiff

to obtain a roughly $10,000.00 a year raise, which would make her

new salary comparable to what she earned in Defendant’s employ.

Considering the factors outlined in Suggs, the trial record,

and the parties’ briefs, Plaintiff is AWARDED $30,000.36 as and

for front pay.

B. Liquidated Damages

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA, an employer that

violates the act’s retaliation provision is liable “for such legal

or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the

purposes of section 215(a)(3) or 218d of this title, including

without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the

payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated

damages.”

Although liquidated damages are “the norm” in FLSA wage and

hour cases, Solis v. Min Fang Yang, 345 F. App'x 35, 38 (6th Cir.

2009) (quoting Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 585

(6th Cir. 2004)), liquidated damages in FLSA retaliation cases are

awarded only when “appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the

FLSA retaliation provision. See Blanton v. City of Murfreesboro,

856 F.2d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 1988). The purpose, “generally

speaking, is ‘to foster an environment in which employees are

unfettered in their decision to voice grievances without fear of

economic retaliation.’” Hanson v. McBride, 337 F.R.D. 139, 146

(M.D. Tenn. 2020) (quoting Jackson v. Maple Dips, LLC, No. 3:16-

CV-296, 2017 WL 991701, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2017) and Saffels

v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Moore v.

Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 563 (6th Cir. 2004) (One purpose is “to

ensure that employees feel free to report grievances under the

FLSA.”).

Plaintiff seeks liquidated damages doubling her awards of

back pay, front pay, and non-economic compensatory damages, for a

total liquidated damages award of $804,808.17. Defendant argues

that it did not maintain an environment in which employees “did

not feel free to report FLSA grievances for fear of economic

retaliation or reprisal.” (ECF No. 73 at 2 (quoting Roe v. City of

Murfreesboro, No. 314-cv-1395, ECF No. 97 at 2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.

30, 2016)).) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s position is

incompatible with the jury verdict, which not only found Defendant

liable for violating the retaliation provisions of both the FLSA

and EPA, but also found by a preponderance of the evidence that

Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference toward the

Plaintiff's federally protected rights by awarding punitive

damages. (See ECF No. 75 at 2.)

The testimony at trial, credited by the jury in reaching its

verdict, demonstrated that there was an atmosphere at Reaves Law

Firm in which raising complaints or challenging the decisions of

CEO Henry Reaves was met with hostility. In this case, testimony

supports the conclusion that, after Plaintiff raised complaints

about equal pay and wage classification, her loyalty to Defendant

was questioned, she was demoted from the c-suite to intake clerk,

and she was fired on pretextual grounds days later. (See ECF No.

64 at 58–83.)

The testimony also shows that Defendant’s leadership has no

remorse for Defendant’s violations of federal anti-retaliation

law. CEO Henry Reaves testified, “I fired her, and I stand on it,

and I would fire her again today if I could fire her again today.”

(ECF No. 63 at 224.) He called Plaintiff’s case a “frivolous

lawsuit” and maligned Plaintiff as “a liar and a manipulator” for

the accusations she made in bringing her retaliation claims. (ECF

No. 64 at 9, 22.)

Plaintiff is correct that the jury’s verdict is incompatible

with Defendant’s contention that the atmosphere at Reaves Law Firm

was one in which employees felt free to make complaints about

potential labor law violations.

Perhaps the only reason a discretionary award of liquidated

damages on all or part of the jury’s damages awards might be

inappropriate is the fact that the jury has already awarded

Plaintiff $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages. However, the purposes

of the two types of damages are not the same. Punitive damages do

not compensate the victim for harm, they punish the wrongdoer and

deter others from committing similar wrongs in the future. See,

e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S.

424, 432 (2001). Liquidated damages “are compensation, not a

penalty or punishment.” Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs.,

276 F.3d 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting McClanahan v. Mathews,

440 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1971)); see also Roe, No. 314-cv-1395,

ECF No. 97 at 2 (“liquidated damages are not rendered punitive

merely because they have an incidental deterrent effect.”).

In this case, liquidated damages are appropriate in the amount

of Plaintiff’s back pay award: $258,269.27. Because Plaintiff was

unlawfully fired in retaliation for making complaints under the

FLSA, she was left without income for a period of 15 months. Being

deprived of a paycheck for such a long time has serious financial

consequences for wrongfully terminated employees.

Liquidated damages are often necessary to compensate

Plaintiffs in FLSA cases because an award of back pay plus modest

statutory prejudgment interest does not fully compensate a person

for the financial damage caused by unpaid wages. Cf. Brooklyn Sav.

Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (Because of the economic

damage done by failure to pay wages owed under the FLSA, “double

payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure

restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-

being.”).

In this case, an award of liquidated damages on Plaintiff’s

award of back pay will further the purposes of the FLSA, serving

“to compensate Plaintiff for the delay in payment” of her salary

and for “lost opportunities”, as well as “provide incentive for

employees of Defendant to report FLSA complaints and for Defendant

not to retaliate.” Roe, No. 314-cv-1395, ECF No. 97 at 2. Pursuant

to § 216(b) of the FLSA, Plaintiff is AWARDED $258,269.27 in

liquidated damages, equal to the amount of her back pay award.

Awarding liquidated damages on Plaintiff’s front pay and non-

economic compensatory damages award would not serve the same

compensatory purpose for lost economic opportunity. The arguments

in favor of doubling those awards to further the purposes of the

FLSA carry less weight when considered in the context of the jury’s

$2,500,000.00 punitive damages award. Many of Plaintiff’s

arguments revolve around the issue of deterrence. Had punitive

damages not been sought or awarded in this case, liquidated damages

on Plaintiff’s compensatory damages and front pay awards might

have sufficiently furthered the purposes of the act. On this

record, they do not.

C. Prejudgment Interest

Prejudgment interest on back pay is awarded as a matter of

course “to make victims of discrimination whole.” E.E.O.C. v.

Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994). However,

a Plaintiff cannot recover both liquidated damages and prejudgment

interest on a back pay award under the FLSA. See Elwell, 276 F.3d

at 841.

Courts have also awarded prejudgment interest for non-

economic compensatory damages, such as damages for emotional

distress, because they “are just as much an actual loss (for which

pre-judgment interest is in order) as purely economic damages.”

Yerkes v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, No. 2:19-CV-2047, 2024 WL

4929293, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2024), appeal dismissed, No.

25-3002, 2025 WL 992614 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025) (quoting Barnard

v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013)) (internal

quotations removed). See also Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water

Div., No. 2:14-CV-02156-JTF-dkv, 2017 WL 11681788, at *10 (W.D.

Tenn. Mar. 29, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis

Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2018); Flynn v.

Trumbull Cnty., Ohio, No. 4:02-CV-773, 2007 WL 582323, at *2 (N.D.

Ohio Feb. 20, 2007) (citing Thomas v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice,

297 F.3d 361, 372 (5th Cir. 2002)).

In awarding prejudgment interest, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1961, courts use the rate “equal to the weekly average 1-year

constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week

preceding the date of the judgment” and generally compounded

annually. Umfress v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02568-SHL-tmp,

2020 WL 12969188, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2020). The average 1-

year constant maturity Treasury yield for the week ending August

15, 2025, is 3.91 percent.1

Plaintiff seeks an award of prejudgment interest on her jury

awards of back pay in the amount of $258,269.27 and compensatory

emotional distress damages in the amount of $516,538.54. (See ECF

Nos. 60, 66.) Because the Court is awarding liquidated damages in

the amount of her back pay award, Plaintiff will not also receive

prejudgment interest on that award. See Elwell, 276 F.3d at 841.

Defendant objects only on the basis that Plaintiff’s request is

“excessive and not supported by the facts.” (ECF No. 73.)

Defendant’s objection is unpersuasive. Awards of prejudgment

interest on emotional distress damages are appropriate because

they “are just as much an actual loss (for which pre-judgment

interest is in order) as purely economic damages.” Yerkes, 2024 WL

4929293, at *17.

Plaintiff is awarded prejudgment interest at a rate of 3.91

percent on her award of compensatory damages from the date of her

termination, June 2, 2022, to the present. Plaintiff is AWARDED

1 See Market Yield on U.S. Treasury Securities at 1-Year Constant

Maturity, Quoted on an Investment Basis (WGS1YR), Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St.

Louis FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WGS1YR (last visited

August 20, 2025).

$68,018.48 in prejudgment interest on her award of compensatory

damages.2

D. Defendant’s Rule 60 Motion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a party to seek

relief from a final judgment or order of a court, “circumscribed

by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of

litigation.” Waifersong Ltd., Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976

F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992). Defendant relies on Rule 60

subsections (b)(3) and (b)(6) to support its motion. (See ECF No.

72-1 at 2.) Both are unavailing.

1. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(3)

Rule 60(b)(3) permits relief when there has been “fraud

(whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Relief

under 60(b)(3) “clearly requires the moving party to ‘show that

the adverse party committed a deliberate act that adversely

impacted the fairness of the relevant legal proceeding [in]

question.’” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448,

2

Dates Days Principal Interest

6/2/2022 - 6/1/2023 365 $516,538.54 $20,196.66

6/2/2023 - 6/1/2024 365 $536,735.20 $20,986.35

6/2/2024 - 6/1/2025 365 $557,721.54 $21,806.91

6/2/2025 - 8/21/2025 81 $579,528.46 $5,028.56

Total Prejudgment Interest $68,018.48

455 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 1996 WL

528950, at *6, (6th Cir. 1996)). A party alleging fraud must show

“the knowing misrepresentation of a material fact, or concealment

of the same when there is a duty to disclose, done to induce

another to act to his or her detriment.” Info-Hold, Inc., 538 F.3d

at 455. The movant must prove fraud by clear and convincing

evidence. Id. at 454.

Defendant first raises Plaintiff’s counsel’s remark during

Plaintiff’s closing argument about Defendant’s CEO, Henry Reaves,

being “the dumbest lawyer in America to retaliate against her.”

(ECF Nos. 65 at 26, 61; 72-1 at 3–4.) Defendant contends that this

argument, combined with the fact that Defendant’s counsel did not

object, was “highly prejudicial” and prevented Defendant from

“fully and fairly litigating their case.” (ECF No. 72-1 at 3–4

(citing RDI of Michigan, LLC v. Michigan Coin-Op Vending, Inc, No.

08-11177, 2011 WL 3862347, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2011)).)

As Plaintiff notes, Plaintiff’s counsel’s remark about Reaves

was a direct quotation from Reaves, who testified at trial that

“an attorney who would illegally fire a labor law employment

attorney who has 25 years of litigating for an illegal reason, I

think that would be the dumbest lawyer in America. I think that

would be the dumbest lawyer in America.” (ECF Nos. 63 at 223; 74

at 3.) Reaves then asked Plaintiff’s counsel to call him “dumb”,

saying: “Hey, hey, say it. I'm dumb, ain't I?” (ECF No. 63 at 223.)

In Plaintiff’s closing argument, Plaintiff’s counsel raised this

line of questioning and twice said that “He [Reaves] is not the

dumbest lawyer in America.” (ECF No. 65 at 26, 61.)

Plaintiff’s counsel’s repeating Defendant’s CEO’s testimony

and saying that “He is not the dumbest lawyer in America” does not

constitute fraud or misconduct. To the extent Defendant’s

contention relies on the failure of its own trial counsel to

object, its contention is unavailing under 60(b)(3) because the

misconduct alleged must be “by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(3).

Defendant next contends that Plaintiff’s counsel told

Defendant’s trial counsel: “We’ve made a lot of money together and

we’ll make a lot more.” (ECF No. 72-1 at 4.) Defendant offers that

Reaves will swear under penalty of perjury that such a statement

was made, but does not attach as an exhibit a sworn declaration of

this alleged off-the-record statement. Defendant argues that this

comment’s “tone and familiarity...undermined adversarial posture

of the proceedings and...adversely impacted the fairness of the

trial.” (Id.)

This contention is also unavailing. Even if true, the comment

alone would not constitute misconduct by an opposing party within

the meaning of Rule 60(b)(3). It would also fail to satisfy the

clear and convincing standard, inter alia, because there is no

evidence to support it.

2. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief when there is “any other reason

that justifies relief.” Relief is available under 60(b)(6) “only

in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not

addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the Rule.” Olle v.

Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990). A movant

must raise “something more,” which “must include unusual and

extreme situations where principles of equity mandate relief.” Id.

Defendant seeks relief from the Court’s Order on Jury Verdict,

filed May 8, 2025. (ECF Nos. 60; 72-1 at 6.) Defendant appears to

seek relief from that Order because Defendant is under the

impression that its trial counsel missed the deadline to file a

Rule 59 motion for a new trial and other post-trial motions. (See

ECF No. 72-1 at 6–7.) Defendant is mistaken. Rule 59(b) plainly

states that a “motion for a new trial must be filed no later than

28 days after the entry of judgment.” Judgment in this case has

not been entered.

Regardless, an allegation of legal malpractice by trial

counsel is not one of the “extreme situations where principles of

equity mandate relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). See Olle, 910 F.2d

365; Moore v. United States, No. CV 14-114-DLB-HAI, 2018 WL

5046065, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2018); McCurry ex rel. Turner v.

Adventist Health Sys., 298 F.3d 586, 593 (6th Cir. 2002).

III. Conclusion

For good case shown, Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Front

Pay, Liquidated Damages, and Prejudgment Interest (ECF No. 66.) is

GRANTED. In addition to the jury’s verdict, Plaintiff is AWARDED

$30,000.36 in front pay, $258,269.27 in liquidated damages, and

$68,018.48 in prejudgment interest.

Because Defendant fails to show it is entitled to relief under

Rule 60, Defendant’s Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order

(ECF No. 72) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE