Garner v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-55C

(Filed: August 21, 2025)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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THERESA GARNER, *

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Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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Defendant. *

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OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Theresa Garner, proceeding pro se, pursues various claims arising

from alleged retaliation for whistleblower activity. See Compl. at 1–2 (ECF 1).

Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. See

Application (ECF 2). The government has moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) and

in the alternative under RCFC 12(b)(6). Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 7). Plaintiff’s response

seeks a transfer to the District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.D.C.”). See Resp.

& Mot. to Transf. (ECF 12). The government opposes transfer. See Def.’s Reply &

Resp. (ECF 13); see also Pl.’s Reply (ECF 14). The motion to dismiss (ECF 7) is

GRANTED. The motion to transfer (ECF 12) is DENIED.

This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on

the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort

claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see

also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal

Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Claims that are outside the Court’s

jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff concedes that most of her claims fall outside this Court’s jurisdiction.

See Resp. & Mot. to Transf. at 7–9; Pl.’s Reply at 11–12. That is plainly correct. Among

other issues outside this Court’s jurisdiction, her claims allege torts or crimes, see

Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)); Treviño v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 204, 209 (2013),

aff’d, 557 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2014), misconduct by parties other than the United

States, see Lawton v. United States, 621 F. App’x 671, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2015), claims for

non-monetary relief such as directing the government to initiate investigations, see

Santini v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 724, 727 (2024), claims assigned by statute to

other bodies, see, e.g., Stekelman v. United States, 752 F. App’x 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir.

2018) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8461(e)(1)), and claims under statutes and constitutional

provisions that do not mandate payment of money, see McGhee v. United States, 155

Fed. Cl. 380, 386 (2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1023806 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 6, 2022).

Instead of contesting jurisdiction, Plaintiff argues that this Court should

transfer her complaint to the D.D.C. See Resp. & Mot. to Transf. at 6. This Court

“may transfer an action where [1] it lacks jurisdiction, [2] the transfer is in the

interest of justice, and [3] the transferee court is one in which the action could have

been brought at the time the action was filed.” Ewers v. United States, 168 Fed. Cl.

812, 818 (2024) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 862 F.2d 1558, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir.

1988)). I do not find that the second or third elements of that test are met.

Here, it is not clear that the D.D.C. would have had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims either. Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act — one of the main sources

of law Plaintiff relies on, see Compl. at 9–11, 26–29 — “may be prosecuted only in the

judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained

of occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b). Plaintiff lives in Michigan and alleges that wrongful

acts occurred in “Arizona, Wisconsin, New York, Ohio, Illinois, California, other

States and [the] Washington DC headquarters” of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”). Compl. at 27. But Plaintiff provides no evidence, and no specific

allegations, of any connection to the District of Columbia. See Compl. at 15–18

(mentioning unnamed officials at the FBI headquarters and other “federal

government actors”). On these facts, I cannot find that Plaintiff will satisfy the

jurisdictional requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act to litigate these claims in

the D.D.C. See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).

Further, transfer would not be in the interest of justice because Plaintiff’s

allegations appear unlikely to succeed on the merits. Ewers, 168 Fed. Cl. at 818 (“The

deciding court may decline to transfer if transfer would ‘be futile given the weakness

of plaintiff’s case on the merits.’”) (quoting Faulkner v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 54,

56 (1999) (itself quoting Siegal v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 386, 390–91 (1997))).

Plaintiff alleges a wide-ranging retaliation conspiracy involving multiple federal,

state, and local agencies. See Compl. at 1–2, 11, 15–16, 18, 22. Those allegations are

unsubstantiated and implausible. For example, Plaintiff claims that the FBI’s alleged

failure to investigate whistleblower retaliation resulted from decisions of “[s]enior

officials” at the FBI’s headquarters in violation of “multiple FBI policies.” Compl. at

15–17. But Plaintiff does not specify who the officials are, which policies were violated

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and when, or otherwise provide factual details. Similarly undeveloped pleadings can

be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683

(2009). And even if Plaintiff provided sufficient facts, claims seeking to direct an

agency’s discretionary investigatory and enforcement activities are unlikely to

succeed. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (explaining that an agency

decision to refuse enforcement is generally unsuitable for judicial review).

Sometimes the applicable statute of limitations expires after a plaintiff

mistakenly files here rather than the proper venue. In those circumstances, transfer

may be in the interest of justice. See Lan-Dale Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 299,

305 (2004). But most of the events Plaintiff pointed to occurred only last year. See,

e.g., Compl. at 2–8. It therefore appears that if Plaintiff’s claims have merit, she has

time to identify the correct venue and pursue them. Gunn v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 118

F.3d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997).

The only claims in the complaint that this Court might have jurisdiction to

address are those related to breach of contractual “settlement agreements” between

Plaintiff and the United States. Compl. at 2, 6, 12, 18. Those claims fail for lack of

factual pleading. “In pleading a claim founded on a contract … , a party must identify

the substantive provisions of the contract … on which the party relies.” See RCFC

9(k). Plaintiff has not explained the nature of the breach, i.e., exactly what provision

of the agreements the government breached and how. Plaintiff therefore failed to

“plead[] facts upon which a valid claim can rest.” El Bey v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl.

777, 780 (2021) (quoting Stroughter v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 755, 760 (2009)); see

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

I therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s contractual theories for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, see RCFC 12(b)(6), and her remaining theories for

lack of jurisdiction, see RCFC 12(b)(1).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 2) is

GRANTED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 7) is GRANTED. The motion to

transfer (ECF 12) is DENIED.

If Plaintiff wishes to plead additional facts in support of the legal theories

within this Court’s jurisdiction, she may move for leave to file an amended complaint

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— in a single filing that includes all necessary attachments — no later than

September 22, 2025.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephen S. Schwartz

STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ

Judge

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