The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3086-22
HOPEWELL BOROUGH, a
political subdivision of the State
of New Jersey, PENNINGTON
BOROUGH, a political
subdivision of the State of New
Jersey, PAUL ANZANO,
individually, and JAMES DAVY,
individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HOPEWELL TOWNSHIP, a
political subdivision of the
State of New Jersey and
COURTNEY PETERS-MANNING,
in her official capacity as Mayor,
MICHAEL RUGER, in his official
capacity as Deputy Mayor,
DAVID CHAIT, in his official
capacity as Committeeperson,
KEVIN KUCHINSKI, in his official
capacity as Committeeperson,
UMA PURANDARE, in her official
capacity as Committeeperson, U.S.
HOME AT HOPEWELL PARC
URBAN RENEWAL, LLC, and
U.S. HOME CORPORATION,
d/b/a LENNAR,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER,
Defendant/Intervenor-
Respondent.
______________________________
Argued October 1, 2024 – Decided August 21, 2025
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-0497-22.
Walter R. Bliss, Jr. argued the cause for appellants
(Law Offices of Joseph C. Tauriello, PC, and Law
Offices of Walter R. Bliss, Jr., attorneys; Joseph C.
Tauriello, Walter R. Bliss, Jr., and Virginia Kerr, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Steven P. Goodell argued the cause for respondents
Hopewell Township, Courtney Peters-Manning,
Michael Ruger, David Chait, Kevin Kuchinski, and
Uma Purandare (Parker McCay PA, attorneys; Steven
P. Goodell, of counsel and on the brief; Alexis C.
Smith, on the brief).
Timothy M. Prime argued the cause for respondents
U.S. Home at Hopewell Parc Urban Renewal, LLC, and
U.S. Home Corporation (Prime & Tuval LLC,
attorneys; Timothy M. Prime, on the brief).
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2
William S. Fairhurst argued the cause for respondent
Fair Share Housing Center (Fair Share Housing Center,
attorneys; William S. Fairhurst, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order dismissing their complaint in lieu
of prerogative writs. Plaintiffs challenged defendant Hopewell Township's
(Township) adoption of Ordinance 22-1766, which, among other things,
approved a financial agreement between co-defendants Township and U.S.
Homes (Lennar) under the Long Term Tax Exemption Law (LTTEL), N.J.S.A.
40A:20-1 to -22. The agreement facilitated Lennar's construction of more than
a thousand units of housing and provided for a thirty-year property tax
exemption with a payment-in-lieu of taxes schedule. After the Township
adopted the ordinance, plaintiffs sued to block the project, alleging that the
Township's adoption was arbitrary and capricious. During the court's case
management of the ensuing litigation, it issued an order barring discovery except
for presentation of expert opinion testimony by each party. After a bench trial,
the court found the Township was not arbitrary and capricious in adopting the
ordinance, which satisfied the provisions of the LTTEL.
Plaintiffs allege the trial court committed error when it denied plaintiffs
discovery and then misapplied the LTTEL. We affirm.
A-3086-22
3
I.
A.
In 2015, Township filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to have
its affordable housing plan deemed compliant. After multiple parties
intervened, the Township entered into a series of settlement agreements between
2017 and 2019. In 2019, the Township obtained an order from the trial court
declaring the property designated for residential development was an area in
need of redevelopment pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law
(LRHL), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to 40A:12A-49.
After the execution of redevelopment agreements 1 and subsequent litigation
to resolve municipal sewer service for the project, in October 2021, Lennar
applied for a thirty-year long term tax exemption to cover all development
phases of the project. On January 24, 2022, the Township introduced Ordinance
1
First, the Township adopted an ordinance designating Block 93, Lots 5.01 and
portions of 5.02 and 6.02 as areas in need of redevelopment, then adopted
legislation authorizing corresponding redevelopment plans. The plans
incorporated both market rate and affordable housing elements. After approving
the plans, the Township next designated Lennar as the redeveloper for the Block
93 properties, then entered into two redevelopment agreements with Lennar, one
for the north portion of the site and one for the south-east portion of the site.
The north-site redevelopment agreement, the location of Lennar's proposed
affordable housing development, is the subject of this litigation.
A-3086-22
4
22-1766, which authorized the financial agreement with Lennar. After proper
notice, the Township conducted a public hearing on February 22, 2022. The
hearing was attended by the Township's governing body, redevelopment
counsel, financial and redevelopment experts, and the public, which included
officials from neighboring communities. According to the record, several
Hopewell Township committee members including Mayor Courtney Peters-
Manning, Deputy Mayor Michael Ruger, Committee member Kevin Kuchinski,
Committeeman David Chait, and Committeewoman Purandare, spoke in support
of the payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) 2 agreement at the public hearing.
At the hearing Township officials discussed the statutory purposes and
benefits of PILOTs authorized under the LTTEL, particularly in the context of
affordable housing. Some members of the public stated their opposition,
pointing out the impact of long-term PILOT agreements on school tax revenue.
Public officials from Pennington and Hopewell Boroughs also attended and
voiced opposition to the PILOT, but they did not present expert testimony at that
time. After the hearing, members of the Township Committee expressed their
2
To encourage investment, municipalities and developers may enter into
financial agreements that provide tax exemptions on land and improvements, as
authorized by the LTTEL, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22. These agreements
typically take the form of payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs).
A-3086-22
5
support for the ordinance, emphasizing the role of the agreement in facilitating
affordable housing, redeveloping an underutilized site, and mitigating the tax
burden on existing residents. The Township Committee unanimously adopted
the ordinance.
On March 15, 2022, the Township and Lennar executed the financial
agreement3 which established the terms of the PILOT, as authorized in the
ordinance. The agreement set forth the duration of the PILOT, the annual
service charge applied, and the general obligations of the parties. The financial
agreement between the Township and Lennar included three sections pertinent
to our review.
Section 9.01, titled Relative Benefits of the Project, provides:
In accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law,
specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-ll(a), the Township
hereby finds and determines that this Agreement is to
the direct benefit of the health, safety, welfare and
financial well-being of the Township and its citizens
despite the tax exemption granted hereunder. The
Property is currently underutilized. The Project will
redevelop the site with a mix of approximately 1,077
residential units consisting of apartments, townhomes,
stacked townhomes, condominiums and single family
homes, subject to Article III of the Redevelopment
3
We note that the financial agreement, not set forth in its entirety in this
opinion, contains a comprehensive recital of the development project history.
Because that history is part of the record we have reviewed in deciding this
matter, we see no need to recite all of it here.
A-3086-22
6
Agreements, at least the lesser of 20% of the total
residential units or 216 of such units will be Affordable
Units, to be sold or leased at market rates and affordable
rates, as applicable, in accordance with the
Redevelopment Plan, the Redevelopment Agreements
and Site Plan Approval. The Project will create
approximately 2,410 construction jobs and 10
permanent jobs. The Project will generate significant
amounts of new (otherwise unavailable) municipal
revenues through the Annual Service Charge,
construction permit fees and water/sewer fees. More
importantly, the Project will help the Township fulfill
its constitutional obligation to provide housing
opportunities for households with limited incomes.
Considering current market conditions, economic
factors and development costs impacting this Project, it
is not financially feasible to undertake the development
of this Project in the absence of the tax exemption
provided for herein.
Section 9.02, titled Importance of Tax Exemption, states in pertinent part:
In accordance with the Long Term Tax Exemption Law,
specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(b), the Township has
reviewed the [a]pplication and the accompanying
financial information and it has determined that this
Agreement is a critical incentive for [Lennar] to
undertake the Project in the Township due to the
extraordinary costs associated with the development of
the [p]roperty. The tax exemption permits the
development of underutilized property and provides a
stream of revenue in the form of Annual Service
Charges. The Annual Service Charge will allow the
units to be sold at marketable prices and leased at
marketable rates, which will ensure the likelihood of
success of the project and ensure that it will have a
positive impact on the surrounding area. The tax
exemption permits the development of the Project in an
A-3086-22
7
area that cannot otherwise be developed in its proposed
scope by reducing the expenses associated with the
ownership of the project. Reduced expenses allows for
more competitive purchase prices and rents, thus
helping to ensure the project's success. . . . Considering
current market conditions, economic factors and
development costs impacting this project, it is not
financially feasible to undertake the development of
this project in the absence of the tax exemption
provided for herein. Without the project, the benefits
described herein would not be realized.
Section 16.14 of the agreement, titled Use of Annual Service Charge
Proceeds, states in pertinent part, "[t]he Township may, in its sole discretion,
discuss the potential impact of the project on the Hopewell Valley Regional
School District with the School Board and the potential use of a portion of the
[PILOT] proceeds to address such impact."
B.
After the financial agreement was executed by the Township and Lennar,
plaintiffs filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs seeking to overturn the
ordinance and the agreement. Plaintiffs argued that Ordinance 22-1766 was
invalid because it: was adopted in an arbitrary and capricious manner; violated
the LTTEL; was adopted for an unlawful purpose that purposely evades the
regional school funding formula set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:13-23; and violated
A-3086-22
8
the Thorough and Efficient Education Clause (T&E clause) of the New Jersey
Constitution by wrongful appropriation of regional school district funds.
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the court granted the Township's
motion to dismiss the committee members in their individual capacities, then
entered an order establishing a discovery schedule. Approximately one month
later, during the initial discovery stages, Lennar filed a motion to quash
plaintiffs' discovery demands and the Township moved for a protective order
pursuant to Rule 4:10-3 to prohibit further discovery. The Fair Share Housing
Center (FSHC) next intervened on behalf of the defendants.
The court granted both applications, quashing further discovery and
striking the parties' interrogatories and requests for production of documents.
The court also issued an order permitting the parties to submit expert reports.
On May 1, 2023, the court conducted a hearing. It reviewed the submissions,
including the dueling expert reports, and heard argument of counsel. On May
12, 2023, the court entered judgment for defendants. It dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice, finding: the Township's ordinance and PILOT
agreement complied with the LTTEL; the ordinance and the PILOT were
adopted for a lawful purpose; and the Township's adoption of the ordinance was
not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
A-3086-22
9
On appeal, plaintiffs present two main arguments: first, that the LTTEL
obligates the governing body to make an express finding, supported by
substantial evidence, that the project would be financially infeasible without a
tax exemption; and second, that the court erred by denying them further
discovery.
II.
We consider the applicable standards of review.
First, municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid, and the presumption
of validity may not be overcome unless the ordinance is "clearly arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of
zoning or the [zoning] statute." Berardo v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super.
341, 355 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601,
610-11 (1988)) (quoting Bow & Arrow Manor v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J.
335, 343 (1973)). The party challenging the ordinance "bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption." Riya Finnegan LLC v. Twp. Council of Tp. of
South Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 204 (2008) (citing Ward v. Montgomery Twp.,
28 N.J. 529, 539 (1959)). A "'[r]eviewing court[] should not be concerned over
the wisdom of an ordinance'" and "'[i]f debatable, the ordinance should be
upheld.'" Blackridge Realty, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 481 N.J. Super.
A-3086-22
10
183,194 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239,
253 (2015)) (quoting Rumson Ests., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair Haven, 177
N.J. 338, 350-51 (2003)).
Thus, "[t]he proper scope of judicial review is not to suggest a decision
that may be better than the one made by the [Township], but to determine
whether the [Township] could reasonably have reached its decision on the
record." Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005).
A reviewing court must not substitute its own judgment for that of the
municipality unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Ten Stary Dom P'ship
v. Mauro, 216 N.J. 16, 33 (2013).
Next, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Wiggins
v. Hackensack Meridian Health, 259 N.J. 562, 574 (2025). To do that, "we look
to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute's plain terms." Ibid. "'There
is no more persuasive evidence of legislative intent than the words by which the
Legislature undertook to express its purpose . . . .'" Musker v. Suuchi, Inc., 260
N.J. 178, 185 (2025)) (quoting Fuster v. Twp. of Chatham, 259 N.J. 533, 547
(2025)) (omission in original) (quoting Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202,
209-10 (2014)). "'We ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and
significance and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense
A-3086-22
11
to the legislation as a whole.'" Ibid. (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477,
492 (2005) (citations omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (requiring that statutory
"words and phrases shall be read" in context "and shall, unless inconsistent with
the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is
expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the
approved usage of the language"). "If the plain language of a statute is clear,
our task is complete." Id. at 186 (quoting Savage v. Twp. of Neptune, 257 N.J.
204, 215 (2024)).
Finally, we use a deferential standard of review when considering a trial
court's discovery orders. Keyworth v. CareOne at Madison Ave., 476 N.J.
Super. 86, 100 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J. 225, 240
(2018)).
III.
A.
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard
in analyzing their challenge to the long-term tax exemption created by the
Township's adoption of Ordinance 22-1766. Plaintiffs' core contention is that
the exemption the Township granted should have been accompanied by an
express finding that the redevelopment project would not be financially feasible
A-3086-22
12
without it. Plaintiffs contend that without this finding by the Township, its
adoption of the ordinance was arbitrary and capricious. We find plaintiffs'
argument unpersuasive.
To review challenges to municipal ordinances, Riggs v. Long Beach, 109
N.J. 601 (1988), established a four-part objective test for an ordinance's validity:
First, the ordinance must advance one of the purposes
. . . as set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2. Second, the
ordinance must be substantially consistent with the land
use plan element and the housing plan element of the
master plan or designed to effectuate such plan
elements, unless the requirements of that statute are
otherwise satisfied. Third, the ordinance must comport
with constitutional constraints on the zoning power,
including those pertaining to due process, equal
protection, and the prohibition against confiscation.
Fourth, the ordinance must be adopted in accordance
with statutory and municipal procedural requirements.
[Id. at 611-12 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).]
Two Riggs criteria are relevant to this appeal: whether the ordinance is
adopted in accordance with the enabling statute and whether the ordinance
advances one of the legislative purposes of that statute.
Guided by Riggs and the well-established principles applicable to
challenges to municipal ordinances, we first consider the relevant sections of the
LTTEL.
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N.J.S.A. 40A:20-8, establishes the detailed information required for
Lennar's submission of its long-term tax exemption application to the Township.
It states in pertinent part:
Every urban renewal entity qualifying under this act,
before proceeding with any projects, shall make written
application to the municipality for approval thereof.
The application shall be in a form, and shall certify to
those facts and data, as shall be required by the
municipality, and shall include but not be limited to:
a. A general statement of the nature of the
proposed project, that the undertaking
conforms to all applicable municipal
ordinances, and that the project accords
with the redevelopment plan and master
plan of the municipality . . . .
****
d. The source, method and amount of
money to be subscribed through the
investment of private capital, setting forth
the amount of stock or other securities to
be issued therefor or the extent of capital
invested and the proprietary or ownership
interest obtained in consideration therefor.
e. A fiscal plan for the project outlining a
schedule of annual gross revenue, the
estimated expenditures for operation and
maintenance, payments for interest,
amortization of debt and reserves, and
payments to the municipality to be made
pursuant to a financial agreement to be
entered into with the municipality.
A-3086-22
14
f. A proposed financial agreement
conforming to the provisions of section 9
of this act.
The application shall be addressed and submitted to the
mayor or other chief executive officer of the
municipality. The mayor or other chief executive
officer shall, within 60 days of [their] receipt of the
application thereafter, submit the application with
[their] recommendations to the municipal governing
body. The governing body shall by resolution approve
or disapprove the application, but in the event of
disapproval, changes may be suggested to secure
approval. An application may be revised and
resubmitted.
N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9 governs the financial agreement between Lennar and
the Township. It states in pertinent part:
Every approved project shall be evidenced by a
financial agreement between the municipality and the
urban renewal entity. The agreement shall be prepared
by the entity and submitted as a separate part of its
application for project approval. The agreement shall
not take effect until approved by ordinance of the
municipality. Any amendments or modifications of the
agreement made thereafter shall be by mutual consent
of the municipality and the urban renewal entity, and
shall be subject to approval by ordinance of the
municipal governing body upon recommendation of the
mayor or other chief executive officer of the
municipality prior to taking effect.
The financial agreement shall be in the form of a
contract requiring full performance within 30 years
from the date of completion of the project. . . .
A-3086-22
15
****
The financial agreement shall contain detailed
representations and covenants by the urban renewal
entity as to the manner in which it proposes to use,
manage or operate the project. The financial agreement
shall further set forth the method for computing gross
revenue for the urban renewal entity, the method of
determining insurance, operating and maintenance
expenses paid by a tenant which are ordinarily paid by
a landlord, the plans for financing the project, including
the estimated total project cost, the amortization rate on
the total project cost, the source of funds, the interest
rates to be paid on the construction financing, the
source and amount of paid-in capital, the terms of
mortgage amortization or payment of principal on any
mortgage, a good faith projection of initial sales prices
of any condominium units and expenses to be incurred
in promoting and consummating such sales, and the
rental schedules and lease terms to be used in the
project. Any financial agreement may allow the
municipality to levy an annual administrative fee, not
to exceed two percent of the annual service charge.
[emphasis added.]
N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11, states in pertinent part:
A financial agreement approved under this act shall
include findings by the municipality, approved by the
municipal governing body, setting forth appropriate tax
exemption provisions and an appropriate annual service
charge schedule. . . based upon the provisions of
[section 12 of this act] and the municipality's
determinations as to:
a. The relative benefits of the project to the
redevelopment of the redevelopment area when
A-3086-22
16
compared to the costs, if any, associated with the
tax exemption;
b. An assessment of the importance of the tax
exemption to be granted in obtaining the
development of the project and in influencing the
locational decisions of probable occupants of the
project or units of the project.
[Ibid.]
Plaintiffs do not dispute that: Lennar submitted a complete application to
the Township; the financial agreement itself contains the statutorily required
findings; and the Township's adoption of the ordinance was procedurally proper.
Since plaintiffs' core argument on appeal is that the trial court misinterpreted
N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11, the first part of our Riggs' analysis, whether the ordinance
was adopted in accordance with the LTTEL, turns on how we interpret the
statute.
N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(a) and (b) contain express language which requires
the Township to include certain "findings" in its approved financial agreement.
Those findings must include "appropriate tax exemption provisions" and "an
appropriate annual service charge schedule," as well as the following: a cost
benefit analysis comparing the benefits of the project with any identified costs
"associated with the tax exemption;" and an assessment of the "importance" of
the role the tax exemption played in persuading the developer as well as
A-3086-22
17
subsequent purchasers and renters to participate in the project. Subsection (b),
which requires the Township to assess the role the tax exemption played in
attracting investment, contains no language requiring a finding that the
exemption be "necessary" to attract investment.
We consider the ordinance language the Township used in making its
findings. The recital section of the ordinance states that Lennar submitted an
application for a tax exemption and a form of financial agreement to the mayor,
who in turn submitted the documents to the Township Committee with a
recommendation for approval. The operative section of the ordinance states that
the Township approved the tax exemption application and authorized execution
of the financial agreement. The Township's ordinance recites site-specific
findings which track the LTTEL requirements.
For example, financial agreement states that the Township made findings
which satisfy the statutory requirements, such as: "In accordance with the Long
Term Tax Exemption Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(a), the Township
hereby finds and determines that this Agreement is to the direct benefit of the
health, safety, welfare and financial well-being of the Township and its citizens
despite the tax exemption granted hereunder" and, "[i]n accordance with the
Long Term Tax Exemption Law, specifically N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11(b), the
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Township has reviewed the Application and accompanying financial
information and it has determined that this Agreement is critical to the Project
in the Township due to the extraordinary costs associated with the development
of the Property." The trial court correctly concluded that such findings, and
others like it, satisfied the statute. We agree.
There is no language in the LTTEL which compels a municipality to
conduct an assessment under subsection 11(b) resulting in a municipal finding
that the tax exemption granted under the ordinance was "necessary" to attract
the desired development. The Legislature's choice of the word "importance"
rather than "necessity" demonstrates its clear intent to provide municipalities
with flexibility in their assessments. Further, when the Legislature is silent on
such a proposition, as it is here, we should not incorporate that proposition by
inference. Brock v. Pub. Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 391 (1997). We
conclude that the ordinance was adopted by the Township in accordance with
the plain meaning of the LTTEL, including N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11. This satisfies
the first element of Riggs.
The second question posed by the Riggs analysis, whether the ordinance
met a proper legislative purpose, has a simpler answer: yes. Our Constitution
and our jurisprudence recognize tax exemptions as important tools to facilitate
A-3086-22
19
the construction of affordable housing. The Supreme Court allows
municipalities like Hopewell to use available financial incentives like tax
exemptions or abatements to facilitate affordable housing construction. In re
Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by N.J. Council on Affordable Housing, 221
N.J. 1 (2015).
Having concluded that this ordinance satisfies the Riggs test, we conclude
that the ordinance was proper. Like the trial court, we decline plaintiffs'
invitation to replace our traditional deference to a properly enacted municipal
ordinance with a "substantial evidence" standard of review.
Plaintiffs' reliance upon Malanga v. Twp. of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291
(2023) for this proposition is misplaced. In Malanga, the Court addressed
whether West Orange improperly designated the local public library as an area
in need of redevelopment under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.4
The Court ultimately found that West Orange failed to meet the burden of proof
established by N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(d), which requires two showings. First,
there must be "sufficient proof" that targeted areas suffer from specific
conditions, including, but not limited to: dilapidation, obsolescence, or
overcrowding, or any combination of them. Second, there must be sufficient
4
N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to 40A:12A-49.
A-3086-22
20
proof that the targeted areas "are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or
welfare of the community." The Court found the record lacked "substantial
evidence" that the local public library, still in active use, suffered from
obsolescence such that it was detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare
of the community. The record in that matter showed that the licensed
professional planner hired by West Orange did not present sufficient proof to
support the West Orange planning board's 3-2 approval of the designation of the
area in need of redevelopment, nor West Orange's ultimate adoption of the
ordinance authorizing the final designation. The Court concluded that N.J.S.A.
40A:12A-5(d)'s language called for "substantial evidence" to justify taking the
community public library for redevelopment purposes.
We consider the record before us. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the
Township has complied with every aspect of the LRHL, the statute addressed
and interpretated in Malanga. However, the statute at issue here, the LTTEL is
different, and must be analyzed on its own merit. While the LRHL identifies
specific conditions tied to the public safety, health, and welfare, conditions
which must be found before designating an area in need of redevelopment, the
LTTEL contains no such requirement. The key distinction lies in the different
statutory language and purposes. N.J.S.A. 40A: 12A-5(d) of the LRHL requires
A-3086-22
21
"sufficient proof" of the enumerated conditions before the planning board, a
quasi-judicial body, can take property for redevelopment purposes. Cox &
Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration § 5-1.1 (2025). The
LTTEL, by contrast, involves municipal choices about the adoption of financial
incentives to encourage development and allocation of local tax consequences
which flow from such choices. When municipalities pass resolutions and
ordinances to implement those choices, they are acting purely in their legislative
capacity. This exclusively legislative role is separate from the quasi-judicial
role municipalities play in reviewing and adopting (or rejecting) the housing
policy decisions of their own municipal planning boards. Because courts must
interpret statutes as written, giving words their ordinary meaning and
significance, Musker, 260 N.J. at 185, we conclude that Malanga's "substantial
evidence" holding does not extend to the LTTEL.
B.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error by severely
constraining discovery. We are unconvinced for the cogent reasons set forth by
the trial court in its written decision. We make the following brief observations.
Because we conclude that N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11 does not require the
Township to find that a development project could not occur without assistance
A-3086-22
22
from a long-term tax exemption agreement, plaintiffs' focus on the Township's
motives, the quality of its economic analysis, or other potentially better
development options are not material to whether the terms of the financial
agreement satisfy the statutory criteria in N.J.S.A. 40A:20-11. Finally, the
record shows plaintiffs' expert's findings and conclusions were presented to the
Township's elected officials at the public hearing in February 2022. Plaintiffs
had the opportunity to voice their opposition, and Township officials had ample
opportunity to consider it.
Affirmed.
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