Crenshaw v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Marion County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

JOSEPH CRENSHAW,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 5:24-cv-93-SPC-PRL

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Joseph Crenshaw’s Amended Petition Under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (Doc.

7). Crenshaw challenges his 2021 convictions and concurrent Life and 15-

year prison sentences for robbery with a firearm while wearing a mask and

possession of a firearm by a felon while wearing a mask offenses. In his

Amended Petition, Crenshaw raises two grounds for relief: that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s acceptance of a

prosecution witness as an expert in the jury’s presence and was also ineffective

for failing to move for a mistrial for the same reasons. (Doc. 7 at 4).

Respondent argues the petition is untimely and, alternatively, should be

denied as insufficiently pleaded or on the merits. (Doc. 12).

I. Background

In an amended information filed on October 8, 2019, in the Circuit Court

of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Marion County, Florida, Crenshaw was

charged with robbery with a firearm while wearing a mask (Count I) and

possession of a firearm by a felon while wearing a mask (Count II). (Doc. 13-

1 at 95–96). Crenshaw proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial, with jury selection

conducted on June 1, 2021, and the trial on June 2 and 3, 2021. (Id. at 131–

34, 229, 242–43).

Crenshaw’s charges relate to a robbery at the Lucky Panda Internet Café

on June 4, 2018. The proceedings and testimony provided at trial are

summarized by the state postconviction court. (Id. at 1249–57). Most of the

proceedings are not relevant to Crenshaw’s claims. In sum, an employee at

the Lucky Panda rang a known customer into the store in the early morning

hours, then encountered a man wearing a wolf mask holding a gun in the lobby

who proceeded to rob her. The employee gave the robber approximately

$2,500 accompanied with a GPS tracker and called 911 once the robber left.

Law enforcement utilized the tracker and encountered a single car in the

location of the tracker, in which Crenshaw was in the backseat—shirtless,

barefoot, and wearing cargo pants—and appeared to be very sweaty. A gun

fell out of the vehicle when a deputy opened the backseat door where Crenshaw

was sitting. Law enforcement officers testified regarding the investigation

that led to Crenshaw’s arrest. The State also called Crenshaw’s co-defendant,

Dennis Waters, who received a seven-year prison sentence in exchange for

truthful testimony. (Id.)

Relevant here, the State called Brook Hoover, a FDLE crime laboratory

analyst in the biology DNA section, as a witness. (Id. at 800–50). The State

proceeded to elicit Hoover’s education, training, and employment to establish

her as an expert in DNA analysis and testing. (Id. at 801–04). The State

then asked the trial court to permit Hoover as an expert, stating, “And Your

Honor, at this time I would ask that the witness be permitted to testify to her

opinion regarding the field of forensic DNA analysis.” (Id. at 805). The trial

court replied, “You may proceed.” (Id.) Counsel for Crenshaw did not object

to the tender and acceptance of Hoover as an expert witness. (Id.) Hoover

testified that Crenshaw is included as the major contributor to the mixed DNA

profile obtained from the blue shirt, the mask and hat, whereas the profiles

from other individuals investigated failed to demonstrate sufficient statistical

support for inclusion or exclusion. (Id. at 822, 824, 834).

After the close of the State’s case, Crenshaw presented two alibi

witnesses. (Id. at 898–922). The trial court denied his renewed motion for

judgment of acquittal, and the jury convicted Crenshaw as charged on Count

I. (Id. at 1028). The jury later convicted him of Count II. (Id. at 1055).

Crenshaw was sentenced to life in prison with a minimum mandatory sentence

of 10 years as to count one and 15 years in state prison with a minimum

mandatory sentence of 10 years as to count two. (Id. at 246–54).

Crenshaw timely appealed his convictions and sentence. (Id. at 304).

Court-appointed counsel filed an Anders1 brief, and Crenshaw thereafter filed

a pro se brief arguing that the trial court erred in denying his hearsay objection

regarding introduction of third-party GPS data. (Id. at 1164–1205, 1207–27).

On April 29, 2022, the Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) per curiam

affirmed the judgment and sentence but remanded to correct a scrivener’s error

in the judgment; mandate issued on May 27, 2022. (Id. at 1229–30, 1232); see

also Crenshaw v State, 338 So. 3d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).

On March 13, 2023, Crenshaw filed a motion for post-conviction relief,

alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or move for

mistrial when the State tendered, and the trial court accepted, Hoover as an

expert witness. (Doc. 13-1 at 1247–66). On April 6, 2023, the trial court

summarily denied his claim. (Id. at 1268–72). Crenshaw appealed and filed

a pro se initial brief. (Id. at 1317–51). On November 21, 2023, the Fifth DCA

per curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, and the

mandate issued on December 15, 2023. (Id. at 1353–54, 1356); see also

Crenshaw v State, 373 So. 3d 876 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). On February 16, 2024,

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Crenshaw sought certiorari review with the Supreme Court of the United

States. (Doc. 13-1 at 1358–87). On April 15, 2024, the Supreme Court denied

the petition. See Crenshaw v. Fla., 144 S. Ct. 1365 (2024).

Crenshaw initiated this action on February 21, 2024.2

II. Applicable Habeas Law

A. AEPDA

The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state

prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Relief may

only be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if the

adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet.

White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). A state court’s violation of state

law is not enough to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the

2 Crenshaw filed an amended § 2254 petition on April 23, 2024. (Doc. 7

at 28). The Court assumes that the Amended Petition relates back to the

filing date of the original petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1); Haecker v.

Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:17-cv-89-WFJ-PRL, 2019 WL 1763221, at *4 n.10

(M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2019) (assuming, for purposes of deciding timeliness under

AEDPA, that “the amended petition relates back to the original petition”).

“Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).

“Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal

principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court when

the state court issued its decision. White, 572 U.S. at 419; Casey v. Musladin,

549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).

Habeas relief is appropriate only if the state court decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of,” that federal law. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the

state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme

Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592

F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal

principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner’s case in an objectively

unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v.

Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406).

When reviewing a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court must

remember that any “determination of a factual issue made by a State court

shall be presumed to be correct[,]” and the petitioner bears “the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013) (“‘[A] state-court

factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’”) (quoting

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010)). “A state court’s determination that

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists

could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (cleaned up). “[T]his standard is difficult to

meet because it was meant to be.” Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961, 965

(2018) (cleaned up).

B. Timeliness

Pursuant to the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended

by the AEDPA, a one-year limitation period applies to the filing of a habeas

petition by a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. This

limitation period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Here, Crenshaw does not allege, nor does it appear

from the pleadings or record, that the statutory triggers set forth in

§§ 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D) apply. Therefore, the statute of limitations is measured

from the remaining statutory trigger, which is the date on which Crenshaw’s

conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part

test for determining whether a convicted person may have relief for ineffective

assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must

establish: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. Id.

When considering the first prong, “courts must ‘indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.’” Sealey v. Warden, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir.

2020) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). And “[a] state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long

as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 975 F.3d 1165, 1176 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). Thus, a habeas petitioner must “show that

no reasonable jurist could find that his counsel's performance fell within the

wide range of reasonable professional conduct.” Id. This is a “doubly

deferential” standard of review that gives both the state court and the

petitioner’s attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (citing

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011)).

The second prong requires the petitioner to “show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1355

(quoting Strickand, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The

critical question on federal habeas review is not whether this Court can see a

substantial likelihood of a different result had defense counsel taken a

different approach. Mays v. Hines, 592 U.S. 385, 392 (2021). All that

matters is whether the state court, “notwithstanding its substantial ‘latitude

to reasonably determine that a defendant has not [shown prejudice],’ still

managed to blunder so badly that every fairminded jurist would disagree.” Id.

(quoting Knowles v. Mirazayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).

“An ineffective-assistance claim can be decided on either the deficiency

or prejudice prong.” Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1355. And “[w]hile the Strickland

standard is itself hard to meet, ‘establishing that a state court's application of

Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.’” Id.

(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105).

III. Analysis

A. Timeliness

Respondent asserts that the petition is untimely. (Doc. 12 at 9–12).

However, Respondent’s calculations are inaccurate, inconsistent, and

ultimately incorrect.

Crenshaw’s conviction became final on July 28, 2022, which is 90 days

after the Fifth DCA’s per curiam affirmance.3 See Nix v. Sec’y for Dep’t of

Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The one-year

3 Although the Fifth DCA remanded for correction of a scrivener’s error

on the judgment and sentence, the entry of the amended judgment does not

reset the limitations period. See, e.g., Mathews v. Sec’y, No. 8:09-cv-57-T-

30EAJ, 2009 WL 5128027, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2009) (noting that

correction of scrivener’s error did not restart AEDPA’s one-year limitation

period).

limitations period ran for 228 days, when Crenshaw filed his Rule 3.850 motion

on March 13, 2023.4 The limitations was tolled until December 15, 2023,

when the Fifth DCA issued its mandate. See Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264,

1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that a Florida postconviction

motion remains pending until the mandate issues in the appeal). Crenshaw

filed his petition 68 days later on February 21, 2024, meaning 296 days had

elapsed in the 365-day limitations period.5 The Petition was therefore timely

filed.

B. Sufficiency of Pleading

Respondent contends that Crenshaw realleges the facts as set forth in

his Rule 3.850 motion but does not make any argument specific to his claims

other than as they are asserted in the heading for claim one. (Doc. 12 at 11).

Thus, Respondent submits that the petition is insufficiently pleaded.

4 In reply (Doc. 14 at 2), Crenshaw asserts that he filed the Rule 3.850

motion on March 8, 2023. However, the records he presents undermine his

argument, as the motion states it was provided for mailing on March 13, 2023,

and nothing in the signature block or other records undermines this. (Doc.

13-1 at 1247–67). As Crenshaw notes (Doc. 14 at 2), this has no impact on the

calculations.

5 Although Crenshaw petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the

Supreme Court of the United States days before filing the instant habeas

action, this did not have the effect of tolling the limitations period. See

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (explaining that an application for

state post-conviction review is not “pending” after the state court’s post-

conviction review is complete and § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the one-year

limitations period during pendency of a petition for certiorari).

The Court agrees that Crenshaw’s claims are due to be denied as

conclusory. Crenshaw gives sparse factual allegations in support of his claims

and has not pled facts supporting a showing of prejudice. Instead of alleging

how his counsel was ineffective, Crenshaw merely recites his case’s procedural

history and testimony at trial. (Doc. 7 at 4–13). In reply, Crenshaw states

that he “relies on his previously filed § 2254 Petition and Memorandum of Law

in support of his deficient performance and prejudice arguments.” (Doc. 13 at

3). The problem for Crenshaw is that he did not provide a memorandum of

law and has otherwise made no arguments in support of his deficient

performance arguments. For these reasons alone, the Amended Petition is

due to be denied. See Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011)

(Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court

“mandate ‘fact pleading’ as opposed to ‘notice pleading.’ ”); Wilson v. United

States, 962 F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that conclusory allegations

of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to merit habeas relief).

C. Merits

Crenshaw’s claims also fail on the merits because the record refutes any

claim of deficient performance of trial counsel. As the trial court found in

denying Crenshaw’s Rule 3.850 motion, the jury was given a standard

instruction regarding expert witnesses. (Doc. 13-1 at 1269). The trial court

addressed a conflict between the state appellate courts but noted that the Fifth

DCA had found that it disagreed with a sister court’s finding “that a trial

court’s declaration that a witness is an expert is error.” Mitchell v. State, 207

So. 3d 369 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Therefore, the trial court found counsel

“cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection or

argument.” (Doc. 13-1 at 1271). “Moreover, [Crenshaw] failed to establish

that due to Ms. Hawthorne’s failure to object when the State tendered, and the

Court accepted Ms. Hover [sic] as an expert witness in front of the jury the

outcome of his trial would be different.” (Id.) The trial court added, “With

respect to [Crenshaw’s] claim that Ms. Hawthorne provided ineffective counsel

when she failed to move for a mistrial based on the tender and acceptance of

Ms. Hoover as an expert witness, the Court addressed the tender and

acceptance of Ms. Hoover above. Ms. Hawthorne cannot be deemed ineffective

for failing to file a meritless motion for a mistrial.” (Id.) (citing Ferrell v. State,

29 So. 3d 959 (Fla. 2010)).

Given the deferential treatment afforded the state court’s ruling and

Crenshaw’s failure to plead how counsel was ineffective, his allegations of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel also fail on the merits. The state court’s

rejection of Crenshaw’s claims is consistent with federal law and supported by

the record. The Constitution does not require defense counsel to raise

meritless arguments. The Court thus denies Crenshaw’s federal habeas

claims.

IV. DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement

to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).

Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (COA).

“A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such

a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,”

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further,” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–

36 (2003) (citations omitted). Crenshaw has not made the requisite showing

here and may not have a certificate of appealability on his Amended Petition.

V. Conclusion

Although the Amended Petition is considered timely filed, it is due to be

denied because it is insufficiently pleaded and also fails on the merits.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Petitioner Joseph Crenshaw’s Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc.

7) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment, terminate any pending

motions and deadlines, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 20, 2025.

, Hite POLSTER attat he

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: OCAP-2

Copies: All Parties of Record