The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
G&G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS LLC, : Case No. 1:25-cv-252
Plaintiff, Judge Matthew W. McFarland
z :
CHERRI MCENTIRE a/k/a CHERRI
CANNON a/k/a CHERRI BALLEW, ‘
et al., :
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
(Doc. 11)
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc.
11). Defendants failed to timely respond to the motion. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2).
Thus, this matter is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion for
Default Judgment (Doc. 11) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a corporation that was granted the exclusive nationwide commercial
distribution rights to the Errol Spence Jr. vs. Terence Crawford Championship Fight
Program (“Program”) that took place on July 29, 2023. (Complaint, Doc. 1, 6, 16.)
Plaintiff entered into subsequent sublicensing agreements with other commercial entities
throughout North America, which gave these entities the rights to publicly exhibit the
Program within their respective commercial establishments in the hospitality industry.
(Id. at § 17.) Defendant Cherri McEntire is the principal owner, managing member, and
operator of Defendant VJS Andys Café Inc. (Id. at { 7.) Defendants knew that they were
not permitted to intercept or display the program without the proper sublicense from
Plaintiff. (Id. at $19.) Nevertheless, Defendants intercepted the program and displayed it
at their commercial establishment in Cincinnati, Ohio, on July 29, 2023, in violation of 47
U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. (Id. at 19, 22.)
Plaintiff brought the present action against Defendants on April 18, 2025, alleging
violations of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The summonses to Defendants were
executed, and their answers we due on May 27, 2025. Neither Defendant answered, pled,
or otherwise responded to the Complaint. Plaintiff applied to the Clerk of Courts for an
entry of default against Defendants on June 30, 2025, (see Doc. 9), and the Clerk filed an
Entry of Default (Doc. 10) on July 1, 2025. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Default
Judgment (Doc. 11) on July 8, 2025. Neither Defendant responded to the Motion.
LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs entries of default and default
judgment. A plaintiff seeking entry of default against a defendant must first show, “by
affidavit or otherwise,” that the defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a). Upon such showing, the clerk must enter default against the defendant.
Id. Following such entry, the plaintiff must apply to the court for a default judgment,
except when the claim “is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
computation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Once default is entered against a defendant, that
party is deemed to have admitted all of the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint,
except those related to damages. Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110-11 (6th Cir.
1995).
When deciding whether to grant a motion for a default judgment, the Court must
satisfy itself that the facts in the complaint state a claim for relief against the defendant.
See Kuhlman v. McDonnel, No. 1:20-cv-510, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23846, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 10, 2022) (citation omitted). The Court is also required to “conduct an inquiry in
order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Vesligaj v. Peterson,
331 F.Appx. 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009). To do so, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“require that the party moving for a default judgment present some evidence of its
damages.” Mill’s Pride, L.P. v. W.D. Miller Enters., No. 2:07-cv-990, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36756, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2010).
ANALYSIS
To start, the Court is satisfied that the facts as alleged state claims for violations of
47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. The Court will now address the issue of damages.
a. Statutory and Willful Damages
Plaintiff requests that the Court grant statutory damages in the amount of
$6,900.00 and enhanced damages for willfulness in the amount of $27,600.00. (Motion,
Doc. 11.) Plaintiff's President, Nick Gagliardi, filed a sworn affidavit describing the
damages Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendants’ violations. (See Gagliardi Affidavit,
Doc. 11-1.) The affidavit states that Plaintiff noticed its licensure sales were declining and
paid $687.50 for investigators to detect, identify, and document unlawful exhibition of
the Program by Defendants’ commercial establishment. (Id. at { 6.) The affidavit also
asserts that Plaintiff sold the sublicense for the Program to other establishments of similar
size to Defendants’ for a price of $2,300.00. (Id. at { 8; see also Bryant Affidavit, Doc. 11-4.)
The Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 11-3) lays out the
calculation of the requested statutory and enhanced damages. Regarding the request for
$6,900.00, Plaintiff points out that this number is three times the licensing fee it lost from
Defendants’ violations. (Supplemental Memorandum, Doc. 11-3, Pg. ID 55.) This treble
award is in accordance with awards that other courts have given plaintiffs for similar
violations. (Id. (citing Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Pat’s Snack Bar, LLC, No. 6:19-CV-67,
2020 WL 1923178, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2020; J] & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Tonita
Restaurant, LLC, No. 5:13-CV-382, 2015 WL 9462975, at *5, n.8 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2015)).)
The Supplemental Memorandum also addresses the enhanced damages request.
Plaintiff describes that the Court has discretion to award a flat sum for such damages, or
to use a multiplier of the statutory damages. (Supplemental Memorandum, Doc. 11-3, Pg.
ID 55, 58.) The Court notes that it may award not more than $100,000 for each violation
when it finds that the violation was committed willfully. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii).
Plaintiff asserts that, based on the intentional steps necessary to broadcast the Program
without a license, Defendants understood their broadcast of the Program “was improper
and illegal,” and took willful steps to broadcast it. (Supplemental Memorandum, Doc. 11-
3, Pg. ID 57; Gagliardi Affidavit, Doc. 11-1, J 9.) And, according to the investigator, Pierce
Bryant, Defendants’ establishment used the Program as its primary form of
entertainment on the night in question. (Supplemental Memorandum, Doc. 11-3, Pg. ID
57; Bryant Affidavit, Doc. 11-4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff requests $27,600.00, or four times
the statutory award, as other courts have done for similar violations. (Supplemental
Memorandum, Doc. 11-3, Pg. ID 58-59 (collecting cases).) Looking at both the statutory
and enhanced damages, the Court finds both requests are within the statutory limits and
supported by case law. Further, the award amounts are reasonably ascertainable based
on the sworn affidavits of Bryant and Gagliardi. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's
request for statutory damages in an amount of $6,900.00 and enhanced damages of
$27,600.00.
b. Attorney’s Fees
Next, Plaintiff's attorney, Jeffrey Koberg, filed a sworn affidavit attesting to the
breakdown of hours and rate for his legal work on Plaintiff's case. (Koberg Affidavit, Doc.
11-2.) Plaintiff's total attorneys’ fees accrued were $1,350.00. The relevant U.S. Code
section allows for the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. 47. U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
Courts use the lodestar method to determine an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.
Imwalle v. Reliance Med, Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). The lodestar
amount is “a reasonable hourly rate times a reasonable number of hours worked.” Brown
v. Halsted Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 3:12-cv-308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26144, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 26, 2013) (citing Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 551). “The key requirement for an award of
attorney’s fees is that the documentation offered in support of the hours charged must be
of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high
degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the
prosecution of the litigation.” Inwalle, 515 F.3d at 553. “[T]he district court is required to
give a clear explanation” for its award calculation. Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 566
(6th Cir. 2004).
i. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The Court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable
hourly rate. Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1208 (6th Cir. 1997). The reasonable hourly
rate is generally the prevailing market rate in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The prevailing market rate is the rate that lawyers of comparable
skill and experience can reasonably expect to command in the venue of the court of
record. Geer v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004). Courts may also look to other
markets, such as a national market, an area of specialization, or any other appropriate
market for a prevailing market rate. Louisville Black Police Officers Org. v. City of Louisville,
700 F.2d 268, 278 (6th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff seeks $300.00 per hour for his attorney, Jeffrey Koberg, who has 35 years
of litigation experience. (Koberg Affidavit, Doc. 11-2; see also” About Our Law Firm,” Law
Offices of Timothy M. Sullivan, timsullivanlaw.com/about-sullivan (last visited July 30,
2025).) The Court finds this rate reasonable, as other courts in this district have approved
similar rates in similar cases. See, e.g., Funk v. Airstream, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-260, 2019 US
Dist. LEXIS 162334, at *7-8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2019) (finding that a rate of $350.00 for an
attorney with ten years of experience to be reasonable).
ii. Reasonable Number of Hours
When determining the reasonable number of hours worked, “the standard is
whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended
in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed.” Brown, 2013
US. Dist. LEXIS 26144, at *6 (citing Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177
(6th Cir. 1990)).
Plaintiff's counsel maintains that he billed 4.5 hours by the date of his affidavit.
(Koberg Affidavit, Doc. 11-2.) However, counsel does not provide a description or
documentation of how those hours were spent. The Sixth Circuit has laid out that the
“key requirement” for awarding attorneys’ fees is that “the documentation offered in
support of the hours charged must be of sufficient detail and probative value to enable
the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and
reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med.
Producsts, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Although counsel need not
provide great detail of how he spent each minute, “the general subject matter should be
identified.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rowland Plumbing, Ltd., No. 5:11-CV-316, 2013 WL
5442302, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2013) (cleaned up). As such, the Court will refrain from
calculating the lodestar amount and awarding attorneys’ fees until Plaintiff's counsel
submits supplemental information of the billing entries for the 4.5 hours worked.
c. Costs
The Court may also award reasonable costs. See 47. U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
Gagliardi stated that Plaintiff spent $687.50 in investigator fees related to this matter.
(Gagliardi Affidavit, Doc. 11-1, 6). And, Plaintiff's counsel stated that court fees totaled
$402.00 for this matter. (Koberg Affidavit, Doc. 11-2.) The Court finds these costs
reasonably ascertainable and awards them both to Plaintiff, for a total of $1,089.50 in
costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS the following:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 11) is GRANTED;
2. Default Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants
in the following amounts:
i. $6,900.00 in statutory damages;
ii. $27,600.00 in enhanced damages;
iii. $402.00 in court costs; and
iv. $687.50 in investigator costs; and
3. Plaintiff or Plaintiff's counsel SHALL FILE additional documentation
itemizing the hours billed for work performed by Plaintiff's counsel on
this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
By: =
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND