Singh v. Warden, Noble Correctional Institution

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI

TARANPREET SINGH, : Case No. 1:24-cv-156

Petitioner, Judge Matthew W. McFarland

v.

WARDEN, NOBLE CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTION,

Respondent.

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendations (Doc. 11) of

United States Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz. Petitioner filed Objections (Doc. 14), to

which Respondent did not respond. Thus, this matter is ripe for the Court’s review.

BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2024, Petitioner Taranpreet Singh filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Habeas Petition, Doc. 1.) Specifically, he seeks

habeas relief from his state convictions for rape, kidnapping, and assault by arguing that

he was convicted without sufficient evidence. (Id. at §{ 32-44.) Petitioner unsuccessfully

raised similar sufficiency arguments with Ohio’s Twelfth District Court of Appeals. (Id.

at 24); State v. Singh, 2022-Ohio-3385, 2022 WL 4476557, at *9-12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26,

2022). The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the Petition after concluding that

Petitioner's sole ground for relief—the claim of insufficient evidence—is meritless.

(Report, Doc. 11.) Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 14) are now before the Court.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions concerning the lack of

citations in Petitioner’s Traverse and the dismissal of his Petition on the merits.

(Objections, Doc. 14.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court is tasked with reviewing de novo any portion of a Report

and Recommendation to which a proper objection was made. “The district judge may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return

the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also

Williams v. Parikh, 708 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1351 (S.D. Ohio 2023). With this framework in

mind, the Court considers Petitioner’s objections in turn.

I, Citations to the Record

Petitioner's first two objections revolve around the Magistrate Judge’s finding that

Petitioner had failed to include required record citations in his Traverse. (Objections, Doc.

14, Pg. ID 1294-97.) It was ordered that “[a]ll papers filed in this case [after Respondent

files the relevant state court record] shall include record references to the Page ID

number.” (Order, Doc. 2, Pg. ID 24.) The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that the “[fact] portion of the Traverse contains not a single reference to the

record.” (Report, Doc. 11, Pg. ID 1283-84; Traverse, Doc. 9, Pg. ID 1251-54.) While

Petitioner acknowledges this, he maintains that the argument section did include several

citations to the record. (Objections, Doc. 14, Pg. ID 1294-95.) Some subsections — but not

all subsections — within Petitioner’s argument section contain record cites. (See Traverse,

Doc. 9, Pg. ID 1267-68.) The Court therefore overrules Petitioner's first two objections.

However, at Petitioner’s request, the Court will also consider the record cites as set forth

in the Petition and Objections.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner also objects to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to

support his convictions for rape, kidnapping, and felonious assault. (Objections, Doc. 14,

Pg. ID 1297.)

The seminal Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), provides

the applicable standard for evidentiary sufficiency in criminal cases and accompanying

habeas cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per

curiam). In Jackson, the Supreme Court articulated the key question as follows: “after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [could] any rational

trier of fact .. . have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt[?]” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Notably, this standard “gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.

Ultimately, “the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable

as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656; see also Cavazos

v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (per curiam).

The already deferential standard expressed in Jackson becomes “doubly

deferential” when considered in conjunction with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Parsley v. Skipper, No. 20-2003, 2021 WL 1502725, at *2

(6th Cir. Feb. 17, 2021) (citing Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2008)). “By virtue

of the AEDPA’s command that federal habeas relief may issue only if the state court's

decision is ‘contrary to’ controlling federal law or ‘based on an unreasonable application’

of the controlling federal law, a state court determination that the evidence satisfied the

deferential Jackson standard is itself ‘entitled to considerable deference’ by the federal

habeas court.” Woods v. Parris, No. 1:15-CV-1207, 2018 WL 4355208, at *5-6 (W.D. Tenn.

Sept. 12, 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656). Together, the two-

layered deference of Jackson and the AEDPA results in a “nearly insurmountable hurdle”

for a petitioner seeking relief in this habeas context. Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 534 (6th

Cir. 2011) (en banc).

Petitioner presented his “insufficient evidence” arguments as to his rape,

kidnapping, and assault convictions to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District.

See Singh, 2022 WL 4476557, at *9. The Twelfth District began by correctly identifying the

elements of the crimes in question:

Appellant was convicted of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which

provides that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with another

when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force

or threat of force.” A person acts purposely “when it is the person’s specific

intention to cause a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “Force” is defined by

the [Ohio] Revised Code as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint

physically exerted by any means or against a person or thing.” R.C.

2901.01(A)(1). Sexual conduct includes “vaginal intercourse between a male

and female” and “without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight,

of any part of the body . .. into the vaginal or anal opening of another.” R.C.

2907.01(A).

Appellant was also convicted of kidnapping in violation of R.C.

2905.01(A)(4), which provides that “[n]o person, by force, threat, or

deception, . . . shall remove another from the place where the other person

is found or restrain the liberty of the other person, . . . [t]o engage in sexual

activity, as defined in Section 2907.01 of the Revised Code, with the victim

against the victim’s will.” Sexual activity means sexual contact or sexual

conduct, including vaginal intercourse. R.C. 2907.01(C).

Finally, appellant was convicted of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A),

which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause

physical harm to another.” Pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), “[a] person acts

knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the

person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of

a certain nature.” Any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment,

regardless of its gravity or duration, constitutes “physical harm” to a

person. R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).

Id. at *10.

Then, after establishing the appropriate standard of review, the appellate court’s

analysis proceeded as follows:

After reviewing the record, weighing inferences and examining the

credibility of the witnesses, we find appellant’s convictions for rape,

kidnapping, and assault are supported by sufficient evidence and are not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. The state presented testimony

and evidence from which the jury could have found all the essential

elements of the offenses proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jane testified

that appellant picked her up near the Circle K on Pleasant Avenue and

drove her to an abandoned building on East Avenue in Hamilton.

Using his need to search for his missing wallet as a ruse, appellant

approached Jane on the passenger side of the vehicle, grabbed her hair and

forcibly pulled her away from the car and into a back room of the

abandoned building. While forcing Jane into the abandoned building,

appellant assaulted Jane, striking her in the head and beating her “in the

front” and “in the back.” Once inside the back room, appellant engaged in

forcible sexual conduct with Jane, vaginally raping her with his penis before

ejaculating inside of her.

Jane was injured during the incident. As the [sexual assault nurse examiner

(“SANE”)] who examined Jane testified, Jane had an abrasion to her left

nostril and upper lip as well as “multiple contusions, abrasions, erythema,

which is redness, to [her] back” near her shoulders. Forensic evidence

obtained during the SANE nurse’s examination was later tested by a BCI

forensic scientist. Appellant's DNA was found on swabs taken from Jane’s

perianal area and labia minora and on the underwear Jane had worn on the

night of the sexual assault. Jane’s testimony, evidence gathered during her

sexual assault examination, and the forensic analysis of the rape kit was

evidence demonstrating appellant assaulted, kidnapped, and raped Jane.

Appellant challenges Jane’s credibility and the weight given to her

testimony. Appellant, who had admitted to picking up prostitutes in

Hamilton, theorizes that Jane was a prostitute and that she and other

prostitutes had developed a scheme to try to extort him for money or set up

a civil suit for damages. Appellant contends the fact that Marie knew of a

prostitute storing his semen in her freezer demonstrated prostitutes in

Hamilton were acting with nefarious intentions.

Appellant contends Jane lied when she denied being a prostitute, lied about

not knowing Marie or Daisy, and lied about not making plans with them or

anyone else to sue appellant following the criminal trial. To support his

claim that Jane was not a credible witness, appellant relies on the fact that

Jane has a prior felony conviction for possession of heroin and the fact that

she gave inconsistent stories about where appellant had picked her up on

the night of the rape. When Jane originally gave a statement to officers, she

had claimed that appellant had offered her a ride and picked her up at

Circle K. However, after surveillance footage from the store showed her

arriving at the store in appellant’s car, Jane later changed her story and

stated appellant picked her up “near” Circle K.

Appellant further contends Jane’s appearance and lack of serious physical

injuries in the aftermath of the alleged rape, assault, and kidnapping also

cast doubt on the credibility of her testimony. Appellant argues that if the

events described by Jane had actually occurred, then one would have

expected the SANE nurse to have observed more injuries to Jane’s scalp and

face, such as missing hair, bruises, or scratches, as well as visible injuries to

her back, thighs, or vagina, including bruises and cuts from broken glass

that was spread out in the abandoned building. Appellant contends that

one would have also expected to find blood on more than Jane’s underwear.

Appellant noted that Jane’s shirt, though dirty, did not have any blood on

it.

Appellant also contends that Jane’s behavior during the kidnapping and

sexual assault and her actions after the incident also cast doubt on the

credibility of her story. Appellant notes that Jane admitted that she did not

fight back or try to escape from appellant during the sexual assault, and

once appellant finished and left her alone in the empty building, she did

not immediately call police. Instead, Jane got dressed, started walking

home, and called her mother. She did not try to flag anyone walking or

driving by for help. Jane then waited approximately eight hours to report

the sexual assault to the police. After her initial report, Jane became

uncooperative with the police, failing to appear for scheduled interviews.

Jane waited until May 2020 to report seeing the man who raped her driving

in the area where she lived.

The jury, through defense counsel’s cross-examination of the state’s

witnesses and closing arguments, was presented with appellant’s theory

that Jane lied about the events that occurred on September 4, 2019. They

heard about the inconsistencies in her story and were given the opportunity

to weigh her version and explanation of events against appellant's version.

Jane explained that once appellant had her in the back room of the

abandoned building, she ceased resisting and screaming for help so that

appellant would stop beating her. She also explained that after the sexual

assault, she was “in shock of everything” and just wanted her mother and

the safety of her home.

“[W]hen conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed

the prosecution testimony.” State v. Lunsford, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-

10-021, 2011-Ohio-6529, § 17. This is because, “[a]s the trier of fact in [the]

case, the jury was in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses

and the weight to be given to the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 12th Dist.

Warren Nos. CA2019-07-076 and CA2019-08-080, 2020-Ohio-3501, {| 24. The

jury considers any inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony and resolves

them accordingly, believing all, part, or none of each witnesses’ testimony.

State v. Enoch, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-07-117, 2020-Ohio-3406, § 27.

Here, the jury clearly found Jane’s testimony, which was corroborated by

the visible injuries she sustained and the DNA evidence obtained from the

rape kit, credible.

Given the evidence presented at trial, the jury was entitled to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that appellant committed assault, kidnapping, and rape

against Jane. Appellant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence

and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury did not

lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

appellant’s convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Appellant's third and fourth assignment of error are overruled.

Id. at *10-12.

After thoroughly examining the record in this matter and Petitioner’s Objections,

the Court arrives at the same conclusion as the Magistrate Judge: “The Twelfth District's

decision evinces the incorporation of the Jackson standard in Ohio law and reasonably

determines that the State provided sufficient evidence to the jury to satisfy the Jackson

standard.” (Report, Doc. 11, Pg. ID 1283.)

Petitioner resists this conclusion by pointing to the following alleged shortcomings

in the evidence. First, as for the rape conviction, Petitioner argues that the victim’s failure

to report the rape, her lack of medical injuries consistent with rape, and her selection of

another man in a photo array demonstrate that the rape conviction is not based upon

sufficient evidence. (Objections, Doc. 14, Pg. ID 1297.) Though the victim testified that she

did not immediately call the police, she also testified that she was “in shock of

everything,” sought the safety of her own home, and was not avoiding the police.

(Transcript, Doc. 4-1, Pg. ID 268, 277, 292.) Additionally, Petitioner’s argument that the

victim’s medical injuries fail to evince rape is unpersuasive. The victim had injuries to

her nostril, lip, and back. (Id. at Pg. ID 341-44.) The witness describing these injuries

further testified that it “is not unheard of that we would not have visible injury in a sexual

assault.” (Id. at Pg. ID 347, 364.) In any event, it was the province of the jury to credit the

victim’s testimony that she was raped by Petitioner, even if it were uncorroborated by

physical evidence. (Id. at Pg. ID 268); see United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 565 (6th

Cir. 2000) (“[T]he testimony of a rape victim alone is sufficient to support a defendant’s

conviction.”); O’Hara v. Brigano, 499 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2007). Finally, while the victim

selected a different man as part of a police photo array at one point in time, Petitioner

does not contest the DNA evidence in this matter linking him to the crime. (Transcript,

Doc. 4-1, Pg. ID 294, 1016-20.)

Turning to the kidnapping and assault convictions, Petitioner contends that the

victim went willingly with him and that the medical reports do not comport with such

an attack. (Objections, Doc. 14, Pg. ID 1297.) As Respondent notes, even if the victim had

voluntarily accepted a car ride, this does not extend to the subsequent actions of

Petitioner dragging her into an abandoned building and beating her. (Return of Writ,

Doc. 5, Pg. ID 1240-41; Transcript, Doc. 4-1, Pg. ID 267-68); see also Singh, 2022 WL 4476557,

at *14. Petitioner’s contention that the medical examination failed to sufficiently evince

an assault is similarly unconvincing. The record includes evidence that the victim

suffered injuries to her nostril, lip, and back. (Transcript, Doc. 4-1, Pg. ID 337, 341-44.) It

was also explained to the jury that “it is possible that injuries do appear [later]” and that

“bruises don’t form immediately.” (Id. at Pg. ID 337.) The jury, for its part, may credit the

victim’s testimony of the assault and kidnapping without the corroboration of physical

evidence. (Id. at Pg. ID 267-68); see O’Hara, 499 F.3d at 500; Howard, 218 F.3d at 565.

The Court, once again, emphasizes that on habeas review it does not reweigh the

evidence, reassess witness credibility, or resolve conflicts in testimony —dquestions

squarely reserved for the jury. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433-34 (1983); Neal

v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 212 (6th Cir.

2009). “Jurors have broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the

evidence, and when there are a number of plausible ways to interpret the record, the state

court's interpretation must not be disturbed by a habeas court as long as it is among those

plausible interpretations.” Waterford v. Washburn, 455 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595 (M.D. Tenn.

2020) (quotations omitted). Instead, as to the specific question before the Court, Petitioner

has not shown that the Twelfth District’s application of Jackson is objectively

unreasonable or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Thus, Petitioner’s

final objection is overruled.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:

1. Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 14) are OVERRULED;

2. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 11) is ADOPTED in full;

3. The Petition is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

4. A certificate of appealability is DENTED under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) because

reasonable jurists would not disagree with the Court's adjudication;

5. It is hereby CERTIFIED that any appeal of this decision would not be taken in

good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

6. This matter is TERMINATED from the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 2 O

JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND

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