Morris v. The City of Chicago

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IL LINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT MORRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 24 CV 1431

v. )

) Judge Joan H. Lefkow

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Robert Morris brings this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000 et. seq., the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1 et.

Seq., and Illinois common law. Morris alleges that his employer, the City of Chicago (the

“City”), discriminated against him by refusing to accommodate his religious beliefs in enforcing

its COVID-19 vaccination policy. The City moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1 For the reasons stated herein, the court

grants the City’s motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND2

Morris works as a firefighter for the City of Chicago. He is also a “devout Catholic

Deacon.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 11, 26.) In August 2021, the City “implemented a COVID-19 vaccination

policy that required employees to be vaccinated” unless they qualified for an exemption. (Id. ¶¶

1 The court has federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Venue is proper under

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

2 The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. See Taha v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying

standard to Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir.

2014) (same as to Rule 12(b)(1) motion).

22, 27.) On October 13, 2021, Morris filed a religious-accommodation exemption request in

which he detailed his religious beliefs and addressed all questions posed on the City’s exemption

form. Specifically, he asserted that the manufacturers of COVID vaccines use fetal cells from

aborted fetuses in their production.3 Morris did not provide the signature of a spiritual advisor, as

required by the form, as he deemed it “unnecessary and illegal … to require such validation of

his beliefs.” (Id. ¶ 28.) The City responded by “insisting on a spiritual advisor’s signature” and

“demand[ing] answers to the questions” Morris had “already addressed” in his initial request.4

(Id. ¶ 29.)

The City also asked Morris for a “medication follow-up” form. (Id. ¶ 32.) The follow-up

form set out a list of “common medicines,” including Tylenol, Pepto Bismol, Benadryl,

ibuprofen, and aspirin, that “fall into the same category as the COVID-19 vaccine in their use of

fetal cell lines.” (Dkt. 1-2 at 6.) It then provided:

By signing this form, I truthfully acknowledge and affirm that my sincerely held

religious belief is consistent and true and that I do not use, nor will I use, any of

the medications listed above as examples or any other medication (prescription,

vaccine, or over the counter medication) that has used fetal cell lines in their

testing, research, and/or development. I also truthfully affirm that, if my request

for religious exemption is approved, I will abide by the vaccine accommodation

requirements (twice-weekly testing, social distancing, masking). I understand that

my failure to abide by the accommodation requirements will subject me to

disciplinary action, up to and including termination. …

3 “[A] court may consider, in addition to the allegations set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are

attached to the complaint ...” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013). The exhibits attached to

Morris’s complaint are appropriately considered “based on [Morris’s] own reliance on these documents and in the

absence of any indication from [him] … that the documents are not genuine or that they have been falsified in some

way.” Id.

4 The City’s request form asked, “When did you begin practicing this religion or following these beliefs?”

and “Do your religious beliefs include objections to other vaccines or medications?” (See Dkt. 1-2 at 8.) Morris’s

request did include information in response to both questions.

Morris retained legal representation to challenge the City’s requirements and, after

making attempts to rebut the City’s position, filed charges of discrimination and retaliation with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in December 2021. On January 26,

2022, Morris submitted the required follow-up paperwork “under duress.” (Id. ¶ 38.) His

exemption request was approved the next day.

In October 2022, Morris received a notice recommending his suspension. Represented by

a union attorney, Morris responded to the charges and contested the rationale supporting his

suspension.5 Morris was suspended for nine days.

On November 20, 2023, Morris received notice of his right to sue under Title VII. He

initiated this suit on February 20, 2024. The vaccination policy is no longer in place. The City

moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).6

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the court’s subject-

matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating that the district court has

subject-matter jurisdiction over [the] case[.]” Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241,

1244 (7th Cir. 2021). If the court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, then “the

court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of

the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The complaint “must contain

5 Morris does not allege the stated basis of the suspension, but his memorandum suggests that it concerned

his acting as a spiritual advisor in signing religious exemption forms for other Fire Department employees.

6 On August 26, 2024, the court granted the City’s motion to dismiss without prejudice due to Morris’s

failure to respond. Morris did not file an amended complaint by the ordered deadline, so the court converted the

dismissal to one with prejudice. Morris filed a motion for reconsideration on September 18, 2024, which the court

denied for failure to demonstrate diligence. On October 21, 2024, Morris filed another motion to reopen the case.

After a hearing, the court granted the motion.

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. In short, the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

ANALYSIS

I. Standing

The City first argues that Morris’s claim must be dismissed for lack of standing under

Article III of the Constitution. Article III limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and

“controversies.” Ciarpaglini v. Norwood, 817 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

“To establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury

in fact,’ (2) that the challenged conduct caused the injury, and (3) some likelihood that a decision

in his favor will remedy the injury.” Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir.

2020) (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157‒58 (2014)). “An injury in

fact is ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,’ and

‘(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty., 47 F.4th

587, 597 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

Morris bears the burden of establishing Article III standing. Id. at 596.

Morris contends that he has standing because he was required to sign the follow-up form,

which “changed [his] employment terms.” (Dkt. 24 at 6.) Morris asserts that the follow-up form

“imposed unreasonable restrictions on medications essential to his duties as a first responder,

including aspirin, Tylenol, ibuprofen, Claritin, and Benadryl.” (Id. at 4.)7 He argues that several

such medications “were developed decades before fetal cell lines were used in research” and that

his faith “does not consider these medications morally objectionable.” (Id.) Therefore, “by

compelling him to abstain, the City not only misinterprets Catholic teaching but also infringes

upon [Morris’s] religious rights.” (Id.)

The City responds that Morris has not suffered an injury in fact because it granted him a

religious exemption to the COVID-19 vaccine. In support, the City primarily relies on Klaassen

v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021), and a district court interpreting its holding.

See Campbell v. Edward-Elmhurst Health, No. 23-CV-02799, 2024 WL 5247932 (N.D. Ill. Dec.

30, 2024). In Klaassen, the Seventh Circuit explained that plaintiffs who qualified for Indiana

University’s religious exemption for the COVID-19 vaccination did not establish a justiciable

controversy. 7 F.4th at 593.8

Courts in this district have referenced Klaassen for the broader proposition that

qualifying for a religious exemption to a vaccine requirement divests plaintiffs of standing. See,

e.g., Perez v. City of Chicago, No. 1:24-CV-03077, 2025 WL 1191079, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24,

2025) (stating that under Klaassen, “persons who received an exemption to a vaccination

mandate lack standing to challenge that mandate in federal court”); Campbell, 2024 WL

5247932, at *3 (“Plaintiff’s attempts to demonstrate standing run up against Klaassen v. Trustees

7 Morris makes such contentions for the first time in his briefing. While it is “axiomatic … that a plaintiff

may not amend his complaint in his response brief,” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v.

Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011), a plaintiff may “allege without evidentiary support any facts he

pleases that are consistent with the complaint, in order to show that there is a state of facts within the scope of the

complaint that if proved ... would entitle him to judgment.” Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th

Cir. 1992). Morris’s contentions in his response brief appropriately expand on the ways in which the follow-up form

“switched the terms and condition of his employment” (dkt. 1 ¶ 41) and how the City “forced [him] to … either take

[the] vaccine or risk losing his livelihood.” (Id. ¶ 58.)

8 The court reiterated this conclusion in a subsequent opinion. Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 24 F.4th 638,

639 (7th Cir. 2022).

of Indiana University, where the Seventh Circuit held that those who, as did Plaintiff, receive a

religious exemption to a vaccine mandate lack standing to challenge that mandate in federal

court.”); see also Sanchez v. City of Chicago, No. 24 C 1322, 2025 WL 1042821, at *3 (N.D. Ill.

Apr. 7, 2025) (holding that plaintiff could not have challenged the City’s vaccination policy

under Klaassen had he received an exemption).

Klaassen, however, expressly relied on the limited strings attached to the exemption at

issue: the student-plaintiffs “just need[ed] to wear masks and be tested, requirements that are not

constitutionally problematic.” 7 F.4th at 593. Unlike in Klaassen, Morris has alleged

requirements for receiving the exemption that raise constitutional problems. The form sets out a

list of various over-the-counter medications, including Benadryl, Claritin, Tylenol, Pepto

Bismol, ibuprofen, and aspirin, that it asserts used fetal cells in “testing, research, and/or

development.” (Dkt. 1-2 at 6.) It then requires the signatory to “affirm” that “I do not use, nor

will I use, any of the medications listed above” and to acknowledge “that providing false or

misleading information in support of [the] request for religious exemption … may result in

disciplinary action, up to and including termination, under the City’s Personnel Rules.” (Id.)

Despite Morris’s position that using such medications remained consistent with his faith,

the City required him to sign the follow-up form. In so doing, the City “effectively forced [him]

to choose between abstaining from the use of these medications … and maintaining status as an

observant Catholic to remain in good standing as employee and not be deemed a religious fraud.”

Baumgartner v. City of Chicago, 759 F. Supp. 3d 868, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2024). Morris’s allegations

are thus sufficient to allege an injury in fact. See id. (concluding that the City’s follow-up form

constituted an adverse employment action under Title VII).

The court next considers whether Morris has standing to bring his claims for prospective

relief. The City argues that, since its COVID-19 policy is no longer in place, “there is no future

threat of injury, the issues presented are not ‘live,’ and his claims are moot.” (Dkt. 12 at 4.)

Indeed, Morris alleges that “[t]he original arbitrary and discriminatory policy is no longer in

place.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 22.)

As set out in Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982), a case is not moot if “there [is] a

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action

again.” (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plaintiff must show a “reasonable

expectation” or a “demonstrated probability” that the same controversy will recur involving the

same complaining party.” Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per

curiam)). Since “the City has not renounced the enforceability” of the follow-up form, “the threat

that violating it (i.e., by taking one of the restricted medications) could impact [Morris’s]

employment status ensures the suit remains ripe for adjudication.” Baumgartner, 759 F. Supp. 3d

at 875. Although the claim could be readily mooted by the cancellation of Morris’s follow-up

form, as alleged, this has not occurred. Morris therefore maintains Article III standing for

prospective relief. Because there is subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(f)(3), the court denies the City’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion.

II. Title VII (Count I)

The court turns to the City’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which first seeks dismissal of

Morris’s Title VII claim.9 “The Seventh Circuit has made clear that the pleading standard under

9 Morris makes two conclusional references to a “hostile work environment” in his Amended Complaint,

including once in the opening paragraph. (Dkt. 1 at 1, ¶ 10.) The City contends that Morris fails to raise “a single

allegation demonstrating harassment.” (Dkt. 12 at 8.) Morris does not respond and has therefore waived any claim of

hostile work environment harassment under Title VII. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F.3d

599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by

legal authority.”).

Title VII is a low bar.” Baumgartner, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 875 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Concentra

Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2007)). To state a claim for religious

discrimination based on failure to accommodate under Title VII, Morris must show: “(1) the

observance, practice, or belief conflicting with an employment requirement is religious in nature;

(2) the employee called the religious observance, practice, or belief to the employer’s attention;

and (3) the religious observance, practice, or belief was the basis for the employee’s

discriminatory treatment.” Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2024); see

also Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012).

The City first argues that Morris “fails … to connect how his alleged stance is related to

the COVID-19 vaccine or to being a Christian [or] Catholic.” (Dkt. 26 at 5.) “At the pleading

stage, an employee seeking an accommodation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s

vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an inference that some ‘aspect[ ]’ of the

request is based on the employee’s ‘religious observance and practice’ or ‘belief.’” Passarella,

108 F.4th at 1009 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

Morris alleges that an employment requirement, receiving the COVID-19 vaccine

conflicts with his religious beliefs: Catholic “commandments and teachings.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22‒23,

26, 53.) Morris expands on his religious objection in his six-page “Accommodation Request,”

attached to the Amended Complaint, which sets out his position in more detail. (Dkt. 1-2 at 9‒

14.) Morris explains, citing the Catechism of the Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II’s

Evangelium Vitae, among other resources, that the Catholic Church “has consistently regarded

abortion as a moral evil” and inconsistent with the use of fetal cell lines in producing vaccines.

(Dkt. 1-2 at 11‒12.)10 This sufficiently connects Morris’s exemption request to his religious

10 The City appears to suggest that Morris, for the first time in his briefing, draws a “clear distinction”

between medications “developed through the use of fetal cells” (dkt. 24 at 18) and those that only used fetal cells “in

beliefs. Passarella, 108 F.4th at 1009 (concluding that plaintiffs’ exemption requests to COVID-

19 vaccination were “religious in nature within the meaning of Title VII” because the

“exemption requests are based on their face and at least in part on a dimension of the plaintiffs’

religious beliefs”).

Morris also adequately pleads the second element of his claim, as he called his religious

objection to the City’s attention by completing a religious exemption request. Finally, Morris

alleges an adverse employment decision based on his Catholic faith. The City required him to

complete the follow-up form to receive the religious exemption and the form prohibited

medications that are “essential to [Morris’s] duties as a first responder.” (Id. ¶ 32, dkt. 24 at 4.) If

Morris “violates the form, presumably by taking one of the medications, [he] ‘may be subject to

discipline, up to [and] including termination.’” Baumgartner, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 876; Dkt. 1-2 at

5. In other words, the City “changed the terms of [Morris’s] employment when he requested a

religious exemption.” Baumgartner, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 876. The court therefore denies the

City’s motion to dismiss Count I.

III. Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act (Count II)

In Count II, Morris alleges a claim under the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience

Act (“IHCRCA”), 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1 et. seq, which protects Illinoisans’ rights to decline

health care services “contrary to [their] conscience.” Troogstad v. City of Chicago, 571 F. Supp.

3d 901, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2021), aff’d sub nom. Lukaszczyk, 47 F.4th 587 (quoting 745 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 70/2). Section 13.5 of the IHCRCA provides an exception, however, for measures related to

preventing COVID-19: “It is not a violation of this Act … to take any measures or impose any

requirements … intended to prevent contraction or transmission of COVID-19 ….” 745 Ill.

research” (id. at 4), such that it is inconsistent with this more general objection. (See Dkt. 26 at 3 n.2.) The court

rejects this characterization and finds the reasoning in both documents sufficiently consistent.

Comp. Stat. 70/13.5. The City contends that Section 13.5 bars Morris’s claim, citing in part

Carrero v. City of Chicago, No. 23-CV-00650, 2024 WL 22099, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2024)

(dismissing IHCRCA claim challenging City’s COVID-19 vaccine policy pursuant to Section

13.5).

Morris offers no counter to the City’s arguments and fails to mention the IHCRCA at all

in his response. He has therefore waived the claim. Schaefer, 839 F.3d at 607. The court

dismisses Count II with prejudice.

IV. IIED and NIED Claims (Counts III and IV)

The City argues that Morris’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and

negligent infliction of emotional distress are preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101, et seq., and the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 305/1, et seq. The City also argues, in the alternative, that Morris fails to state a claim for

either tort. Morris offers no substantive response to the City’s arguments and has therefore

waived the claims. Schaefer, 839 F.3d at 607. The court dismisses Counts III and IV with

prejudice.

V. First Amendment

At the outset, the City argues that Morris “does not assert a separate count or claim under

the First Amendment” and therefore fails to assert a viable claim (Dkt. 12 at 12.) While not

explicitly stated, the City appears to invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), which

provides that “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence … must be stated in a

separate count or defense” “[i]f doing so would promote clarity.” A court may dismiss, sua

sponte, a portion of a complaint that does not comply with Rule 10(b), “particularly when the

complaint does not provide the defendant with adequate notice of the claims it must defend.”

Williams v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 16 C 9072, 2017 WL 4467456, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,

2017).

Morris has not pleaded a First Amendment claim as a separate count and offers vague

theories regarding speech on behalf of himself and other employees.11 In his Amended

Complaint, Morris alleges that the City retaliated against him “[i]n direct violation of [his] First

Amendment [r]ights” following Morris’s “compl[iance] with the medical attestation form which

switched the terms and condition of his employment.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 41‒44.) Morris later alleges,

however, that he “helped others … [and] signed the religious exemption form[s] of other

employees.” (Id. ¶ 54) (emphasis added). He pleads that the City “retaliated against his right to

organize” pursuant to the First Amendment and “violated his free speech in retaliation to

Morris’[s] leadership.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Morris appears to opt for the latter theory in his response,

adding new facts about the temporal proximity between signing an exemption on behalf of “the

final [Chicago Fire Department] member on unpaid leave” and Morris’s suspension. (Dkt. 24 at

16‒17.)

The City represents that it is uncertain as to whether this theory serves as the basis for

Morris’s First Amendment retaliation claim and contends that it was never referenced in the

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 26 at 9 n.6) (“It is unclear from Plaintiff’s response, but he may be

asserting that he signed exemption request forms on behalf of other CFD employees in his

capacity as a Deacon, and he is now contending that these other requests triggered retaliation. If

so, such allegations do not appear in the Complaint and should be disregarded.”) (cleaned up).

11 While Morris does not identify 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a cause of action anywhere in his Amended

Complaint, this oversight is not fatal. See Robinson-Miller v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:18-CV-512-

JTA, 2022 WL 13701300, at *17 & n.18 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 21, 2022) (construing constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 despite plaintiff’s failure to plead the specific statutory mechanism).

Though the theory is briefly referenced in the pleading, it does not arise from Morris’s

negotiations with the City for his own religious accommodation—the basis of his Title VII

claim.12 Rather, it originates from his efforts on behalf of other City employees. These

allegations amount to a different “transaction or occurrence” under Rule 10(b). See Pratt v.

Illinois Dep’t of Corr., No. 06-CV-847-JPG, 2007 WL 1320626, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 3, 2007)

(ordering amendment of complaint pursuant to Rule 10(b) where “the specific acts of

discrimination and retaliation of which [plaintiffs] complain take different forms”).

Moreover, Morris has not provided the City “with adequate notice of the claims it must

defend.” Williams, 2017 WL 4467456, at *5 (citation omitted). The City did not brief the merits

of Morris’s “right to organize” theory, nor has Morris supported it with any citation to legal

authority. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 55.) The court therefore dismisses his First Amendment retaliation claim

under Rule 10(b). Because Morris has offered some substantive factual explanation in support of

his retaliation claim, however, the court will permit Morris to replead with more clarity.

VI. Illinois Tort Immunity Act

The City also contends that the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2-101,

et. seq, bars Morris’s claims. The Tort Immunity Act “protect[s] local public entities and public

employees from liability arising from the operation of government. It grants only immunities and

defenses.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/1-101.1(a). The statute is accordingly “an affirmative

defense, and a plaintiff does not have to plead around affirmative defenses.” Prokop v. Hileman,

588 F. Supp. 3d 825, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2022). The court therefore “declines to dismiss based on the

12 Morris “realleges all the paragraphs above for his Title VII discrimination claim” (dkt, 1 ¶ 63) but clearly

articulates that his Title VII theory applies to his individual accommodation process. (Id. at 1) (“Defendant violated

Title VII when it discriminated against Morris by refusing to accommodate his sincerely held religious belief in a

timely manner and causing [Morris] damages when Defendant coerced Plaintiff into changing the terms and

conditions of his employment by signing a medical attestation form ….”).

Tort Immunity Act at this stage of the litigation.” Rogers v. Dart, No. 24-CV-03739, 2025 WL

790740, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2025).

VII. Punitive Damages

Finally, the City seeks to dismiss Morris’s claim for punitive damages against the City.

Only Count I, Morris’s Title VII claim, remains and “[p]unitive damages are not available under

Title VII against a municipality or government.” McKay v. City of Chicago, No. 21 CV 00577,

2024 WL 3251349, at *13 (N.D. ILL. July 1, 2024) (collecting cases). Morris’s claim for punitive

damages is therefore stricken.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. The

court denies the City’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion. The City’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 1s

granted in part and denied in part. Count I may proceed, but the claim for punitive damages is

stricken. The court dismisses Counts II, II, and IV with prejudice. Morris may replead a First

Amendment claim if he can plead consistently with this opinion. Morris is given until September

3, 2025, to file an amended complaint.

Date: August 20, 2025 Y MM fropterd—

.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

13