R. Doc. 511-1 at 18
How later courts described this case
- R. Doc. 511-1 at 18
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KATHERINE MUSLOW, et al. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 19-11793
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SECTION M (2)
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY,
AND AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al.
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court are motions in limine filed by plaintiffs Katherine Muslow and Meredith
Cunningham (together, “Plaintiffs”)1 and defendant Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU”).2 Both motions are opposed,3 and
both parties reply in further support of their motions.4 Having considered the parties’ memoranda,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants the motions in part and denies them in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves an employment dispute between LSU and Plaintiffs, who were
employed as full-time general counsel (Muslow) and part-time staff attorney (Cunningham) at
LSU’s Health Sciences Center in New Orleans (“LSUHSC-NO”) until their positions were retired
pursuant to LSU’s plan to consolidate its university-wide legal team into its Office of General
Counsel (“OGC”).5
1 R. Doc. 572.
2 R. Doc. 574.
3 R. Docs. 576 (LSU’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion in limine); 577 (Plaintiffs’ opposition to LSU’s motion
in limine).
4 R. Docs. 578 (Plaintiffs’ reply); 579 (LSU’s reply).
5 See R. Doc. 564-2 at 5.
The consolidation plan involved retiring the two LSUHSC-NO legal positions then
occupied by Plaintiffs and adding two new attorney positions to the OGC to be filled by Plaintiffs
at their same, then-current LSUHSC-NO salaries.6 Plaintiffs were provided with unexecuted,
proposed employment contracts for the OGC positions in January 2019.7 On February 15, 2019,
Muslow emailed OGC Vice President of Legal Affairs Thomas Skinner, with Cunningham copied
on the email, requesting that Plaintiffs’ salaries be reviewed before they executed the contracts
(the “Salary-Review Email”).8 Based on a 2017 market study (the “2017 Market Study”)
conducted by LSUHSC-NO, Muslow suggested that her salary be increased from $227,520 to
$375,000, and Cunningham’s part-time salary from $76,500 at 60% full time equivalent (“FTE”)
to $204,748 at 80% FTE “to ameliorate an environment at [LSUHSC-NO] that has not seemed
historically to view equity as potentially a gendered issue.”9 On February 18, Skinner notified
Plaintiffs that their OGC offers were rescinded “pending further review” for the stated reason that
the contracts had not been executed by the February 1, 2019 effective date.10 LSU posted the two
OGC positions online on March 28, 2019, and invited Plaintiffs to apply,11 but Plaintiffs refused
to do so.12 Plaintiffs remained in their LSUHSC-NO positions until the positions were retired
pursuant to the consolidation plan on June 30, 2019, for Cunningham and July 15, 2019, for
Muslow.13 LSU subsequently hired T. Louis Colletta, Jr., for the OGC Chief Counsel position, at
a starting annual salary of $182,500.14 The OGC Staff Attorney position was not filled.15
6 See R. Doc. 564-4 at 4, 10. Muslow was intended to fill the position of OGC Chief Counsel, id. at 16, and
Cunningham was intended to fill an OGC Staff Attorney position. Id. at 13.
7 Id. at 12-17.
8 Id. at 18.
9 Id. at 19.
10 R. Docs. 551-5 at 16-17 (quote at 17); 551-6 at 1-2 (quote at 2).
11 R. Doc. 551-6 at 20-25.
12 R. Doc. 551-7 at 1-4.
13 R. Doc. 564-4 at 2, 5.
14 R. Doc. 365-10 at 100.
15 R. Doc. 576 at 12-13.
Plaintiffs filed EEOC charges against LSU on March 26, 2019.16 On July 22, 2019,
Plaintiffs filed this action against LSU and several individual defendants alleging violations of
Title VII, Title IX, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law.17 After extensive preliminary motion practice and with the filing of a third
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs’ claims were narrowed to include gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII against LSU, retaliation in violation of Title VII against LSU, gender
discrimination in violation of the EPA against LSU and three individual defendants, retaliation in
violation of the EPA against LSU and three individual defendants, and gender discrimination in
violation of § 1983 against two individual defendants.18 Thereafter, the Court granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims.19 Plaintiffs
appealed to the Fifth Circuit,20 which affirmed the Court’s dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ gender-
discrimination and retaliation claims with the exception of their “Title VII and Equal Pay Act
claims alleging that LSU retaliated against [them] by revoking their employment contracts
following their salary-review request,”21 having determined that Plaintiffs had “presented evidence
sufficient to overcome summary judgment on this allegation of retaliation.”22
To prepare the remaining claims for trial, this Court held a status conference to determine
what issues were left for resolution after the Fifth Circuit’s ruling.23 The parties identified three
general categories of issues: what damages are available, whether Plaintiffs forfeited their Title
VII and EPA protections, and, if necessary, whether LSU could limit back- and front-pay damages
16 R. Doc. 564-6 at 38.
17 R. Doc. 1.
18 R. Doc. 99.
19 R. Docs. 451; 452.
20 R. Docs. 502; 503.
21 Muslow v. La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., Bd. of Supervisors, 2023 WL 5498952, at *11 (5th Cir.
Aug. 24, 2023) [hereinafter Muslow v. LSU] (R. Doc. 511-1 at 23), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 573 (2024).
22 Muslow v. LSU, at *9 (R. Doc. 511-1 at 20).
23 R. Doc. 541.
under the after-acquired evidence doctrine.24 The Court ordered that the parties address these
issues via motions for summary judgment before moving to evidentiary issues, while encouraging
the parties to consider any “potential stipulations to simplify trial presentation and minimize the
evidentiary issues.”25 The Court then ruled on LSU’s successive motions for summary judgment
regarding damages26 and forfeiture.27 After resolving these preliminary issues, the Court held
another status conference, this one by telephone, to address the remaining pretrial matters.28
Because the parties agreed that no Daubert motions would be necessary, the Court ordered that
the parties file motions in limine directed at the evidentiary issues they identified and that they
continue to confer with each other regarding potential trial stipulations.29
II. PENDING MOTIONS
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine
Plaintiffs first move to exclude any reference to “Plaintiffs’ alleged breaches of their
fiduciary duties and/or ethical obligations to LSU”30 as irrelevant in light of the Court’s forfeiture
ruling,31 likely to confuse the jury, and unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiffs by “improperly invit[ing]
the jury to draw negative inferences regarding Plaintiffs’ credibility and the merits of their
claims.”32 Plaintiffs next argue that the Court should exclude any reference to “the dismissal of
other claims asserted by Plaintiffs in this case” (except as necessary to instruct the jury as to the
24 Id. at 2.
25 Id. Because, in resolving the summary-judgment motion addressing available damages, the Court held that
back- and front-pay are not available, R. Doc. 561 at 26-33, it became unnecessary to address the after-acquired
evidence doctrine through a separate motion. See R. Doc. 569 at n.33.
26 R. Doc. 561.
27 R. Doc. 569.
28 R. Doc. 571.
29 Id. at 2. The parties have not agreed upon any trial stipulations. See R. Docs. 577 at 3; 579 at 2-3.
30 R. Doc. 572 at 3.
31 Id. (citing R. Doc. 569 at 17-22).
32 Id. at 3-4 (quote at 4).
claims to be tried) as irrelevant, confusing, and unfairly prejudicial.33 Plaintiffs also argue that,
while they “believe there is no factual dispute nor legal basis to submit a jury question on whether
Plaintiffs had a reasonable belief that they were being discriminated against,” to the extent that
Plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case of retaliation at trial, “any evidence or suggestion
regarding whether Plaintiffs[] ‘won’ or ‘lost’ their discrimination claims is entirely irrelevant to
the question of whether they had a reasonable belief that they were being discriminated against.”34
Plaintiffs then move to exclude “any purported non-retaliatory reasons LSU rescinded the OGC
employment contracts other than (1) the OGC employment contracts were not signed by February
1, 2019, and (2) Plaintiffs’ demands for salary increases were too high,” as these are the only
reasons LSU has yet identified for rescinding the contacts, and “any other performance-based or
other reason” raised at trial would be irrelevant, confusing, and unfairly prejudicial.35 Plaintiffs
also move to exclude references to “any individual who LSU hired to replace Plaintiffs, including
[any such] replacement’s credentials, demographics, and/or salaries,” as well as the fact that the
OGC Staff Attorney position was never filled, as irrelevant to their retaliatory rescission claims
and likely to confuse or mislead the jury.36 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that LSU should be precluded
from referring to any contractual arrangement between Plaintiffs and their counsel because any
mention of such arrangements by LSU “can only serve one purpose – to unfairly prejudice
Plaintiffs.”37
In its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion in limine, LSU first “submits that it does not intend
to introduce related arguments or evidence regarding Plaintiffs’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
33 Id. at 5.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 6.
36 Id. at 7-8.
37 Id. at 8.
and/or ethical obligations,” and therefore argues that Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude same should be
denied as moot.38 LSU next contends that Plaintiffs must establish their prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence at trial because “the summary judgment rulings by this Court and
the Fifth Circuit applied only the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56] summary judgment
standard.”39 LSU only opposes Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude references to the Court’s resolution
of prior dispositive issues in this case to the extent it is intended to apply to evidence and arguments
“relevant to remaining claims, even though also related to dismissed claims.”40 As to Plaintiffs’
motion to exclude additional non-retaliatory reasons for rescinding the contracts, LSU concedes
that “it is not permitted to offer non-retaliatory reasons that were unknown by LSU as of the date
of the contract rescissions (i.e., an after-acquired reason),” but argues that it “is not limited to only
offering [at trial the two] non-retaliatory reasons identified by Plaintiffs.”41 LSU opposes
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude references to Plaintiffs’ “replacements” at the OGC or lack thereof,
arguing that such evidence is relevant to its argument that it rescinded the OGC contracts because
Plaintiffs’ salary demands were too high.42 Lastly, LSU submits that it does not oppose Plaintiffs’
motion to exclude references to Plaintiffs’ arrangements with their attorneys “to the extent it is
limited to exclusion at trial of references to payment arrangements and fees” but argues that it
should be permitted to present “any evidence that may become relevant at trial regarding Plaintiffs’
attorneys, including but not limited to the dates of retention of any attorney of record.”43
38 R. Doc. 576 at 6.
39 Id. at 7.
40 Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted) (citing Cooper v. Meritor, Inc., 2019 WL 1028530, at *17 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 4,
2019); Fontenot v. Republic Nat’l Distrib., 2018 WL 1137519, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 2, 2018); Wright’s Well Control
Servs., LLC v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., 2018 WL 3439660, at *4 (E.D. La. May 3, 2018); Medecor Pharma LLC v.
Fleming Pharms., Inc., 2014 WL 3867548, at *1 (M.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014)).
41 Id. at 11.
42 Id. at 12-15. LSU also “reiterate[s] that Plaintiffs were not replaced and there are no wrongful termination
claims remaining at issue in this suit.” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
43 Id. at 16-17 (emphasis omitted). LSU also asserts that “Plaintiffs’ motion in limine overlooks the fact that
a designated lead attorney of record for Plaintiffs throughout the entirety of this suit has been Peter Koeppel – who is
In reply, Plaintiffs reurge that, “to the extent LSU is hoping to tell the jury about Plaintiffs’
dismissed claims to counter Plaintiffs’ prima facie showing of a reasonable belief that gender-
based pay discrimination was occurring at LSU, the Fifth Circuit has foreclosed that argument in
this case.”44 They argue that “LSU has yet to raise an actual, genuine dispute of material fact as
to any element of Plaintiffs’ prima facie case such that there is anything for the jury to resolve.”45
They further contend that “LSU cannot identify any relevance that evidence or argument regarding
the prior dismissal of other claims has to any issue remaining in this case.”46 As to LSU’s
insistence that it is not precluded from asserting new non-retaliatory reasons for rescinding the
contracts at trial, Plaintiffs contend that LSU has cited no authority for its “position that a defendant
can lay behind the log and ambush a plaintiff at trial with brand new reasons for its retaliatory
conduct.”47 Plaintiffs also contend that, should LSU be permitted to argue that it rescinded the
contracts because the salaries requested by Plaintiffs were too high, “Plaintiffs should be given
every opportunity to point out that this reason is completely inconsistent with the only articulated
reason LSU gave for the rescission at the time,” viz., that Plaintiffs failed to sign the contracts by
the effective date.48 Plaintiffs next contend that LSU’s argument in response to their motion to
exclude references to Plaintiffs’ replacements at the OGC, or lack thereof, “is entirely inconsistent”
because it denies that Plaintiffs were “replaced” while arguing that “the salaries and credentials
also Plaintiff Muslow’s husband,” which LSU argues “is significant because [Plaintiffs] have failed to distinguish
between dates when alleged discussions between Muslow and Koeppel on workplace events were in his capacity as
her spouse and the date upon which Muslow formally retained her husband (Koeppel) to serve as her attorney of
record in this suit.” Id. at 16.
44 R. Doc. 578 at 4 (emphasis omitted) (citing Muslow v. LSU, at *8 (R. Doc. 511-1 at 17) (“That we conclude
that [LSU] did not discriminate against Plaintiffs does not negate their reasonable belief … that they received
discriminatory wages on account of their gender.”)).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 5.
47 Id. at 6.
48 Id. at 7.
‘of individuals ultimately hired to the new OGC positions’ [are] relevant after all.”49 Plaintiffs
further argue that “[i]f LSU is permitted to introduce OGC salary evidence for individuals it says
did not replace Plaintiffs to support its case, Plaintiffs must likewise be permitted to introduce
other relevant salary evidence from LSU … to demonstrate pretext.”50 Finally, Plaintiffs contend
that “there is no reason for LSU to reference the fact that one of Plaintiffs’ attorneys is Ms.
Muslow’s husband, or to parse the timing of when he or any other lawyer was retained as counsel,”
in light of the Court’s holding that a forfeiture defense is not available. 51
B. LSU’s Motion in Limine
LSU moves to exclude a total of 33 witnesses, exhibits, arguments, or groups thereof.52 It
first seeks the removal of an unidentified representative of its Board of Supervisors from Plaintiffs’
“may call” witness list as irrelevant, improper, and unnecessary.53 As the crux of its argument,
LSU maintains that Plaintiffs must prove their prima facie case – including that they had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that they were being discriminated against because of their gender –
by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. Accordingly, LSU contends that Plaintiffs should be
barred from referencing the Fifth Circuit’s opinion reversing summary judgment on the retaliatory-
recission claim “to argue that all elements of a prima facie case, such as protected activity, have
been proven.”54 However, LSU also seeks to exclude evidence that Plaintiffs offer to support their
good-faith, reasonable belief that they were subjected to wage discrimination, as irrelevant,
unfairly prejudicial to LSU, and likely to confuse the issues and the jury. It argues that much of
this evidence is irrelevant because it was produced or relates to events that occurred after Plaintiffs’
49 Id. at 8 (quoting R. Doc. 576 at 15).
50 Id. at 9.
51 Id.
52 R. Doc. 574-1. The Court will address the requested exclusions by categories rather than in the precise
order presented by LSU.
53 Id. at 3.
54 Id. at 22-23.
employment with LSU ended and thus could not have contributed to their belief of wage
discrimination.55 LSU also argues that evidence related to the compensation of LSU employees
other than Plaintiffs is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and likely to confuse the jury because there
are no wage-discrimination claims remaining in this case and, in any event, none of those
employees would be wage comparators for Plaintiffs.56 LSU similarly moves to exclude testimony
and exhibits relating to pay-disparity and discrimination complaints raised by non-party LSU
employees,57 including anonymous complaints,58 and documents related to internal audits of pay
disparities at LSU59 and an independent Title IX review, as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.60
LSU frequently argues that anticipated trial testimony and exhibits prepared by or pertaining to
current or former LSUHSC-NO employees are irrelevant because, as employees of “a separate
agency on a separate LSU campus,”61 these individuals had no authority within the OGC, were not
decisionmakers with respect to the OGC consolidation, and were not involved in the OGC’s
55 Id. at 7-8 (moving to exclude the testimony of Colletta), 8 (moving to exclude LSUHSC-NO Chief of Staff
position exhibits), 9-10 (moving to exclude the 2021 internal audit testimony and exhibits), 10-11 (moving to exclude
the memorandum of Frank Wasser), 14 (moving to exclude the Legal Office Coordinator position exhibit), 16 (moving
to exclude an exhibit regarding the OGC salary of Winston Decuir). LSU also seeks to exclude evidence relating to
events that occurred after LSU rescinded the OGC employment contracts for the same reason. See id. at 6-7 (moving
to exclude the affidavit of Nicole Honoree).
56 Id. at 3-4 (moving to exclude the testimony of Rosalynn Martin), 4 (moving to exclude the deposition
testimony and employment records of John Harman), 8 (moving to exclude LSUHSC-NO Chief of Staff position
exhibits), 13 (moving to exclude the LSUHSC-NO Unclassified Staff Pay Adjustments Policy), 13-14 (moving to
exclude LSUHSC-NO Executive Director of External and Payer Relations position exhibits), 5 (moving to exclude
the testimony of Sara Schexnayder), 14-15 (moving to exclude the 2015 offer letter for LSUHSC-NO Vice Chancellor
for Clinical Affairs), 7-8, 15 (moving to exclude the testimony of Colletta and the salary records of Richard Buhler),
17 (moving to exclude LSUHSC-NO salary records), 19-21 (moving to exclude the 2017 Market Study and 2019
LSUHSC-NO equity review), 21-22 (moving to exclude complaints by LSUHSC-NO employees and anonymous
sources).
57 Id. at 6-7 (moving to exclude the affidavit of Honoree relating to, inter alia, her own pay-equity complaint),
8-9 (moving to exclude the affidavit of Roy Clay regarding “an investigation of a pay disparity complaint by a female
LSUHSC-NO employee, an investigation of a LSUHSC physician, and … information he received about the
LSUHSC-NO 2017 Unclassified Employee Market Study”).
58 Id. at 21-22.
59 Id. at 9-10.
60 Id. at 12. LSU points out that “there are no Title IX claims at issue in this suit” and the Title IX “[r]eport
does not address any Equal Pay Act or Title VII complaints of LSUHSC-NO employees.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
61 Id. at 4.
decision to rescind Plaintiffs’ proposed employment contracts.62 LSU likewise moves to exclude
Plaintiffs’ LSUHSC-NO employment records,63 an LSUHSC-NO Staff Pay Adjustment Policy,64
the 2017 Market Study referenced in Plaintiffs’ Salary-Review Email, and a 2019 LSUHSC-NO
equity review, because these LSUHSC-NO documents are not directly related to the consolidation
plan or the recission of Plaintiffs’ OGC contracts.65 LSU moves to exclude exhibits related to
OGC staff salaries, as well, because this information was not known to Plaintiffs when they sent
the Salary-Review Email.66 LSU also contends that “[e]mails related to internal discussions by
LSUHSC-NO in preparation for consolidation of legal services to the OGC do not address relevant
facts and are not germane to the remaining alleged retaliatory rescission issues.”67 In addition,
LSU moves to exclude a newspaper article as inadmissible hearsay,68 public records requests
submitted by Cunningham after Plaintiffs’ employment at LSU ended,69 and exhibits related to
Plaintiffs’ EEOC charges filed after their contracts were rescinded.70 It also moves to exclude any
reference to Plaintiffs’ dismissed claims to prevent the jury from “draw[ing] an improper,
unproven inference that because the remaining claims against LSU were not dismissed, they have
62 Id. at 3-4 (moving to exclude the testimony of Martin, LSUHSC-NO’s former Human Resources Director),
4 (moving to exclude the testimony and records of Harman, LSUHSC-NO’s former Vice Chancellor of Administration
and Finance), 5 (moving to exclude the testimony of Schexnayder, LSUHSC-NO’s current Assistant Director of
Human Resources, Compensation and Talent Acquisition, and former Human Resources Manager, Compensation),
5-6 (moving to exclude the testimony of Terri Cunningham, LSUHSC-NO’s former Assistant Director of Employee
Relations), 6 (moving to exclude the testimony of Christine Manalla, former LSUHSC-NO Administrative
Coordinator), 6-7 (moving to exclude the testimony and affidavit of Honoree, LSUHSC-NO’s former Assistant Vice
Chancellor for Economic Development and Strategic Initiatives), 8-9 (moving to exclude the testimony and affidavit
of Clay, LSUHSC-NO’s former Fiscal Compliance Officer). LSU also moves to exclude employment records of
Edward Jones, a former staff attorney at its Shreveport campus, on the same basis. Id. at 15-16.
63 Id. at 17-18.
64 Id. at 13.
65 Id. at 20.
66 Id. at 16.
67 Id. at 19.
68 Id. at 11-12.
69 Id. at 13.
70 Id. at 19.
merit”;71 evidence related to past or pending lawsuits;72 and arguments regarding LSU’s ability to
pay compensatory damages,73 all as irrelevant to the remaining claims, unfairly prejudicial, and
likely to confuse the jury.
In their opposition to LSU’s motion in limine, Plaintiffs first assert that they “have
advocated for a narrow trial of this case on one ultimate question” – namely, whether LSU’s
rescission of Plaintiffs’ OGC employment contracts constituted retaliation for their Salary-Review
Email74 – whereas LSU “insist[s] that Plaintiffs re-prove every element of their prima facie case
and counter LSU’s newly invented ‘too high salary request’ reason for immediately rescinding
Plaintiffs’ OGC employment contracts, thereby opening the door to a much broader range of
evidence necessary to prove Plaintiffs’ case at trial.”75 They contend that LSU wants to “have it
both ways” by demanding “that Plaintiffs re-prove their prima facie case at trial, including that
they held a reasonable belief that LSU was engaging in unfair pay practices [while] simultaneously
seek[ing] to exclude evidence highly relevant to that very question.”76 As to LSU’s motion to
remove a representative of the Board of Supervisors from Plaintiffs’ witness list, Plaintiffs assert
that they included this witness to authenticate certain LSU documents and rebut any argument by
LSU that Skinner “was not acting on behalf of LSU and its Board when he rescinded Plaintiffs’
OGC contracts,” but they would remove this witness if LSU agrees to stipulations addressing these
concerns.77 Plaintiffs reject “LSU’s artificial distinctions between the OGC and LSUHSC-NO,”
arguing that it does not diminish the relevance of evidence from LSUHSC-NO and its former
employees supporting Plaintiffs’ belief that “their employer – LSU – was engaging in an unlawful
71 Id. at 23-24 (quote at 24).
72 Id. at 24.
73 Id. at 24-25.
74 R. Doc. 577 at 2.
75 Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
76 Id. at 13.
77 Id. at 6.
employment practice.”78 Consequently, they argue that the testimony and any related exhibits of
Martin, Harman, T. Cunningham, Manalla, Clay, and Honoree are “not only relevant but necessary
to Plaintiffs’ showing – at LSU’s insistence – that they reasonably believed LSU was engaging in
pay discrimination and that their salary requests were not too high.”79 Plaintiffs also argue that it
does not “matter that Jones was employed at LSU-Shreveport,” rather than the OGC, because his
employment records “address a central issue in the case” – whether LSU rescinded Plaintiffs’
proposed OGC employment contracts because they failed to sign them by the deadline.80 Plaintiffs
contend that the internal audit exhibits are relevant to Plaintiffs’ reasonable, good-faith belief that
they were discriminated against, even if they post-date Plaintiffs’ employment at LSU, because
they “address [the same] systemic issues [that] Plaintiffs allege were at play during their tenure.”81
They similarly argue that the Title IX report should not be excluded because, even though there
are no Title IX claims remaining in this case, the report “provides critical insight into the overall
environment at LSU.”82 Plaintiffs also argue that several LSUHSC-NO employee salary exhibits,
including Plaintiffs’ own LSUHSC-NO employment records, are relevant because they “provide
essential background on how pay decisions were made and how Plaintiffs’ compensation
compared to similarly situated employees”83 and support their belief that they were underpaid
because of their gender.84 They oppose LSU’s motion to exclude the 2017 Market Study and
78 Id. at 10 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 7-9, 14-15.
79 Id. at 7 (discussing Martin’s anticipated testimony regarding LSUHSC-NO salary adjustment policies and
the 2017 Market Study); see also id. at 9 (arguing that Harman’s deposition testimony and records are “certainly
relevant to whether Plaintiffs possessed a reasonable belief that they were being discriminated against based on
gender”), 10 (arguing that T. Cunningham, Manalla, Clay, and Honoree’s concerns about their own pay or knowledge
about others’ pay-disparity complaints are relevant to Plaintiffs’ reasonable beliefs).
80 Id. at 15. Plaintiffs assert that this evidence “demonstrates that [Jones] did not sign his OGC employment
contract until well after he was required to, yet he still transitioned to the OGC without issue.” Id. at 16 (emphasis
omitted).
81 Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
82 Id. at 12.
83 Id. at 13.
84 Id. at 14.
related documents, arguing that these are “key documents that go to the very heart of Plaintiffs’
case,”85 and contend that the exhibits regarding other LSU employees’ complaints are “directly
relevant to the existence of concerns about pay equity.”86 Plaintiffs urge that the OGC salary
exhibits are likewise “directly relevant” because they “show how similarly situated employees
were treated in terms of salary and appointment within the OGC.”87 Plaintiffs further argue that
the LSUHSC-NO emails regarding the consolidation plan are “highly probative” of LSU’s
motivation for rescinding the OGC employment contracts because they “detail[] the intended
matter-of-course transition of legal staff to the OGC, which included Plaintiffs until they raised
pay-disparity concerns.”88 Plaintiffs agree to remove Schexnayder and Colletta from their witness
list and do not oppose LSU’s motions to exclude the LSUHSC-NO Chief of Staff position exhibits,
the news article, Cunningham’s public records requests, and the Legal Office Coordinator position
exhibit.89 They also agree that neither party should be permitted to reference the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion, except to the extent necessary to instruct the jury or resolve legal issues,90 and “that neither
party should discuss the fact that Plaintiffs ‘lost’ or LSU ‘won’ Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims,”
though they argue that they should be permitted to refer to their dismissed discrimination claims
and their EEOC charges to demonstrate their reasonable belief that they were subjected to wage
discrimination.91 Plaintiffs also contend that evidence regarding other lawsuits against LSU should
be admitted because “Plaintiffs’ awareness of previous or ongoing lawsuits alleging similar
85 Id. at 18-19 (quote at 18).
86 Id. at 20-21 (quote at 20).
87 Id. at 16-17 (quote at 17).
88 Id. at 18.
89 Id. at 23.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 23-24.
discriminatory practices is highly probative of the reasonableness of their belief that pay
discrimination was occurring at LSU.”92
In reply, LSU first contends that Plaintiffs “erroneously argue[] that [they] are being
required to ‘re-prove’ their prima facie case, including protected activity,” because the Fifth
Circuit’s holding as to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case only applied a summary-judgment standard.93
LSU further argues that Plaintiffs’ “materially different, higher trial burden” does not allow them
“to proffer ‘large swaths of evidence’ that are inadmissible, irrelevant, prejudicial, confusing, or
cumulative,”94 and “that [LSU] is not required to stipulate to unproven elements of Plaintiffs’
retaliatory rescission claims, including a prima facie case [or to] withdraw a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the OGC contract rescissions,” to avoid the admission of such evidence at
trial.95 LSU also argues that the record demonstrates that its position that it rescinded the contracts
because Plaintiffs’ salary demands were too high is not “newly invented.”96 Concerning Plaintiffs’
arguments about the specific evidence LSU moves to exclude, LSU first contends that Plaintiffs’
stated reasons for including a representative of the Board of Supervisors in their “may call” witness
list “are speculative and not supported by record facts of any such prior assertions by LSU in this
suit.”97 As to Martin’s anticipated trial testimony regarding the 2017 Market Study, LSU argues
that “the rescissions were for new OGC positions under OGC’s budget, and Skinner testified [that]
he was unaware of the 2017 LSUHSC-NO market study.”98 LSU next argues that some of the
exhibits pertaining to Harman post-date Plaintiffs’ Salary-Review Email or were only made
92 Id. at 22-23.
93 R. Doc. 579 at 1.
94 Id. at 2 (quoting R. Doc. 577 at 3).
95 Id. at 2-3 (emphasis omitted).
96 Id. at 2.
97 Id. at 5.
98 Id.
available to Plaintiffs during discovery after this suit was filed.99 And as to the testimony of T.
Cunningham, Manalla, and Clay, LSU maintains that their testimony is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’
retaliatory-recission claims because Plaintiffs have not shown that these witnesses have any
personal knowledge of the contract rescissions.100 LSU then argues that, because Plaintiffs have
not shown that they were aware of the contents of Honoree’s testimony and affidavit when they
sent the Salary-Review Email, this evidence is irrelevant.101 LSU also denies Plaintiffs’ assertion
that Jones’s employment records from LSU-Shreveport show that he was permitted to transition
to the OGC without having signed his OGC employment contract by the stated deadline because
Jones never accepted the OGC position.102 With respect to the LSUHSC-NO salary exhibits, LSU
again argues that evidence that was “acquired by Plaintiffs after this suit was filed [can]not support
Plaintiffs’ allegedly reasonable belief of pay discrimination at the time of the [Salary-Review
E]mail.”103 LSU then argues that, “[c]ontrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions,” the timing of the internal
audit exhibits in relation to Plaintiffs’ employment at LSU “absolutely diminishes the[ir] relevance
and increases the likelihood that any probative value (which is denied) is far outweighed by unfair
prejudice.”104 LSU also contends that Plaintiffs’ argument with respect to the Title IX
investigation report “stretches the scope of relevance beyond any reasonable boundary.”105 LSU
continues to distinguish between the OGC and LSUHSC-NO in its reply, arguing that the
LSUHSC-NO Pay Adjustments Policy exhibit is irrelevant because it “applies to pay adjustments
for LSUHSC-NO employees, it does not apply to OGC employees, and it does not provide context
99 Id.
100 Id. at 6.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 5.
103 Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
104 Id. at 7.
105 Id.
into similarly situated employees of Plaintiffs.”106 LSU likewise contends that Plaintiffs “fail to
note that [their own LSUHSC-NO employment records] relate to their former employment at
LSUHSC-NO, and are not relevant to the new OGC positions or the OGC consolidation.”107 LSU
again argues that exhibits relating to “LSUHSC-NO’s 2018 preparation for position retirements
ha[ve] no bearing on the OGC’s later decision to rescind offers for new OGC positions.”108 It
contends that Plaintiffs’ argument that evidence of their EEOC charges against LSU is relevant to
their reasonable, good-faith belief that they were discriminated against “overlook[s] that alleged
retaliation based on the filing of EEOC charges is a dismissed claim in this suit, and do[es] not
overcome the fact that such EEOC exhibits will be unnecessary, cumulative, prejudicial, and
confusing to the jury.”109 As to the 2017 Market Study and 2019 LSUHSC-NO equity review,
LSU reiterates that “there are no wage discrimination claims remaining in this suit” and Plaintiffs’
assertions that these exhibits “show gender-based pay disparities are also misplaced, as this Court
and the Fifth Circuit found the 2017 Market Study did not establish similarly situated male
comparators for Plaintiffs.”110 LSU next argues that the non-party employee complaints “are
irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, will confuse the trial issues, and” constitute inadmissible
hearsay.111 Finally, in response to Plaintiffs’ argument that evidence of other lawsuits against LSU
supports their reasonable, good-faith belief of wage discrimination, LSU argues that Plaintiffs
“point[] to no lawsuit upon which Plaintiffs relied on” in drafting the Salary-Review Email in
February 2019.112 Thus, concludes LSU, all of these specific items of evidence should be
excluded.
106 Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
107 Id.
108 Id. (emphasis omitted).
109 Id. at 8-9 (quote at 9).
110 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
111 Id. at 9-10 (quote at 9).
112 Id. at 10.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and that
fact “is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Evidence that is not relevant
is not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a court
to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “[B]ecause rule
403 permits the exclusion of probative evidence it is an extraordinary remedy that must be used
sparingly.” Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985). Evidence is not
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 if it is “merely adverse to the opposing party.” Brazos River
Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 427 (5th Cir. 2006). “Virtually all evidence is prejudicial;
otherwise it would not be material. The prejudice must be ‘unfair’” to be excluded under Rule
403. Id. (citing Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977)). “In reaching
a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the
probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.” Fed. R. Evid. 403
advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
B. Analysis
1. Scope of the Claim Remaining on Remand
Before addressing the specific evidence and arguments the parties seek to limit or exclude,
the Court must address the scope of the claim remaining for trial. As LSU points out,113 at the first
status conference following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in this case, the Court initially “advised that,
113 R. Docs. 574 at 23; 576 at 11.
because the Fifth Circuit only reversed a summary judgment on the one claim left to be tried,
Plaintiffs must still prove each element of the claim (including their prima facie case) by a
preponderance of the evidence.”114 However, notwithstanding the procedural posture on appeal,
a close reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion makes clear that the Fifth Circuit made critical
findings to hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case with respect
to their retaliatory recission claim:
To qualify as a protected activity, “the employee’s conduct must have ‘opposed’
the employer’s practice and that opposed practice must have been unlawful.” Scott
v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021). “Importantly, a
plaintiff need not demonstrate that the practice was actually unlawful for his
opposition to be a protected activity; rather, it is enough that the plaintiff reasonably
believed the practice was unlawful.” Id. at 1210. We hold that Plaintiffs’ belief
that LSUHSC[-NO] unlawfully discriminated against them because of their gender
was reasonable. … That we conclude that [LSU] did not discriminate against
Plaintiffs does not negate their reasonable belief, based on these facts [i.e., the facts
recited in the Salary-Review Email], that they received discriminatory wages on
account of their gender. … [T]he record reflects that Skinner understood [this]
email to raise gender-pay equity concerns. … As the district court recognized,
such testimony “seem[s] to corroborate that Plaintiffs’ belief was objectively
reasonable.” Taken together, this evidence satisfies Plaintiffs’ burden at the
summary judgment stage to show that their salary-review request was a protected
activity.
Defendants do not contest that the other elements of a prima facie case have been
satisfied for Plaintiffs’ salary-review-request allegation. We hold that [Plaintiffs]
have identified two adverse employment actions related to this allegation – the
rescission of their employment contracts, and their eventual termination – and
provided evidence linking such actions to their salary-review request. Accordingly,
we find that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect
to this allegation.115
While the Fifth Circuit determined that the “evidence satisfies Plaintiffs’ burden at the summary
judgment stage to show that their salary-review request was a protected activity,”116 it also “h[e]ld
that Plaintiffs’ belief that LSUHSC[-NO] unlawfully discriminated against them because of their
114 R. Doc. 541 at 1.
115 Muslow v. LSU, at *8 (R. Doc. 511-1 at 17-18) (some emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit thereafter upheld
the dismissal of the retaliatory-termination claim.
116 Id. (R. Doc. 511-1 at 18) (emphasis added).
gender was reasonable”117 and then found “that Plaintiffs ha[d] established a prima facie case of
retaliation with respect to [the retaliatory-recission] allegation” without a similar caveat.118
“Following remand, a district court must implement the letter and spirit of the appellate
mandate.” Jacked Up, L.L.C. v. Sara Lee Corp., 807 F. App’x 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing
Perez v. Stephens, 784 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2015)). While the Fifth Circuit here did not give
“specific and explicit instructions regarding how to proceed on remand,” id. at 350, it did instruct
this Court to conduct “further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion,”119 which “forecloses
relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court.” Franklin v. Regions
Bank, 125 F.4th 613, 630 (5th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added; quotation omitted). Accordingly, this
Court cannot relitigate on remand the question whether “Plaintiffs’ belief that LSUHSC[-NO]
unlawfully discriminated against them because of their gender was reasonable,” given the Fifth
Circuit’s explicit holding that it was.120 Thus, any evidence that goes only to Plaintiffs’ belief of
wage discrimination – including Plaintiffs’ EEOC charges and discrimination claims against LSU,
evidence pertaining to any non-party employee’s own pay-equity complaints or employment
disputes, the 2021 internal audit exhibits, Wasser’s memorandum, the Title IX review, the 2019
equity review, complaints submitted by named and anonymous LSUHSC-NO employees, and
pending and prior lawsuits involving LSU – is no longer relevant, and LSU’s motion to exclude
this evidence is granted.121 Because Plaintiffs’ reasonable belief of discrimination, and thus
protected activity, are established, LSU’s motion to exclude references to the Fifth Circuit’s
117 Id. (R. Doc. 511-1 at 17) (emphasis added).
118 Id. (R. Doc. 511-1 at 18) (emphasis added).
119 Id. at *11 (R. Doc. 511-1 at 23).
120 Id. at *8 (R. Doc. 511-1 at 17).
121 Any other ruling would have the untoward effect of opening the trial to all the evidence that would have
been required to try the wage-discrimination claims that are no longer part of the case.
opinion “to argue that all elements of a prima facie case, such as protected activity, have been
proven”122 is likewise granted as unnecessary.123
Although they claim it is “newly invented,”124 Plaintiffs do not move to exclude LSU’s
argument that it rescinded the OGC contracts because Plaintiffs’ salary requests were too high.
They instead argue that LSU should be prevented from raising any non-retaliatory reasons for
rescission “other than (1) the OGC employment contracts were not signed by February 1, 2019,
and (2) Plaintiffs’ demands for salary increases were too high.”125 LSU opposes this limitation
generally, but does not identify any additional reason it intends to assert at trial.126 The Court
agrees with Plaintiffs that any attempt by LSU to assert a non-retaliatory reason for rescinding the
contracts not yet identified at this late stage would be “trial by ambush,”127 and Plaintiffs’ motion
to exclude additional non-retaliatory reasons for rescinding the contacts on remand is granted.
Therefore, the only liability issue remaining for trial is whether LSU’s stated reasons for
rescinding the contracts – which are (1) that Plaintiffs failed to sign them by the February 1, 2019
122 R. Doc. 574-1 at 22-23.
123 Nonetheless, this Court may find it necessary during the trial to give the jury a limiting instruction to
explain that, while it has been established that Plaintiffs’ belief of gender-based wage discrimination was reasonable,
it has also been established that LSU did not discriminate against Plaintiffs on the basis of gender. Both can be true
– and, in this case, they are.
124 R. Doc. 577 at 3. While Plaintiffs rely on the Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion in arguing that “[t]he only
purported non-retaliatory reason LSU briefed to the Fifth Circuit was that the OGC contracts purportedly expired by
February 1, 2019,” R. Doc. 572-1 at 2 n.2 (citing Muslow v. LSU, at *9 (R. Doc. 511 at 20)), they overlook the
dissenting opinion’s observation that “the university also contended that the salary demands themselves – rather than
any allegation of pay disparity – provoked the contract rescission.” Muslow v. LSU, at *11 (R. Doc. 511 at 25). The
dissent also identified record evidence supporting this stated reason, id. at *12 (R. Doc. 511 at 25-26), as did the
majority. Id. at *9 (R. Doc. 511 at 20) (“Skinner explained at his deposition that the employment contracts were
rescinded because he was ‘taken aback’ by Plaintiffs’ salary-review request.”). Thus, while the defendants may have
“jumbled the (potentially different) non-retaliatory reasons for each of the two employment actions … on appeal,” id.
at *11 (R. Doc. 511 at 25), it is clear that LSU’s contention that Plaintiffs’ salary demands were too high was not
“newly invented” on remand.
125 R. Doc. 572-1 at 6 (emphasis added).
126 R. Doc. 576 at 9-11.
127 R. Doc. 578 at 7.
deadline and (2) that Plaintiffs’ salary demands were too high – were pretext for unlawful
retaliation.128
2. Relevant Pretext Evidence
Because LSU is permitted to argue that it rescinded the contracts for the reason that the
salaries requested by Plaintiffs were too high, some salary evidence will be relevant and may be
presented by either party in support of their respective positions on this issue – notwithstanding
that Plaintiffs’ reasonable, good-faith belief that they were subjected to wage discrimination is no
longer at issue. Evidence regarding the compensation and qualifications of individuals ultimately
hired for the OGC positions offered to Plaintiffs is certainly relevant in determining whether the
salaries they requested for those same positions were appropriate, and Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude
such evidence129 is denied. Evidence pertaining to the compensation of other LSU employees –
within both the OGC and LSUHSC-NO130 – may also be relevant to this issue, even though there
are no wage-discrimination claims remaining in this case, as LSU frequently repeats.131 Yet, the
Court emphasizes that the only remaining jury issue to which compensation evidence may be
relevant is whether LSU rescinded the OGC contracts based on its subjective belief that the salaries
128 Of course, while Plaintiffs’ prima facie case, including a preliminary showing of causation, is established,
see Muslow v. LSU, at *8 (R. Doc. 511-1 at 18) (“[W]e find that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of
retaliation with respect to this allegation.”), Plaintiffs bear the ultimate, heightened burden of establishing that the
Salary-Review Email was the but-for cause of the recission of the OGC contracts at the pretext stage. See Saketkoo
v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1001 (5th Cir. 2022) (“At first glance, the ultimate issue in an unlawful
retaliation case – whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff because the plaintiff engaged in conduct
protected by Title VII – seems identical to the third element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case – whether a causal link
exists between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. However, the standards of proof applicable
to these questions differ significantly. The ultimate determination in an unlawful retaliation case is whether the
conduct protected by Title VII was a ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment decision. The standard for establishing
the ‘causal link’ element of the plaintiff's prima facie case is much less stringent.” (emphasis added; quotations and
internal citations omitted)).
129 R. Doc. 572-1 at 7-8.
130 The Court is not persuaded by LSU’s distinction between the OGC and LSUHSC-NO. Notably, the
salaries in Plaintiffs’ proposed OGC employment contracts matched their LSUHSC-NO salaries. Thus, the Court will
not exclude evidence pertaining to LSUHSC-NO compensation policies simply because the positions offered to
Plaintiffs were within the OGC and not LSUHSC-NO.
131 See, e.g., R. Doc. 574-1 at 4, 14, 17.
requested by Plaintiffs for the OGC positions were “too high,” not whether Plaintiffs were actually
subjected to wage discrimination. Thus, LSU’s motion in limine is denied as to evidence regarding
the compensation of non-party LSU employees, the LSUHSC-NO staff pay adjustments policy,
the 2017 Market Study, and the OGC salary exhibits. LSU’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’
LSUHSC-NO employment records is also denied to the extent these exhibits relate to Plaintiffs’
LSUHSC-NO compensation.132 However, the Court reserves the right to exclude certain salary
exhibits and testimony at trial on its own motion or upon a party’s contemporaneous objection if
it deems such evidence, in context, to be outside this narrower range of relevance, unfairly
prejudicial, cumulative, or likely to confuse the issues – especially given that there are no wage-
discrimination claims remaining in this case.
Because the liability issue left for trial is LSU’s reason or reasons for rescinding the OGC
contracts, evidence probative of LSU’s expectations regarding Plaintiffs’ transition to the OGC is
also relevant. Therefore, the Court also denies LSU’s motion to exclude the emails between
LSUHSC-NO staff discussing preparations for the transition of legal positions to the OGC.133
3. Other Evidence
LSU moves to exclude an unnamed representative of the Board of Supervisors from
Plaintiffs’ “may call” witness list,134 arguing that Plaintiffs’ reasons for including this witness –
viz., authentication of certain documents and “to rebut any attempt [by LSU] to argue that Thomas
Skinner … was not acting on behalf of LSU and its Board when he rescinded Plaintiffs’ OGC
132 See supra note 130.
133 However, because the Court has already determined that “[w]hether or not Plaintiffs had already begun
transitioning to the OGC [in January 2019] is immaterial, as Plaintiffs admit that they were required to sign the
contracts in order to complete their transfer to the OGC and be ‘guaranteed’ continued employment at LSU,” R. Doc.
561 at 32 n.122, to the extent Plaintiffs intend to use these emails to argue that they had already assumed the OGC
positions when the contracts were rescinded, such an argument is precluded – and evidence offered in support of any
such argument will not be admitted.
134 R. Doc. 574-1 at 3.
contracts”135 – “are speculative and not supported by record facts of any such prior assertions by
LSU in this suit.”136 However, because LSU has not indicated that it will stipulate to these issues,
the Court will not grant LSU’s motion to preclude Plaintiffs from calling a representative of the
Board of Directors for this discrete purpose.137
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude references to “any arrangement Plaintiffs have with their
lawyers”138 is granted with respect to both payment arrangements between Plaintiffs and their
counsel, which LSU does not oppose, as well as “any evidence that may become relevant at trial
regarding Plaintiffs’ attorneys, including but not limited to the dates of retention of any attorney
of record.”139 LSU has not identified any reason that the timing of Plaintiffs’ retention of counsel
would be relevant to the issues remaining for trial. Especially in light of the Court’s orders on
forfeiture and excluding references to yet unidentified reasons for rescinding the OGC contracts,
there is no reason for the Court, at this time, to permit the introduction of the broad category of
“evidence that may become relevant at trial regarding Plaintiffs’ attorneys.”140
Finally, the Court grants the unopposed portions of each party’s motion in limine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion in limine (R. Doc. 572) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
135 R. Doc. 577 at 6.
136 R. Doc. 579 at 5.
137 Should the parties agree to such stipulations, the testimony of this potential witness would not be relevant
or necessary.
138 R. Doc. 572-1 at 9.
139 R. Doc. 576 at 16-17 (quote at 17).
140 Id. at 17 (emphasis added). If a foundation for such evidence is laid at trial, LSU may ask the Court to
reconsider this ruling.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that LSU’s motion in limine (R. Doc. 574) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of August, 2025.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE