The opinion
08/20/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs June 24, 2025
QUADARIUS DESHUN MARTIN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henderson County
No. 24-063-1 Joseph T. Howell, Judge
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No. W2024-01472-CCA-R3-PC
___________________________________
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Appellant, Quadarius Deshun Martin, pled
guilty to seven offenses on April 4, 2024, and received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve
years’ incarceration. Eighteen days later, the Appellant filed an unsigned, untitled,
handwritten pleading in which he stated he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing
that he pled guilty under duress and that trial counsel failed to investigate his case. The
trial court1 entered an order construing the filing as a petition for post-conviction relief and
appointing counsel. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated that it
would hear both the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas and his petition for
post-conviction relief. Following the hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief
but did not rule upon the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas. The Appellant
appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to find he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel. We ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to address whether
the trial court erred by construing the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-conviction
relief despite his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Following our review of the record,
we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for consideration of the Appellant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed;
Case Remanded
STEVEN W. SWORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER,
J., JOINED. MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Samuel W. Hinson, Lexington, Tennessee, for the appellant, Quadarius Deshun Martin.
1
Although this appeal arises from the denial of post-conviction relief, because we conclude the
lower court erred by considering the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-conviction relief, we will refer
to it as the trial court for clarity.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin L. Barker, Assistant
Attorney General; Jody Pickens, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault and one count
each of domestic assault and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon at some
point prior to the charges giving rise to this appeal (“case number 23-232-1”).2 The
Appellant made bond and retained trial counsel, and a trial date was set for April 4, 2024.
While released on bond, the Appellant was arrested, and on April 1, 2024, a Henderson
County grand jury returned an indictment charging the Appellant with two counts of
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of simple possession
of marijuana relating to events occurring on or about December 31, 2023 (“case number
24-063-1”). After negotiating with the State, trial counsel presented the Appellant with a
plea offer in which his felony charges of aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in case number 23-232-1 would be reduced to misdemeanor
charges in exchange for his otherwise pleading guilty as charged in both case numbers 23-
232-1 and 24-063-1. The State also agreed to recommend a sentence of twelve years’
incarceration. The Appellant accepted the plea offer.
On April 4, 2024, the trial court held a guilty plea submission hearing and advised
him of his constitutional rights. The Appellant testified he had reviewed the terms of his
plea agreement with trial counsel and that he understood what he was doing in pleading
guilty. When the trial court noted that the Appellant seemed “hesitant,” the Appellant
conceded he had questions “about the two counts of the possession of a firearm.” He stated
the firearm “wasn’t mine, and I didn’t know it was there. That’s my problem.” The trial
court provided the Appellant the opportunity to speak with trial counsel, after which the
Appellant testified he understood what he was doing by pleading guilty. The trial court
again advised the Appellant of his constitutional rights, and the Appellant testified he still
wished to plead guilty. The Appellant testified that he had not been forced or coerced into
pleading guilty or that any promises had been made in exchange for his pleading guilty
beyond the terms of the plea agreement. The State summarized the terms of the plea
agreement, and the Appellant stipulated that the facts contained in the indictments for both
case numbers 23-232-1 and 24-063-1 were substantially true and correct. The trial court
2
The record does not include the underlying indictments or judgment forms in case number 23-
232-1, nor does it indicate when these offenses were committed.
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accepted the Appellant’s guilty pleas and imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’
incarceration. Judgments were entered in case number 24-063-1 on April 11, 2024.
On April 22, 2024, the Appellant filed the following unsigned, untitled, handwritten
pleading:
Dear Judge Howell[,] my name is Quadarius Martin[.]
I recently pled out to a 12 year sentence at 85% for a possession of
firearm on April 4, 2024.
I would like to withdraw[] my guilty plea [d]ue to the fact that it was
taken under [d]uress when my counsel ke[pt] telling me to take the plea[.]
When my counsel failed to investigate, had counsel investigated[,]
counsel would have seen that I was not in possession of any firearm, the
firearm did not belong to me[,] nor did the car th[at] the firearm was found
in belong to me.
The [C]onstitution of the State of [T]ennessee section 9 states that,
[“]In all criminal prosecutions[,] the accused hath the right to be heard by
himself and [his] counsel[.”] In this case I was not.
I am indigent an[d] request counsel for the proceeding to withdraw[]
my guilty plea.
The trial court interpreted this filing as a petition for post-conviction relief and appointed
post-conviction counsel with instructions to file any amended petition within thirty days of
his appointment. Post-conviction counsel did not file an amended petition. The trial court
record does not contain a response or answer by the State.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on September 4, 2024. At the beginning
of this hearing, the trial court stated, “We’re here [on the Appellant’s] motion to withdraw
guilty plea and for post[-]conviction” relief. The Appellant testified he retained trial
counsel following his arrest in case number 23-232-1 at the recommendation of his fiancée,
Trinity Baker. The Appellant stated he was released on bond in case number 23-232-1
when he was arrested in case number 24-063-1. The Appellant recalled that he was arrested
shortly after Ms. Baker picked him up from a friend’s home. The Appellant testified he
quickly fell asleep in the passenger seat of Ms. Baker’s vehicle. When he awoke, he saw
“blue lights” flashing behind the vehicle. The police subsequently searched Ms. Baker’s
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vehicle and recovered a firearm and marijuana. The Appellant maintained that the firearm
belonged to Ms. Baker and that he did not know it was in her vehicle prior to its recovery.
The Appellant further testified that trial counsel filed a motion for discovery at the
outset of her representation but only gave the Appellant “[a] small part of” the discovery
materials she received. He averred that he wanted to go to trial because he did not believe
the State had sufficient evidence to convict him as charged, and he informed trial counsel
that he wanted to proceed to trial. Despite this request, trial counsel nevertheless began
plea negotiations and ultimately presented the Appellant with a plea offer from the State
approximately two days before his trial was set to begin. He recalled the State’s offering
to recommend an effective sentence of twelve years’ incarceration and to reduce his felony
charges to misdemeanor charges in case number 23-232-1 in exchange for his pleading
guilty as charged to the remainder of the counts in both case numbers 23-232-1 and 24-
063-1. The Appellant testified trial counsel encouraged him to accept this plea offer despite
his noted desire to proceed to trial because he “could be facing twenty to forty years” if
convicted as charged.
The Appellant estimated he met with trial counsel “[m]aybe twice” before his guilty
plea submission hearing and asserted she never discussed the strengths and weaknesses in
the State’s evidence nor any potential defenses the Appellant could present at trial during
these meetings. The Appellant testified he ultimately pled guilty on April 4, 2024, because
he was afraid of receiving a higher sentence if convicted. The Appellant stated he now
wished to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial.
On cross-examination, the Appellant agreed that he signed his guilty plea paperwork
voluntarily and that the trial court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement “line by line”
with him at the guilty plea submission hearing. He also agreed that he testified at the
hearing that he was “freely and voluntarily” pleading guilty. He testified that trial counsel
successfully negotiated his felony charges of aggravated assault down to misdemeanor
charges of simple assault.
Trinity Baker, the Appellant’s fiancée, testified that she owned the firearm
recovered from her vehicle when the Appellant was arrested. She asserted that
photographic evidence established her ownership and that she was prepared to testify
accordingly if the Appellant had gone to trial. Ms. Baker recalled discussing her intent to
testify with trial counsel.
On cross-examination, Ms. Baker agreed she testified at the Appellant’s bond
revocation hearing that she had lied to the police following the Appellant’s arrest. She
recalled discussing her intent to testify at the Appellant’s trial with trial counsel and that
following this discussion, trial counsel informed her that her credibility would be “an issue”
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at the Appellant’s trial. Ms. Baker was unsure whether trial counsel ever discussed the
potential problem of her credibility with the Appellant.
Ms. Baker testified that she advised the Appellant against accepting the State’s plea
offer and that she believed he nevertheless accepted it because he felt “pressured” to do so.
She stated the Appellant was presented with the plea offer less than twenty-four hours
before his trial was set to begin. Ms. Baker maintained she was prepared to testify and to
be subject to cross-examination at the Appellant’s trial if he was permitted to withdraw his
guilty pleas.
Trial counsel testified she first began working with the Appellant after his bond was
revoked in case number 23-232-1 on January 26, 2024. She stated Ms. Baker called her
on February 1, 2024, to ask her to “go see” the Appellant. Trial counsel interviewed Ms.
Baker, who told her she had “lied to the police.” Trial counsel advised Ms. Baker to seek
independent legal counsel, but Ms. Baker declined to do so and “decid[ed] to continue with
the assertion that she had lied previously to the police.” Trial counsel also interviewed the
Appellant, who maintained he did not understand how the State could prove he was in
possession of the firearm recovered from Ms. Baker’s vehicle if the firearm was under his
seat and he did not know it was present. Trial counsel discussed the facts of the Appellant’s
case with him and represented him at his preliminary hearing.
Trial counsel stated she was formally retained on March 6, 2024, and that she gave
birth on March 11, 2024. She asserted she continued to prepare for the Appellant’s April
4, 2024 trial and engaged in plea negotiations while on maternity leave. Trial counsel
testified that she filed a motion for discovery shortly after she was retained in case number
23-232-1 and that she reviewed the evidence she received with the Appellant. After “going
through all the discovery” and negotiating with the prosecutor, trial counsel received the
State’s plea offer on April 2, 2024, the day after the Appellant’s indictment in case number
24-063-1. Pursuant to this plea offer, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of twelve
years’ incarceration and to reduce the Appellant’s felony charges for aggravated assault
and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in case number 23-232-1 down
to misdemeanor charges in exchange for the Appellant’s pleading guilty as charged to the
remaining counts in case numbers 23-232-1 and 24-063-1. Trial counsel stated she
“immediately went and met” with the Appellant to explain the terms of the plea offer. She
recalled explaining both the “benefits” and “disadvantages” of the Appellant’s acceptance
of the plea offer and advised him that she believed “it was in his best interest to accept this
plea offer when looking at what he was possibly facing if it all went forward.” She also
stated she advised the Appellant he could potentially face a much longer sentence if he
rejected the State’s plea offer, proceeded to trial, and was convicted as charged. She
conceded she did not receive any discovery in case number 24-063-1 before the April 4,
2024 guilty plea submission hearing because the Appellant had been indicted just three
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days before that hearing. She stated she nevertheless recommended that the Appellant
accept the plea offer based upon her understanding of the case following her interviews
with the Appellant and Ms. Baker, as well as the testimony presented at the Appellant’s
preliminary hearing.
Trial counsel testified she believed the Appellant understood the terms of the plea
offer following their April 2, 2024 discussion. She noted that while she advised the
Appellant to accept the plea offer, she also assured him she was prepared to proceed to trial
if he preferred. She recalled discussing the potential issue Ms. Baker’s credibility could
pose if she testified at trial. The Appellant ultimately accepted the plea offer, and a guilty
plea submission hearing was held on April 4, 2024, in place of the scheduled trial in case
number 23-232-1.
Trial counsel recalled that during the Appellant’s guilty plea submission hearing, he
told the trial court, “he did not understand how he could be charged” with unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court called a brief recess in the
Appellant’s proceedings to permit trial counsel to speak privately with the Appellant.
During this discussion, the Appellant reiterated his doubts about the sufficiency of the
State’s proof regarding his unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge.
Trial counsel reiterated she was prepared to proceed to trial if that was what the Appellant
preferred, but maintained that she believed it was in the Appellant’s “best interest” to
accept the State’s plea offer. At the conclusion of their discussion, the Appellant decided
to accept the State’s plea offer, and the guilty plea submission hearing resumed.
On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that the Appellant was primarily
concerned with the length of his potential sentence if he was convicted as charged and that
this concern motivated her to recommend the State’s plea offer. She recalled she explained
the potential “risks and benefits” of the Appellant’s accepting the plea offer and believed
she had “answered every question” the Appellant had prior to his guilty plea submission
hearing. She stated she felt “irritated” when the Appellant said “he did not understand how
he could be charged” with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during his
guilty plea submission hearing because she believed she and the Appellant had
“extensively discussed everything” beforehand.
Neither party presented closing arguments following the close of proof.
Considering the Appellant’s pleading as a petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court
accredited trial counsel’s testimony. The trial court noted that although the Appellant was
initially hesitant at the guilty plea submission hearing, he ultimately testified that he
understood his constitutional rights, that he knowingly pled guilty, that the facts as alleged
in both indictments were substantially true and correct, and that he was satisfied with trial
counsel’s representation. Accordingly, the trial court concluded the Appellant had failed
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to prove he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to establish
either deficient performance or prejudice resulting therefrom. The trial court entered a
written order reiterating these findings of fact and conclusions of law on October 10, 2024.
This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to find he received
the ineffective assistance of counsel. The State responds that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-conviction relief
because it was not signed and verified as required by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104(d). Therefore, the State argues the judgment of the trial
court should be vacated and the Appellant’s filing should be dismissed.
However, the State failed to raise the issue that the petition was unverified in the
trial court. It is raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, this argument is waived. See
State v. Rowland, 520 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d
162, 171 (Tenn. 2009). A post-conviction court must give a petitioner who filed a post-
conviction petition pro se, but fails to verify the petition under oath, the opportunity to
correct the petition before dismissing it. Tenn. S. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(4)(b) (providing that
“[n]o pro se petition shall be dismissed for failure to follow the prescribed form until the
court has given petitioner a reasonable opportunity to amend the petition with the assistance
of counsel”); see T.C.A. 40-30-106(d) (providing that if “the petition was filed pro se, the
judge may enter an order stating that the petitioner must file an amended petition that
complies with this section within fifteen (15) days or the petitioner will be dismissed”).
This court has reversed a post-conviction court's summary dismissal of a petitioner's pro se
post-conviction petition based on the failure to properly verify the petition when the post-
conviction court did not afford the petitioner the opportunity to correct the deficiency. See,
e.g., Price v. State, No. M2010-01633-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 2671821, at *4 (Tenn. Crim.
App. July 7, 2011); Harrison v. State, No. E2009-00222-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 3949344,
at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2010).
This court also has recognized that when a petitioner files a pro se petition that is
not verified and when the deficiency is not corrected after the appointment of counsel, a
post-conviction court should not dismiss the petition unless the petitioner is provided
notice of the deficiency and afforded an opportunity to correct it. See Timberlake v.
State, No. W2008-00037-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 302294, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb.
5, 2009); see also Ayers v. State, No. W2010-01634-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 2533795, at
*4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 24, 2011) (rejecting the State's argument that the petitioner's
failure to verify the initial and amended post-conviction petitions warranted dismissal of
the petitions when the State did not raise the issue until the appeal and the post-
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conviction court could have given the petitioner the opportunity to correct the deficiency
had the post-conviction court been made aware of the deficiency).
Turning now to the nature of the pro se filing, appellate courts generally have
jurisdiction to consider only those issues which are properly preserved and presented for
appellate review pursuant to the party-presentation principle. State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d
917, 923 (Tenn. 2022) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b)). Nevertheless, this court may
consider an unpresented or unpreserved issue in order to prevent needless litigation, injury
to the interests of the public, and prejudice to the judicial process, Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b),
and must “grant the relief on the law and facts to which the party is entitled or the
proceeding otherwise requires,” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). This discretion is to be exercised
sparingly, and only in those cases where consideration of an unpresented or unpreserved
issue is necessary “to achieve fairness and justice.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 540
(Tenn. 2015). When this court considers an unpresented or unpreserved issue, it must give
the parties to the appeal “fair notice and an opportunity to be heard on the dispositive
issues.” State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 165 (Tenn. 2018); see also Bristol, 654
S.W.3d at 927-28 (“At a minimum, an appellate court must give the parties notice of the
specific issue it intends to address and sufficient time to review the record, conduct
research, and prepare an argument before the court rules on the issue.”) (emphasis in
original). This requirement is generally satisfied through supplemental briefing. Id. at 928.
Accordingly, we ordered the parties to prepare supplemental briefs to address
whether the trial court erred by considering the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-
conviction relief and, if not, whether the trial court erred by failing to rule on the
Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas. In his supplemental brief, the Appellant
argues the trial court properly considered his filing as a petition for post-conviction relief
because he “made it clear that the plea was not intelligently or knowingly made because
his former attorney did not adequately discuss the case” with him. The Appellant further
argues the trial court erred in failing to rule on his request to withdraw his guilty pleas, but
asserts “the only ruling would have been to dismiss” the motion because the Appellant’s
judgments had already become final, so that error was harmless. The State responds that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the Appellant’s filing as a petition
for post-conviction relief. The State further contends that the trial court’s denial of post-
conviction relief was sufficient because it “was functionally equivalent to denying a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea.” We respectfully disagree with both parties.
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) provides that a trial court may grant a
defendant’s motion to withdraw his or her guilty plea under two scenarios. If the defendant
files a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before the sentence is imposed, then the trial court
may grant the motion “for any fair and just reason.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1). However,
if the defendant files a motion to withdraw after the sentence is imposed but before the
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judgment becomes final, the trial court may only permit the withdrawal of the guilty plea
“to correct manifest injustice.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(2). “[A] judgment of conviction
entered upon a guilty plea becomes final thirty days after acceptance of the plea agreement
and imposition of sentence.” State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tenn. 2003).
Rule 32(f) does not define manifest injustice, so trial courts and appellate courts
must make a case-by-case determination as to whether a manifest injustice has occurred.
State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 655 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, this court has
previously determined that manifest injustice may occur when:
(1) the plea was entered through a misunderstanding as to its effect, or
through fear and fraud, or where it was not made voluntarily; (2) the
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963), and this failure to disclose influenced the
entry of the plea; (3) the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and
understandingly entered; and (4) the defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of the plea.
State v. Virgil, 256 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). A trial court’s disposition
regarding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 740
(Tenn. 2005)).
The Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides relief only when a petitioner’s
“conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right
guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A petitioner who seeks post-conviction relief must do so
by filing a petition within one year “of the date of the final action of the highest state
appellate court to which an appeal is taken.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). If a
petitioner does not appeal his or her initial judgment, then he or she must file a petition for
post-conviction relief within one year “of the date on which the judgment became final.”
Id. The petition must also comply with the procedural and technical requirements provided
in Code section 40-30-104. In a post-conviction proceeding, a petitioner has the burden of
proving his or her allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
30-110(f); Tenn. S. Ct. R 28, § 8(D)(1). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them, Kendrick v. State,
454 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2015) (citations omitted), while its application of the law to
those factual findings and the conclusions drawn therefrom are reviewed de novo with no
presumption of correctness, Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tenn. 2020) (citations
omitted).
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We conclude that the trial court erred by considering the Appellant’s pleading as a
petition for post-conviction relief. In his pleading, the Appellant explicitly stated he wished
to withdraw his guilty pleas because he pled guilty “under [d]uress.” He further alleged
that trial counsel repeatedly told him to plead guilty and “failed to investigate his case.”
As stated above, these claims may properly form the basis of a manifest injustice
supporting the withdraw of a guilty plea under Rule 32(f). He concluded his pleading by
referencing his constitutional right to counsel and requesting the appointment of counsel
to represent him “for the proceeding to withdraw[] my guilty plea.” The trial court
construed this pleading as a petition for post-conviction relief, appointed counsel, and held
an evidentiary hearing. At the outset of that evidentiary hearing, the trial court noted that
its purpose was to address both the Appellant’s “motion to withdraw guilty pleas and for
post[-]conviction” relief. The Appellant testified he understood the consequences of being
permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas and nevertheless maintained that he wished to do so;
Ms. Baker testified that she was willing to testify at the Appellant’s trial if he was permitted
to withdraw his guilty pleas; and trial counsel testified extensively about her interactions
with the Appellant and his concerns with pleading guilty prior to and during the guilty plea
submission hearing. Despite its statement at the outset of the evidentiary hearing that it
was considering the Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the trial court made
no further reference to that request and instead only denied post-conviction relief.
We disagree with the Appellant that “the only ruling would have been to dismiss”
the Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because his judgments had become
final. The Appellant pled guilty on April 4, 2024, and judgments were entered on April
11, 2024. Judgments become final thirty days after entry, so the Appellant had thirty days
from the entry of his April 11, 2024 judgments in which he could timely file a Rule 32(f)
motion. The Appellant’s pleading was filed on April 22, 2024, well within that thirty-day
timeframe. Thus, dismissal based on timeliness would have been wholly inappropriate.
On the other hand, because the Appellant’s judgments were not yet final when he filed his
pleading, it would have been a prematurely filed post-conviction petition. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-102(a); see also Robinson v. State, No. E2015-00038-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL
721706, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (“Without an order disposing of the
[petitioner’s] motion [to withdraw his guilty plea], there was no evidence that the
petitioner’s judgment had become final, meaning that his petition for post-conviction relief
would have been filed prematurely and that this court would not have had jurisdiction to
hear the petitioner’s appeal.”), no perm. app. filed (citing Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47, 50
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-5-108(a)(1) (2010)). Thus, whether or
not the pro se filing was a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, it could in no way be
considered a timely petition for post-conviction relief because judgment had not yet
become final when the instrument was filed, and neither the trial court nor this court would
have jurisdiction to consider it.
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As the State notes in supplemental briefing, trial courts have discretion to treat
pleadings according to the relief sought therein. Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tenn.
2009) (citing Norton v. Everheart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn. 1995)). The State also
notes that trial courts are not bound by the titles of pleadings in interpreting them, Norton,
895 S.W.2d at 319, and that the trial court thus “did not abuse its discretion in construing
[the pleading] in a manner that it could grant the relief [the] Appellant sought if his
allegations were true.” Setting aside the fact that the Appellant’s pleading was untitled,
the pleading explicitly requested to withdraw his guilty pleas, the Appellant presented
evidence in support of that request at the evidentiary hearing, and the trial court
acknowledged his request at the outset of the evidentiary hearing but failed to rule upon it.
Therefore, beyond the timeliness concerns with treating the Appellant’s pleading as a
petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court erred by failing to address the Appellant’s
request to withdraw his guilty plea. As this court has previously held, the appropriate
remedy for a post-conviction court’s errant consideration of a Rule 32(f) motion as a
petition for post-conviction relief is to reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and
remand with instructions to consider the pleading as a Rule 32(f) motion. See, e.g., Rankin
v. State, No. W2013-01216-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 3537893, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App.
July 16, 2014), no perm. app. filed; Hearing v. State, No. E2006-00362-CCA-R3-PC, 2006
WL 3813625, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2006), no perm. app. filed; Adams v. State,
No. E2001-02765-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 21221958, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 27,
2003), no perm. app. filed.
We acknowledge the Dissent’s accurate statement that counsel for the Defendant
never claimed the error found by this court nor requested the relief being given. However,
as stated above, we respectfully find that counsel for the Defendant is wrong and the only
available remedy to the trial court’s error is that commanded in Rankin, Adams, and
Hearing. In Hearing, this court stated:
In this appeal, neither the petitioner nor that [sic] state challenges the trial
court's order to treat the petitioner's motion to withdraw guilty pleas as a
petition for post-conviction relief. However, we conclude that the trial court
erred in this regard and that the case should be remanded to the trial court for
consideration of the petitioner's original motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Hearing, 2006 WL 3813625 at *1.
Several legal principles require this remedy. Firstly, there are significant differences
in the procedural requirements and standards of review between a Rule 32(f) motion to
withdraw a guilty plea and a petition for post-conviction relief. A Rule 32(f) motion is “in
its nature a part of the conviction case,” while a petition for post-conviction relief is “in its
nature a collateral attack on a final conviction.” Lessenberry v. State, No. W2010-01549-
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CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 13165163, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2011) (citing Tenn.
R. Crim. P. 32(f)(2); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102), no perm. app. filed. As discussed
above, the timeliness requirements also differ; as relevant here, a defendant seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea after the entry of judgments of conviction must do so before the
judgments become final, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(2), whereas a petitioner seeking post-
conviction relief must do so by filing a petition within one year after the judgments became
final, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). Additionally, a defendant must establish that
withdrawal of his or her guilty plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice in order to
succeed in a Rule 32(f)(2) motion, whereas a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must
prove his or her “conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of
any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United
States” by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-103, -110(f); Tenn.
S. Ct. R. 28, § 8(D)(1). The standards of appellate review also differ; a trial court’s
disposition of a Rule 32(f) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Phelps, 329
S.W.3d at 443, while we review a post-conviction court’s disposition of a petition for post-
conviction relief de novo, Holland, 61 S.W.3d at 455.
The differences in the standards of review are particularly noteworthy in cases
where, as here, a defendant seeking to withdraw his or her guilty plea alleges the ineffective
assistance of counsel, because that claim is cognizable under both Rule 32(f)(2) and the
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. State v. Bumpus, No. W2018-01034-CCA-R3-CD, 2019
WL 1896562, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2019) (“Indeed, although there may be
considerable overlap between the standards, manifest injustice allows a trial judge greater
latitude than the constitutional requirements [of a petition for post-conviction relief] and is
more inclusive and less stringent than constitutional abridgment.”), no perm. app. filed
(citing State v. Lyons, No. 01C01-9508-CR-00263, 1997 WL 469501, at *7-8 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Aug. 15, 1997), no perm. app. filed (internal quotation marks omitted). The State
acknowledges this and makes much of the fact that the remedy for a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim – dismissal of the underlying conviction and remanding the
case for a new trial – is the same regardless of whether that claim is raised under Rule
32(f)(2) or the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d at 752; Grindstaff v.
State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 222-23 (Tenn. 2009). This fact, the State argues, is dispositive of
this case, because the trial court’s “conclusion would have been the same had the trial court
construed his filing as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” But the manifest injustice
standard of proof required by Rule 32(f)(2) is less demanding than the clear and convincing
evidence of a constitutional violation required by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and
in that respect, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which may be unsuccessful
under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act may nevertheless be availing under Rule 32(f)(2).
Bumpus, 2019 WL 1896562, at *2; see also Lyons, 1997 WL 469501, at *7 (“[A]lthough
the standards overlap, a trial court may, under some circumstances, permit the withdrawal
of a guilty plea to prevent manifest injustice even though the plea meets the ‘voluntary and
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knowing’ requirements of constitutional due process.”). In short, the State presupposes
that the trial court would have ruled in the same manner if it had considered the Appellant’s
pleading as a request to withdraw his guilty pleas under a less demanding standard of
review. Because endorsing that argument would, in effect, substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court, we cannot agree.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded
for consideration of the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas. Because the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing in this case in which the Appellant presented proof on his
request to withdraw his guilty pleas, the trial court is not required to hold a new evidentiary
hearing on remand, although it may do so if justice so requires. Rankin, 2014 WL 3537893,
at *3; Hearing, 2006 WL 3813625, at *2.
III. CONCLUSION
Following our review of the record and based on the foregoing analysis, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand for consideration of the Appellant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
S/ STEVEN W. SWORD
STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE
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