Adacia v. City of Cleveland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DOUGLAS H. ADACIA, ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 01469

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER

)

vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

Pro se plaintiff Douglas H. Adacia filed this civil rights complaint against the City of

Cleveland; Cuyahoga County; Earl B. Turner, Clerk of Court; Mayor Justin Bibb, Police Chief

Dorothy Todd; Chief Constable Mark Webster; Judge Michelle D. Early; Cleveland Law

Director, Mark Griffin; and Judge Sheila Turner McCall. (Doc. No. 1).

Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), which the

Court grants.

I. Background

This case is the eighth of ten cases Plaintiff has filed with similar allegations against the

City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. See Adacia v. Cuyahoga Cty Sheriff, No. 1:25 CV

01312 (N.D. Ohio filed June 24, 2025)(Barker, J.); Adacia v. Cuyahoga Cty Sheriff Dept., 1:25

CV 1326 (N.D. Ohio filed June 25, 2025)(Gaughan, J.); Adacia v. Bishop William A. Cosgrove

Center, No. 1:25 CV 1336 (N.D. Ohio filed June 26, 2025)(Barker, J.); Adacia v. City of

Cleveland, No. 1:25 CV 1388 (N.D. Ohio filed July 1, 2025)(Fleming, J.); Adacia v. City of

Cleveland, No. 1:25 CV 1393 (N.D. Ohio filed July 2, 2025)(Brennan, J.); Adacia v. Bibb, No.

1:25 CV 1405 (N.D. Ohio filed July 3, 2025)(Gaughan, J.); Adacia v. City of Cleveland, No.

1:25 CV 1442 (N.D. Ohio filed July 9, 2025)(Brennan, J.); Adacia v. City of Cleveland, No.

1:25 CV 1469 (N.D. Ohio filed July 14, 2025)(Polster, J.); Adacia v. Bibb, No. 1:25 CV 1484

(N.D. Ohio filed July 15, 2025)(Fleming, J.); Adacia v. Focus Cleveland, No. 1:25 CV 1516

(N.D. Ohio filed July 21, 2025)(Polster, J.).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants created a gang and RICO enterprise to

harass and retaliate against Plaintiff. He alleges that the defendants agreed to use their “official

powers” as government employees to break the law, they created an illegal scheme to

unlawfully ban Plaintiff from the Justice Center, and they participated in gang rituals such as

spitting on Plaintiff and ordering others to assault him. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff additionally

claims the following: the City of Cleveland Law Enforcement has “waged war” against Plaintiff

and the employees “all agreed to help” (Id. at 8); Judge Early, Judge Turner McCall, and the

APL burglarized his home (Id. at 9); the defendants “commented to Plaintiff with an evil

menacing smirk” that it does not matter what Plaintiff says on the record because their minds

are made up (Id.); all defendants conspired with the Clerk of Court to alter the court records and

submit false statements on the docket (Id.); and all defendants ordered an unknown Cleveland

police officer and bailiff to “threaten [Plaintiff] in a fist fight” if he decided to file any

additional documents with the Clerk’s Office. (Id. at 10).

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief and a “stay away order” from all Defendants. He also

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asks the Court for 24-hour security paid for by the defendants and a criminal investigation into

the defendants’ conduct.

II. Standard of Review

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,

109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable

basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable

factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly

incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992).

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the

pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

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plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more

than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct.

2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.

1998).

III. Discussion

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).

However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not

“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A

complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all the material elements

of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid v. Fanny

Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Although specific facts are not

required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l

Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of

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Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)). Additionally, the Court has discretion to refuse to

accept without question the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations when they are “clearly baseless,” a

term encompassing claims that may be fairly described as fanciful, fantastic, delusional, wholly

incredible, or irrational. Denton, 504 at 32-33.

Here, Plaintiffs complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic

pleading standard, as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim

showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief].]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint fails to

assert a cognizable claim within the jurisdiction of this Court based on recognized legal

authority. And Plaintiff's sparse factual allegations are wholly incredible and irrational.

Plaintiff's complaint must therefore be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

No. 2), denies his motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. No. 3), and dismisses this case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),

that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

2 ben ess.

DAN AARON POLSTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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