“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
- finding that an inmate who got no receipt or response to an appeal should have inquired as to the status of the appeal before filing a lawsuit
- a premature lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice, an inmate cannot sue first and exhaust later
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ASHTON DANIEL, R69925, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Case No. 24-cv-1512-DWD
JOHN PETERSON, )
DYLAN WILLIS, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ashton Daniel, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) currently incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”), brings this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff alleges that in May of 2024, Defendant Peterson used excessive force against him,
and Defendant Willis forcibly placed him on a hunger strike. Defendant Willis seeks
summary judgment on the exhaustion of administrative remedies (Doc. 31), and
Defendant Peterson moved to withdraw (Doc. 33) the affirmative defense. Plaintiff has
responded (Docs. 37, 38), and Defendant Willis replied (Doc. 39). For reasons explained
in this Order, Willis’ Motion (Doc. 31) is granted.
BACKGROUND
This case was opened when Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
on June 14, 2024. (Doc. 1). The Court quickly informed Plaintiff that to proceed, he would
need to file a proper complaint (Doc. 6), and Plaintiff complied, signing and submitting
his complaint on June 28, 2024 (Doc. 11). Plaintiff alleges that problems began on May
9, 2024, when he was escorted to investigation status. (Doc. 11 at 7). He asked to see
mental health, but instead was placed on crisis watch without further consultation. While
on crisis watch, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Willis prepared a hunger strike
declaration on his behalf without his permission. This forced him to miss meals for three
days. (Doc. 11 at 11, 18).
The Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on a single claim against Willis related to
the alleged hunger strike issue:
Claim 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Willis for
placing Plaintiff on a hunger strike that he did not request,
leading to the deprivation of food for 3 days.
(Doc. 19). Plaintiff was also allowed to proceed on a claim against Defendant Peterson,
but Peterson withdrew the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, so he will not be
discussed further in this order.
The parties undertook discovery on the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
and in doing so they identified a single grievance relevant to the claim against Willis—
grievance no. K7-0624-535.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff submitted grievance K7-0624-585 on May 28, 2024. (Doc. 31-1 at 9-10). In
the grievance, he alleged that on May 11, 2024, he was forced on hunger strike by the first
shift officer who was assigned to the crisis watch zone of the healthcare unit. He claims
he asked multiple officers why he was on hunger strike and told them that he did not
sign any hunger strike declaration, but they insisted he had signed and refused to help
him. The grievance was marked as received for review in Plaintiff’s cumulative
counseling log on June 7, 2024. (Doc. 31-2 at 2). The counseling log further reflected that
on July 15, 2024, the counselor forwarded grievance K7-0624-585 to mental health a
second time for them to respond. (Doc. 31-2 at 1). Finally, on October 25, 2024, the
counseling log noted that mental health answered grievance K7-0624-585, and that the
counselor then returned the grievance to Plaintiff on October 28, 2024. (Doc. 31-6 at 1).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In
determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is
not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to
exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).1 After hearing evidence,
finding facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the
claim to proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004
(7th Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.
Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring
a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion
requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”
Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the
administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process
outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
An inmate must file a grievance within 60 days of an event, 20 Ill. Admin. Code §
504.810(a), and generally, a grievance officer shall make a report to the Chief
1 This case does not involve intertwinement as contemplated by Perttu v. Richards, 145 S.Ct. 1793 (2025).
Administrative Officer within two months of receipt of the written grievance, when
reasonably feasible, 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.830(e).
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with
the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s
decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer
and CAO to his appeal. Id.
B. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the Court grants Defendant Willis’s Motion to Amend
(Doc. 35), wherein he simply asks to tender a signed copy of a declaration from ARB
chairperson John Loftus. The request was made less than a week from the filing of the
motion, and it had no apparent impact on Plaintiff’s ability to respond.
As to the exhaustion issue, the parties agree that just one grievance is relevant to
the claim against Willis—grievance no. K7-0624-535. Plaintiff signed this grievance May
28, 2024, and it was logged as received by the prison’s grievance system on June 7, 2024.
Rather than wait for the outcome of this grievance, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, first by
lodging a preliminary injunction on June 14, 2024, and then by filing a complaint on June
28, 2024. This strategy is simply unacceptable, because inmates cannot sue first, and
exhaust later. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020) (a premature lawsuit
must be dismissed without prejudice, an inmate cannot sue first and exhaust later).
Plaintiff argues that any misstep with his grievance should be excused because the
prison only had 60 days to respond to his grievance, and it took them more than 4
months.2 To support this position, he points to 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.830(e), which
sets an aspirational processing time of two months when reasonably feasible. Courts
have held that the passage of an aspirational grievance processing deadline does not
automatically trigger an inmate’s right to sue. See e.g. Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 331 (7th
Cir. 2020). The Court must also consider what the inmate knew or could learn about his
grievance at the time the aspirational deadline passed. In Reid¸ the Seventh Circuit
allowed an inmate to proceed because at the time he filed suit, he had tried to no avail to
get information on if a relevant grievance was still being processed, and without a
response he had no idea what was happening.
Plaintiff’s situation is different in two respects. First, he did not wait for the
aspirational 60 days to lapse. He signed his grievance May 28, 2024, and he signed his
complaint on June 28, 2024 (Doc. 11 at 10). Thus, he waited less than 60 days for his
grievance to potentially be processed. Second, he offers no proof that he made any effort
whatsoever to learn the status of the relevant grievance before suing. See e.g., Lockett v.
Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1027 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that an inmate who got no receipt or
response to an appeal should have inquired as to the status of the appeal before filing a
lawsuit); Hill v. Bond, 2015 WL 1166053 at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2015) (finding that an
inmate did not exhaust remedies where he did not inquire with the ARB about the status
of his grievance before filing suit). Against this backdrop, he simply sued too early before
giving the grievance process a chance to play out. He also argues that he never got his
2 Plaintiff submitted two response briefs. (Docs. 37, 38). They contain identical contents, but one was
submitted digitally via the e-filing system at the prison (Doc. 37), and one was sent via physical mail (Doc.
38).
grievance back from the prison on or after October 28, 2024, but that is irrelevant because
his lawsuit was filed too early, and this additional allegation cannot remedy that problem.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Willis’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 31) will be granted, and Defendant Willis will be dismissed without prejudice
because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies against him.
DISPOSITION
The Motion to Supplement (Doc. 35) and the Motion for Summary Judgment on
the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant Willis (Doc. 31) are GRANTED. Claim 2 is
DISMISSSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to Defendant Willis. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in
Willis’ favor at the close of the case.
Defendant Peterson’s Motion to Withdraw the Affirmative Defense (Doc. 33) is
GRANTED. A merits summary judgment schedule shall issue by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 19, 2025
/s David W. Dugan
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge