KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 31, 2025 Decided August 19, 2025

No. 23-7175

KLEO AG, A STOCK CORPORATION FORMED UNDER THE LAWS

OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN,

APPELLANT

v.

RIVADA NETWORKS, INC., A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:22-cv-01664)

David M. Parker argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Torsten M. Kracht. Elbert Lin entered an

appearance.

Daryoush Behbood argued the cause for appellee. On the

brief was Peter H. White.

Before: PILLARD and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

2

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

GARCIA, Circuit Judge: KLEO AG, a satellite company,

sued its competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., for defamation.

The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that KLEO

was required, but failed, to adequately allege that the

challenged statements caused it specific harms. We affirm the

district court’s ruling that the complaint needed to identify

KLEO’s harms and explain how Rivada’s statements caused

them. But unlike the district court, we conclude that the

complaint adequately did so. Accordingly, we reverse in part.

I

A

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the truth of the

factual allegations in KLEO’s complaint. See Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

KLEO AG is a corporation based in Liechtenstein. It is

working to develop a constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites

that will support a global data network. Satellites rely on the

radio-frequency spectrum to transmit information. To avoid

signal interference, international regulations prohibit satellite

operators from accessing the radio-frequency spectrum unless

they obtain usage rights from their national governments.

In 2018, the Liechtenstein government allocated radio-

frequency rights to another company, TRION AG. The

Liechtenstein government also approved a contract under

which TRION licensed its usage rights to KLEO. To comply

with regulatory requirements for holders of radio-frequency

rights, KLEO successfully launched and operated two test

satellites the following year.

3

One of KLEO’s competitors, Rivada Networks, Inc.,

wanted KLEO’s frequency rights for itself. To that end, Rivada

commenced a corporate takeover of TRION in 2021. As a

result of the takeover, TRION’s board members voted to

terminate the contract licensing the company’s radio-frequency

rights to KLEO. TRION eventually transferred those rights to

Rivada. KLEO disputed the legality of those actions, and the

purported cancellation of KLEO’s contract with TRION

remains the subject of ongoing litigation and arbitration in

Europe.

About three weeks after TRION’s vote, Rivada’s

Chairman and CEO, Declan Ganley, appeared for an interview

on Space Café Radio, a podcast for satellite-industry insiders.

Ganley stated during the interview that KLEO “only ever had

a provisional and subjective” license to use the radio-frequency

spectrum, that KLEO “no longer ha[d] the use of [its]

license[],” and that any usage rights KLEO once enjoyed had

“been terminated” and “amputated from the filings.” J.A. 86

¶ 40. Ganley further claimed that KLEO’s plan all along had

been to move control of the satellite network to China:

There w[as] a group of Chinese government-

backed shareholders . . . . [L]et’s just say

that there was absolutely no way in the world

that this plan of theirs was credible or was

capable of being executed upon, and

furthermore, there are some very strict rules

with regard to moving, or de facto moving, [a

license for] constellation rights from one

place to another. . . . These are European

filings and it was pretty obvious, not just

obvious, but actually categorically stated that

the plan was to move these to China, and

while there would’ve been, if you like, a sort

of front organization left remaining in

4

Germany, everything else would’ve been

moved . . . .

Id. (last alteration in original).

The podcast aired during the second day of a four-day

satellite conference in Washington, D.C. The conference bills

itself as the most widely attended event each year among

executives and customers in the satellite industry. The podcast

was also distributed on an authoritative news platform that

professionals across the industry followed.

During the conference, manufacturers approached KLEO

to express doubt about its satellite network’s viability. Some

of those same manufacturers then refused to partner with

KLEO in its planned satellite project.

B

KLEO sued Rivada for defamation under District of

Columbia law (as well as for tortious interference with

contract, though it later abandoned that claim). The district

court had diversity jurisdiction over the suit. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a)(2).

To state a defamation claim under D.C. law, a plaintiff

must allege “(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory

statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant

published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3)

that the defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amounted

to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was

actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or

that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.” See

Crowley v. N. Am. Telecomms. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169, 1172 n.2

(D.C. 1997) (quoting Prins v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 757 F.

Supp. 87, 90 (D.D.C. 1991)). This case concerns the final

element, which (as the quoted language suggests) can be

pleaded in two ways. First, a plaintiff can allege that the

5

challenged statements were so inherently harmful that they

were defamatory per se, in which case no additional showing

of damages is required. See Farnum v. Colbert, 293 A.2d 279,

281–82 (D.C. 1972). Second, a plaintiff can allege that the

statements caused “special damages,” a term that “refers to

actual pecuniary loss.” 1 Law of Defamation § 1:15 (2d ed.

May 2025 update). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

9(g), special damages “must be specifically stated.”

Rivada moved to dismiss KLEO’s complaint for failure to

state a claim. KLEO twice amended the complaint, and each

time it did so, Rivada filed a renewed motion. Rivada argued

that KLEO had not plausibly claimed any injury from the

podcast. KLEO responded that Ganley’s statements were

defamatory per se and that, in any event, the second amended

complaint (hereinafter the “complaint”) adequately pleaded

special damages. KLEO pointed to several allegations in the

complaint detailing the harms it sustained from Ganley’s

interview, including the costs of repairing its relationships with

satellite manufacturers and establishing new partnerships.

The district court granted each of Rivada’s motions and

ultimately dismissed KLEO’s lawsuit with prejudice. See

KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc., 2023 WL 7921969, at *1

(D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2023). Assuming without deciding that

Ganley’s statements were false and defamatory, the court ruled

that they were not defamatory per se. The district court then

determined that KLEO had not pleaded special damages

because the complaint did not adequately allege a causal tie

between Ganley’s statements and KLEO’s losses.

KLEO now appeals.

II

We review the district court’s dismissal of KLEO’s suit de

novo. See Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

6

“In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, [we] must construe the

complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617

F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).

On appeal, KLEO reprises its argument that it has stated a

defamation per se claim and that, in the alternative, it has

adequately pleaded special damages. We affirm the district

court’s determination that Ganley’s statements did not amount

to defamation per se. We hold, however, that KLEO

adequately pleaded one theory of special damages and remand

for further proceedings on that issue.

A

Only “statements about extreme subjects” are considered

defamatory per se. Smith v. Clinton, 886 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C.

Cir. 2018) (per curiam). That category includes “statements

imputing to a person a criminal offense; a loathsome disease;

matter affecting adversely a person’s fitness for trade, business,

or profession; or serious sexual misconduct.” Carey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247, 262 n.18 (1978). Statements like those are

“virtually certain” to damage someone’s reputation, so a

defamation plaintiff need not separately establish that the

statements caused actual harm. Id. at 262.

KLEO insists that Ganley attributed to it a matter

adversely affecting its fitness for the satellite industry in two

ways: first, by communicating that KLEO lacked the radio-

frequency rights needed to operate its satellite system; second,

by claiming that KLEO “planned to transfer control of [its

satellite] network to China.” Appellant’s Brief 9. Neither

argument succeeds.

7

To start, it was not defamatory per se for Ganley to claim

that KLEO had lost its radio-frequency rights. Ganley’s

statements described a business deal that fell through, not

anything so “extreme” as to constitute defamation per se.

Smith, 886 F.3d at 128.

KLEO resists that basic point by relying on cases about

individual professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, who

sued for defamation over allegedly false statements that they

had lost their licenses, were in danger of losing their licenses,

or were incapable of performing the work of their trade. See

Appellant’s Brief 18–20 (citing Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256,

1264 (D.C. 1984); Krishnan v. Blueprint Healthcare LLC,

2021 WL 4255359, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2021); Cretella v.

Kuzminski, 640 F. Supp. 2d 741, 763 (E.D. Va. 2009); Mimms

v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 2017 WL 25456, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Jan.

3, 2017), rev’d in part on other grounds, 889 F.3d 865 (7th Cir.

2018); and Elibol v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 747 N.Y.S.2d

649, 650 (2002)). Courts found the statements at issue in those

cases defamatory per se, and KLEO submits that the same

reasoning should control here: After all, KLEO says, Ganley

said it “lack[ed] a license necessary to conduct its business.”

Id. at 19.

But a statement alleging the lack of a license does not

amount to defamation per se in all settings. The unifying theme

of the cases KLEO cites is that they involved lines of work

where such an accusation tends to seriously damage a

professional’s reputation. For example, a statement that a

doctor or a lawyer no longer has a license can communicate

that she has engaged in “illegal or unethical behavior,” Mimms,

2017 WL 25456, at *9, or that she is so “incompetent” as to fall

woefully short of basic professional standards, Cretella, 640 F.

Supp. 2d at 763; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 791–92 (5th ed. 1984)

(explaining that statements may be defamatory per se if they

8

portray the plaintiff as “dishonest, incompetent,” or otherwise

having traits “incompatible with the proper conduct” of her

trade (footnotes omitted)). Those cases make sense because

the types of professionals they address—doctors, lawyers, and

the like—generally lose their licenses as a form of discipline

for misconduct.

The allegations here are materially different. Ganley

stated that KLEO had lost a contract to use the radio-frequency

rights allocated to TRION. That statement does not inherently

impute to KLEO any professional malfeasance or ineptitude.

Contracts can fall through for any number of reasons, some

more benign than others. Indeed, the alleged defamatory

statements explicitly included such a reason: Ganley said

KLEO lost its rights because his company had “stepped in” and

“terminated” the contract KLEO had with TRION. J.A. 86

¶ 40. Ganley never indicated that KLEO was “not capable of”

operating a satellite system, only that KLEO needed to obtain

another contract for radio-frequency rights before it could do

so. Ingber, 479 A.2d at 1264 (emphasis omitted).

KLEO also asserts that questioning a competitor’s

solvency can constitute defamation per se. See Appellant’s

Brief 17 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 cmt. c

(A.L.I. 1977 Supp. Oct. 2024)). Even if that is so, KLEO never

actually argues that Ganley cast it as insolvent. The closest

KLEO comes is its repeated reference to an allegation in the

complaint that, according to one foreign tribunal, “the

withdrawal of these [radio-frequency] rights would ‘destroy

the existence’ of KLEO.” J.A. 84 ¶ 33. But that quotation—

which postdated the podcast by about seven months—does not

retroactively infuse Ganley’s statements with the same

meaning.

The complaint elsewhere claims that Ganley’s statements

about the loss of frequency rights were defamatory per se

9

insofar as they discouraged investors and potential business

partners “from dealing with KLEO.” J.A. 89 ¶ 41(ii). But on

that logic, any statement tending to cause unease among the

investing public could constitute defamation per se. KLEO

would have us broaden the category considerably, forgetting

that it is “reserved for statements about extreme subjects.”

Smith, 886 F.3d at 128.

KLEO’s second theory of defamation per se fares no

better. KLEO zeroes in on Ganley’s statements that “the plan

was to move [the satellite network] to China,” and that “there

would’ve been . . . a sort of front organization left remaining in

[Europe].” J.A. 86 ¶ 40.

On appeal, KLEO asserts that, through these remarks,

Ganley accused it of “deceiv[ing] European regulators.”

Appellant’s Brief 1. The most cogent gloss on KLEO’s

argument looks something like this: A European regulator

would not have approved a company based in China to use the

radio-frequency spectrum. Ganley implied that KLEO

established a European presence for the sole purpose of duping

a European regulator into granting it frequency rights. All

along, Ganley said, KLEO planned to shift control of the

satellite network to China while leaving only a nominal

presence in Europe.

In theory, KLEO is correct that a statement impugning

someone’s “honesty in business” can be defamatory per se.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 (1977) cmt. c (A.L.I.

1977 Supp. Oct. 2024); see also Golden Palace, Inc. v. Nat’l

Broad. Co., 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974). The

problem for KLEO is that Ganley’s statements are far too

vague to support the meaning KLEO now seeks to ascribe to

them. Ganley did not even mention European regulators, much

less state that KLEO was conniving to deceive them. And the

complaint, even after KLEO amended it multiple times, does

10

not allege other facts that might fill in the gaps. For example,

the complaint does not identify which entity was purportedly

deceived, nor why it would have been impermissible for KLEO

to move control of the satellite network to China. And KLEO’s

solitary and conclusory assertion that Ganley accused it of

“fraud and deception” is no substitute for well-pleaded facts

explaining how that is so. J.A. 95 ¶ 50. At bottom, KLEO asks

us to read an accusation that KLEO was scheming to deceive

European regulators into Ganley’s remarks without providing

the context we would need to make that interpretive leap.

KLEO also argues that Ganley’s statements about China

were defamatory per se because they “stok[ed] fears among

investors, satellite manufacturers, and launch service providers

that management of the project [would] be taken over by the

Chinese government.” Appellant’s Brief 9 (first alteration in

original) (quoting J.A. 87 ¶ 41(i)). But as we have explained,

a statement is not defamatory per se just because it might shake

stakeholder confidence.

In the end, Ganley left the podcast’s listeners only with the

impression that KLEO planned on conducting its business in

China. That does not remotely meet the standards of a

defamation per se claim.

B

With defamation per se off the table, the remaining

question is whether KLEO has properly pleaded that Ganley’s

statements caused it special damages. Special damages

encompass “those elements of damages that are the natural, but

not the necessary or usual, consequence of the defendant’s

conduct.” 5A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &

Procedure § 1310 (4th ed. Supp. May 2025).

When “an item of special damage is claimed,” Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) requires that it “be specifically

11

stated.” As the district court correctly explained, a plaintiff

pleading special damages as part of a defamation claim must

identify a specific economic loss and “evidence of causation”

linking that loss to the challenged statements. Browning v.

Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Rivada does not

ask us to reconsider the district court’s ruling that KLEO’s

complaint detailed several specific economic losses. Instead,

the parties dispute whether the complaint adequately pleaded a

causal tie between Ganley’s statements and KLEO’s damages.

We will assess that question by asking, as the district court

did, whether the causal relationship KLEO posits is supported

by “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To

be sure, some of our pre-Twombly cases describe Rule 9(g) as

imposing a “heightened pleading standard” to allegations of

causation as compared to the generally applicable standard

under Rule 8 for stating a claim. Browning, 292 F.3d at 245;

see also Fowler v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 182 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C.

Cir. 1950). But the parties both assume that the Twombly

standard applies to measure KLEO’s causation allegations and

that we should draw all reasonable inferences in KLEO’s favor

at the motion-to-dismiss stage, notwithstanding their fleeting

references to Rule 9(g)’s “heightened pleading standard.” See

Appellant’s Brief 16, 25; Appellee’s Brief 13–14, 26–27. So

did the district court. See KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at

*1–2; id. at *4–5. We will do the same.

We conclude that KLEO has alleged a plausible causal

connection between Ganley’s statements and one category of

special damages: costs related to KLEO’s loss of business

relationships with satellite manufacturers. The complaint

specifically alleges that Ganley’s statements caused KLEO to

incur “at least €4,000 in travel expenses” to rebuild those

12

relationships and “secure [other] partnerships” to replace

relationships that were beyond repair. J.A. 93 ¶ 42.1

The complaint tells the following story about how

Ganley’s statements caused those damages. KLEO was

making progress toward commercializing its frequency rights,

having launched and operated two test satellites, when Rivada

initiated a corporate takeover that culminated in the purported

termination of KLEO’s contract with TRION. See J.A. 82 ¶ 22;

J.A. 82–83 ¶¶ 26–29. Knowing how attuned the satellite

industry was to the media, Ganley made his defamatory

statements on the second day of the year’s most important and

widely attended conference in the industry, and on a podcast

that the satellite community followed. See J.A. 85 ¶¶ 36–37.

The podcast was then circulated on a well-respected platform

for satellite-related news. See id. ¶ 38. Manufacturers began

approaching KLEO “[d]uring” the conference with concerns

“that KLEO’s satellite project appeared likely to fail, or had

already failed.” J.A. 93 ¶ 42. Those same manufacturers have

since refused to partner with KLEO. See id.

The sequence of events that KLEO describes is clear,

logical, and factually grounded. And it gives rise to a natural

1

The complaint identifies three other types of special damages:

KLEO’s loss of frequency rights, its loss of a prominent space

consultant’s services, and its loss of employees. The district court

deemed the first two allegations plainly insufficient under Rule 9(g).

See KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at *3 n.2 (finding KLEO’s

allegation about the space consultant “speculative and vague”); id. at

*4 n.3 (noting that KLEO lost its frequency rights “before [the]

allegedly defamatory statements”). KLEO does not challenge those

aspects of the district court’s ruling. Nor has KLEO offered any

argument on appeal that the complaint adequately alleges how

Ganley’s statements caused it to lose employees. Any such argument

is therefore forfeited. See Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 199

(D.C. Cir. 2014).

13

inference that the companies refused to partner with KLEO

because of Ganley’s statements.

KLEO’s complaint also compares favorably to others that

courts have found to satisfy Rule 9(g). For example, in Schoen

v. Washington Post, 246 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1957), we held

that the plaintiff adequately pleaded special damages by

alleging that he lost business relationships close on the heels of

a defamatory news story. Id. at 672. The plaintiff alleged that

his gross receipts declined after the story’s publication, that the

decrease “resulted solely and proximately from the [associated]

damage to his good name and reputation,” and that the story

had caused three named persons to withdraw their business and

other potential customers to withhold theirs. Id. at 671–72;2

see also Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610,

614 (7th Cir. 2013) (deeming sufficient under Rule 9(g) a

complaint that also relied on the sequencing of events). For its

part, Rivada has not identified any decision finding similar

allegations insufficient. In the cases Rivada relies on most

heavily, the plaintiff “allege[d] no facts suggesting causation”

whatsoever. Browning, 292 F.3d at 246; see also Smith, 886

F.3d at 128 (noting that complaint included only “a boilerplate

recitation, unaccompanied by any factual detail”); Fowler, 182

F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (similar). Unlike in those cases,

the complaint here contains ample facts to suggest that Rivada

carefully selected the time of the interview and the podcast that

broadcast it to maximize the damage to KLEO’s reputation,

2

Schoen noted that even under Rule 9(g), a plaintiff need not

plead a “causal relationship . . . with as great precision as might be

possible or desirable.” Schoen, 246 F.2d at 672. The dissent would

dismiss Schoen as a relic of the “notice-pleading approach which

Twombly has long since supplanted.” Dissenting Op. 6 n.2. This

court, however, has already considered and rejected the argument

that Schoen merely applied a “notice pleading” standard. See

Browning, 292 F.3d at 246.

14

that the participants in the conference heard Ganley’s

statements, and that the statements had their intended effect.

In concluding otherwise, the district court erred in four

ways.

First, the district court found that the complaint was

“unclear” about whether the manufacturers expressed their

misgivings “before or after Rivada made its allegedly

defamatory statements.” KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at *4.

The complaint states that the manufacturers voiced concerns to

KLEO “[d]uring the” conference, without specifying when

over the course of the conference’s four days those encounters

occurred. J.A. 93 ¶ 42. “Presumably,” KLEO explains, “the

district court [reasoned] that because Rivada’s statement

occurred on the second day of this conference, the

manufacturers could have approached KLEO . . . on the first

day, or earlier [on] the second day.” Appellant’s Brief 28.

Against the backdrop of the complaint’s other well-

pleaded allegations, KLEO is entitled to a reasonable inference

that its conversations with manufacturers occurred after the

podcast had already aired. The complaint, again, alleges that

Ganley made his statements on day two of the four-day

conference, and that manufacturers approached KLEO with

concerns during the conference. It further alleges that “[t]he

most immediate impacts of the [podcast] were felt in

Washington, [D.C.],” J.A. 85 ¶ 39, and that “the purpose and

result” of the podcast were “to discredit KLEO among its

industry peers who were attending the conference,” J.A. 78

(emphases added). The plain thrust of KLEO’s allegations is

that manufacturers approached it after hearing Ganley’s

statements, and the district court should have construed the

complaint accordingly. To conclude otherwise, we would have

to draw an inference against KLEO, which is not proper at this

stage. See Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476.

15

Second, the district court faulted the complaint for

“vaguely alleg[ing] that KLEO lost business” without

providing “specific dates.” KLEO AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at

*4. That “degree of detail” is unnecessary at the motion-to-

dismiss stage. Browning, 292 F.3d at 246 (citation modified).

KLEO’s other factual allegations make out a sufficiently

plausible causal chain to suggest that the manufacturers, in

refusing to partner with KLEO, were acting on the concerns

that they had mentioned during the conference. That is so

regardless of the precise date the manufacturers declined to

work with KLEO. At this early stage of the litigation, our

inability to precisely discern the alleged lag time between the

conference’s end and KLEO’s loss of business is not fatal to

KLEO’s defamation claim.

Third, the district court gave undue weight to a potential

alternative explanation for KLEO’s losses: TRION’s purported

termination of KLEO’s usage rights, which preceded the

conference by about three weeks. TRION’s announcement,

according to the district court, “support[ed] an inference that

KLEO’s business relationships suffered because of its loss of

frequency rights, not because of Rivada’s statements.” KLEO

AG, 2023 WL 7921969, at *4 n.3. The dissent reasons

similarly. See Dissenting Op. 5.

The problem with that theory is that the complaint does not

include any allegation that even supports an inference that the

conference participants learned about TRION’s purported

cancellation of KLEO’s frequency rights independently of

Ganley’s podcast interview. True, the complaint states that the

satellite industry was monitoring “the ongoing arbitration and

litigation” involving KLEO, Rivada, and TRION. J.A. 84 ¶ 34.

But the only milestones in the litigation identified in the

complaint all postdated the conference by several months. The

most natural reading of the complaint, drawing all reasonable

inferences in KLEO’s favor, is that the conference participants

16

learned of the fallout with TRION from Ganley’s podcast

appearance.

Fourth and finally, the district court focused myopically on

KLEO’s allegations that, “[o]n information and belief,” the

special damages it sustained were “caused by Rivada’s

defamatory statements.” J.A. 93–94 ¶¶ 42–43. The district

court deemed these allegations conclusory and found that

“KLEO has thus failed to plead causation.” KLEO AG, 2023

WL 7921969, at *3. Once again, the dissent is in accord. See

Dissenting Op. 3. But the conclusion does not follow from the

premise. The one sentence alleging causation on information

and belief may have been “boilerplate,” KLEO AG, 2023 WL

7921969, at *3 (quotation omitted), but the point is that

KLEO’s other allegations, detailed above, lend factual support

to its claims about causation. To take just one example, the

complaint does not directly allege that manufacturers heard

Ganley’s remarks on the podcast. But it does allege that

Ganley made the statements during the largest annual industry

convention, J.A. 85 ¶ 36–37, that the statements were

“distributed publicly and globally” through “a well-known and

authoritative source for news within the close-knit satellite-

communications industry,” id. ¶ 38, and that the “most

immediate impacts of the” statements were “felt” at the

convention, id. ¶ 39. The presence of some conclusory

allegations does not negate the combined force of other well

pleaded factual contentions.

To be sure, the dissent makes a strong case that KLEO

omitted from its complaint details that would have placed its

claim on stronger footing. Although the matter is close, we

conclude that when the complaint is read as a whole and

reasonable inferences are drawn in KLEO’s favor, KLEO has

done enough to “nudge[]” its “claim[] across the line from

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

17

Accordingly, we hold that KLEO has adequately pleaded

special damages under Rule 9(g), and that the district court

erred by dismissing its defamation claim.

III

The decision below is affirmed in part, reversed in part,

and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

In this defamation action, satellite company KLEO AG

asserts that a competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., falsely

impugned KLEO’s business. I agree that the defamation per se

theory and three of the four claimed “special damages” injuries

fail, see Majority Op. 6, 12 n.1, and I accordingly join parts I

and II.A of the majority opinion.

But my colleagues’ otherwise admirable opinion falters in

its analysis of KLEO’s sole remaining injury: the loss of

business partnerships. The complaint is replete with conclusory

statements that Rivada is to blame, but it is bereft of any factual

allegations actually showing a connection between the

statements and the losses. Despite this insufficient pleading, the

majority knits together unrelated facts to “tell[]” a “story” of

causation—one KLEO left untold. Majority Op. 12. This

storytelling exercise is not only inconsistent with Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), but also contravenes the

heightened pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 9(g). I therefore would affirm in full.

I.

To survive a motion to dismiss, Rule 9(g) requires “special

damages” to be “specifically stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g).1 As

the majority agrees, this entails showing both a “specific

economic loss and ‘evidence of causation’ linking that loss to

1

This is a diversity of citizenship case, and the parties agree that the

substantive law of defamation is that of the District of Columbia. But

federal law provides the procedural rules for this case, including the

pleading standards. See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d

1328, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.

460, 472 (1965); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010).

2

the challenged statements.” Majority Op. 11 (quoting Browning

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

The majority believes that we measure the complaint

against these elements by using the motion to dismiss standard

from Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See

Majority Op. 11. If Twombly is the correct standard—more on

that later—KLEO must provide evidence of causation by

alleging “sufficient factual matter” to make its claim

“plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (second excerpt quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While we “draw all reasonable

inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor, those inferences must

themselves be “plausible” and supported by “sufficient facts.”

Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (first

excerpt quoting N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244,

1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). And a reasonable inference requires

something more than “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557).

While KLEO did claim a specific economic loss, the

entirety of the complaint’s pleading on causation is the

following paragraph:

These defamatory statements caused specific harm to

KLEO. After these statements, many satellite manufacturers

have refused to partner with KLEO and KLEO Connect

GmbH in the planned satellite project. During the DC

SATELLITE Conference, some of these manufacturers

expressed their belief that KLEO’s satellite project

appeared likely to fail, or had already failed. On

information and belief, the loss of these relationships was

caused by Rivada’s defamatory statements. Further, the loss

of these relationships has caused KLEO specific pecuniary

harm, because KLEO has spent time and resources

3

attempting to repair these relationships, and also to secure

partnerships with other manufacturers, including at least

€4,000 in travel expenses, and more to be later proven.

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 42 (J.A. 93) (emphasis added).

This level of pleading is inadequate. KLEO had to plead

“evidence of causation.” But only one sentence of the complaint

actually bears on causation: “On information and belief, the loss

of these relationships was caused by Rivada’s defamatory

statements.” Id. The first three sentences simply describe the

post-statement events and the nature of the injury, explaining

that manufacturers refused to partner with KLEO and told it so;

the last sentence quantifies the loss.

KLEO’s bare assertion that Rivada “caused” the losses is

not evidence—it is an unsupported “legal conclusion” we should

not credit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Twombly and Iqbal

require “sufficient factual matter” to make causation plausible,

id., but KLEO provided no factual matter whatsoever. It did not

allege that its business partners heard Rivada’s statements, or

that they were influenced by the statements, or that they

mentioned the statements in cutting ties with KLEO, or even

that they changed their minds after the podcast was released.

KLEO merely stated a legal conclusion—causation—“[o]n

information and belief.”

KLEO’s invocation of “on information and belief” raises a

further problem. In some cases, this type of bare-bones pleading

is a “practical necessity,” 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1224 (4th ed. 2025),

since “the necessary information [may] lie[] within [the]

defendants’ control.” Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16

F.3d 1271, 1279 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). But plaintiffs in a

4

position to have “personal knowledge”—or, conversely, those

lacking “sufficient data to justify interposing an

allegation”—may not use “on information and belief” pleading

to avoid alleging specific facts. Wright & Miller, supra, § 1224.

And when Rule 9 is in play, still more detail is required: “on

information and belief” pleadings must “be accompanied by a

statement of the facts upon which the allegations are based.”

Kareem, 986 F.3d at 866 (quoting Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1279 n.3);

see also Wright & Miller, supra, § 1224 (requiring, for “on

information and belief” pleading in Rule 9 “special damages”

cases, a statement of “the facts on which the pleader’s belief is

founded”).

These principles further confirm the insufficiency of

KLEO’s allegations. The relevant information about causation

is not within the defendant’s control—on the contrary, KLEO is

better positioned than Rivada to determine why its own business

partners cut ties. In addition, in lieu of a statement of facts

supporting its “information and belief,” KLEO has supplied only

a one-sentence legal conclusion. We have no basis for assuming

that the plaintiff has information about causation that is

reasonably supported by factual knowledge.

In recognition of the lack of any direct evidentiary

allegation of causation, the majority falls back on inferences. In

my colleagues’ telling, KLEO was riding high until “Rivada

initiated a corporate takeover,” transferred essential radio-

frequency licenses, and “made [the] defamatory statements,”

leading manufacturers to have “concerns” about KLEO’s

business. Majority Op. 12. KLEO’s complaint thus provides a

“story” which “gives rise to a natural inference” of causation. Id.

at 12–13. But there is nothing “natural” about this inferential

leap, and KLEO’s allegations do not support it. The majority’s

hypothesis rests on the business partners reversing course near

in time to the podcast, yet that temporal inference is

5

unsupported. The complaint contains no specific allegations

about dates, attitudes before and after the podcast, or any other

evidence connecting the statements and the injury. In lieu of that

factual backing, the majority’s narrative is just a post hoc ergo

propter hoc assumption—the logical fallacy “meaning ‘after

this, therefore because of this.’ A progression in time is

necessary for a causal relationship, but it’s not enough.” David

J. Hand, The Improbabilty Principle: Why Coincidences,

Miracles, and Rare Events Happen Every Day 18 (2014).

In any event, the majority’s recounting provides an obvious

alternative: the termination of KLEO’s access to radio

frequencies. See Majority Op. 2–3, 12 (discussing KLEO’s

contract with another entity, TRION, for radio frequencies). My

colleagues explain that the loss of this essential asset also

preceded the business partners’ “concerns ‘that KLEO’s satellite

project appeared likely to fail.’” Id. at 12 (quoting J.A. 93 ¶ 42).

And while the majority emphasizes that KLEO did not allege its

business partners independently heard of the lost frequencies,

see id. at 15, KLEO also did not allege they heard the podcast.

Accordingly, the complaint contains nothing that would make

the alleged defamatory podcast a more likely explanation, and

Iqbal requires us to dismiss a complaint containing facts

“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

The majority’s choice to relax Twombly also breaks with

our decision in Smith v. Clinton, 886 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

There, applying Rule 9(g) post-Twombly, we rejected a

complaint containing the following one-sentence allegation

about causation: “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Defendant

Clinton’s statements, [plaintiffs] have suffered pecuniary

damage.” Id. at 128 (first alteration in original). That

unsupported assertion—similar to KLEO’s pleading—was “a

boilerplate recitation, unaccompanied by any factual detail,” and

6

warranted dismissal. Id.2

II.

There is an additional problem with the majority’s opinion:

Twombly is not the appropriate standard. “Special damages”

pleading is governed by Rule 9(g)’s “heightened pleading

standard,” Browning, 292 F.3d at 245, not the typical Rule 8

requirement of a “short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Even if KLEO’s complaint could pass muster

under Twombly, it certainly could not survive Rule 9(g).

We have repeatedly held that Rule 9(g) requires a plaintiff

to describe the claimed injury with “‘particularity’ and specify

‘facts showing that such special damages were the natural and

direct result’ of the defendant’s conduct.” Browning, 292 F.3d

at 245 (quoting Fowler v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 182 F.2d 377, 379

(D.C. Cir. 1950)). In other words, instead of merely pleading

evidence of causation under Twombly’s plausibility standards,

a special damages plaintiff must state causation with “a good

deal of particularity,” describing “precisely in what way the

special damage resulted from the spoken or written words.”

Fowler, 182 F.2d at 379.3

2

The majority instead relies on Schoen v. Washington Post, 246 F.2d

670 (D.C. Cir. 1957), which held a defamation complaint was

sufficient even though causation was “not alleged with as great

precision as might be possible or desirable.” Id. at 672. But Schoen

emphasized that the plaintiff had “adequately notifie[d] both appellee

and the court as to the nature of the claimed damages,” id., a notice-

pleading approach which Twombly has long since supplanted.

3

This heightened standard arises from the theory of “special

damages.” In contrast to a defamation per se claim where the slander

is outrageous and damages are presumed, the common law was

skeptical of defamation claims arising from less extreme statements.

7

Rule 9(g) is about eliminating flimsy lawsuits. It is not

enough for plaintiffs to propose theories, conjectures, and

hypotheses. Rule 9(g) demands an explanation, grounded in

evidence. KLEO’s complaint falls far short. Even if the

majority’s “natural inference[s]” of causation are permissible

under Twombly, Majority Op. 12–13, Rule 9(g) makes clear that

this is not sufficient for special damages. KLEO did not

“specify” any “facts” to explain why the loss of its business

relationships was the “natural and direct result” of Rivada’s

statements. And it did not explain “precisely in what way” its

business counterparties were influenced by Rivada’s statements.

Nor did Rivada forfeit an argument based on the Rule.

Contrary to the majority’s statement that the “parties both

assume that the Twombly standard applies” and “[s]o did the

district court,” Majority Op. 11, both Rivada and KLEO

explicitly refer to a heightened pleading standard in their briefs.

See Appellant Br. 26 n.5 (mentioning “Rule 9(g)’s heightened

pleading standard” (quoting In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data

Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2019))); Appellee

Br. 2, 10, 24, 27 (applying the “heightened pleading standard”

of Rule 9(g)). The district court also understood that compliance

with Rule 9(g) was at stake. As a result, the court applied “Rule

9(g)’s heightened pleading standard for special damages.”

KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc., No. 22-cv-01664, 2023 WL

7921969, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2023). To be sure, the parties’

general statements of the standard of review mention Twombly,

but both parties acknowledge that Rule 9(g) requires something

additional for special damages. That specificity is absent here.

When reputational injury is “not the necessary consequence” of the

defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff must plead his or her injury—and

how the defendant caused it—in greater detail. Browning, 292 F.3d at

245 (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice & Procedure § 1310 (2d ed. 1990)).

8

For this reason too I would affirm the dismissal in its entirety.