Global Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Republic of France

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 1 of 42

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10148

____________________

GLOBAL MARINE EXPLORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

Defendant-Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Intervenor.

____________________

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 2 of 42

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00181-AW-MJF

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and BRASHER, Cir-

cuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether the Sunken Mili-

tary Craft Act bars a salvage claim brought by Global Marine Ex-

ploration, Inc., against the Republic of France. In 1565, la Trinité—

a French ship sent to resupply and defend a struggling French fort

in Florida—sunk off the coast of Cape Canaveral during a hurri-

cane. In 2016, Global Marine—an underwater exploration com-

pany—discovered the remains of la Trinité on the ocean floor. After

France claimed the ship and obtained a dismissal without prejudice

of an in rem action filed by Global Marine, Global Marine brought

an in personam action against France for the salvage value of its

work. It also sued for unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade

secrets, and tortious interference. The district court granted sum-

mary judgment for France. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We describe the background of this appeal in four parts. We

first review the record developed by the parties to describe the last

voyage of la Trinité and the hurricane that sank it. We next describe

the events that led to la Trinité’s discovery. We then describe the in

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 3 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 3

rem action Global Marine brought against the ship. And we last re-

count the in personam action Global Marine brought against France.

A. In 1565, la Trinité Sinks Off the Coast of Florida.

Two 16th-century storylines set the stage for the sinking of

la Trinité and France’s doomed efforts to colonize Florida. The first

is one of empire: France, England, Spain, Portugal, and the Neth-

erlands all hungered for new lands, new trade routes, and new re-

sources in the so-called New World. The second is one of religion:

Europe, long united in faith under the Catholic Church, fractured

and descended into religious wars as the Protestant Reformation

spread from kingdom to kingdom.

In 1562, France sat at the center of both storylines. For dec-

ades, the kingdom had disputed Spain’s claim to all newly discov-

ered lands in the Americas. And for decades, fleets of French ships

had stalked Atlantic waters, raided Spanish colonies, and attacked

Spanish ships. These fleets, carrying French mariners called cor-

sairs, often were controlled by French nobles and merchants. And

often the French monarch granted the ships’ captains letters of

marque, which allowed the corsairs to engage in privateering that

would otherwise be called piracy.

The French corsairs’ raiding and trading in the Americas ig-

nited diplomatic flare-ups with Spain and eventually a war. The

two kingdoms reached an uneasy truce in 1559, when they signed

the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Although this treaty generally

permitted merchants from France to conduct business in Spain’s

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 4 of 42

4 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

colonial territories, negotiations stalled over France’s rights, if any,

to lands in the New World.

As France addressed its geopolitical crisis abroad, it also

faced a religious crisis at home. By the 1550s, the Protestant Refor-

mation had attracted converts, eventually known as Huguenots,

within the kingdom’s borders. This religious schism threatened

French national identity, destabilized the kingdom, and led to out-

breaks of religious violence. But by 1561, despite religious persecu-

tion, approximately 10 percent of the French population had con-

verted to Protestantism.

This geopolitical and domestic unrest set the stage for

France’s three ill-fated attempts to establish a colony in Florida.

The efforts were led by Gaspard de Coligny, Lord of Châtillon and

Grand Admiral of France. King Henri II appointed Coligny Admi-

ral of France in 1552. Coligny retained his position as Admiral even

after he became a Huguenot. In this role, Coligny oversaw defense

of the French coastline. He directed French missions to the Amer-

icas. He negotiated with Spain. And he used his position to advo-

cate for religious tolerance.

In 1562, Coligny appointed Jean Ribault, another Huguenot,

to lead the first French naval expedition to Florida. Ribault was

more than qualified to take command. A storied seafarer, he had

commanded French vessels in battles against the Spanish, English,

and Flemish for years.

Under Ribault’s command, two ships sailed from France on

February 18, 1562, and made landfall in Florida two months later.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 5 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 5

Once ashore, the ships’ crews erected a “piller or colume of hard

stone, our kinges armes graven therin,” near the mouth of the

River May (known today as the St. Johns River). From there, the

ships sailed north until they reached Parris Island, off the coast of

present-day Georgia. Ribault ordered part of the crew to disem-

bark, stay behind, and build a settlement, named Charlesfort. Rib-

ault departed Charlesfort in June 1562 after promising to return the

next year with supplies and reinforcements.

Ribault returned to a France at war with itself. In March

1562, only a month after he set sail for Florida, a massacre of Hu-

guenots sparked the beginning of the first War of Religion. Ribault

joined a Huguenot rebellion against the crown. When that rebel-

lion failed, and its leadership surrendered to royalist forces, Ribault

fled to England, where he was imprisoned in the Tower of London

as a suspected spy. Meanwhile, the settlers of Charlesfort, starved

without reinforcements, abandoned the French outpost and set sail

for Europe.

With Ribault confined in the Tower of London, Coligny

needed a new leader for his second mission to Florida. He recom-

mended René Goulaine de Laudonnière, a Huguenot and Ribault’s

second-in-command during the 1562 mission, to King Charles IX.

After King Charles IX approved the commission and furnished

ships and supplies for the voyage, Laudonnière set sail for the New

World on April 22, 1564, taking with him soldiers, sailors, and Hu-

guenot settlers. The fleet landed at the St. Johns River on June 22,

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 6 of 42

6 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

1564, and established a new settlement, called Fort Caroline, up-

river.

The third and final French foray to Florida took place in

1565. Ribault, released from English custody, resumed service in

the French naval forces. And Admiral Coligny again commissioned

Ribault to command a fleet headed to Florida—this time, to resup-

ply and reinforce Fort Caroline. As with the 1564 expedition, King

Charles IX approved of and supported the mission. He summoned

Ribault to “the court” and “honor[ed] him with the title of . . . lieu-

tenant and leader of the troops which he had been commanded to

raise.” Mindful of the fragile peace with Spain, King Charles IX also

“forbade [Ribault] from making a landfall in any other country or

island, especially those which were under the dominion of the King

of Spain.”

By then, Spain had caught wind of France’s encroachment

in Florida. In 1564, King Philip II ordered his forces in Havana to

investigate and eradicate any French presence. But when the first

Spanish expedition stumbled upon Charlesfort, the French settlers

were gone.

King Philip II’s second attempt to wrest Florida away from

the French took on greater urgency when he learned about Fort

Caroline and Ribault’s upcoming 1565 expedition. On March 20,

1565, he gave Pedro Menéndez de Avilés—an experienced Captain

General who had long commanded ships in Spain’s treasure

fleets—a royal appointment to settle and govern Florida. Days

later, Spain learned of France’s second settlement, Fort Caroline.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 7 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 7

A Spanish spy at the French port of Dieppe sent news of Rib-

ault’s new fleet. The spy’s report described “[seven] ships,” “very

well armed with artillery, people and munitions,” including “[f]ive

hundred soldiers.” And he added that “the King of France released

from his Rouen profits 100 thousand francs for this enterprise.” In

the light of this fresh intelligence, Spain bolstered Menéndez’s

forces, expanding the fleet to over 10 ships and 995 soldiers and

sailors.

While Menéndez outfitted his armada, the French ambassa-

dor in Spain sent back news of Spain’s planned attack on Fort Car-

oline. This intelligence changed the nature of Ribault’s voyage

from relief mission to military venture. As of April 1565, Ribault

had focused his efforts on recruiting more Huguenot settlers and

garnering supplies. But after word of Menéndez’s armada reached

the French on April 3, Ribault and Coligny expanded the scope of

the expedition. Seven ships, instead of the planned five, prepared

to go to Florida. Each ship was a heavily armed “galleass[],” and

four weighed over 100 tons. At least 500 soldiers joined the civilian

settlers, with the final headcount for the expedition numbering be-

tween 700 and 1000.

French Registers of Artillery for May 1565 confirm that the

“treasurer and guard of artillery and munitions of the Navy in Nor-

mandy” issued arms and equipment to “Ribault[,] ordinary captain

of the Navy [and] chief and conductor of the ships and people of

war that the King sends presently to the country of New France.”

Elsewhere, the armament records referred to la Trinité and another

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 8 of 42

8 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

ship, l’Émérillon, as “belonging to the King.” Both were armed with

“artillery, both of bronze and wrought iron, powder, cannonballs,

[and] artifices of war.”

With both the Spanish and French fleets stocked and armed,

the race to Florida began. On May 22, 1565, Ribault set sail on la

Trinité, the flagship leading the seven French ships. Over a month

later, on June 29, 1565, Menéndez followed Ribault to Florida on

San Pelayo, one of Spain’s largest warships.

Both fleets reached Florida on the same day. On August 28,

1565, Ribault’s fleet made landfall south of Fort Caroline, and Men-

éndez grounded his armada near present-day Cape Canaveral. Rib-

ault sent the three smaller ships upriver to Fort Caroline while the

four larger ships—too large to sail over the sandbar—anchored off-

shore of the mouth of the St. Johns River. In the meantime, Men-

éndez sailed north in search of Ribault’s fleet.

On September 4, 1565, the Spanish fleet spotted the four an-

chored French ships. Menéndez drew close to the ships under the

cover of night, with plans to attack in the morning. But before

dawn came, the fleets’ crews traded escalating threats. Menéndez

warned that he “had come to this coast to burn and hang the

French Lutherans whom [he] should find . . . in the morning [when

he] should board their vessels.” The Frenchmen urged him to

“come on and not wait till morning.” But before Menéndez could

order an attack, Ribault’s ships “cut their cables, and hoisted their

sails, and all four of them took to flight.” Menéndez gave chase but

could not make ground on Ribault’s ships.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 9 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 9

Outpaced, Menéndez retreated and sailed south. He made

landfall at a natural harbor, which he named St. Augustine and

claimed in the name of King Philip II. From there, Menéndez began

disembarking soldiers and armaments in preparation for a land in-

vasion of Fort Caroline.

One of Ribault’s ships tailed Menéndez to the newly chris-

tened St. Augustine. Reports that the Spanish fleet had anchored

and set up base reached Ribault soon after. He decided to attack,

and on September 8, 1565, his largest ships, reinforced with soldiers

from Fort Caroline, sailed south.

Ribault descended on the Spanish fleet on September 10,

1565. But Menéndez’s ships, protected by landed cannons, took

shelter in the harbor before Ribault could overtake them. While

Ribault’s fleet lay in wait, a “hurricane and terrible storm came

upon them.” The French ships, caught in the hurricane, were

driven south and sank off the coast of Cape Canaveral.

A few days later Menéndez—now sure that Ribault’s fleet

posed no further threat—marched Spanish troops northward. In

quick succession, his forces stormed the depleted Fort Caroline,

captured it, and then used the Fort’s own cannons to sink one of

the small French ships that remained. Captain Laudonnière, who

had remained behind to defend Fort Caroline, fled on the two re-

maining ships and sailed back to Europe.

As for Ribault, he did not go down with la Trinité. Instead,

he swam ashore, along with many of the soldiers who sailed to at-

tack the Spanish fleet. It took Menéndez only about a month to

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 10 of 42

10 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

track down the French survivors. He beheaded almost all of them,

including Ribault.

B. In 2016, Global Marine Discovers the Remains of la Trinité.

La Trinité rested undisturbed in its watery grave for more

than four centuries. Then, in 2015, Global Marine applied for and

received an exploration permit from the Florida Department of

State, Division of Historical Resources. The permit gave Global

Marine permission to explore a three-square-mile area offshore of

Cape Canaveral. Under the permit’s terms, Global Marine could

“delineate the extent of historic shipwreck site(s)” and “[e]valuate

the potential characteristics and significance of any historic ship-

wreck site in consultation with the Division.”

The permit conditioned Global Marine’s exploration activi-

ties on the submission of daily field notes and logs, interim reports,

and final reports. Detailed regulations, promulgated by the Divi-

sion of Historical Resources, provided the specifics of those report-

ing requirements. For example, one regulation required Global Ma-

rine to submit “Survey Log Sheets” with “topographic quadrangle

map[s],” “site locations,” and photos to the Division. FLA. ADMIN.

CODE ANN. r. 1A-46.001 (2025). Another permit condition required

Global Marine to “immediately contact” the Division upon the dis-

covery of “a historic or prehistoric archaeological site” so that the

Division could help “coordinat[e] submission of new or revised

Florida Master Site File site forms.”

After more than a year of searching, Global Marine identi-

fied five shipwrecks at six sites off the coast of Cape Canaveral.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 11 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 11

Eager to cash in on the find, Global Marine’s CEO and president,

Robert Pritchett, first contacted France about the discoveries. In a

May 30, 2016, email to the French Embassy in Washington, D.C.,

Pritchett stated, “I am working with the State of Florida in the Area

of Cape Canaveral and we may have found French shipwreck re-

lated items from the 16-17th century.” He also included a list of

questions about “the Trinity,” its cannons, anchors, coat of arms,

and Ribault’s fleet. And he offered to enter “an agreement” with

France to “bring up” the discovered “items/artifacts.”

Under the permit’s requirements, Pritchett next submitted a

“Notification of Find Report” to the Division on June 3, 2016. The

report described the discovery of a cannon (marked with the

French fleur de lis) and a stone monument (likely the one Ribault

erected near St. Johns Bluff during his first voyage to the new

world) at what it called Site #2. Weeks later, on June 30, 2016,

Global Marine sent the Division its “Final Dig & Identify Report

and Request for Rescue Recovery Permit.” The report contained

additional photos of bronze cannons on the ocean floor and the

marble monument. The report also acknowledged “strong indica-

tions” that the artifacts belonged to la Trinité, and that “France,

Spain, England and other countries must be contacted.”

Instead of responding to Pritchett’s outreach, France issued

a diplomatic note to the United States Department of State about

la Trinité in July 2016. The note made clear that France would not

enter a relationship with Global Marine. France stressed that “as

part of a royal fleet of Charles IX, the sunken ship and all its

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 12 of 42

12 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

contents are under the ownership of the French Republic.” This

position, the note explained, was consistent with France’s formal

notice, published in the Federal Register, that “every State craft

(e.g. warship, naval auxiliary and other vessel . . . owned or oper-

ated by a state) enjoys sovereign immunities, regardless of its loca-

tion and the period elapsed since it was reduced to wreckage.”

France categorically “oppose[d] any commercial exploration on the

vessel discovered by Global [Marine].”

Pritchett followed up with the Division about his Final Re-

port in mid-July 2016. A Division employee responded that Pritch-

ett’s final report was incomplete. Missing from its pages was

“[l]ocation information,” including the “coordinates of the archeo-

logical material,” “[b]oundaries for potential sites, and coordinates

of site components.” Not only were these details “critical” for the

Division’s “potential assessment of the site,” but they were “also

necessary to advance the discussion with the appropriate French

authorities.” Pritchett explained that Global Marine did not include

“specific coordinates in the reports due to the fact it would become

public information.” But in the end, he acquiesced and promised to

send “the GPS coordinates.” The Division employee, in turn, ex-

plained that the Division had “an exemption under Florida’s public

records law and [was] not required to divulge site location infor-

mation as part of public records requests.”

Pritchett followed up with France on July 21, 2016. He asked

whether France’s diplomatic note represented the “position of

France on [the] issue.” He also emphasized that he “never said” that

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 13 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 13

the shipwreck “was [F]rench”; instead he had asked to “make a[n]

arrang[e]ment in the State of Florida” or otherwise “IF it turn[ed]

out to be a Military French ship.” An attaché at the French embassy

in Washington, D.C., replied that France would permit “no com-

mercial exploitation whatsoever.” Pritchett responded that he “re-

spect[ed] France’s wish[es].”

C. Global Marine Brings an In Rem Salvage Claim

Against la Trinité.

Despite Pritchett’s assurance, Global Marine filed suit in rem

against the sunken ship in the Middle District of Florida in October

2016. See Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & (for

Finders-Right Purposes) Abandoned Sailing Vessel (Global Marine I), 348

F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2018). It now disputed whether

the ship was, in fact, la Trinité. Id. at 1223–24, 1228. Global Marine

brought a claim under the law of finds and sought a salvage award.

Id. at 1224. It also asked for declaratory judgment that “no govern-

ment ha[d] the authority to interfere with” its “exploration and re-

covery” of the vessel and for a preliminary injunction that prohib-

ited “rival salvors” from accessing the site. Id.

The Middle District issued a warrant of arrest in rem for the

vessel. Id. To execute the warrant, United States Marshals seized

several artifacts—including “3 cannon balls, 3 ballast stones, [and]

one pick head”—that Global Marine had recovered from the site of

la Trinité. Id. The Marshals then surrendered those artifacts back to

Global Marine, which the Middle District appointed as custodian

of the vessel. Id.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 14 of 42

14 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

France then appeared in the suit, contested Global Marine’s

claim, and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. The res in

question, France asserted, was a ship from “the French Royal Fleet

of 1565 commanded by Jean Ribault and sunk by a hurricane in the

vicinity of what is now Cape Canaveral, Florida.” Id. And the Mid-

dle District, France argued, lacked “subject matter jurisdiction be-

cause the res [was] the French Royal Vessel la Trinité and ha[d] im-

munity” from Global Marine’s claims. Id. at 1225.

In the meantime, Florida learned about Global Marine’s re-

moval of artifacts from la Trinité. It determined that the artifacts

“were illegally recovered in violation of ” Global Marine’s permit

and Florida regulations. Not only had Global Marine used “meth-

ods beyond the scope of the permit” to recover artifacts not “au-

thorized for recovery by the permit,” but it had also failed to notify

the “Project Archaeologist prior to recovery.”

Florida responded to Global Marine’s artifact recovery with

legal and administrative action. On the legal side, the Middle Dis-

trict granted Florida’s request to take over as custodian of the ship

in the in rem action. Id. at 1224–25. On the administrative side, Flor-

ida “suspend[ed]” Global Marine’s exploration permit. Then, after

Global Marine failed to “return the artifacts,” Florida notified

Global Marine that it “intend[ed] to revoke” its permit. Later, Flor-

ida denied Global Marine’s “application for recovery of materials

in the permit area” because the company failed to comply with the

terms of its previous permit.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 15 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 15

The Middle District—after much jurisdictional discovery—

granted France’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1226. It explained that

“[a]lthough federal courts have the exclusive power to adjudicate

in rem suits against a vessel, that power is dependent on the court’s

jurisdiction over the res.” Id. at 1227. “If the res at issue is the prop-

erty of a foreign state,” the court continued, “the federal courts

only have jurisdiction to arrest the res if authorized by the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act.” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Under that Act, France and its

property “[were] presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of

the United States courts; unless a specified statutory exception ap-

plie[d].” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Global Marine did “not assert that any exception

to the [Act] appl[ied].” Id. at 1228. So the “lone issue to be decided

. . . [was] a question of fact: Is the res la Trinité?” Id.

After an exhaustive historical and geographic survey, the

Middle District ruled that France “establish[ed] by a preponderance

of the evidence that the res is la Trinité.” Id. at 1242. It explained

that Global Marine “ha[d] not come forward with sufficient evi-

dence to undermine [that] conclusion.” Id. Instead, Global Marine

relied on “speculation” that “[m]aybe some unnamed non-French

ship somehow gained control of cannons like those on la Trinité

and a territorial monument like that on la Trinité and then hap-

pened to sink in the exact place that la Trinité is known to have

sunk—all without leaving any documentary evidence.” Id. Those

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 16 of 42

16 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

arguments, the Middle District concluded, were “not persuasive.”

Id. Global Marine did not appeal this ruling.

With the identity of the vessel settled, France and Florida

announced a joint venture to protect and recover la Trinité. This

venture included the “recovery of the shipwreck” la Trinité and

“the other shipwrecks” from Ribault’s fleet.

D. Global Marine Brings an In Personam Suit Against France.

Global Marine then filed this in personam action in the district

court against France in April 2020. This suit no longer asserted any

claims to the ship itself. Instead, Global Marine sued France for

damages related to its efforts and the benefits those efforts con-

ferred on France.

The operative complaint alleged four claims. First, it sought

a “salvage and/or maritime lien” award “under federal admiralty

law” to compensate Global Marine for “services in the discovery,

location, identification, or mapping of the shipwreck sites being re-

covered by France.” Second, it alleged a “quasi contract/unjust en-

richment” claim to recover the value of “services benefitting

France.” Third, it alleged a claim for “misappropriation of trade se-

cret information”—the secrets being “coordinate location data” for

the shipwrecks. And fourth, it alleged tortious interference with

Global Marine’s relationship with the Florida Department of State.

France again moved to dismiss. It asserted that the district

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sover-

eign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, and that the commercial-

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 17 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 17

activity exception was inapplicable to its recovery of la Trinité. The

district court agreed with France and dismissed the action.

We reversed. Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. Republic of France, 33

F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022). We held that the commercial-ac-

tivity exception to sovereign immunity applied. Id. The “grava-

men” or “core” of Global Marine’s claims against France, we ex-

plained, was “France’s failure to compensate” Global Marine for

“the value of [its] salvaging services.” Id. at 1324–25.

On remand, France moved for summary judgment. It ar-

gued that the Sunken Military Craft Act barred the complaint for a

salvage award. See Pub. L. No. 108-375, §§ 1401–08, 118 Stat. 1811,

2094–98 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note). That Act provides

that “[n]o salvage rights or awards shall be granted with respect to

. . . any foreign sunken military craft located in United States wa-

ters without the express permission of the relevant foreign state.”

Id. § 1406(d)(2). And it defines “sunken military craft” to mean “all

or any portion of . . . any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or other

vessel that was owned or operated by a government on military

noncommercial service when it sank.” Id. § 1408(3)(A). France con-

tended that the categorical bar on salvage awards applied to Global

Marine’s in personam claim.

Global Marine’s response on salvage was twofold. First, it

argued that the Sunken Military Craft Act barred only in rem sal-

vage claims, not in personam salvage claims. Second, it asserted that

la Trinité was not a “sunken military craft” under the Act because

it was not “on military noncommercial service when it sank.”

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 18 of 42

18 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

In support of its arguments, Global Marine cited the reports

of two experts: Dr. Lubos Kordac and Dr. Robert H. Baer. Dr. Kor-

dac, in his one-page report, argued that la Trinité “was not any mil-

itary ship.” Instead, la Trinité “was a cargo ship, bringing supplies,

civilians and money to the new French colony.” He cited no sources

to back up his assertion. Dr. Baer, who also submitted a one-page

statement, also argued that the “assertion that the Huguenot sup-

ply vessel, the ‘Triniti’ was a military vessel on a military mission is

erroneous.” Instead, “the ‘Triniti’ was a civilian (Huguenot) resup-

ply vessel dispatched to the Fort Caroline Huguenot outpost.”

Baer, unlike Kordac, included two pages that listed and briefly ex-

cerpted a few sources.

France replied to Global Marine with its own experts. The

report of Dr. Frank Lestringant described Ribault’s expeditions to

Florida from the French perspective. His report explained the geo-

political and religious context that led to the voyages. It also de-

tailed the military nature of the 1565 mission, describing Ribault’s

fleets as composed of “warships.” Lestringant backed up his report

with citations to nearly 250 pages of primary and secondary

sources. The report of Dr. James P. Delgado did the same but from

the Spanish perspective. He described the military confrontation

between Spain and France in a long report supported by hundreds

of pages of source material.

Global Marine, perhaps recognizing the gap between its two

experts and those proffered by France, asked to submit two more

expert reports and a surreply. Its first additional expert,

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 19 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 19

Emmanuelle Lize, submitted an eight-page report intended “to re-

fute the Lestringant Declaration.” To that end, she asserted that

France and Spain were at peace in 1565, so the “mission of Ribault’s

fleet cannot be military because it would have been a violation of

the Treaty [of Cateau-Cambrésis].” She asserted that “Coligny was

not following the King’s orders when he sailed La Trinité and had

his own private agenda to establish a Protestant settlement.” She

also argued that Coligny had “close ties with privateers” and was

the “main organiser of the privateering war” against Spain. Finally,

she concluded that “Ribault’s 1565 fleet was permitted by the King

of France to transport Protestant dissenters to Fort Caroline and

any activities of war or battle were beyond the scope of authority

and were not official state actions.” The body of her report con-

tained no citations to primary or secondary sources. Instead, Lize

attached 200 pages of documents, almost entirely in untranslated

French.

Global Marine’s final expert, James J. Sinclair, also responded

to Dr. Lestringant’s declaration and disputed its conclusions. Sin-

clair reviewed “the same source materials” cited by Dr. Lestringant

but argued that “La Trinité was [on] a state-sanctioned voyage [that]

permitted only the transport of families, farmers, and food to Fort

Caroline.” “La Trinité was not,” he asserted, “on military noncom-

mercial service when it sank—it sank in a hurricane, not because

of a military attack or engagement.” He also stated that “any mili-

tary activity exceeded and countermanded the crown’s directive to

maintain peace and required [the] fleet [to] steer clear of Spain.”

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 20 of 42

20 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

The district court granted summary judgment for France. It

ruled that the bar on salvage awards, under the Sunken Military

Craft Act, covered both in rem and in personam actions. It also ruled

that France met its “initial summary-judgment burden” to establish

that la Trinité was a “sunken military craft.” Global Marine, it con-

cluded, “point[ed] to no evidence contradicting the contention that

la Trinité sank while on a mission to attack the Spanish fleet.” So

Global Marine failed to create a genuine dispute of fact about

whether the ship was on “military noncommercial . . . service

when it sank.” See § 1408(3)(A), 118 Stat. at 2098. For the “quasi

contract/unjust enrichment claim,” the district court ruled that

Global Marine “pointed to no evidence that France knowingly ac-

cepted any benefit” from Global Marine. For the “misappropria-

tion of trade secrets claim,” it ruled that Global Marine “fail[ed] to

show that the GPS coordinate information qualifie[d] as a trade se-

cret because there is no evidence that [Global Marine] took reason-

able efforts to protect the information.” And for the “interference”

claim, it ruled that the “privilege of interference” protected

France’s actions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a summary judgment de novo. Bearden v. E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 945 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2019). We draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of Global Marine and view the

evidence in the light most favorable to it. CSX Corp. v. United States,

18 F.4th 672, 678 (11th Cir. 2021).

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 21 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 21

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we address

Global Marine’s salvage claim, and we reject the argument that the

bar on salvage awards, under the Sunken Military Craft Act, ex-

tends only to in rem actions. And we explain that the bar applies to

this suit because the undisputed record establishes that la Trinité

was on military noncommercial service when it sank. Second, we

explain that the record presents no genuine issues of fact about the

claims for unjust enrichment, trade-secret misappropriation, and

tortious interference.

A. The Sunken Military Craft Act Bars Global Marine’s

In Personam Salvage Claim.

In 2004, Congress enacted the Sunken Military Craft Act.

§§ 1401–08, 118 Stat. at 2094–98. The Act prohibits “any activity di-

rected at a sunken military craft that disturbs, removes, or injures

[it]” unless the activity is authorized by a permit or some other law.

Id. § 1402. It also forecloses traditional maritime-law claims of sal-

vage for sunken military craft. Id. § 1406(d) (“No salvage rights or

awards shall be granted with respect to . . . any United States

sunken military craft” or “any foreign sunken military craft located

in United States waters without the express permission of the rele-

vant . . . state.”). And it defines “sunken military craft” as “any

sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or other vessel that was owned or

operated by a government on military noncommercial service

when it sank.” Id. § 1408(3)(A).

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 22 of 42

22 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

Global Marine contends that the Sunken Military Craft Act

allows its in personam salvage claim against France for two reasons.

First, it argues that the Act “preserves salvors’ in personam claims

because such claims are ‘not directed at a sunken military craft,’ but

at the owner of the craft itself.” Second, it argues that “La Trinité is

not a ‘sunken military craft’’’ under the Act. We reject both argu-

ments.

1. The Sunken Military Craft Act Bars Salvage Awards

for Both In Rem and In Personam Actions.

Global Marine argues that the Act’s bar on salvage claims

does not apply to in personam actions. We disagree. The plain lan-

guage of the Act, considered in the context of traditional principles

of admiralty, belies Global Marine’s interpretation.

Traditionally, a salvor invoking admiralty jurisdiction could

bring an in rem or an in personam action to recover a salvage award.

See 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW

§ 16.1 (6th ed. 2024) (“Under settled principles of admiralty juris-

diction, the federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction

in cases involving marine salvage. The salvage act gives rise to a

right to a reward, and a maritime lien is created in the salved prop-

erty. Accordingly, the courts may exercise jurisdiction both in perso-

nam and in rem under appropriate circumstances.” (footnotes omit-

ted)). The Supreme Court recognized this principle as early as 1880,

when it explained that “[s]uits for salvage may be in rem against the

property saved or the proceeds thereof, or in personam against the

party at whose request and for whose benefit the salvage service

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 23 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 23

was performed.” The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 386 (1880). Venerable ad-

miralty treatises echo that although “[g]enerally, a suit for a salvage

award is one brought in rem,” “[t]he salvor also has his remedy in

personam against the owners of the salved property.” E.g., 3A

BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 288 (2025). And our predecessor circuit

likewise affirmed that a federal court exercising its admiralty juris-

diction could grant salvage rights or awards in rem or in personam.

Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing

Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981).

The Sunken Military Craft Act states that “[n]o salvage rights

or awards shall be granted with respect to . . . any foreign sunken

military craft located in United States waters without the express

permission of the relevant foreign state.” § 1406(d), 118 Stat. at

2097 (emphasis added). This plain language makes no distinction

between in rem and in personam suits. And its failure to do so makes

sense in the light of settled principles of admiralty regarding the

movement of vessels in maritime commerce. See 1 SCHOENBAUM,

supra, § 9:1 (discussing the relationship between in rem and in perso-

nam actions based on maritime liens).

Global Marine’s counterargument invokes the structure of

the Act. It points to section 1402, which generally prohibits “activ-

ity directed at a sunken military craft that disturbs, removes, or in-

jures [it].” 118 Stat. at 2094. And it points to section 1406(a), which

makes clear that nothing in the Act “is intended to affect” either

“any activity that is not directed at a sunken military craft” or “the

traditional high seas freedoms of navigation” like “the laying of

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 24 of 42

24 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

submarine cables” or “fishing.” 118 Stat. at 2096. Global Marine ar-

gues that we must read the ban on salvage awards in sec-

tion 1406(d) in the light of sections 1402 and 1406(a), which focus

on activities “directed at” sunken vessels. In personam claims, it pos-

its, are not “directed at” sunken military craft. So section 1406(d)’s

prohibition of salvage claims, it reasons, does not reach in personam

claims.

We reject this strained interpretation. Section 1402(a) bans

activities that could physically disturb a sunken military craft. Pen-

alties in sections 1404 and 1405 provide enforcement mechanisms

for that ban. Section 1406(a) clarifies that the prohibition of sec-

tion 1402 and the associated penalties do not apply if the relevant

physical activity was “not directed” at the craft. It does not refer to

salvage rights or litigation activity. Section 1406(d), by contrast,

stands on its own. It lacks any limiting language—like “directed

at”—that mirrors or references section 1402. Nor does its text hint

at some other clue that suggests that its bar on “salvage rights or

awards” is limited to in rem actions.

An amici curiae brief, submitted by two law professors, ar-

gues that the Sunken Military Craft Act, as construed by the district

court, is “unconstitutional” because it “removes claims under both

the law of salvage and the law of finds from the purview of Arti-

cle III courts.” They urge us to construe the Act to allow for “in

personam [salvage] remedies” to avoid these constitutional con-

cerns.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 25 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 25

We decline to consider the law professors’ argument. We dis-

cern no ambiguity in section 1406(d), and “our adversarial system

of adjudication” follows “the principle of party presentation.”

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). Under

that principle, we rely on parties to litigation “to frame the issues

for decision” and retain “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the

parties present.” United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872 (11th

Cir. 2022) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Here, no party raised a constitutional objection in the district

court or this Court. And although the amici challenge the constitu-

tionality of the Act, as applied, their non-party brief does not cure

the party-presentation defect. Unless “exceptional circumstances”

are present, “amici curiae may not expand the scope of an appeal

to implicate issues not presented by the parties to the district

court.” Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d 1240, 1247 (11th

Cir. 1991). No exceptional circumstance warrants departure from

that rule here.

2. La Trinité Is a Sunken Military Craft.

Global Marine contends that the Sunken Military Craft Act’s

bar on salvage claims does not apply to la Trinité because the vessel

was not engaged in “military noncommercial service when it

sank.” We disagree. France presented evidence that the vessel was

so engaged, and Global Marine’s experts failed to create a genuine

dispute of fact about the ship’s mission when it sank. The Sunken

Military Craft Act defines “sunken military craft” to mean “any

sunken . . . vessel that was owned or operated by a government on

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 26 of 42

26 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

military noncommercial service when it sank.” § 1408(3)(A), 118

Stat. at 2098. No one disputes that France owned la Trinité. So we

ask only whether la Trinité was “on military noncommercial service

when it sank.”

The undisputed record establishes that la Trinité was “on

military noncommercial service when it sank.” To be sure, Ribault

was tasked with providing relief to Fort Caroline. To that end, he

transported families, civilians, food, goods, livestock, and trades-

men to the settlement. But Ribault was also tasked with defending

Fort Caroline from a potential Spanish attack. To that end, the

French king armed him to the teeth with artillery and gave him

around 500 French soldiers. And if we examine what la Trinité was

doing “when it sank,” the answer is clear. On its way to attack the

Spanish fleet—a mission that can only be described as “military

noncommercial service”—la Trinité sank in a storm. On that basis

alone, the undisputed record supports France’s position.

Global Marine unpersuasively argues that la Trinité was not

engaged in military service because Ribault attacked the Spanish

Fleet in defiance of King Charles IX’s orders. Even if the Act allows

us to consider whether Ribault defied the King’s orders, nothing in

the record supports this argument. The only evidence that even

comes close is the statement of one passenger, cited in the report

by James Sinclair, that King Charles IX “forbade [Ribault] from

making a landfall in any other country or island, especially those

which were under the dominion of the King of Spain.” That state-

ment, at most, confirms that Ribault had no license to attack

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 27 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 27

Spanish colonial lands. But it does nothing to undermine the evi-

dence that Ribault was tasked with defending Fort Caroline from

Spanish attack. And that defense was unquestionably “military

noncommercial service.”

Global Marine next maintains that the ships in Ribault’s fleet

were cargo ships, not military ships. But this argument misses the

point of section 1408(3)(A). What matters is whether la Trinité was

engaged in military noncommercial service when it sank. A cargo

ship qualifies as a “sunken military craft” under the Act so long as

it was “owned or operated by a government on military noncom-

mercial service when it sank.” § 1408(3)(A), 118 Stat. at 2098.

Global Marine’s assertion about Ribault’s fleet, even if true, would

not sway the outcome of this appeal.

B. Global Marine’s Common-Law Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred when it

granted summary judgment to France on its claims for unjust en-

richment, trade-secret misappropriation, and interference. We take

each claim in turn.

1. Global Marine’s Unjust-Enrichment Claim Fails.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred when it

granted summary judgment for France on its unjust-enrichment

claim. It contends that “France took the benefit of [Global Ma-

rine]’s costs and risks with full knowledge that [Global Marine]’s

services produced this benefit.” And it accuses France of respond-

ing with “hauteur but no gratitude” when it accepted the

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 28 of 42

28 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

“windfall” of Global Marine’s work. These arguments fail on the

facts and on the law.

To succeed on an unjust-enrichment claim under Florida

law, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) he “conferred a ben-

efit on the defendant, who has knowledge thereof ”; (2) the “de-

fendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred”; and

(3) “the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the

defendant to retain the benefit without first paying the value

thereof to the plaintiff.” Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 333 So. 3d

1095, 1097 (Fla. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Put another way, “[w]here unjust enrichment is asserted, a

party is liable for services rendered only when he requests the other

party to perform the services or knowingly and voluntarily accepts

their benefits.” Coffee Pot Plaza P’ship v. Arrow Air Conditioning & Re-

frigeration, Inc., 412 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).

The record contains no evidence that France requested

Global Marine’s services or that it knowingly and voluntarily ac-

cepted the benefits of Global Marine’s efforts. Indeed, all signs

from France would lead a reasonable party to conclude the oppo-

site. Since 2004, France had publicly stated that it opposed any “in-

trusive action” directed at any French “warship, naval auxiliary [or]

other vessel” without “the express consent of the French republic.”

69 Fed. Reg. 5647 (Feb. 5, 2004). Then, in 2016, when Global Marine

contacted France about the discovery of la Trinité, France refused

the company’s salvage services. Plus, far from “directly confer[ring]

a benefit to [France],” as Global Marine must show to recover

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 29 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 29

under Florida law, Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812, 818 (Fla. 2017),

Global Marine conducted its exploratory activity in the hopes of

making a profit for itself. When those efforts failed, it brought a

legal action, denied that it had located la Trinité, and even submit-

ted an expert report contending that Global Marine “ha[d] not dis-

covered a primary shipwreck site at all.” Global Marine I, 348 F. Supp.

3d at 1234 n.8. No matter which way we look at it, Global Marine

has failed to create a genuine dispute of fact that would warrant

reversal for this claim.

2. Global Marine’s Trade-Secret-Misappropriation Claim Fails.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred when it

granted summary judgment for France on its misappropriation-of-

trade-secrets claim. This claim proceeds under the Florida Uniform

Trade Secrets Act. Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898

F.3d 1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018). To prove liability under that Act,

Global Marine must prove that “(1) it possessed a ‘trade secret’ and

(2) the secret was misappropriated.” Id. (citation and internal quo-

tation marks omitted). Misappropriation occurs when a trade se-

cret is acquired “by someone who knows or has reason to know

that the secret was improperly obtained or who used improper

means to obtain it.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omit-

ted).

No record evidence proves that France misappropriated the

purported trade secrets—i.e., the “precise locations” of Global Ma-

rine’s “discovered shipwreck sites”—in question. Global Marine’s

exploratory permit required the company to turn over “Survey

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 30 of 42

30 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

Log Sheets” with “topographic quadrangle maps” and “site loca-

tions” to the Florida Department of State. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.

r. 1A-46.001 (2025). Global Marine may believe that the Florida De-

partment of State, through “coercion and deception,” “induced” it

to turn over this location data. But that alleged coercion has noth-

ing to do with France. And Global Marine failed to bring forth any

evidence proving that France knew that the precise location data

“was improperly obtained” or that France itself “used improper

means to obtain it.” Yellowfin Yachts, 898 F.3d at 1297 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

3. Global Marine’s Tortious-Interference Claim Fails.

Global Marine argues that the district court erred when it

granted summary judgment for France on its claim of tortious in-

terference. More specifically, Global Marine contends that France

interfered with Global Marine’s “rights and business relations” with

the Florida Department of State when France joined forces with

the Department to explore and recover la Trinité and “the other

shipwrecks” from Ribault’s fleet. We disagree. Any interference

was justified under Florida law.

To succeed on this claim, Global Marine must prove “(1) the

existence of a business relationship[;] (2) knowledge of the relation-

ship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified

interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage

to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship.” Ethan

Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994)

(alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 31 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 31

omitted). The third element, most important here, requires the

plaintiff to allege “that the defendant acted without justification.”

Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Balt. v. McDill Columbus Corp., 543 So. 2d

852, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). A defendant does not act “with-

out justification,” id., if he has “the privilege of interference.”

Wackenhut Corp. v. Maimone, 389 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1980).

Florida law provides a “protection privilege” against liability

for tortious interference when a defendant “interfere[s] to protect

[its] own financial and contractual interests.” Weisman v. S. Wine &

Spirits of Am., Inc., 297 So. 3d 646, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)

(citing Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So.

2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). “To defend using this privilege

requires only that the defendant show improper means were not

employed.” Id. “The burden to defeat the privilege then shifts to

the party that brought the tortious interference claim to show im-

proper means were employed.” Id. Under the protection privilege,

a defendant cannot be liable for tortious interference for “‘doing no

more than insisting upon existent legal rights in a permissive way.’”

Id. (alteration adopted) (quoting Horizons Rehab., Inc. v. Health Care

& Ret. Corp., 810 So. 2d 958, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). The

“controlling principle is that so long as improper means are not em-

ployed, activities taken to safeguard or promote one’s own financial

[and contractual interests] are entirely non-actionable.” Sec. Title

Guarantee Corp. of Balt., 543 So. 2d at 855 (citation and internal quo-

tation marks omitted).

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 32 of 42

32 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

France’s interference related to la Trinité was justified under

the protection privilege because France did nothing more than pro-

tect its economic and financial interests in a permissive way. See

Weisman, 297 So. 3d at 651. France established a relationship with

the Florida Department of State and interfered (in the legal sense)

in Global Marine’s in rem action to protect its ownership of and

sovereign interest in la Trinité. No evidence suggests that France

protected its interests using improper means.

In response, Global Marine asks us to infer that France acted

with a “malicious motive” because France and Florida’s declaration

of joint venture referred not only to la Trinité but also to other

“sites within the state permit area previously awarded to” Global

Marine. But the question under the protection privilege is whether

France protected its rights without resorting to “improper means,”

Weisman, 297 So. 3d at 651, not whether France acted with a mali-

cious motive. “[I]t is irrelevant whether the person who takes au-

thorized steps to protect his own [economic] interests does so while

also harboring some personal malice or ill-will towards the plain-

tiff.” Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1980) (citing Chipley v. Atkinson, 1 So. 934, 938 (Fla. 1887)).

The declaration of joint venture does not suggest that

France acted improperly. The declaration outlines France’s and

Florida’s intent to “[p]rotect the archeological site off the coast of

Cape Canaveral, State of Florida, where the shipwreck of the

Trinité and of other vessels from its fleet are located.” It also de-

scribes efforts to study and preserve the “vestiges of the Trinité,

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 33 of 42

24-10148 Opinion of the Court 33

which will include in particular the study and recovery of the ship-

wreck of the Trinité and of the other shipwrecks from its fleet and

the related activities aiming to identify, preserve and commemo-

rate this heritage.” The declaration establishes that France and

Florida plan to search for other ships from Ribault’s fleet, but it

makes no mention of the five additional sites identified in Global

Marine’s reports.

This omission makes sense. As Global Marine points out,

there is little evidence that the five other sites contained shipwrecks

of the French fleet. At a hearing, France’s legal representative

agreed with Global Marine on that point. He stated, the “record . . .

show[s] that la Trinité is the only one of the Ribault fleet ships that

was driven that far south. The others are somewhere to the north

remaining to be found.” He also clarified that France did not “make

any claim as to those other[]” five sites.

France’s lawful financial and contractual interests in recover-

ing the other ships in Ribault’s fleet are the same as its interests in

recovering la Trinité. No evidence proves that France, in pursuit of

these lawful interests, interfered with the five other sites identified

by Global Marine in its reports. Global Marine’s drive-by request

for an inference of “malicious motive” in its favor does not create a

genuine dispute of material fact.

Moreover, though Global Marine faults France for the de-

mise of its “business relations” with Florida, the record establishes

that Global Marine’s own conduct caused the fallout. “Imbedded

within” the elements of tortious interference “is the requirement

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 34 of 42

34 Opinion of the Court 24-10148

that the plaintiff establish that the defendant’s conduct caused or

induced the breach that resulted in the plaintiff’s damages.” Chi. Ti-

tle Ins. v. Alday–Donalson Title Co. of Fla., 832 So. 2d 810, 814 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2002). When Global Marine filed its in rem suit, it

presented to the district court “3 cannon balls, 3 ballast stones,

[and] one pick head” recovered from the site of la Trinité. Florida

determined that those artifacts “were illegally recovered in viola-

tion of ” Global Marine’s permit. Florida then suspended the permit

and later revoked it because Global Marine failed to “return the ar-

tifacts.” Missing from this chain of causation is any evidence point-

ing to French interference. Instead, Global Marine’s actions caused

Florida to revoke its permit and deny its “application for recovery

of materials in the permit area.”

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of France.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 35 of 42

24-10148 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 1

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, concurring:

I write separately to offer a comment about the initial and

reply briefs filed by the amici curiae, Associate Professor of Law An-

nie Brett and Staff Attorney and Fellow Ryan L. Scott of the Uni-

versity of Florida, regarding the Sunken Military Craft Act. See Pub.

L. No. 108-375, §§ 1401–08, 118 Stat. 1811, 2094–98 (2004) (codified

at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note). The amici contend that the Act, as we and

the district court have interpreted its plain text, is “likely unconsti-

tutional as an impermissible repudiation of the federal courts[’] ad-

miralty and maritime jurisdiction.” See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Alt-

hough the panel properly declines to address this argument be-

cause no party raised it either in the district court or on appeal, our

silence should not be understood as implying that it has potential

merit. The argument is, at best, dubious.

The amici maintain that the Act, as we have construed it, un-

constitutionally “removes claims under both the law of salvage and

the law of finds” from admiralty jurisdiction. They contend that

because those claims have historically been allowed “against both

sunken and floating military craft,” Congress cannot remove any in

personam claims for salvage from admiralty jurisdiction. And in sup-

port of that novel argument, they rely on the following often re-

peated but obscure passage from Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson:

“[T]here are boundaries to the maritime law and admiralty juris-

diction which inhere in those subjects and cannot be altered by leg-

islation, as by excluding a thing falling clearly within them or in-

cluding a thing falling clearly without.” 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924).

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 36 of 42

2 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 24-10148

Their argument, if meritorious, would also cast doubt on

the constitutionality of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43

U.S.C. §§ 2101–06, which likewise provides that the laws of salvage

and finds “shall not apply to abandoned shipwrecks” in United

States waters, id. §§ 2105(a), 2106(a). The issue is important: “An

estimated fifty thousand shipwrecks lie in the territorial waters of

the United States.” Russell G. Murphy, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act

of 1987 in the New Millennium: Incentives to High Tech Piracy?, 8

OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 167, 167 (2002).

Respectfully, the amici misunderstand the breadth of con-

gressional power to “alter, qualify or supplement” maritime law

and jurisdiction. Panama R.R. Co., 264 U.S. at 386. As the Supreme

Court also stated in Panama Railroad, “[T]here is no room to doubt

that the power of Congress extends to the entire subject and per-

mits of the exercise of a wide discretion.” Id. Indeed, several years

earlier, the Court declared “as settled doctrine” that “Congress has

paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which

shall prevail throughout the country.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.

205, 215 (1917). And as for the broad grant of admiralty jurisdiction

to the federal courts, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, the Court later ex-

plained, “There is nothing in that grant of jurisdiction—which sanc-

tioned our adoption of the system of maritime law—to preclude

Congress from modifying or supplementing the rules of that law

as experience or changing conditions may require.” O’Donnell v.

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40–41 (1943) (emphasis

added). Indeed, Supreme Court precedents on this point lead the

authors of one respected treatise “irresistibly” to conclude “that,

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 37 of 42

24-10148 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 3

while limitations do exist in theory, it is difficult to envisage circum-

stances which would call for any maritime legislation undertaken

by the Congress, conforming to adequate standards of harmony of

a national system, to be struck down by the courts.” 1 BENEDICT

ON ADMIRALTY § 110 (2025). Of course, Congress too enjoys ple-

nary power to define the jurisdiction of the inferior courts that it

creates. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187

(1943) (“The Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior

courts includes the power . . . ‘of withholding jurisdiction from

them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may

seem proper for the public good.’” (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.

(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234

(1922) (declaring that jurisdiction “conferred may, at the will of

Congress, be taken away in whole or in part”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.

(8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (stating that “Congress may withhold

from any court of its creation jurisdiction” over any cases or con-

troversies).

To be sure, some scholars debate whether the general mari-

time law should preempt state law after the demise of “federal gen-

eral common law” in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78

(1938) (“There is no federal general common law.”). Compare Ern-

est A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 275, 277

(1999) (proposing that after Erie “there should be no special

preemption doctrine in admiralty”), and Bradford R. Clark, Federal

Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245,

1332–60 (1996) (critiquing the preemptive nature of general mari-

time law for private claims), with Robert Force, An Essay on Federal

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 38 of 42

4 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 24-10148

Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367, 1367–68, 1377–

82 (1999) (defending the doctrine of general maritime law preempt-

ing state law). The critics of treating general maritime law as fed-

eral law contend that “preemption is extremely difficult to justify

in the absence of legislative action.” Young, supra, at 277. But see

Force, supra, at 1380 (“If the Supreme Court applied the Erie ra-

tionale to the general maritime law tomorrow, assuredly there

would be chaos.”). Yet both critics and defenders alike acknowledge

the constitutionality and supremacy of federal maritime legisla-

tion. See, e.g., Clark, supra, at 1259 (arguing that “the Court must

point to some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional pro-

vision, as authority for the creation of substantive federal law”);

Force, supra, at 1377 (“When Congress enacts maritime legislation

under the Commerce Clause or some other express power, there is

no question that conflicting state law must yield to the Supremacy

Clause.”).

The breadth of the discretion of Congress to define the mar-

itime law for sunken military craft must also be understood in the

light of its other enumerated powers. The Constitution grants

Congress several powers to effect the alteration of substantive mar-

itime law made by section 1402(b), 118 Stat. at 2095 (providing that

“[n]o person may possess, disturb, remove, or injure any sunken

military craft,” ancient or modern and domestic or foreign, except

as otherwise permitted), and section 1406(d), 118 Stat. at 2097

(preempting the ordinary laws of salvage and finds for those craft),

of the Act. These powers include the power “[t]o regulate Com-

merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”; “[t]o

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 39 of 42

24-10148 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 5

define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high

Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”; “[t]o declare War,

grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning

Captures on Land and Water”; “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy”;

“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land

and naval Forces”; and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary

and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and

all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of

the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Moreover, the Constitu-

tion grants Congress, among its “other Powers,” id., the authority

“to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-

ing the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,”

id. art. IV, § 3.

Any sunken military craft carries enormous significance to a

nation. See Guidelines for Permitting Archaeological Investigations

and Other Activities Directed at Sunken Military Craft and Terres-

trial Military Craft Under the Jurisdiction of the Department of the

Navy, 80 Fed. Reg. 52588, 52588 (Aug. 31, 2015) (codified at 32

C.F.R. § 767). For the sailors, pilots, or soldiers who drowned, the

craft serves as a graveyard and a memorial to their service. Id. Its

remaining ordnance represents a threat to public safety. Id. Its fuels,

chemicals, or hazardous substances may cause environmental pol-

lution. Id. An ancient craft will likely hold historical and cultural

value for the nation that operated it. Id. And a modern craft may

contain sensitive technologies and military secrets. Id.

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 40 of 42

6 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 24-10148

The federal interests in preempting the general maritime

laws of salvage and finds for sunken military craft and establishing

a modern uniform law on this subject are easy to comprehend.

When Congress enacted, and President George W. Bush signed,

this law as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Author-

ization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811

(2004), it permitted the federal government to protect not only its

sunken military craft but also to promote our foreign relations and

national security by respecting the military craft of other nations.

80 Fed. Reg. at 52589 (“As more than half of [the Navy’s] sunken

military craft rest beyond U.S. waters, the U.S. government has an

interest in reaching understandings or agreements with foreign na-

tions, . . . seeking assurances that U.S. sunken military craft will be

respected and protected[,] and offering foreign nations reciprocal

treatment.”). The Act preserves title to our sunken military craft

regardless of location or age, § 1401, 118 Stat. at 2094, and it pro-

tects any foreign military craft in United States waters from private

disturbance, §§ 1402(a)–(b), 1408(3), 118 Stat. at 2094–95, 2098. It

covers not only naval vessels but also sunken aircraft and spacecraft.

§ 1408(3)(B), 118 Stat. at 2098.

Contrary to the argument of the amici scholars, the Sunken

Military Craft Act does not “remove[]” a maritime subject from its

jurisdiction within the meaning of Panama Railroad. That is, it does

not treat a maritime subject as the province of local law. It instead

supplants general law derived from the ancient law of nations, see,

e.g., 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 293, at 256 (Béla

Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008) (1758)

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 41 of 42

24-10148 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 7

(describing “the right to wrecks” in the law of the sea); see generally

ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS

AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 41–134 (2017) (recounting

the development of the law of state-state relations and the law mar-

itime in relation to the Constitution), and fashions new uniform

rules of maritime law for the changed conditions of our modern

nation.

The Act creates a new regime for the salvage of a sunken

military craft within admiralty jurisdiction. Under sec-

tions 1406(d)(1) and (2), 118 Stat. at 2097, a salvor must have “the

express permission” of the nation that owns the craft to exercise

any rights of salvage or to obtain an award of salvage. Sec-

tions 1404 and 1405, 118 Stat. at 2095–96, give the United States the

authority to enforce the Act through steep civil penalties for viola-

tions and to obtain enforcement costs and damages for any injury.

Section 1404(d), 118 Stat. at 2096, creates in rem liability for any ves-

sel used to violate the Act. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.

443, 446–47 (1994) (“An in rem suit against a vessel is . . . distinctively

an admiralty proceeding, and is hence within the exclusive province

of federal courts.”). And section 1406(f ), 118 Stat. at 2097, excepts

any violator of the Act from the benefit of the Limitation of Lia-

bility Act. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30.

Under the Act, the subject of ownership and recovery of

sunken military craft remains both federal and maritime even as its

substantive rules have been altered. Not surprisingly, when it sued

la Trinité in its in rem action in the Middle District of Florida, Global

USCA11 Case: 24-10148 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/19/2025 Page: 42 of 42

8 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring 24-10148

Marine invoked maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333. See Com-

plaint at 2, Glob. Marine Expl., Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & (for

Finders-Right Purposes) Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 348 F. Supp. 3d 1221

(M.D. Fla. 2018) (No. 6:16-cv-1742-Orl-KRS). And when it sued

France in this in personam action, it alleged that it sought to enforce

a “maritime lien under federal admiralty law.” The jurisdictional

issues that later arose in both cases involved foreign sovereign im-

munity, not any question about admiralty jurisdiction. The subject

of this controversy—a vessel in navigable waters—remains, of

course, the province of maritime law. See generally 1 THOMAS J.

SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW §§ 3.3, 3.6 (6th ed.

2024) (explaining the importance of location and vessel status in

determining jurisdiction); 1 BENEDICT, supra, § 106 (same). But

Congress changed the substantive maritime law of salvage rights

for sunken military craft, and under the Act, Global Marine enjoys

no salvage rights. Congress knew what it was doing when it en-

acted this law. And under the Constitution, we are duty-bound to

respect its judgment on this matter.