Cathy M. Martinez v. Leland Dudek

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

CATHY M., No. CV 25-01822-DFM

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

v.

FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.1

Plaintiff Cathy M. appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying her

application for disability insurance benefits.2 For the reasons set forth below,

the ALJ’s denial of benefits is reversed, and this action is remanded to the

Commissioner for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on October 29, 2021,

1 Frank Bisignano is the Commissioner of Social Security. Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted for Michelle

King as Defendant in this action.

2 The Court partially redacts Plaintiff’s name in compliance with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the

Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial

Conference of the United States.

alleging disability beginning on February 4, 2020. See Dkt. 8, Administrative

Record (“AR”) 242.3 Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on December 29,

2022, see AR 186-90, and upon reconsideration on June 13, 2023, see AR 196-

98. Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) on December 7, 2023. See AR 28-62. The ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision on February 9, 2024. See AR 9-25

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At

step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since February 4, 2020, the alleged onset date. See AR 14. At step two,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:

“degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine status post fusion, degenerative

changes of the right knee, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia.”

Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See

AR 15.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except:

“the claimant can occasionally perform postural activities; the claimant cannot

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; the claimant can occasionally reach overhead

bilaterally; the claimant can perform frequent but not constant handling and

fingering bilaterally; the claimant must avoid unprotected heights.” AR 16. At

step four, based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ found

that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a preschool teacher. See

3 Citations to the AR are to the record pagination. All other docket

citations are to the CM/ECF pagination.

AR 20. Consequently, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. See id.

The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. See AR 1-5.

Plaintiff then sought judicial review. See Dkt. 1.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court will set aside a denial of benefits only if “it is either not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Luther v.

Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Under the

substantial-evidence standard, the district court looks to the existing

administrative record and determines “whether it contains sufficient evidence

to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.

1148, 1154 (2019) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). “Substantial” means “more

than a mere scintilla” but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). This

threshold “is not high” and “defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the

hearing up close.” Id. at 1154, 1157. “Where evidence is susceptible to more

than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be

upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

I. DISCUSSION

The parties dispute whether the ALJ erred in (1) evaluating Plaintiffs

subjective symptom testimony, and (2) finding that Plaintiff could perform her

past relevant work. See Dkt. 9, Plaintiff's Brief (“PI.’s Br.”); Dkt. 13,

Defendant’s Brief (““Def.’s Br.”); Dkt. 14, Plaintiff's Reply (“Reply”).

A. Symptom Evaluation

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing

reasons for rejecting her testimony. See Pl.’s Br. at 3-6.

1. Plaintiff’s Alleged Symptoms and Limitations

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified about the extent of her impairments.

See AR 28-62. Plaintiff last worked in February 2020 as a preschool teacher.

See AR 33. Plaintiff stopped working after her doctor said another fall, trip, or

accident could result in paralysis. See AR 33-34. Plaintiff does not work due to

chronic pain that has continued despite a three-level fusion surgery in her

cervical spine. See AR 35. She also suffers from fibromyalgia. See AR 39-40.

Plaintiff takes Oxycodone for the pain, which is worst in her neck, back, and

arms. See AR 41, 46. She has a moderate level of carpal tunnel syndrome that

also causes her pain. See AR 35, 41. She experiences anxiety and depression.

See AR 36. Plaintiff does not drive and alternates between walking, lying

down, and sitting. See AR 47-48. Her husband takes care of all chores. See id.

Plaintiff submitted a Disability Report, which mirrored her hearing

testimony. See AR 315-22. Plaintiff stated that she had trouble getting in and

out of a car, standing up from a sitting position, walking downstairs, and

sitting or standing for prolonged periods of time. See AR 316. She mentioned

that she cannot look to her left or right without pain. See AR 318.

The ALJ accurately summarized Plaintiff’s testimony as follows:

At the hearing, the claimant testified she last worked in

February 2020 as a preschool teacher. She mentioned she stopped

working due to increased back pain and her fall risk. The claimant

mentioned she received retirement and social security benefits.

The claimant alleged she could not work due to neck and back

pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, knee arthritis, fibromyalgia, anxiety

and depression. She mentioned she experienced pain across her

neck, back, arms and hands. The claimant contended she

experienced anxiety and depression due to her physical symptoms.

She indicated she experienced increased pain with sitting. The

claimant mentioned she spent time alternating between walking,

sitting and laying down during the day.

With regard to treatment, the claimant testified she

underwent neck fusion surgery with hardware placement. She

reported she maintained appointments with an orthopedist. The

claimant contended she had been told she developed bone spurs in

her neck. She mentioned she was hospitalized for one week with

Covid-19 two years prior to the hearing. The claimant contended

she took prescription medication for anxiety and depression that

was prescribed by her general practitioner. She indicated she took

oxycodone and over the counter medication for pain on an as

needed basis. The claimant reported she underwent injections for

pain. She mentioned she wore braces for carpal tunnel at night.

The claimant indicated she lived with her husband, their

daughter and two of their grandchildren. She mentioned she no

longer drove and had last driven a vehicle prior to undergoing neck

surgery. The claimant contended she relied on her husband for

transportation. She indicated her husband performed the chores for

the household.

AR 16-17 (paragraph breaks added).

2. Applicable Law

The ALJ applies a two-step analysis to assess a claimant’s credibility for

symptom severity. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017).

Once the claimant “has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged,” then, absent evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation omitted).

“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in

Social Security cases.” Id. (citation omitted). The ALJ’s findings “must be

sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator

rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not

arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Brown-Hunter v.

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). However, “an

ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else

disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to

the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kyakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The clear and convincing

“standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s

rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Id.

3. Analysis

The ALJ partially rejected Plaintiffs testimony at the second step,

concluding that her medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but that her “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record

for the reasons explained in this decision.” AR 17.

Specifically, the ALJ reasoned that despite Plaintiff's treatment records

documenting tenderness, a history of neck surgery, and trigger point injections,

her record did not show that she used an assistive device and was noted by the

consultative examiner to have full motion of the shoulders, elbows, wrists, and

hands. See id. (citing AR 632-40). Additionally, the ALJ explained that

although her records documented limited motion of the neck and back and

some knee tenderness, she had intact sensation and was able to perform heel,

toe, and tandem walk. See id.

Although an ALJ may use “inconsistent objective medical evidence in

the record to discount subjective symptom testimony,” the ALJ “cannot

effectively render a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony superfluous by

demanding positive objective medical evidence fully corroborating every

allegation within the subjective testimony.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498 (cleaned

up); see Coleman v. Saul, 979 F.3d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An ALJ,

however, may not discredit the claimant’s subjective complaints solely because

the objective evidence fails to fully corroborate the degree of pain alleged.”).

Thus, to satisfy the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ must provide

specific, clear, and convincing reasons which explain why the medical

evidence is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. See

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-38, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007); Ferguson

v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2024) (remanding where ALJ

failed to expressly and specifically state how claimant’s symptom testimony

was inconsistent with any particular record evidence).

Here, the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons explaining

why the medical evidence was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s pain symptom

testimony. The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s extensive treatment records—

which included MRI findings revealing degenerative disease throughout the

cervical spine, physical examinations revealing tenderness, pain, and spasms,

trigger point injections, lidocaine injections, use of strong opiates, and three-

level fusion surgery—but noted that Plaintiff did not use an assistive device.

See AR 17. However, the ALJ did not explain, and the Court does not see,

why Plaintiff’s non-use of an assistive device is inconsistent with her testimony

about her chronic pain and ambulatory limitations. Indeed, Plaintiff did not

state that she was fully incapacitated, instead testifying that she spent time

alternating between walking, sitting, and lying down during the day. See AR

47-48.

The ALJ also noted the consultative examiner’s findings that Plaintiff

had full motion of the shoulders, elbows, wrists, and hands, and could perform

heel, toe, and tandem walk. See AR 17 (citing AR 632-40). Again, it is not

evident why or how those exam results are inconsistent with Plaintiff's

testimony that she suffers from chronic pain in her neck and back. To the

contrary, the consultative examiner noted tenderness and limited range of

motion of the cervical and lumbar spines. See AR 634-35, 637.

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly found Plaintiff did not

present evidence of a level of treatment commensurate with her claims of

disabling limitations. See Def.’s Br. at 5-6 (citing AR 15-16, 35-36, 222). But as

the Commissioner notes, that finding was specific to Plaintiff's allegations

concerning her mental impairments, not her physical limitations. See id. The

Commissioner also argues that Plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent with the

findings from the State agency medical consultants. See id. at 7 (citing AR 19).

While “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting

the claimant’s subjective testimony,” an ALJ must still “identify what

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints.” Carmickle v. Comm/’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161

(9th Cir. 2008). Here, the ALJ found that the consultants’ opinions “were

consistent with the objective findings” but did not explain how they undercut

Plaintiff's testimony.

The ALJ’s credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence.

B. Past Relevant Work

Plaintiff argues that the Court should review the ALJ’s decision

consistent with the June 22, 2024 regulation amendment that changed the

definition of “past relevant work” from 15 years to 5 years. See Pl.’s Br. at 6-9.

Plaintiff asserts that application of the new regulation would compel a

determination that she is disabled under the Commissioner’s Medical

Vocational Guideline Rule. See id. at 8.

While Plaintiff's request for review was pending, the SSA amended the

regulations under both Title II and Title XVI to shorten the 15-year period to a

five-year period. See 89 Fed. Reg. 27653 (Apr. 18, 2024). The amendment

applies to “claims newly filed and pending beginning on June 22, 2024.” 89

Fed. Reg. 48138 (June 5, 2024). Consistent with this guidance, the Ninth

Circuit has declined to apply the new regulation to appeals in which the ALJ

decision became final before June 22, 2024. See McClune v. Dudek, No. 24-

2911, 2025 WL 1099701, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (“Because McClune’s

application was filed in 2016, and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision

of the Commissioner in 2023, and because the Commissioner has issued a

Social Security Ruling explaining that the new definition is intended to be

applied prospectively in ALJ decisions issued on or after June 22, 2024, we

decline to apply the new regulation in this appeal.”); Dodge v. Dudek, No. 24-

2899, 2025 WL 1099705, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (same). Here, by

contrast, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on

January 27, 2025, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, the revised rules apply.

Plaintiff asserts that under the amended regulations, she has no past

relevant work history. See Pl.’s Br. at 8. But the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since February 4, 2020, see AR

14, within five years of the date the Appeals Council denied review on January

28, 2025, see AR 1-5.4 What’s more, the Commissioner appears to be correct

that the relevant date is the ALJ’s decision issued in February 2024, not when

4 Plaintiff asserts that the “sole job that she performed in this five-year

period is an eight-day work effort that lasted from January 28, 2025, to

February 5, 2025.” Pl.’s Br. at 8; see also Reply at 6 (“[Plaintiff] worked as a

preschool teacher only for the period of January 28, 2025, to February 5, 2025,

a mere eight days.”). It is possible that Plaintiff meant to reference the year

2020 instead of 2025, since her alleged disability onset date is February 4,

2020. If the 2025 date is not a typographical error, it is unclear how eight days

of work in that year impacts the applicable lookback period.

the Appeals Council declined to review it. Recently, in Obrien v. Bisignano,

142 F.4th 687, 702 (9th Cir. 2025), the district court found that the relevant

date was when the agency initially denied benefits. The Ninth Circuit reversed:

“Here, because the Appeals Council denied review, the relevant ‘adjudication’

is the ALJ’s decision.” Id.

Regardless of how the lookback window is calculated, Plaintiff last

performed her past relevant work as a preschool teacher within the 5-year

timeframe. Reversal is not warranted on this alleged error.

C. Remand Is Warranted

Whether to reverse and remand for further administrative proceedings,

or to reverse and simply award benefits, is within the discretion of the district

court. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Remand is

appropriate where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made and it is not clear from the record that

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence

were properly evaluated. See Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th

Cir. 2003). Here, the Court recommends remand to allow the ALJ to properly

consider Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony and to conduct other

proceedings as warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s denial of benefits is reversed, and this action is remanded to

the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Date: August 15, 2025 L, + ¢

DOUGLAS F. McCORMI

United States Magistrate Judge

in