The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MICHAEL QUILES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:24-cv-1610-PGB-DCI
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant/
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Third-Party
Defendant.
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court upon the following filings:
1. CSX Transportation, Inc.’s (“CSX”) Motion to Dismiss Count I of
Michael Quiles’s (“Quiles”) Complaint (Doc. 29), and Quiles’s
response thereto (Doc. 30).
2. Florida Department of Transportation’s (“FDOT”) Motion to Dismiss
CSX’s Third-Party Complaint (Doc. 52), and CSX’s response thereto
(Doc. 53).
Upon consideration, CSX’s Motion to Dismiss is denied, and FDOT’s Motion
to Dismiss is granted in part and denied as moot in part.
I. BACKGROUND1
In November 2021, Michael Quiles was hired by Prince Contracting, a
construction contractor. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1, 5). During Quiles’s employment, Prince
Contracting ordered Quiles to work under CSX, a railroad transportation
corporation. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 6–8). In supervising Quiles’s employment, CSX possessed
the ability to terminate Quiles. (Id. ¶ 8).
CSX assigned Quiles to work on the Central Florida Corridor railroad, which
is owned by FDOT. (Id. ¶ 7; Doc. 40, ¶ 7). On June 6, 2022, CSX directed Quiles to
remove brackets from a bridge using a two-man lift boom. (Doc. 1, ¶ 9). CSX told
Quiles that it would provide a lookout to ensure trains did not enter the railroad.
(Id. ¶¶ 10–11). However, while Quiles was working on the railroad, the provided
lookout abandoned her post. (Id. ¶ 12). Subsequently, an incoming train struck the
lift boom that Quiles was working on, which caused him to sustain injuries to his
back, ribs, hips, and knee. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16). Following the collision, CSX directed
Quiles to take a class led by CSX safety managers. (Id. ¶ 18). The CSX safety
managers informed Quiles that he was a borrowed servant of the railroad while he
was working on the railroad. (Id. ¶ 19). The CSX safety managers also told Quiles
that CSX was supposed to provide safety devices, and that the lookout should not
have abandoned her post under any circumstance. (Id. ¶¶ 20–21).
1 This account of the facts comes from Quiles’s Complaint and CSX’s Third-Party Complaint.
(Docs. 1, 40). The Court accepts well-pled factual allegations therein as true when considering
the motions to dismiss. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Court is not required to accept as true any legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
Consequently, Quiles filed suit against CSX. (Doc. 1 (the “Complaint”)). In
the Complaint, Quiles pursues two counts: Count I under the Federal Employers
Liability Act (“FELA”) and Count II for negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 25–32). CSX moved to
dismiss Count I of Quiles’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (Doc. 29).
Soon thereafter, CSX demanded indemnification from FDOT pursuant to
the parties’ Central Florida Operating and Management Agreement, which governs
the area where the incident occurred. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 7, 12; Doc. 40-2). Considering
CSX was unsuccessful in its demand, it then filed a Third-Party Complaint against
FDOT, alleging one count for a declaratory judgment. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 12–14). Therein,
CSX seeks a declaratory judgment regarding FDOT’s indemnification duties under
the parties’ Central Florida Operating and Management Agreement. (Id.; Doc. 40-
2). FDOT moved to dismiss Count I of the Third-Party Complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 52). In the alternative, FDOT moved to
dismiss the Third-Party Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), or for a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e). (Id. at p. 8).
The relevant Motions to Dismiss are fully briefed, and the matter is thus ripe
for review. (Docs. 29, 30, 52, 53).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may challenge
subject matter jurisdiction on facial or factual grounds. Carmichael v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). For facial
challenges, as here, courts look to the face of the complaint and determine whether
the plaintiff sufficiently alleges standing. Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l
Healthcare Sys. Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2008). In doing so, the
court is limited to the complaint’s allegations and exhibits, which the court must
accept as true. Id. at 1232. Factual challenges, in contrast, allow courts “to consider
extrinsic evidence such as deposition testimony and affidavits.” Carmichael, 572
F.3d at 1279.
B. Failure to State a Claim
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, to survive a
motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any doubts as to the sufficiency of the
complaint in the plaintiff’s favor. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1484
(11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). However, though a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, pleading mere legal conclusions, or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” is not enough to satisfy the
plausibility standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations,” and the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986).
In sum, the court must: reject conclusory allegations, bald legal assertions,
and formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim; accept well-pled factual
allegations as true; and view well-pled allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
III. DISCUSSION
A. CSX’s Motion to Dismiss
In Count I, Quiles seeks to recover under FELA for CSX’s alleged negligence.
(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 25–28). CSX moves to dismiss Count I of Quiles’s Complaint for failure
to state a claim. (Doc. 29). Specifically, CSX asserts that Quiles fails to allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate the first and second elements of a FELA claim. (Id.
at p. 2).
FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, holds railroads liable to their employees for
injuries “resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of the railroad.” 45 U.S.C.
§ 51. To recover under FELA, a plaintiff must show:
[1] that he was injured while in the scope of his employment,
[2] which employment is in furtherance of the railroad’s
interstate transportation business, [3] that his employer was
negligent, and [4] that his employer’s negligence played some
part in causing the injury for which compensation is sought
under FELA.
Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 763 F.2d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 1985) (internal
citations omitted); see also Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir.
1994).
As to the first element, CSX contends that Quiles was not employed by CSX.
(Doc. 29, p. 2). In support, CSX cites to Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S.
318, 326 (1974), where the Supreme Court addressed the scope of FELA’s “while
employed” language. (Id. at p. 3). Under Kelley, the test to determine employment
for FELA purposes is “[t]he ‘control or right to control’ test.” Kelley, 419 U.S. at
326. In unpacking this test in Kelley, the Supreme Court highlighted several cases
to elicit the presence of control. See id.
The Kelley court first considered Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co., 237 U.S. 84 (1915). In Robinson, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
plaintiff, who was a porter for the Pullman Company and worked with Pullman
railroad cars, was an employee of the railroad. Id. The Robinson court found that,
because the Pullman company “defined their [porters’] duties, fixed and paid their
wages, directed and supervised the performance of their tasks, and placed and
removed them at its pleasure,” the plaintiff was not an “employee” of the railroad.
Id. at 492. The Kelley court then considered Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Bond, 240 U.S. 449 (1916), where the plaintiff, tasked with
gathering wood and coal at a loading center, was not found to be an employee of
the railroad. In Chicago, the court found the plaintiff to be an independent
contractor because although the railroad had some “control in a sense,” it did not
have a “detailed control of the actions” of the plaintiff. Id. at 456. Lastly, the Kelley
court considered Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909), where the
court clarified the distinction between a contractor and an employee. In Standard
Oil, the Supreme Court “emphasized the importance of distinguishing between
‘authoritative direction and control, and mere suggestion as to details or the
necessary cooperation, where the work furnished is part of a larger undertaking.’”
Kelley, 419 U.S. at 330 (citing Standard Oil, 212 U.S. at 222).
Here, under the control or right to control test, Quiles sufficiently alleges
that CSX had the right to control Quiles’s performance—generally and at the time
of the alleged incident. See id. at 318. First, CSX ordered Quiles to complete specific
tasks and had the capacity to terminate Quiles. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 7–8). Further, Quiles
was supervised by, directed by, and reported to CSX personnel. (Id. ¶ 26); see
Chicago, 240 U.S. at 455. Finally, CSX informed Quiles he was not under the
control of Prince Contracting when he was working on the railroad. (Doc. 1, ¶ 26).
These facts amount to CSX’s control over Quiles, consistent with the standard set
forth in Kelley. See Kelley, 419 U.S. at 318. Thus, Quiles alleges sufficient facts to
support the first element of his FELA claim.
With regard to the second element, CSX contends that Quiles “failed to
allege his employment with CSX[] was in furtherance of interstate commerce.”
(Doc. 29, p. 2). In response, Quiles asserts that he satisfies this element by showing
that the railroad engages in interstate commerce. (Doc. 30, p. 7). Neither
articulation wholly captures FELA’s scope. Rather, FELA provides that:
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign
commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and
substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall,
for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being
employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be
considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter.
45 U.S.C. § 51. Thus, “the true test of employment in such [interstate] commerce
in the sense intended is, [w]as the employee, at the time of the injury, engaged in
interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a
part of it?” Shanks v. Del., L. & W. R.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1916).
The Supreme Court has applied this standard, for employment in interstate
commerce, to a variety of circumstances. In Shanks, the Court considered a
plaintiff who was injured while working in a machine shop repairing locomotive
parts. See id. at 556. The Shanks court reasoned that, “repairing or keeping in
usable condition a roadbed, bridge, engine, car, or other instrument then in use in
such [interstate] transportation” would satisfy the standard for employment in
interstate commerce. Id. at 560. However, the plaintiff’s work in Shanks was too
remotely connected to such repairs to fall within the scope of FELA. See id. In
Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackwanna, & Western Railroad Co., 229 U.S. 146 (1913),
the plaintiff was a worker struck by a train while retrieving bolts to repair a bridge
used in interstate transportation. The Pedersen court held that, considering repair
work on the instrumentalities of interstate commerce “is so closely related to such
commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a part of it,” the plaintiff
was sufficiently acting within the scope of interstate transportation. Id. at 649.
Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Quiles’s employment was in
furtherance of CSX’s business of interstate railroad transportation. (See Doc. 1).
Unlike Shanks, where the plaintiff was working in a shop away from the railroad,
Quiles was working directly on the railroad. (See id. ¶¶ 9–10). Specifically, “CSX
ordered Quiles to remove brackets from a bridge using a two-man lift [and] Quiles
did as he was instructed, climbing into the basket, setting onto the track and
beginning to work.” (Id.). Further, like Pedersen, where the plaintiff was repairing
a bridge used in interstate transportation, Quiles was working on a railroad in this
district, which CSX operates in interstate commerce. (Id. ¶ 2). As such, Quiles
sufficiently alleges he performed work that furthered CSX’s interstate
transportation business.
Ultimately, Quiles alleges sufficient facts to satisfy the first and second
elements required for his FELA claim. Thus, CSX’s request that the Court dismiss
Count I of the Complaint is denied.
B. FDOT’s Motion to Dismiss
In Count I of the Third-Party Complaint, CSX seeks a declaratory judgment
against FDOT regarding the parties’ Central Florida Operating and Management
Agreement. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 13–14). FDOT moves to dismiss CSX’s Third-Party
Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1). (Doc. 52). FDOT asserts that, absent a relevant exception, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties
against state agencies. (Id. at p. 5). In the alternative, FDOT moves to dismiss
CSX’s Third-Party Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), or moves for a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e). (Id. at p. 8).
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
“the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced on or prosecuted against on one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. While the text of the amendment does not explicitly so
provide, the Supreme Court has held that a state is immune from suits brought by
its own citizens in federal court. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Accordingly,
states are immune from suits brought by private parties in “federal court unless a
state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has abrogated it.” Cassady v.
Hall, 892 F.3d 1150, 1152–53 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815
F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2016)). This immunity applies to “state agencies and other
arms of the state.” Id. (citing Robinson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 638–
40 (11th Cir. 1992)).
FDOT, a Florida state agency, does not assert congressional abrogation, and
thus, the question is whether FDOT has waived its immunity. Am. Contractors
Indem. Co. v. Regis S., Inc., No. 6:20-CV-1691-ORL-31-EJK, 2020 WL 9073335,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2020). Such a waiver exists “only if there is ‘an
unequivocal indication that the state intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that
would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’” Id. (citing Robinson,
966 F.2d at 640). Thus, any finding of consent must be clear and obvious, and may
not be found by mere inference. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney,
495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990).
Here, there are no allegations FDOT unequivocally consented to federal
jurisdiction. (See Doc. 40). Rather, CSX relies upon Florida Department of
Transportation v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840 (Fla. 2016), and Pan-Am
Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984), to posit
that “Florida courts have previously held these actions are proper and not subject
to sovereign immunity defenses.” (Doc. 53, p. 5). However, “[t]he Eleventh Circuit
has held that this state court waiver does not extend to Florida’s Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.” Am. Contractors, 2020 WL 9073335, at *2
(citing Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel.
Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2003)). Thus, CSX’s reliance on
Schwefringhaus and Pan-Am, both state court cases, does not support a waiver of
consent for suit in federal court.
As such, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over CSX’s Third-Party
Complaint pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. FDOT’s motion to dismiss is
thus granted in part to the extent CSX’s Third-Party Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice. See McQueary v. Child Support Enf’t, 812 F. App’x 911, 914
(11th Cir. 2020) (noting that orders granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction are to do so without prejudice).2 Consequently, FDOT’s
requests in the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e), are denied as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
follows:
1. CSX Transportation, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Count I of Michael
Quiles’s Complaint (Doc. 29) is DENIED.
2. Florida Department of Transportation’s Motion to Dismiss CSX’s
Third-Party Complaint (Doc. 52) is GRANTED IN PART for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and DENIED AS MOOT in all other
respects. CSX’s Third-Party Complaint (Doc. 40) is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
terminate Florida Department of Transportation as a party.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on August 18, 2025.
PAUL G.
UNITED STATE ISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
2 “Unpublished cases do not constitute binding authority and may be relied on only to the extent
ey, yr persuasive.” Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1355 (11th Cir.