Aidong Chen v. Dir., Div. of Taxation

TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSHUA D. NOVIN Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Justice Building

Judge 495 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd., 4th Floor

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Tel: (609) 815-2922, Ext. 54680

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL

OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS

August 15, 2025

Mr. Aidong Chen

1105 Longspur Boulevard

Orion Township, Michigan 48360

Aiden L. Black

Deputy Attorney General

Division of Law

R.J. Hughes Justice Complex

P.O. Box 106

Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0106

Re: Aidong Chen v. Dir., Div. of Taxation

Docket No. 008793-2024

Dear Mr. Chen and Deputy Attorney General Black:

This letter shall constitute the court’s opinion on the motion for summary judgment by the

Director, Division of Taxation, seeking entry of an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under R. 8:4-1(b), N.J.S.A. 54A:9-10(a), and

N.J.S.A. 54:51A-14.

For the reasons explained below, the court grants the Director, Division of Taxation’s

motion.

I. Findings of Fact and Procedural History

Pursuant to R. 1:7-4, the court makes the following findings of fact based on the

submissions of the parties and the pleadings.

In or about April 2018, plaintiff, Aidong Chen (“plaintiff”), filed a New Jersey Resident

Gross Income Tax Return, Form NJ-1040. Plaintiff’s 2017 New Jersey Gross Income Tax Return

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deducted moving expenses of $43,739 and applied a Qualified Conservation deduction of $2,000.

Following an audit of plaintiff’s 2017 New Jersey Gross Income Tax Return, on or about

October 1, 2021, the Director, Division of Taxation (the “Director”) issued plaintiff a Notice of

Deficiency asserting that plaintiff had an outstanding New Jersey Gross Income Tax deficiency in

the sum of $4,447.00, plus interest and penalties. 1

Plaintiff pursued administrative appeal remedies with the Director’s Conference and

Appeals Branch, and on August 16, 2023, the Director issued a Final Determination letter

identifying plaintiff’s total 2017 New Jersey Gross Income Tax liability as $6,607.00, inclusive of

penalties and interest (the “Final Determination letter”).

The motion record contains undisputed evidence that the Final Determination letter was

addressed to plaintiff at 1105 Longspur Blvd., Lake Orion, MI 48360, and was forwarded by

certified mail, return receipt requested. The “USPS Tracking” information reflects that the Final

Determination letter was:

Delivered, Left with Individual

Lake Orion, MI 48360

August 21, 2023, 2:28 p.m.

The Final Determination letter stated that “[y]ou did not submit sufficient documentation

to verify deducting moving expenses in the amount of $43,739 or the Qualified Conservation

Deduction in the amount of $2,000 from your income for tax year 2017.” Importantly, the Final

Determination letter further stated that, “[i]f you do not agree with the above determination, you

may file a complaint with the Tax Court of New Jersey. The Tax Court must receive the complaint,

along with the required fee relative to this determination, within 90 days from the date of this

1

The COVID-19 Fiscal Mitigation Act, P.L. 2020, Ch. 19, extended the period for making an

assessment by an additional ninety (90) days following the lifting of the state of emergency.

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Docket No. 008793-2024

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notice in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 54:51A-13 et seq.”

On July 25, 2024, the Clerk of the Tax Court received a complaint from plaintiff

challenging the Director’s Final Determination letter.

On June 9, 2025, the Director filed the instant motion for summary judgment seeking entry

of an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

under R. 8:4-1(b), N.J.S.A. 54A:9-10, and N.J.S.A. 54:51A-14.

In response to the Director’s motion, plaintiff asserts that the untimely filing was “due to

the technical problem in the defendant side’s website and they make-up it by sending me a pdf file

to print [and] then file in paper format.” Plaintiff further argues that the Director “ignored my

provided solid evidence prepared by professional relocation agent.”

II. Conclusions of Law

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment “‘serve[s] two competing jurisprudential philosophies’: first, ‘the

desire to afford every litigant who has a bona fide cause of action or defense the opportunity to

fully expose his case,’ and second, to guard ‘against groundless claims and frivolous defenses,’

thus saving the resources of the parties and the court.” Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469,

479 (2016) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 541-42 (1995)).

R. 4:46-2 outlines the circumstances under which summary judgment should be granted:

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and

admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of

law.

[R. 4:46-2.]

In Brill, our Supreme Court explained that “the essence of the inquiry [is] whether the

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evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 142 N.J. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must engage

in a “kind of weighing that involves a type of evaluation, analysis and sifting of evidential

materials.” Ibid. The standard established by our Supreme Court in Brill is as follows:

[w]hen deciding a motion for summary judgment under R. 4:46-2,

the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect

to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider

whether the competent evidential material presented, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration

of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a

rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of

the non-moving party.

[Id. at 536.]

In considering the material evidence before it with which to determine if there is a genuine

issue of material fact, the court must view most favorably those items presented to it by the party

opposing the motion and all doubts are to be resolved against the movant. Ruvolo v. American

Casualty Co., 39 N.J. 490, 491 (1963). A court charged with “deciding a summary judgment

motion does not draw inferences from the factual record as does the factfinder in a trial, . . .

[i]nstead, the motion court draws all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-

moving party.” Globe Motor Co., 225 N.J. at 480 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the moving

party bears the burden “to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue

of material fact” with respect to the claims being asserted. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough

of Metuchen, 35 N.J. 193, 196 (1961).

“By its plain language, R. 4:46-2 dictates that a court should deny a summary judgment

motion only where a party opposing the motion has come forward with evidence that creates a

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Docket No. 008793-2024

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‘genuine issue as to any material fact challenged.’” Brill, 142 N.J. at 529. However, when the

party opposing the motion merely presents “facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial

nature, a mere scintilla, fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,” then an otherwise

meritorious application for summary judgment should not be defeated. Judson v. Peoples Bank

and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954). Hence, “when the evidence is so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law . . . the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.”

Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252).

Having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, and undisputed material statements of fact, the

court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute. Rather, this matter involves

an application of law to the undisputed facts contained in the motion record, and thus, is ripe for

summary judgment.

B. Jurisdiction

The court’s analysis begins with a principle that is axiomatic, the Tax Court is a court of

limited jurisdiction. N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2. As our Supreme Court recently observed, the narrow

jurisdiction of the Tax Court is “defined by statute . . . It is against this comprehensive mosaic of

procedural safeguards -- one with which continuing strict and unerring compliance must be

observed.” McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 529 (2008).

This court’s jurisdiction to review any decision, order, finding, assessment or action of the

Director is clearly delineated under our statutes. N.J.S.A. 54:51A-14, provides, in part, that:

all complaints shall be filed within 90 days after the date of the

action sought to be reviewed.

[N.J.S.A. 54:51A-14.]

Similarly, N.J.S.A. 54A:9-10(a) provides that:

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[a]ny aggrieved taxpayer may, within 90 days after any decision,

order, finding, assessment or action of the Director of the Division

of Taxation made pursuant to the provisions of this act, appeal

therefrom to the tax court in accordance with the provisions of the

State Tax Uniform Procedure Law., R.S. 54:48-1, et seq.

[N.J.S.A. 54A:9-10(a).]

Our court rules mirror this statutory scheme, requiring that “[c]omplaints seeking to review

actions of the Director of the Division of Taxation . . . with respect to a tax matter . . . shall be filed

within 90 days after the date of the action to be reviewed.” R. 8:4-1(b).

The 90-day limitations period is “calculated from the date of service of the decision or

notice of the action taken.” R. 8:4-2. In Liapakis v. State Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Taxation,

363 N.J. Super. 96, 99 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 369 (2004), our Appellate

Division concluded that R. 8:4-2 applies to calculation of the 90-day period and therefore, the 90-

day limitations period begins to run upon the taxpayer’s receipt of the notice.

An exacting compliance with the statutory provisions and court rules is a fundamental

prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on this court. It is well-settled that “statutes of limitation

applicable to suits against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign’s consent to be

sued and must be strictly construed.” H.B. Acquisitions, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 12 N.J.

Tax 60, 65 (Tax 1991). The “court has no power . . . to relax or dispense with a statute of

limitations passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor.” Prospect Hill Apartments

v. Borough of Flemington, 172 N.J. Super. 224, 227 (Tax 1979).

A taxpayer’s failure to comply with the applicable limitations period is “of particular

concern in tax matters, given ‘the exigencies of taxation and the administration of . . .

government.’” Millwork Installation, Inc. v. State Dep’t of the Treasury, Div. of Taxation, 25 N.J.

Tax 452, 459 (Tax 2010) (quoting F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418,

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424 (1985)). The court’s strict adherence to “limitation period[s] is mandatory and is justified by

the need for predictability of revenues by the State.” McCullough Transportation Co. v. Motor

Vehicles Division, 113 N.J. Super. 353 (App. Div. 1971). In the taxation arena, “statutes of

limitation and limitation periods play a vital role. Legislative policy has consistently followed the

salutary principle that proceedings concerning tax assessments and governmental fiscal matters be

brought expeditiously within established time periods.” L.S. Village, Inc. v. Lawrence Twp., 8

N.J. Tax 287 (Law Div. 1985), aff'd, 8 N.J. Tax 327 (App. Div. 1986). Thus, after expiration of

the applicable limitations period, the Director is entitled to assume that an assessment is final, and

is not subject to further scrutiny by the court. Commercial Refrigeration & Fixture Co., Inc. v.

Dir., Div. of Taxation, 2 N.J. Tax 415, 419 (Tax 1981).

The taxpayer’s “[f]ailure to file a timely appeal is a fatal jurisdictional defect,” barring

consideration of the merits of the action. F.M.C. Stores Co., 100 N.J. at 425 (citing Clairol v.

Kingsley, 109 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 1970), aff’d, 57 N.J. 199 (1970)). A complaint that is

filed one day late must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Mayfair Holding Corp. v. Twp. of

North Bergen, 4 N.J. Tax 38 (Tax 1982). Even in the absence of harm to a defendant, the failure

to timely file a complaint within the prescribed 90-day limitations period deprives the court of

jurisdiction. See Lawrenceville Garden Apartments v. Twp. of Lawrence, 14 N.J. Tax 285 (App.

Div. 1994).

Here, it is undisputed that the Director issued plaintiff the Final Determination letter on

August 16, 2023. The Final Determination letter was delivered to plaintiff on August 21, 2023.2

2

Plaintiff has not submitted any documentation, certifications, or opposition to the Director’s

motion challenging receipt of the Final Determination letter on August 21, 2023, or the validity of

the address to which the Final Determination letter was mailed.

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Docket No. 008793-2024

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Thus, the court will begin counting the 90-day limitations period from August 21, 2023, the date

the certified mail was delivered. See Liapakis, 363 N.J. Super. at 99.

Affording plaintiff the most favorable inferences, the 90-day limitations period for

establishing jurisdiction with this court concluded on Sunday, November 19, 2023. However,

because the last day of the computation period was a Sunday, under R. 1:3-1, the filing deadline

is extended to Monday, November 20, 2023. Here however, plaintiff’s complaint was not filed

until July 25, 2024, approximately two hundred and forty-eight (248) days after the 90-day

limitations period expired. Moreover, the court’s review of the pleadings reveal that plaintiff’s

complaint was signed on July 18, 2024, well beyond the applicable limitations period. Plaintiff

has offered no credible evidence that he attempted to file a complaint challenging the Final

Determination letter on or before Monday, November 20, 2023.

Accordingly, the court is satisfied that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed with

prejudice for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s complaint was filed beyond the ninety (90) day

limitations period afforded under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-14, N.J.S.A. 54A:9-10(a), and R. 8:4-1(b).

III. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint was not timely filed within the ninety (90) day limitations period

following receipt of the Final Determination letter, as required under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-14, N.J.S.A.

54A:9-10(a), and R. 8:4-1(b). Therefore, following expiration of the ninety-day period the

Director’s Final Determination letter became final and fixed. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint

is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Very truly yours,

/s/

Hon, Joshua D. Novin, J.T.C.