Muse v. City Of Chicago

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KHALEEQ A. MUSE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24-cv-06108

v.

Judge Martha M. Pacold

CITY OF CHICAGO, V.H. GONZALEZ,

O.A. FURLAN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Khaleeq Muse, proceeding pro se, brings this case under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Illinois law against the City of Chicago and two officers involved in his

May 11, 2024, arrest. Defendants move to dismiss. [20]. For the reasons below, the

motion is granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint if he

believes he can do so consistent with this order and his obligations under Rule 11 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint

by September 5, 2025, the court will enter final judgment.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, [1],1 Khaleeq Muse was sitting in his car in the

back of a family member’s house on May 11, 2024, when Officers O.A. Furlan and

V.H. Gonzalez,2 both dressed in plain clothing with an embroidered police star (the

complaint does not specify where the officers wore their police stars), approached him.

Id. at 2. When the officers approached, Muse was on his phone talking to friends and

watching TV. Id. The car was not running. Id.

The officers stated that a stolen vehicle was left abandoned on the property.

Id. When they approached the car, they saw a handgun. Id. Though the complaint

does not say so expressly, liberally construed it alleges that the officers arrested

Muse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is

1 Bracketed numbers refer to docket entries and are followed by page and / or paragraph

number citations. Page numbers refer to the CM/ECF page number.

2 The complaint does not provide either officer’s first name.

‘to be liberally construed.” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). It also

alleges that Furlan and Gonzalez wrote false police reports. [1] at 2.

Although the facts alleged in the complaint are minimal, the defendants

attached body-worn camera footage that provides more detail. [20-1]; [20-2]. Muse

referenced this footage in his complaint, arguing that “the audio video will support

that plaintiff[’s] 4th amendment rights were violated.” [1] at 2. Accordingly, the court

can consider the footage. See Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir.

2024) (explaining that a court “may examine exhibits, including video exhibits,

attached to the complaint, or referenced in the pleading if they are central to the

claim”). In doing so, however, the court “views the video in the light most favorable

to” Muse. Id. at 679.

The footage shows three officers approaching the vehicle (which was parked in

an alley between two houses), telling Muse that he could not block the alley. [20-1]

at 01:57–02:10. (Furlan and Gonzalez do not dispute that they were two of the three

officers.) Another individual—not Muse or any of the three officers—opened the back

driver-side door and appeared to place something in the seat. Id. at 02:29–02:42. As

Officer Gonzalez approached the car and stood near the open door, his body-worn

camera footage shows a handgun in plain view, behind the driver’s seat. Id. at 02:44–

02:47. Gonzalez asked, “Who has a FOID CCL?” (i.e., a Firearm Owners Identification

(FOID) card or a Concealed Carry License (CCL). Id. at 02:50. The answer, if any was

given, is inaudible. Officer Gonzalez then ordered the other individual (who at some

point had entered the vehicle) out of the vehicle and asked Muse if he had a FOID or

CCL. Id. at 02:51–02:58. The answer to this inquiry is also inaudible. Gonzalez then

ordered Muse out of the car. Id. at 03:03–03:12. While another officer handcuffed him,

Muse told the officers that the car was not his. Id. at 03:43–03:47. The other

individual was also handcuffed. Id. at 03:20–03:24. After further investigation, the

officers learned that the other individual had a FOID card, id. at 10:07–10:09, while

Muse did not, [20-2] at 05:55–06:40.

The defendants also submitted two certified statements of disposition, one

relating to Muse’s 2013 prosecution for identity theft and unlawful possession of a

credit/debit card, [20-4], and another relating to the 2024 arrest at issue in this case,

[20-3]. Although these documents are not referenced in the complaint, the court can

consider them at the pleading stage because they are matters of public record. Brown

v. Star, 494 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (considering a certified statement of

disposition at the pleading stage).

The certified statement of disposition from the 2013 identity theft case

indicates that Muse pled guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a credit or debit

card in violation of 720 ILCS 5/17-32(b), a fourth-degree felony under Illinois law, see

720 ILCS 5/17-32(c)(2). [20-4] at 1, 8.

The certified disposition from the 2024 arrest at issue here indicates that Muse

was charged with unauthorized use of a weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a),

and parking in an alley in violation of City of Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-130(a).

[20-3] at 1. On May 12, 2024 (the day after Muse’s arrest), Judge Charles S. Beach

found probable cause to detain Muse. Id. On August 5, 2024, the felon in possession

charge was dismissed nolle prosequi, and the parking violation was nonsuited.

Id. at 4. The certified disposition does not specify whether Muse remained in custody

in the interim.

On July 19, 2024—two and a half weeks before the charges were dismissed—

Muse filed his complaint in this court.3 [1]. He named Officers Furlan and Gonzalez

and the City of Chicago as defendants. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the

complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820

(7th Cir. 2009). In deciding the motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether

the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[N]aked assertion[s]

devoid of further factual enhancement” are insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557).

For the reasons explained previously, the court can consider the body-worn

camera footage, [20-1], [20-2], and certified statements of disposition, [20-3], [20-4],

attached to defendants’ motion to dismiss, in addition to the allegations in the

complaint. See Esco, 107 F.4th at 678; Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 916. The court must

view these exhibits “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Esco, 107 F.4th

at 679.

DISCUSSION

Muse’s complaint indicates that he seeks relief for “false arrest, illegal

detainment, fraud, lying under [oath] and denying citizens honest government

service.” [1] at 3. It also references the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and

3 Because the state court proceedings have now concluded, the court need not decide whether

abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), would have been warranted at the

outset of this case had the court been made aware of those proceedings. See Wilson v. Ill.

Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 871 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Because state disciplinary

proceedings and litigation have ended, Younger no longer requires abstention.”); cf. Deakins

v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (holding that Younger abstention permits a district

court to stay, but not to dismiss, “claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the

state proceeding”).

Equal Protection Clauses, id.; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and an alleged

“practice and pattern of the Chicago police department,” [1] at 3; see Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In his response to the motion to dismiss, Muse

adds references to fabrication of evidence; Article I, Section 8 of the Illinois

Constitution (Illinois’s analogue to the federal Sixth Amendment); and malicious

prosecution under Illinois law.4

In light of the requirement to construe pro se filings liberally, see Erickson,

551 U.S. at 94, the court understands plaintiff to have raised the following theories:

(1) Fourth Amendment false arrest; (2) Fourth Amendment unlawful investigatory

stop; (3) state law false arrest; (4) state law false imprisonment; (5) Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution; (5) state law malicious prosecution; (6) Fourth

Amendment fabrication of evidence; (7) Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of

evidence; (8) violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Illinois Constitution; (9) Monell

liability; (10) state law fraud; and (11) honest services fraud.

I. Federal Theories

The court will first consider Muse’s potential legal theories under federal law.

Those theories can be divided into three groups: (1) those pertaining to the

circumstances of the arrest; (2) those pertaining to Muse’s subsequent detention and

prosecution; and (3) other theories. The court will discuss each in turn.

A. Muse’s Arrest

1. Fourth Amendment False Arrest

Muse has not stated a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim because the arrest

was supported by probable cause. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)

(“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being

committed.”). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances that

4 Defendants argue that the court should not consider these theories because they were not

raised in the complaint. Thus, defendants argue, the complaint did not put them on notice of

these theories. Although this argument finds some support in older cases, see, e.g., Resol. Tr.

Corp. v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 595, 598 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Notice pleading merely requires

that in order to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must give notice to the defendant of the

theory behind the claims alleged and the basic facts which support those allegations.”), it is

inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10

(2014) (per curiam). Under Johnson, a complaint need only “plead facts sufficient to show

that [plaintiff’s] claim has substantive plausibility.” Id. at 12. A complaint that “informed

[defendants] of the factual basis for [plaintiff’s] complaint” is “required to do no more to stave

off threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement of their claim.” Id. “Federal

pleading rules . . . do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the

legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Id. at 11.

are known to the officer reasonably support a belief that the individual has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Braun v. Vill. of Palatine,

56 F.4th 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Holmes v.

Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Defendants primarily argue that the officers had probable cause to believe that

Muse had committed the crime of unauthorized use of a weapon (UUW). 720 ILCS

5/24-1.1(a) provides in relevant part:

It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person

or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business . . . any

firearm . . . if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws

of this State or any other jurisdiction. . . .

Defendants’ argument based on the UUW statute raises two difficult questions. First,

there are lingering questions about whether felon-in-possession statutes can be

applied to non-violent offenders like Muse without violating the Second Amendment

right to keep and bear arms. See United States v. Carbajal-Flores, No. 24-1534,

2025 WL 1948914, at *9 (7th Cir. July 16, 2025) (“The historical justification for

disarming some felons may not support disarming all felons.”).

Second, although Muse has been convicted of a fourth-degree felony—unlawful

possession of a credit or debit card, see [20-4]—“probable cause depends on

information known to the police at the time, not on how things turn out.” Hebron v.

Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994). It is not clear whether Officers Furlan and

Gonzalez had any indication that Muse was a felon at the time of the arrest. If Muse

was not a felon, then his possession of a gun would have been both (1) beyond the

scope of Illinois’s felon in possession statute and (2) presumptively protected by the

Second Amendment. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17

(2022). Thus, it is not clear it could, without more, support probable cause. Cf. United

States v. Wilson, No. 23-30777, 2025 WL 1982767, at *4 (5th Cir. July 17, 2025) (“[A]n

officer cannot search or seize a person simply because he is keeping or bearing a

firearm . . . .”).

The court need not grapple with these issues, however, because Furlan and

Gonzalez clearly had probable cause to believe that Muse had committed a different

offense: blocking the alley. City of Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-130(b) provides:

It shall be unlawful to park a vehicle in an alley in such a manner or

under such conditions as to leave available less than ten feet of the width

of the roadway for the free movement of vehicular traffic or to block the

entrance to any abutting property.

The body-worn camera footage submitted by defendants clearly shows Muse parked

in a way that left less than ten feet of clearance for traffic to pass. [20-1] at 02:00. The

complaint also alleges that the car was not running, and that Muse was in the driver’s

seat. [1] at 2. These facts establish probable cause to believe that Muse had violated

the alley-blocking ordinance—or, at minimum, that he was about to do so. See Braun,

56 F.4th at 548 (noting that “[p]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances . . . support a belief that the individual . . . is about to commit a crime”

(quoting Holmes, 511 F.3d at 679)).

Admittedly, arrest would be a harsh sanction if a parking violation was the

only offense of which Muse was suspected. Parking violations are punishable only by

fines, not imprisonment. See City of Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-230. But in

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the Supreme Court rejected the

argument that the Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests for “nonjailable traffic

offenses.” Id. at 349; see also Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir.

2009) (“But the Fourth Amendment does not forbid an arrest for a ‘nonjailable’

offense.” (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318)). The Municipal Code also provides that

parking violations are civil (rather than criminal) offenses. City of Chicago Municipal

Code § 9-64-230. But the Fourth Amendment also does not forbid arrest for purely

civil offenses. See Thomas, 580 F.3d at 638; Murphy v. Salgado, No. 1:13-cv-04566,

2014 WL 114266, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2014). Thus, the court in United States v.

Churchill, 440 F. Supp. 3d 919 (N.D. Ill. 2020), found probable cause for a violation

of the alley-blocking ordinance sufficient to justify a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id.

at 924; see also Murphy, 2014 WL 114266, at *1 (dismissing a Fourth Amendment

false arrest claim because the officers had probable cause to believe the plaintiff rode

his bicycle on a sidewalk). Nor does the likelihood that Muse would not have been

arrested if blocking the alley was the only offense of which he was suspected render

the arrest unconstitutional. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (holding that “an

arresting officer’s . . . subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal

offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause”).

2. Unreasonable Terry Stop

Muse also argues that, when the officers initially approached him, they

performed an unreasonable investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

“A Terry stop lies somewhere between a consensual encounter and a full-blown

custodial arrest.” United States v. Harris, 218 F. App’x 525, 527 (7th Cir. 2007). Even

assuming that the officers’ initial approach was a Terry stop—rather than a

consensual encounter outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, see United States

v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2020)—the stop did not violate the Fourth

Amendment. “The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops . . . when a

law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the

particular person stopped of criminal activity’”—also known as a reasonable

suspicion. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014) (quoting United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). Because, as discussed above, the officers “had

probable cause to make an arrest, [they] necessarily had the reasonable suspicion

required to conduct an investigatory stop.” Jones ex rel. Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178,

182 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Muse has not stated a Fourth Amendment claim

under Terry.

3. Equal Protection

In addition to prohibiting arrests without probable cause, the Constitution also

(via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause) “prohibits selective

enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). “To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,

plaintiffs must prove that the defendants’ actions had a discriminatory effect and

were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d

612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001).

Here, Muse’s allegations do not state a plausible claim under the Equal

Protection Clause. Although the complaint states that “the officers were racial

profiling,” [1] at 2, that is a mere conclusion, which the court need not accept as true

for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81 (declining to credit

a similar allegation because it was conclusory). The complaint provides no further

support for Muse’s equal protection claim. His response to the motion to dismiss

provides slightly more detail, arguing that Muse was targeted because he is black

and lives in an all-black neighborhood, while the arresting officers “are not of the

same nationality” as plaintiff and, according to Muse, “have a history of racial

profiling and harassing African Americans.” [24] at 6. But “a difference in race

between the person stopped and the officer” does not establish a discriminatory

purpose. Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 248 (7th Cir. 1996). And while “a series of

official actions taken for invidious purposes” may provide evidence of discriminatory

intent, Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977),

Muse’s allegations about a supposed history of racial profiling (made for the first time

in response to the motion to dismiss) are too vague and conclusory to support an

inference that his arrest was motivated by invidious discrimination. Muse has not

“nudged his claims of invidious discrimination across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation and alterations omitted).

B. Muse’s Subsequent Detention & Prosecution

1. Malicious Prosecution

Although Muse expressly raises only a state law malicious prosecution claim,

the court will also consider whether he has stated a federal malicious prosecution

claim—which is “sometimes referred to as a claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant

to legal process,” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022), or as a “claim for

wrongful pretrial detention,” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 474. “To succeed on such a claim, a

plaintiff must show that a government official charged him without probable cause,

leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.” Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon,

602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024). Unlike with a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim,

however, the existence of one charge supported by probable cause does not “create a

categorical bar” to a claim based on other charges not supported by probable cause.

Id. Thus, unlike with the claims based on Muse’s arrest, the existence of probable

cause for the parking violation does not necessarily defeat Muse’s malicious

prosecution claim.

That claim fails, however, for a different reason: Muse cannot rebut the

presumption of probable cause that arose when Judge Beach found probable cause to

detain him. “Judicial determinations of probable cause are ordinarily entitled to a

presumption of validity.” Washington v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 869 (7th Cir.

2024). “To overcome this presumption, plaintiffs must show ‘that the officer . . . [1]

“knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false

statements to the judicial officer, and [2] that the false statements were necessary to

the judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for the [detention].”’”

Id. at 863 (quoting Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010)). While Muse

alleges that the arresting officers’ “reports are false,” [1] at 2, he never indicates what

false statements were included in the police report. That conclusory allegation cannot

overcome the presumption of probable cause.

2. Fabrication of Evidence

Muse also has not stated a claim for fabrication of evidence. Recent Seventh

Circuit cases have “clarified the contours of constitutional claims based on allegations

of evidence fabrication.” Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2020).

Such claims can proceed under any of three theories, each with its own requirements.

First, “false arrest or pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence” may violate

“the Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure without probable cause.” Id.

Second, “a police officer who manufactures false evidence against a criminal

defendant violates due process if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant

of [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir.

2012). Finally, “misconduct of this type that results in a conviction might also violate

the accused’s right to due process under the rubric of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963) . . . if government officials suppressed evidence of the fabrication.” Lewis v.

City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 2019).

Muse has not stated a claim under any of the three theories. First, he has not

stated a fabrication claim under the Fourth Amendment because “[t]he standard for

pretrial detention is probable cause.” Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.

2020). As discussed above, Muse cannot rebut the presumption of probable cause that

attached when Judge Beach found probable cause. Second, he has not stated a

fabrication claim under either due process-based theory because the only deprivation

of liberty he suffered was his pretrial detention, which is cognizable only under the

Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Lewis, 914 F.3d at 475.

Accordingly, Muse has not stated a fabrication of evidence claim.

C. Other Federal Theories

1. Honest Services Fraud

To the extent Muse’s claims rely on the honest services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1346, they fail because the statute does not create a private right of action. See

Seamon v. Shapiro, No. 24-1451, 2025 WL 88837, at *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (per

curiam) (“[Plaintiff] has no private right of action to pursue violations of the criminal

statutes that penalize honest services fraud.”). In other words, while the honest

services fraud statute allows federal prosecutors to bring criminal charges against

government officials who accept bribes or kickbacks, see Kelly v. United States,

590 U.S. 391, 399 (2020), it does not allow private citizens to sue alleged violators.

2. Monell Liability

Muse also has not stated a claim for municipal liability under Monell. Because

Section 1983 does not allow for vicarious liability against municipalities, “a plaintiff

seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983” must “identify a municipal

‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan

Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Even assuming the existence of a policy or

custom, Muse has not stated a claim under Monell because, as explained above, he

has not adequately alleged a violation of federal law. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller,

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).

II. State Law Theories

Having found that Muse’s complaint does not state a claim under federal law,

the court will follow the “usual practice” of declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over his state law claims. Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th

Cir. 1999); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Those claims are thus dismissed without

prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss, [20], is granted. The

complaint, [1], is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Bausch

v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Generally, if a district court

dismisses for failure to state a claim, the court should give the party one opportunity

to try to cure the problem . . . .”). If Muse believes he can address the issues identified

in this order, Muse may submit an amended complaint by September 5, 2025. Any

amended complaint must comply with Rule 11, which provides that by signing a

pleading, a party represents to the court that the party’s claims are warranted by

existing law and that the factual contentions contained within the pleading have

evidentiary support or likely will have evidentiary support after further

investigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). If Muse does not file an amended complaint

by September 5, 2025, the court will enter final judgment dismissing Muse’s federal

claims with prejudice and his state claims without prejudice.

Dated: August 15, 2025 /s/ Martha M. Pacold