Davis v. Miami-Dade County

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Thomas Davis, Plaintiff, )

)

Civil Action No. 22-23715-Civ-Scola

v. )

)

Miami-Dade County, Defendant. )

Order on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Thomas Davis brings this action against his former employer,

Defendant Miami-Dade County, following his termination. (Am. Compl., ECF

No. 18.) Davis complains the County discriminated against him, as a white

male, then in his late fifties, when it terminated his employment and allegedly

replaced him with his 32-year-old, Black male subordinate. (Id.) In his

complaint, Davis sets forth four counts: race-based claims under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Florida Civil Rights Act (counts one and

three); and age-based claims under the Age Discrimination Employment Act

and the FCRA (counts two and four). (Id.) Previously, the Court granted the

County’s motion to dismiss, determining Davis failed to allege sufficient facts to

state a claim. (Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32.) Davis appealed

and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Court erred,

finding Davis’s allegations sufficient to “suggest intentional discrimination.”

Davis v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 23-12480, 2024 WL 4051215, at *4, 6 (11th

Cir. Sept. 5, 2024). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded

this case for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion. Id. at *1.

The County now seeks summary judgment on all of Davis’s claims (Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 54; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts, ECF No. 53), to which

Davis has responded (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 61; Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts, ECF No. 60).

The County has timely replied (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 65; Def.’s Reply Stmt. of

Facts, ECF No. 64) and the issue is now ripe for review. After careful review,

the Court grants the County’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 54), in

part, as to Davis’s federal claims (counts one and two), finding Davis has

failed to make a showing sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the

County intentionally discriminated against him. The Court dismisses Davis’s

remaining state-law claims of discrimination (counts three and four), without

prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

1. Background1

On June 26, 2017, the County hired Davis, a white male and then fifty-

six years old, as the Board of County Commissioners (“BCC”) Director of Policy

and Legislation. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5.) His duties included preparing reports and

conducting research for the County Commission. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 48.) Initially,

Davis reported to supervisors who filled the Commission Auditor role in acting

or interim capacities. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 7, 12.) In December 2018, however,

Adeyinka Majekodunmi, a Black male, was appointed Commission Auditor and

became Davis’s supervisor, beginning in January 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.)

Just over a year after Majekodunmi assumed his supervisory position, in

February 2020, he summoned Davis to a meeting and notified him he was

being removed from his position. (Id. ¶ 36.) During that meeting, Majekodunmi

told Davis he “was not living up to his vision.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Davis was not

provided with any other reasons for his termination during that meeting. (Pl.’s

Stmt. ¶ 56.) Majekodunmi also called security to be present at the meeting

because he felt Davis displayed antagonistic behavior. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 38.) Davis

counters that he was not antagonistic, and there was no reason to call

security. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 38.) Davis was 58 years old when he was fired. (Pl.’s

Resp. at 12; Pl. Dep. 8:9, ECF No. 52-1.)

At the time of his dismissal, no reference to Davis’s age or race was made

nor did Davis believe, then, that the reason he was being fired was because of

his age or race. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 40–41.) It was not until later that Davis

thought “the premise of the meeting was a lie” (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 41), alleging in his

May 2020 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge that the County

had discriminated against him on the basis of his age and race (Def.’s Stmt. ¶

45).

Davis was never issued any formal written warnings and says he was

never disciplined or counseled during the entire time he was employed by the

County. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 49; Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 59-14.) And, although the

County had a policy of evaluating staff annually, in his over two-and-a-half

years there, Davis never received an evaluation or any written goals. (Pl.’s Stmt.

¶¶ 50, 51.) Davis also insists that he treated Majekodunmi respectfully; never

displayed a negative attitude or raised his voice in meetings with Majekodunmi;

and never displayed any antagonistic behavior. (Pl.’s Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶

33.)

After Davis’s termination, Majekodunmi requested a 5% base salary

increase for Phillip Edwards—a thirty-one-year-old Black male who had been

Davis’s subordinate—retroactive to the day Davis was fired. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 42.)

1 Unless indicated otherwise, the facts presented below are undisputed.

In a memo justifying the increase, Majekodunmi described Edwards’s new role

as being “responsible for the operation and supervision of all staff in the

legislative section of [the Office of the Commission Auditor] in an immediate

acting role due to the vacancy of the Policy and Legislation Director.” (Id. ¶ 42;

Pl. Stmt., Ex. 5, ECF No. 52-5, 37.) Then, in August 2020, Edwards was

promoted to the position of Legislative Research Manager. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 42; Pl.

Stmt., Ex. 5 at 38.)

Although Davis maintains he was never insubordinate, on several

occasions, throughout 2019, he failed to comply with various instructions or

directives that Majekodunmi had issued. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 19–21, 27–29, 31–32.)

Several of these incidents were memorialized in emails from Majekodunmi to

Davis. (Id. ¶¶ 19–21, 27.) For example, despite Majekodunmi’s telling Davis not

to, Davis included repetitive language in his reports and sent out reports

without Majekodunmi’s prior approval. (Id. ¶ 19, 21, 26–27.) Davis also failed

to complete research projects that had been assigned to him. (Id. ¶ 20.) In June

2019, when Majekodunmi noticed that no work items had been assigned to

Davis, Edwards told Majekodunmi it was because Davis has told Edwards,

contrary to Majekodunmi’s directive, not to allocate any projects to him. (Id. ¶

24–25.) Davis denies having ever told Edwards to do that, but there is no

indication that, at the time Davis was fired, Majekodunmi was ever aware of

this discrepancy. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 24–25, 55.)

In yet another instance, when requested to do so, Davis refused to

provide a statement to Majekodunmi about Davis’s alleged involvement with

improperly discarding audit files in 2018. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 30–32.) Another

County employee, Luis Carrazana (described as Hispanic and approximately

Davis’s age), either told Majekodunmi that he had witnessed Davis disposing of

the files or that a coworker had told him about the incident. (Id. ¶¶ 30; Pl. Dep.

at 123:25.) In the course of investigating those allegations, Majekodunmi

demanded that Davis provide a written statement about the accusation. (Def.’s

Stmt. ¶31.) Davis refused to do so, insisting he would comply only if

Majekodunmi provided him with more information or evidence regarding the

incident. (Id.) Although Davis admits he didn’t provide a written statement, he

denies that he ever discarded the files. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 30.) Davis also points out

that there is conflicting evidence about witness accounts of the incident in

2018: Majekodunmi said Carrazana reported personally witnessing Davis

discard the files while Carrazana himself testified that another employee had

told Carrazana that she had witnessed it. (Id. ¶¶ 30–31, 58–60.)

Lastly, although Majekodunmi never reported to anyone that Davis was

ever violent or aggressive, Majekodunmi nonetheless says that Davis was

“disrespectful in his discourse” towards him, had a negative attitude, and

raised his voice. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34, 39; Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 33, 34.)

2. Legal Standard

The Court applies the familiar legal standard for summary-judgment

motions. “Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits,

depositions, admissions, and the like show that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned

up). “[T]o survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must . . . make a

showing sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably find on its behalf.” Id. “An

issue of fact is ‘material’ if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect

the outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256,

1259–60 (11th Cir.2004). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a

whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at

1260. All the evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).

3. Analysis

The County moves for summary judgment on all four of Davis’s claims—

(1) race discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

the FCRA (counts one and three); and (2) age discrimination under both the

ADEA and the FCRA (counts two and four).2 According to the County, Davis’s

discrimination claims fail because (1) he is unable to establish his prima facie

case under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas3 as to either his age

or race claims; (2) even if was able to make out that prima facie case, he has

not overcome the County’s proffer of several legitimate reasons that justify

Davis’s termination; and (3) aside from the McDonnell Douglas framework, he

has not otherwise carried his burden of identifying circumstantial evidence

sufficient to allow a jury to infer unlawful discrimination. (Def.’s Mot. at 12–17;

Def.’s Reply at 2–10.) In opposition, Davis points to evidence he says not only

establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, but that also sufficiently lays

out a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to

2 As explained more fully below, because the Court ultimately finds summary judgment

warranted on Davis’s two federal claims, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

his remaining state-law claims.

3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

infer intentional discrimination.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 12–14.) Davis also maintains he

has produced evidence undermining the County’s proffered reasons for his

termination, establishing that those reasons were mere pretext for the County’s

illegal discrimination. (Id. at 15–18.) After careful review, the Court finds

summary judgment warranted because Davis has failed to carry his burden of

identifying enough evidence that would ultimately allow a reasonable jury to

infer intentional discrimination.

“Discrimination claims—whether they are brought pursuant to Chapter

VII, § 1981 or the ADEA—are analyzed in the same manner.” Pope v. Park

Springs, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-01395-JPB, 2024 WL 4063558, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept.

5, 2024). Without direct evidence of discrimination—which is not at issue in

this case—Davis must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove his

discrimination claims. No matter whether the evidence is viewed through the

lens of the burden-shifting framework developed in McDonnell Douglas, the so-

called convincing-mosaic approach, or some other vehicle used to marshal the

presentation of evidence, an employee aiming to ward off summary judgment

must, in the end, simply present enough “circumstantial evidence that would

allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination.” Scott v. Macon Bibb Cnty.

Georgia, No. 24-11388, 2025 WL 1905365, at *3 (11th Cir. July 10, 2025).

A. McDonnell Douglas Framework.

One of the ways Davis attempts to prove his case is through the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under this framework, a

plaintiff must first set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. With respect

to his age-discrimination claim, Davis has to show (1) he was at least forty

years old at the time he was terminated; (2) he was qualified for the position he

held; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) he was

either replaced by a younger employee or was treated less favorably than

younger employees who were “similarly situated.” Horn v. United Parcel

Services, Inc., 433 F. App’x 788, 792 (11th Cir. 2011). The evidence Davis

needs to establish his prima facie race-discrimination case is similar: he must

show (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was subjected to an adverse

employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position he held; and (4) he was

replaced by someone outside his protected class or treated less favorably by his

employer than “similarly situated” employees outside his protected class.

Bowens v. Escambia Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 22-11560, 2023 WL 4145424, at *2

(11th Cir. June 23, 2023). For both claims, a prima facie case establishes “a

presumption of unlawful discrimination against the employee.” Id. Once the

presumption is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to “rebut

that presumption by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

adverse employment acts.” Id. Finally, if the employer is successful, the burden

shifts back to the employee “to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact that the employer's articulated reasons are a pretext for

unlawful discrimination.” Id. After careful review, the Court finds Davis has

likely satisfied his minimal burden of establishing his prima facie case but has

failed to identify evidence supporting his claim that the County’s proffered

reasons for his termination are really just pretext for unlawful race or age

discrimination.

(1)Davis has established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.

There is no real dispute as to the first three elements of each prima facie

case: Davis, at the time he was fired, was over forty and white; his employment

was terminated; and it appears he was qualified for his position. Instead, the

parties’ quarrels as to Davis’s discrimination claims center on the fourth

element of each respective prima facie case: whether Edwards—Davis’s Black

subordinate who was some twenty-five years Davis’s junior—replaced Davis

upon his termination.

As the County views it, Davis could not possibly have been replaced by

someone outside his race or by someone substantially younger because Davis’s

position was never filled at all upon his termination. (Def.’s Mot. at 12, 13–14;

Def.’s Reply at 1–2.) In support, the County points to (1) Davis’s own testimony

that his position—the BCC Director of Policy and Legislation—“was not filled”

(Pl. Dep. at 169:9–10); (2) Majekodunmi’s testimony that Davis’s position “was

abolished after he was terminated,” that Majekodunmi handled Davis’s duties

involving managing external communications and relationships, and that

Davis’s various projects were distributed across the research team

(Majekodunmi Dep. at 163:12–13, 20–23, ECF No. 52-4); and (3) Edwards and

Majekodunmi’s testimony that Edwards’s duties remained the same after

Davis’s termination, with Edwards’s continuing to supervise the same group of

people when he was promoted to senior research manager in August 2020, as

he did when he worked as a senior research analyst, before that (Edwards Dep.

at 18:17–21, 20:7–18, ECF No. 52-3; Majekodunmi Dep. at 203:7–8). In

opposition, Davis draws attention to a memorandum that Majekodunmi issued

to the BCC Operations Manager, in May 2020 (three months after Davis’s

February termination). (Pl.’s Resp. at 13.) In that memo, Majekodunmi

requested a 5% salary increase for Edwards, retroactive to February, explaining

that, since Davis’s termination, Edwards had been “responsible for the

operation and supervision of all staff in the legislative section . . . in an

immediate acting role due to the vacancy” created by Davis’s departure. (May

2020 Mem., ECF No. 52-5, 37.) Additionally, Davis highlights Edwards’s own

testimony that the County “reclassified [Davis’s] position” and ultimately

appointed Edwards to a “downgrade[d]” version of it. (Edwards Dep. at 71:15–

19.)

The Court finds the evidence Davis points to likely sufficient to introduce

a genuine issue of material fact as to the fourth element of his prima facie case.

As a starting point, the Court does not find it necessarily dispositive that the

County did not promote Edwards into Davis’s exact title and position. See

Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing

that even where a plaintiff’s position is “restructured and relabeled,” and even

if some of the plaintiff’s duties are redistributed to various other employees, a

plaintiff can still establish that he was replaced by an employee outside of his

protected class); Vahey v. Philips Elecs. N.A. Corp., 461 F. App’x 873, 875 (11th

Cir. 2012) (noting that “a plaintiff may demonstrate that he was replaced when

another employee assumes the plaintiff’s responsibilities in addition to their

own responsibilities after the plaintiff is terminated”). In addition, the County’s

own memo—describing Edwards as taking over responsibilities in an “acting

role,” as a result of Davis’s termination—is at odds with Edwards and

Majekodunmi’s testimony that, post Davis’s departure, Edwards’s position and

duties were unchanged. Though not overwhelming, the Court finds this

sufficient, especially in light of a plaintiff’s “low bar to hurdle,” in establishing a

prima facie case, to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Davis

was replaced by someone younger, as well as outside Davis’s race. Flowers v.

Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015).

(2)The County has proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

Davis’s termination.

Assuming Davis has met his burden of establishing his prima facie case

(and it appears he has), the Court turns to the County’s proffer of several

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that it says prompted Davis’s

termination. According to the County, Davis’s termination resulted from what

the County describes as Davis’s antagonistic, insubordinate, and disrespectful

behavior towards Majekodunmi, evidenced by several incidents where Davis

failed to follow Majekodunmi’s instructions, directives, or demands. (Def.’s Mot.

at 12–13.) More specifically, for example, Davis sent out emails and other

documents without Majekodunmi’s approval, which he was explicitly directed

to obtain, and without fixing language he was told to fix. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 19,

21, 26, 27, 28.) Similarly, Davis failed to complete certain research tasks

assigned to him through an April 2019 work-allocation plan. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 20,

23.) In fact, two months later, Edwards reported to Majekodunmi that, in direct

defiance of Majekodunmi’s directive, Davis told Edwards not to assign similar

research items to him on the June work plan. (Id. ¶ 25.) The County also says

Davis refused to provide a statement about a 2018 incident, involving the

improper disposal of audit files, that Majekodunmi was investigating in 2019

and early 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 30–32.) Finally, Majekodunmi maintains he felt Davis

generally had a “negative attitude,” was insubordinate and “disrespectful in his

discourse,” and would “raise[] his voice” during meetings where he was

criticized. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.)

Davis does not dispute that the County has proffered legitimate reasons

for his termination, thus rebutting his prima facies case. Certainly, the

County’s account of Davis’s repeated insubordination and performance

issues—if true—could reasonably justify the County’s firing him. Accordingly,

the County’s proffer, and the evidence identified supporting its proffer, is

“sufficient to dispel any presumption created by [Davis’s] prima facie case and

shift the burden back to [him] to demonstrate that this explanation was simply

a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Phillips v. Legacy Cabinets, 87 F.4th

1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2023).4 The Court finds Davis fails to carry this burden,

as set forth below.

(3) Davis’s fails to discredit the County’s proffers or show that the

proffers were fabricated to cover up intentional discrimination.

“To establish pretext, an employee must cast sufficient doubt on the

employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that they were not what actually motivated its conduct.”

Phillips, 87 F.4th at 1323–24 (cleaned up). To do this a “district court must

evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns,

4 As an aside, the Court does not consider the County’s subjective characterizations—that

Davis had a negative attitude, was disrespectful in his discourse, and raised his voice when

criticized—in its pretext analysis. This does not mean the Court finds those proffered reasons

pretextual, or false; it just means the County has not “articulate[d] clear and reasonably

specific factual bas[e]s upon which it based its subjective opinion[s],” rendering them

insufficiently supported by the record to be considered in sustaining the County’s motion for

summary judgment. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgt. Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349

(11th Cir. 2007). Conversely, Davis’s mere disagreement with Majekodunmi’s generalized

characterization of Davis’s behavior, also without any supporting specific factual bases, does

not amount to a showing of pretext. See id. (“Absent evidence that subjective hiring criteria

were used as a mask for discrimination, the fact that an employer based [an employment]

decision on purely subjective criteria will rarely, if ever, prove pretext.”). In other words, neither

side’s reliance on subjective criteria alone moves the needle in either direction.

106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court finds Davis has failed to do

so.

In seeking to undermine the County’s proffered reasons for his

termination, Davis argues (1) the County’s explanations for firing him have

shifted since his termination; (2) Majekodunmi’s statement, at the time of his

termination, that Davis was not meeting his “vision” for the office is

“insufficient and questionable”; (3) the County’s description of Davis’s not

finishing his work, not complying with Majekodunmi’s directives, and otherwise

being disrespectful is disputed; (4) the County’s version of events regarding the

discarded audit files are disputed; (5) other employees were insubordinate but

were never disciplined; (6) the County’s version of Edwards’s removing Davis

from the work-allocation list is disputed; (7) the County failed to follow its own

policies in that it didn’t afford Davis an opportunity to address any alleged

deficiencies like it did for other employees and Davis was never disciplined for

any deficiencies; and (8) contrary to County policies, Davis never received an

annual evaluation like other employees did. The Court is not persuaded that

these issues, whether considered together or isolation, could lead a reasonable

factfinder to conclude the County’s proffered legitimate reasons are unworthy

of credence or that they are mere cover for unlawful discrimination.

First, the Court finds Davis’s criticism about the only reason given to him

at the time of his termination—that he wasn’t meeting Majekodunmi’s

“vision”—and the purportedly shifting reasons the County proffers now, in

litigation, unavailing. To begin, while it is true that not meeting Majekodunmi’s

vision was the only reason the County provided when it fired him, the County

has since specified several underlying factors that motivated its decision,

including instances of Davis’s performance falling short and disobeying

Majekodunmi’s explicit orders. Accordingly, although it’s possible that, in a

vacuum, not meeting Majekodunmi’s “vision” “could’ve meant that

[Majekodunmi] had a plan for how the office would run and he didn’t see Davis

as a part of that ideal office . . . because of his race or age,” Davis fails, now, to

identify record evidence that would support that inference. Davis, 2024 WL

4051215, at *5. In other words, to the extent Davis banks on just the existence

of Majekodunmi’s statement—that Davis was not meeting his “vision”—to

support his contention that the County’s proffered reasons are mere pretext, he

falls short: “there [are] many meanings behind the term [and] it can be applied

in various ways.” Id. The use of the term itself does not render the other

reasons now proffered pretextual. In fact, the record evidence supports a

contrary inference. That is, to the extent the legitimate reasons the County now

proffers, justifying Davis’s termination, are not shown to be pretext, they

support a more benign interpretation: that Davis didn’t meet Majekodunmi’s

“vision” for the office because of performance issues and insubordination.

In the same vein, Davis’s characterization of the County’s proffered

reasons for his termination as “shifting,” without any analysis, is unconvincing.

(Pl.’s Resp. at 17.) Davis fails to explain how the County’s proffered

performance and insubordination reasons are at odds with being told he wasn’t

meeting Majekodunmi’s vision when he was terminated. This case is a far cry

from the cases Davis relies on where testimony revealed that the employers’

proffered reasons, in litigation, were diametrically at odds with the reasons

those employers had given prior to litigation. E.g., Bechtel Const. Co. v. Sec. of

Lab., 50 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (where an employer told an

administrative law judge that an employee was not dismissed because of his job

performance or arthritis but because of his “gung ho nature”; and then later,

during the relevant litigation, said just the opposite—that the employee was

terminated because of his poor job performance which was exacerbated by his

arthritis); Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir.

2012) (“[T]he corporate executive who terminated the plaintiff for alleged

misconduct later said that the plaintiff was an exceptional employee who had

done nothing wrong, had done everything right, and should not have been

fired.”).

Davis next maintains that he has sufficiently disputed all the County’s

alleged incidents of insubordination. (Pl.’s Resp. at 17.) This is simply not true.

First, there is no dispute that Majekodunmi issued a directive, shortly after

becoming the Commission Auditor, that work product for the research team

should not be published from the office without his prior approval. (Def.’s Stmt.

¶ 15; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 15.) There is also no real dispute that, despite this directive,

Davis, more than once, sent out documents, without Majekodunmi’s prior

approval. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 21, 26, 27, 28; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 21, 26, 27, 28.)5 Davis’s

suspicion that he might not have received Majekodunmi’s November 2019

email, asking why “all the special reports were sent to the commissioners

before [his] approval,” does not amount to evidence that Majekodunmi did not

actually send it. Nor does Davis’s testimony, that the email “doesn’t smell

5 Davis asks the Court to strike four November 2019 emails, from Davis to various

commissioners, attaching reports, that the County appended to Majekodunmi’s affidavit in

support of the County’s motion for summary judgment. Davis complains these documents were

never produced during discovery and therefore should be excluded from the Court’s review.

These emails simply bolster Majekodunmi’s otherwise unrebutted testimony—that Davis

published reports to commissioners without Majekodunmi’s prior approval. Davis also does not

deny sending the emails though he implies he could have gotten approval before sending them

out. Regardless, because the Court’s decision does not turn on these four emails (Majekodunmi

Aff., Ex. A, ECF No. 52-6, 4–7), the Court denies Davis’s request as moot.

right,” without more, allow the Court to infer that the email is not legitimate.

See U.S. v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (“An entirely conjectural

and uncorroborated conspiracy theory does not transform an otherwise

trustworthy document into an untrustworthy one.”). Second, there is also no

dispute that Davis failed to heed Majekodunmi’s instruction to eliminate

redundant language from published office memoranda that repeated language

from the “issue” sections in the “analysis” sections. (Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 19, 21; Pl.’s

Stmt. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Similarly, Davis offers no evidence that controverts the

County’s complaint that, in April 2019, of all the action items identified on a

work allocation list, only Davis’s assignments had not been completed. (Def.’s

Stmt. ¶¶ 20; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 20.) Finally, there is no real dispute that Davis,

upon Majekodunmi’s demand, refused to provide a written statement about the

2018 document-disposal incident that Majekodunmi was investigating. (Def.’s

Stmt. ¶ 31.) Davis says he agreed to produce a statement about the discarded

files once Majekodunmi provided him with more information about the

allegations against him. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 31.) But that is not the same as “never

refus[ing] to provide a statement to [Majekodunmi] regarding missing audit

files,” as Davis characterizes his position. (Davis Aff., ¶ 12, ECF No. 59-14.)

That is, a conditional offer to comply does not equate to actual compliance.6

On the other hand, though, there is an actual dispute regarding the

County’s proffer that Davis commanded Edwards, in direct defiance of

Majekodunmi’s instruction, to remove Davis from the work-allocation plan, in

June 2019. Ultimately, however, the Court does not find this dispute material.

Edwards and Davis have conflicting accounts of what happened: Edwards says

Davis told him to remove Davis from the work plan; Davis maintains that never

happened, surmising that Edwards simply made a mistake in leaving him off

the list. Viewing that testimony in the light most favorable to Davis, then, the

Court assumes, for current purposes, that Davis didn’t tell Edwards to leave

Davis off the June work-allocation plan. But that still leaves Majekodunmi’s

contemporaneous understanding of the situation unrebutted: Edwards, in

June 2019, told Majekodunmi that Davis had directed Edwards not to assign

any work items to Davis on the June plan. Since there is no evidence showing

that Davis, or anyone else, ever corrected Majekodunmi’s misunderstanding of

what had happened, Majekodunmi was left with the impression, mistaken

6 Davis also argues that the record reflects conflicting versions of the allegations surrounding

the accusation that Davis discarded the audit files. While there were certainly inconsistencies

among the details surrounding the witnessing of the incident—in terms of who saw what, who

reported what to whom and when, and so on—there is no evidence that the accusation itself

was fabricated by Majekodunmi (or anyone else) or that Majekodunmi had anything other than

a genuine interest in investigating the accusation that Davis had improperly disposed of

documents.

though it might have been, that this was just a “case of Mr. Davis instructing

staff to do the opposite of what [Majekodunmi] directed him to do.”

(Majekodunmi Dep. 137:5–7.) In other words, even though Majekodunmi may

have been misinformed by Edwards about what really happened, that doesn’t

amount to a showing that the decisionmaker himself wasn’t giving “an honest

explanation of [his] behavior.” Kragor, 702 F.3d at 1310–11.

The Court finds Davis’s other attempts to undermine the County’s proffer

of legitimate reasons that it says justified the termination similarly

unpersuasive. For example, Davis complains that none of the infractions the

County identifies are corroborated by written evidence of disciplinary

measures. First, this is not entirely correct—there are several emails from

Majekodunmi to Davis in which Majekodunmi calls out a deficiency or incident

and directs Davis to take remedial action. (E.g., Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 19, 20, 29

(identifying several emails from Majekodunmi to Davis, instructing Davis to

correct verbiage that is repeated in the “analysis” section from the “issue”

section; opining that “only [Davis’s] items were not completed” and that Davis

“will have to support [his] team better next cycle”; and asking why various

reports were sent to commissioners without first obtaining Majekodunmi’s

approval).) Second, even if there was no formal “disciplinary paperwork,” Davis

doesn’t explain how this alone amounts to evidence showing that the County’s

proffered explanations for Davis’s termination are unworthy of credence. That

is, without more, Davis fails to persuade the Court that it can infer dishonesty

from what could be described as nothing more than a shoddy business

practice. See Short v. Mando Am. Corp., 601 F. App’x 865, 874 (11th Cir. 2015)

(noting that quarreling with an employer’s “business judgment and with the

company’s purportedly subjective reasons for its decision,” do not amount to a

showing of pretext). Ultimately, “[a]n employer may fire an employee for a good

reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at

all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Chapman v. AI

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up).

This same analysis applies to Davis’s complaints about Majekodunmi

and the County’s failure to reduce various policies and procedures to writing;

and the de minimis nature, as Davis sees it, of Davis’s admitted infractions.

But again, these arguments amount to nothing more than criticisms of the

County’s business decisions without tying that alleged lack of professional

competence to a lack of honesty. In other words, “federal courts do not sit as a

super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”

Id. (cleaned up). This is so regardless of “how medieval a firm’s practices, no

matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the

firm’s managers” may be. To demonstrate pretext a plaintiff must do more,

providing “concrete evidence in the form of specific facts” that the employer’s

proffered reason was fabricated to cover up the alleged discriminatory reasons

animating its decision. Dent v. Georgia Power Co., 522 F. App’x 560, 563 (11th

Cir. 2013).

Conversely, Davis’s arguments about the County’s failure to ever

evaluate him or give him opportunities to improve are a little different. As Davis

points out, the County has a policy that each staff member should be provided

a formal performance at least annually and that employees should be afforded

opportunities to improve. But, says Davis, he was not given an opportunity to

improve and, unlike, both Edwards and Majekodunmi, Davis was never given

an evaluation throughout his entire tenure at the County. Davis argues these

deviations are evidence of pretext. While certainly “an employer’s deviation from

its own standard procedures may serve as evidence of pretext,” Hurlbert v. St.

Mary's Health Care System, Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006)

(emphasis), Davis fails to explain why the deviations in this case, combined

with the undisputed incidents of insubordination, would be sufficient to

support an inference of pretext here. This is so even though both Edwards and

Majekodunmi were evaluated. During the relevant period, Majekodunmi was

not responsible for Edwards’s evaluation, rather Davis himself was. Nor,

obviously, was Majekodunmi responsible for his own evaluation. In contrast,

Majekodunmi alone was responsible for Davis’s evaluation and there is no

evidence that Majekodunmi, while he worked with Davis, was evaluating other

employees while not evaluating Davis.

Furthermore, there is no record dispute that, despite the County’s policy,

both Edwards and Majekodunmi’s evaluations were issued late. For example,

Edwards’s evaluation was not issued until February 2019 even though it

covered the period ending in July 2018, (Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 44); and Majekodunmi’s

evaluation was not issued until December 2021, but covered the employment

period ending in October 2020 (Pl.’s Index, Majekodunmi Perf. Eval., ECF No.

59-9). In other words, while Majekodunmi’s failure to issue an evaluation for

Davis may have violated County policy, there is no evidence that

Majekodunmi’s failure to do so was an aberration as a matter of practice.

Indeed, since Davis and Majekodunmi only worked together for just over a

year, the Court would be hard pressed to say that Majekodunmi’s failure to

issue Davis a performance evaluation in that timeframe is evidence of pretext.

All in all, the Court finds Davis has failed to tie the deviation from policy, in

this instance, to pretext. Cf. Rojas v. Fla., 285 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“[A] plaintiff must also show that the deviation from policy occurred in a

discriminatory manner.”) (cleaned up); Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352,

1356 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting “deviation from company policy not evidence of

discrimination, absent a nexus between deviation and employee's protected

status”); Eubanks v. Henry Cnty., 626 F. App’x 250, 255 (11th Cir. 2015) (“an

employer’s failure to follow an employment policy or procedure does not

necessarily indicate that an employer's proffered reason was a pretext”).

But, even assuming Davis was able to cobble together a showing of some

pretext, he has still not come forward with record evidence that such pretext

was a cover for unlawful discrimination. “It is not enough, in other words, for [a

plaintiff] to prove that [her employer] is lying about the true reason for her

termination; to escape summary judgment, she must produce sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the true reason was discrimination.”

Phillips, 87 F.4th at 1325.

In support of his claim that he was discriminated against, Davis points to

instances where he claims other employees were insubordinate, like he was,

but were not terminated. For example, he complains that Majekodunmi did not

discipline Edwards for removing Davis from the work-allocation plan. But

Davis fails to explain why the Court can look to Edwards as a proper

comparator. This is especially problematic where there is no dispute that (1)

Edwards was Davis’s subordinate; (2) as far as Majekodunmi knew, Edwards

was simply following directions from his supervisor—Davis—and not

intentionally disregarding Majekodunmi’s directive; and (3) there is no evidence

that Edwards, unlike Davis, had engaged in multiple other incidents of

insubordination. So, even though, at this stage, Davis isn’t required to

establish that Edwards is a strict comparator (as would be necessary, for

example, if relying on comparator evidence to establish his prima facie case

under McDonnell Douglas), Davis nonetheless fails to establish the relevance of

Majekodunmi’s allegedly disparate treatment of Edwards as compared to Davis.

Davis’s reliance on Carrazana as a comparator is even weaker. Davis

complains that Carrazana was not disciplined for failing to retrieve the files

that he alleged Davis had discarded. But Davis fails to explain how Carrazana’s

situation is at all relevant to Davis’s. Davis also fails to show how

Majekodunmi’s disparate treatment of Davis, as compared to Carrazana, could

be construed as discriminatory when (1) the evidence indicates the two men

were about the same age, and (2) there is no evidence establishing Carrazana’s

race, other than Davis’s describing him as Hispanic. Additionally, to the extent

Carrazana was arguably insubordinate for failing to retrieve the files he said

Davis discarded, Carrazana’s position was subordinate to Davis’s, the

purported insubordination had taken place long before Majekodunmi assumed

the position of Commission Auditor, and, like, Edwards, there is no evidence

that Carrazana had engaged in all the other incidents, or types of incidents, of

insubordination that Davis had. In sum, Carrazana and Edwards are so

dissimilarly situated, as compared to Davis, that Davis’s reliance on them as

comparators, to show intentional discrimination, in the pretext context. is

unavailing.

Nor does Davis establish how a factfinder could infer unlawful

discrimination from the evidence supporting his prima facie case. While

adequate to meet the first hurdle in the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Davis fails

to show how that evidence alone would enable a factfinder to infer unlawful

discriminatory animus. “Being replaced by someone outside one’s protected

class can help to establish the prima facie case of discrimination for burden-

shifting purposes,” “[b]ut it is not enough to carry the day on the substantive

question of discrimination.” E.g. Ossmann v. Meredith Corp., 82 F.4th 1007,

1019 (11th Cir. 2023). This is especially so here, where there is (1) undisputed

evidence of Davis’s insubordination; (2) undisputed evidence that, despite

Edwards’ filling a portion of Davis’s role, Edwards continued to supervise the

same employees, Majekodunmi took over the role Davis had managing external

communications and relationships, and Davis’s research projects were

distributed across the remaining members of the research team (Def.’s Reply at

2 (citing Majekodunmi Dep. at 163:9–24); (3) undisputed evidence that Davis’s

exact position was terminated; (4) no evidence that Edwards was unqualified to

be promoted into the vacancy created by Davis’s departure; and (5) no

evidence, other than Davis’s suspicions and innuendo, that Edwards or Davis’s

races or ages played a role in Majekodunmi’s decision-making process.

In sum, although Davis arguably made out a prima facie case, under the

McDonnell Douglas framework, he has failed to identify evidence sufficient to

show that the County’s proffered legitimate reasons for Davis’s termination are

fabricated. Further, aside from the evidence supporting his prima facie case,

Davis has not identified other evidence from which a reasonable factfinder

could infer that the County fired him as a result of unlawful age or race

discrimination. See Bogle v. Alabama L. Enf't Agency, No. 23-13947, 2024 WL

4635025, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2024) (“A reason cannot be pretextual,

however, unless it is shown both that the proffered reason was false and that

discrimination was the real reason.”).

B. Davis has failed to otherwise identify record evidence that creates a

triable question of unlawful discrimination.

Davis also argues that, outside the McDonnell Douglas framework, the

record evidence he has identified is enough to introduce a genuine issue of

material fact that the County unlawfully discriminated against him. (Pl.’s Resp.

at 15.) The Court disagrees.

In addition to, or instead of, proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, a plaintiff can simply focus on the “ordinary summary judgment

standard,” more poetically termed the “convincing mosaic” by courts and

parties in the employment-discrimination context. McCreight v. AuburnBank,

117 F.4th 1322, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]o the extent the term ‘convincing

mosaic’ has become a distraction, we again reiterate that this approach to

analyzing the evidence treats an employment discrimination suit in the same

way we would treat any other case—jumping directly to the ultimate question

of liability and deciding whether the moving party is entitled to judgment at

that stage of the case”) (cleaned up).

While Davis has set forth evidence from which a factfinder could

certainly infer a dysfunctional work environment and poor business practices,

he fails to identify, as described in more detail above, evidence that the

County’s decision to fire him was motivated by discriminatory animus—either

as to Davis’s age or race. See Ossmann, 82 F.4th at 1020 (“[T]he convincing

mosaic inquiry is identical to the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas

framework: both ask whether there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to

infer intentional discrimination.”); Thomas v. Sheriff of Jefferson Cnty.,

Alabama, No. 22-13875, 2023 WL 6534602, at *6 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2023)

(finding no triable issues of discrimination where the plaintiff had failed to

identify evidence of other “animus against non-comparators in the plaintiff's

protected class”; that “the employer had a reason to discriminate such as to

counteract a public perception of leniency”; or that “the [employment] decision

was extraordinarily arbitrary”).

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Having granted summary judgment in the County’s favor on Davis’s two

federal claims, all that remains, then, of his complaint are his two state-law

claims under the FCRA. Once a court disposes of all the claims over which it

had original jurisdiction, it may then, in its discretion, decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over claims that arise only under state law. Having

evaluated this case, and noting that the only federal claims have been disposed

of prior to trial, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state-law claims. The Court thus dismisses, without prejudice,

Davis’s FCRA claims as set forth in counts three and four. See Carnegie–Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Murphy v. City of Aventura,

383 F. App x 915, 918-19 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of pendent

state-law claims after granting summary judgment even where the plaintiff

complained that doing so was “unfair” and “work[ed] an injustice by requiring

her to begin anew in state court”) (cleaned up); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370

F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“encourag|ing] district courts to dismiss any

remaining state claims when ... the federal claims have been dismissed prior

to trial”); Lehman v. Lucom, No. 11-23479-CIV, 2012 WL 1802435, at *7 (S.D.

Fla. May 17, 2012) (Scola, J.), affd, 727 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (granting

the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the federal claims and

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

claims).

4. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the County’s motion for

summary judgment (ECF No. 54) as to Davis’s federal claims of discrimination

under Title VII and the ADEA in counts one and two of his complaint. The

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-

law claims, in counts three and four, and dismisses them without

prejudice.

The Court directs the Clerk to close this case. All pending motions are

denied as moot.

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on August 14, 2025.

(oe N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge