Fidel Santos Mendoza v. Pamela J. Bondi

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-2796

FIDEL SANTOS MENDOZA,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA J. BONDI,

Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A216-405-264

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 8, 2025 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2025

____________________

Before HAMILTON, LEE, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Federal law gives the Attorney

General discretion to cancel removal of an alien who is de-

portable from the United States if, among other conditions,

the alien “establishes that removal would result in excep-

tional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse,

parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.

2 No. 24-2796

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 211–12

(2024). An immigration judge found that petitioner Fidel San-

tos Mendoza satisfies all the criteria to be eligible for discre-

tionary cancellation of removal except the “exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” requirement. He has petitioned

for judicial review of that decision. We find that we have ju-

risdiction to review at least some of his challenges to the de-

nial. But we also find that Santos Mendoza has not shown any

legal error in the finding that his removal would not cause

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his children

who are United States citizens. We therefore deny his petition

for review.

I. Factual Background

Fidel Santos Mendoza entered the United States illegally

in approximately 2006, and he has been here ever since. He

and his wife Feliciana have two children, Anthony and Mi-

chael, who are both United States citizens by birth. In addi-

tion, Feliciana has one child, Brian, from a prior relationship

who lives with her and Santos Mendoza and who is also a

United States citizen. Brian testified that Santos Mendoza has

raised and supported him from an early age and that he con-

siders Santos Mendoza to be his father. If Santos Mendoza is

returned to Mexico, his children will remain in the United

States with Feliciana.

Santos Mendoza is the family’s principal breadwinner. For

the past five or six years, he has worked at a factory in Indi-

ana. He makes approximately $3,600 per month and receives

health insurance through his employer that covers his entire

family. Feliciana also works, but she makes about $1,400 per

month. Santos Mendoza’s removal would undeniably cause

his family financial distress. He believes that if he is returned

No. 24-2796 3

to Mexico, he would probably work as a construction worker

and make very little money. He does not believe that Feliciana

could obtain a better job because she does not have a social

security card, and she needs to care for their children.

By all accounts, Santos Mendoza is a good husband and

father. Feliciana testified that she had been a victim of family

violence in previous relationships and that Santos Mendoza

gives her crucial emotional support. She fears managing the

household alone, both economically and emotionally. Brian

testified that Santos Mendoza is a great man and that his re-

turn to Mexico would be difficult on the family. Santos Men-

doza himself testified that his younger children, Anthony and

Michael, showed symptoms of emotional distress during the

removal proceedings. They became disinterested in school

and extracurriculars and expressed anxiety about the result of

the proceedings, and both were diagnosed with anxiety dis-

orders about a month before the hearing before the immigra-

tion judge.

II. Procedural Background

After Santos Mendoza was arrested for driving on a sus-

pended license and leaving the scene of an accident that

caused property damage, the Department of Homeland Secu-

rity initiated removal proceedings against him. Santos Men-

doza’s Notice to Appear charged him with being removable

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen present

in the United States without having been admitted or paroled.

At a hearing before an immigration judge on February 7, 2018,

Santos Mendoza admitted the allegations contained in the

Notice to Appear and conceded that he is eligible for removal.

He filed an application for cancellation of removal pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

4 No. 24-2796

On May 14, 2021, Santos Mendoza appeared before an im-

migration judge for a merits hearing on his application for

cancellation of removal. Under section 1229b(b)(1), the Attor-

ney General may cancel the removal of an alien who meets

four requirements. He must show (1) continuous physical

presence for at least ten years immediately prior to his appli-

cation; (2) good moral character during that period; (3) no dis-

qualifying convictions; and (4) that removal would result in

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for a qualify-

ing relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Qualifying relatives in-

clude an “alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of

the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence.” § 1299b(b)(1)(D). The government stipulated that

Santos Mendoza had met the requirement of continuous

physical presence in the United States. The judge also found

that Santos Mendoza met the good moral character require-

ment and that he did not have any disqualifying criminal con-

victions. But the judge also found that Santos Mendoza was

not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal because his

removal would not cause “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” to his United States citizen children.

Santos Mendoza appealed the judge’s decision to the

Board of Immigration Appeals. By the time the Board re-

solved the appeal, Brian was too old to serve as a qualifying

relative because he had reached the age of 21. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(b)(1). The Board assumed that Brian remained a quali-

fied relative and affirmed the judge’s decision based on his

dispositive finding that Santos Mendoza did not satisfy the

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requirement.

Santos Mendoza then filed this petition for review.

No. 24-2796 5

III. Jurisdiction

The government first argues that we should dismiss San-

tos Mendoza’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Our jurisdic-

tion over a petition for review of the Board’s decision to deny

cancellation of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Under

section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review either

the Board’s factual findings or a discretionary judgment to

deny cancellation of removal to a person who is legally eligi-

ble for it. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 347 (2022). We re-

tain jurisdiction, however, to review constitutional claims and

other questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In Wilkinson

v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024), the Supreme Court care-

fully parsed section 1252 as applied to cancellation of re-

moval. The Court held that application of the exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship standard to an established set of

facts is a “quintessential mixed question of law and fact” and

therefore reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D) as a question

of law.

Santos Mendoza contends in part that the immigration

judge’s and Board’s finding that his removal would not cause

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his three chil-

dren who are United States citizens was the product of a legal

error. We therefore have jurisdiction over his petition.

The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over San-

tos Mendoza’s petition because his entire argument is prem-

ised on disputes with the judge’s unreviewable factual find-

ings. As we and our colleagues in other circuits have said re-

peatedly, “a petitioner can’t manufacture a legal dispute over

a disagreement on the facts.” Jawad v. Holder, 686 F.3d 400, 404

(7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). We agree that some of Santos

Mendoza’s arguments amount to disagreements with the

6 No. 24-2796

judge’s factual findings. We do not entertain those arguments

here. Nonetheless, Santos Mendoza’s petition presents the re-

viewable claim that the judge’s factual findings show that, as

a matter of law, he meets the exceptional and extremely unu-

sual hardship standard. We have jurisdiction to assess that ar-

gument.

IV. The Merits

Santos Mendoza argues that we should review de novo

the judge’s and the Board’s application of the hardship stand-

ard to the facts. We disagree. The Supreme Court has yet to

determine the precise standard of review for evaluating the

Board’s hardship determination, but in Wilkinson, the Court

explained that the question whether established facts satisfy

the hardship standard “requires close engagement with the

facts,” which “suggests a more deferential standard of re-

view.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222. That instruction is clear

enough that we will not apply de novo review.

Since Wilkinson was decided, circuit courts have engaged

in a fairly abstract debate about a precise formulation for the

appropriate deferential standard of review. See Toalombo

Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 41 (2d Cir. 2025) (collecting cases

from First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh

Circuits declining to select a precise formulation). The Third

and Ninth Circuits have both held that the Board’s hardship

determination should be reviewed for substantial evidence,

as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi,

137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025); Wilkinson v. Attorney

General, 131 F.4th 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2025) (on remand). The

Second Circuit, on the other hand, held that a modestly less

deferential standard of review for clear error applies.

Toalombo Yanez, 140 F.4th at 42.

No. 24-2796 7

One can fairly wonder how different the two standards of

review might be in actual practice. Both standards of review

constrain appellate courts in essentially the same way—by re-

quiring deference to the initial factfinder in the absence of a

clear and unmistakable error. We need not choose here be-

tween substantial-evidence and clear-error review. Under ei-

ther standard, there was no reversible error here. See Donovan

v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985) (“But as so often

in dealing with the standard of review, the verbal formulation

of the standard may not make much practical difference.”). 1

Turning to the substance of Santos Mendoza’s challenge,

we must deny his petition “unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude” that his removal would

cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his

United States citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Be-

cause the Board adopted and affirmed the immigration

judge’s hardship determination without supplementing his

reasoning, we focus our review on the immigration judge’s

decision. See Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 972 (7th

Cir. 2021).

To be eligible for cancellation of removal under section

1229b(b)(1), Santos Mendoza had to show that his removal

1 In addition, we review de novo a petitioner’s argument that the

immigration judge or Board completely ignored evidence in the record

pertinent to his claim. Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir.

2012); Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 978–79 (7th Cir. 2021)

(granting petition for review where immigration judge ignored evidence

of daughter’s developmental delay). That is an avenue through which

petitioners may receive more “meaningful review,” Toalombo Yanez, 140

F.4th at 43, than is otherwise available under the substantial-evidence or

clear-error standards of review.

8 No. 24-2796

would cause hardship that “is substantially different from, or

beyond, that which would be normally expected from the de-

portation of an alien with close family members [in the United

States].” Id. at 975, quoting Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d

991, 995 (7th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original). The hardship

determination is inherently comparative, but “the IJ and

Board must consider individual hardships on their own

terms—generalizations will not do.” Id. at 976, citing In re An-

dazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). The Board

considers “the ages, health, and circumstances” of the appli-

cant’s qualifying relatives. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.

Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001).

Here, the judge properly considered all the relevant fac-

tors and reasonably concluded that Santos Mendoza’s re-

moval would not produce hardship substantially beyond that

which would be ordinarily expected under these circum-

stances. First, the judge reasonably concluded that Santos

Mendoza’s children exhibited anxieties that are alas all too

common for a family in removal proceedings. The judge

noted that Santos Mendoza’s children are generally in good

health and that the removal proceedings had not prevented

them from attending age-appropriate grades in school, but he

did not rely on those facts alone. He acknowledged that the

children had been diagnosed with anxiety by a psychologist

who evaluated them one month before Santos Mendoza’s

merits hearing. But he reasonably weighed that evaluation

against the facts that none of the children had ever been insti-

tutionalized, treated with a form of anti-anxiety medication,

or had a history of therapy. The judge further observed that

“every family member suffers some level of emotional harm”

based on the removal of a loved one and that one would ex-

pect an evaluation prepared one month before “the most

No. 24-2796 9

stressful single event in immigration proceedings” to report

heightened levels of anxiety. That reasonable conclusion is

supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly errone-

ous. We cannot say that any reasonable judge would have to

disagree with it.

Regarding financial hardship too, the judge’s analysis was

supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.

The removal of a primary breadwinner hurts a family finan-

cially, but we cannot say that any factfinder would be com-

pelled to find the financial harm here extremely unusual. In

addition, the judge found that some of the financial conse-

quences of Santos Mendoza’s removal could be mitigated. He

cited Santos Mendoza’s testimony that he would continue to

try and support his children from Mexico. He also relied on

the fact that Feliciana has a job. He rejected Santos Mendoza’s

argument that Feliciana cannot get a better job because she

does not have a work permit or driver’s license, noting that

Santos Mendoza himself had managed to secure a good fac-

tory job without either. Given those findings, we cannot say

that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find

that Santos Mendoza’s removal would produce financial

hardship substantially more severe than the ordinary case.

See also In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA

2002) (“economic detriment alone is insufficient to support

even a finding of extreme hardship,” which is a lower stand-

ard than “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”).

We do not intend to minimize the severity of the financial

and emotional harm that Santos Mendoza’s removal will

cause his family. It is an unfortunate reality that these conse-

quences are common in these cases. See Arreola-Ochoa v. Gar-

land, 34 F.4th 603, 610 (7th Cir. 2022). But the immigration

10 No. 24-2796

judge’s hardship determination did not amount to a legal er-

ror. The petition for review is DENIED.