SMITH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIEL A. S.,1

Plaintiff,

No. 1:24-cv-07859

v.

OPINION

FRANK BISIGNANO,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

Adrienne Freya Jarvis

800 North Kings Highway, Suite 304

Cherry Hill, NJ 08034

On behalf of Plaintiff.

Anne Von Scheven

Catherine Elisabeth Hamilton

Paul B. Waxler

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF PROGRAM LITIGATION

6401 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21235

On behalf of Defendant.

O’HEARN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Daniel A. S.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal from a

denial of Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income by the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (ECF No. 1). The Court did not hear oral

1 Pursuant to this Court’s Standing Order 2021-10, this Opinion will refer to Plaintiff solely

by first name and last initial.

argument pursuant to Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the

Commissioner’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court recites herein only those facts necessary for its determination on this appeal.

A. Administrative History

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”) on March 17, 2020, alleging an onset date of disability beginning January 21, 2020, due

to emphysema, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar II, and generalized anxiety

disorder. (AR 168, 462). Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on August 31, 2020, and upon

reconsideration on November 17, 2020. (AR 168).

On January 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). A hearing was held on April 27, 2022. (AR 99–124). Plaintiff, who was

represented by a non-attorney representative, testified, as did a Vocational Expert (“VE”). (Id.).

The ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application on June 3, 2022. (AR 165–82). Plaintiff

appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, which remanded the matter back to the ALJ for

further review of Plaintiff’s symptom evaluation on November 17, 2022. (AR 188–91).

On remand, a second hearing was held on April 5, 2023. (AR 36–98). Plaintiff, who was

represented by counsel, testified, as did his mother, Lynn Smith, and a VE. (Id.). The ALJ issued

another decision denying Plaintiff’s application on October 4, 2023. (AR 13–28). Plaintiff

appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, which affirmed on June 12, 2024. (AR 1–4). Plaintiff

timely filed an appeal on July 18, 2024, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

(ECF No. 1).

B. Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony

Plaintiff was thirty-four years old at the time of his alleged onset date and had completed

his high school education. (AR 26, 105). At the April 27, 2022 administrative hearing, Plaintiff

testified that he previously worked as a short-order cook, prep cook, warehouse worker, and waiter.

(AR 107, 116, 120–21).

Plaintiff testified2 that he experiences severe episodes of anxiety and social anxiety, racing

thoughts, and memory loss, which he asserts prevent him from working. (AR 43–45, 53, 109–12).

He testified that he struggles to stay focused and requires supervision from his mother to remember

his responsibilities. (AR 48–49, 111). Plaintiff testified that he cannot perform daily activities

consistently without becoming overwhelmed and avoids driving places he is unfamiliar with due

to anxiety. (AR 51–53, 61–68). He also reported chronic back and shoulder pain. (AR 115).

Despite these claimed limitations, the record reflects that Plaintiff is able to complete tasks such

as cooking, exercising at the gym, helping his mother paint, and driving to and from twice-weekly

appointments. (AR 50, 68–69, 77). He also went on several vacations during the period of alleged

disability and reported working part-time with a friend at a moving company. (AR 68–69, 116–

17, 984).

C. Medical History

Plaintiff has been examined by numerous medical professionals throughout the pendency

of his disability claim. The Court will briefly summarize the relevant medical evidence for

purposes of this appeal. This recitation is not comprehensive.

2 The cited testimony comes from both Plaintiff’s initial April 27, 2022 administrative

hearing and his second April 5, 2023 hearing after the matter was remanded.

On January 21, 2020, the date of the alleged onset of disability, Plaintiff was admitted for

inpatient behavioral health treatment after a psychotic episode in which he exhibited “bizarre” and

“irritable” behavior and increasing paranoia. (AR 630). At the time of admittance, Plaintiff had a

history of hospitalizations and treatment for drug induced psychosis. (AR 635, 833, 1288–89,

1501). During one such hospitalization in 2014, he was diagnosed with bipolar I with psychosis

and anxiety disorder. (AR 639). However, prior to the January 2020 hospitalization, Plaintiff was

not taking any medication for his schizoaffective disorder. (AR 636, 1522). During inpatient

treatment in January 2020, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and polysubstance abuse. (AR

633). Although Plaintiff initially refused psychiatric medications, he began a medication regimen

while hospitalized, and his symptoms gradually improved. (AR 631). Plaintiff was discharged

from inpatient care with prescriptions for Haldol, Zyprexa, and Cogentin on February 28, 2020,

after an “adequate” mental examination. (AR 631, 639). Since being discharged and continuing

treatment, Plaintiff’s case manager described Plaintiff as making sustained positive improvement.

(See e.g., AR 2178, 2362).

Plaintiff additionally has a history of drug abuse, specifically the use of “marijuana,

crack/cocaine[,] and heroin.” (AR 630). During his hospitalization in January 2020, psychiatrists

at the hospital opined that his psychosis and schizophrenia is likely exacerbated by substance

abuse. (AR 631). As of March 15, 2023, Plaintiff had been in remission from illicit drugs, including

marijuana and alcohol, for three years, since his inpatient hospitalization. (AR 1478–79). Since

being discharged from inpatient treatment, Plaintiff has remained medication compliant and sober,

and he has seen lasting improvements.

In March 2020, Plaintiff began outpatient medication management with Margaret Ann

Leiter, APN. (AR 639–43). Ms. Leiter noted Plaintiff’s history of “paranoia, decreased sleep, low

moods, racing thoughts, hypomania, agitation, decreased motivation, difficulty concentrating, . . .

[and] periods of some hopelessness [and] helplessness.” (AR 639). Under Ms. Leiter’s care,

Plaintiff tried several medications for managing his symptoms including Zyprexa, Cogentin,

Buspar, Lexapro, Aristada, and Vistaril. (E.g., AR 646, 705, 707, 712). For his reported

concentration and social anxiety issues, Plaintiff was prescribed Wellbutrin, which he has

repeatedly described as helpful in managing his symptoms throughout the course of his treatment.

(E.g., AR 1026, 1103–04).

Plaintiff did not report any of the extreme symptoms that prompted his January 2020

hospitalization during treatment with Ms. Leiter. He consistently denied having hallucinations,

delusions, and suicidal or homicidal ideations during that time. (E.g., 645, 656, 660, 699, 1102,

2374). Ms. Leiter additionally noted that Plaintiff was sleeping and eating normally, abstaining

from drug and alcohol abuse, was medication compliant, had a normal appearance, had a goal-

oriented thought process, and had normal behavior, speech, and affect. (E.g., 1074, 1128, 2374).

In his meetings with Ms. Leiter, Plaintiff regularly reported going to the gym and exercising. (E.g.,

699, 712–13, 974, 1114, 1129). Based on Plaintiff’s self-reports and presentation at appointments,

Ms. Leiter often described Plaintiff as “doing well mentally,” “pleasant,” and “stable.” (E.g., AR

974).

While undergoing medication management, Plaintiff participated in additional forms of

treatment. He began individual weekly therapy sessions in October 2021. (AR 1069). Plaintiff’s

therapist consistently noted that he was doing “[g]reat” or “well.” (E.g., AR 1040, 1046, 1048,

1138, 1140). Plaintiff told his therapist about his personal growth and believed he had made

progress since getting a proper diagnosis and medication. (AR 1182). He additionally participated

in a partial care program twice a week, for six hours each session. (AR 50–51).

Apart from his mental health, Plaintiff was diagnosed with pulmonary emphysema. (AR

678). Additionally, Plaintiff dislocated his shoulder and suffers from shoulder pain, and he attends

physical therapy to manage the pain. (AR 70, 1230).

One medical opinion was submitted regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations. In March

2023, Ms. Leiter opined that Plaintiff has marked limitations in understanding, remembering, and

carrying out simple instructions, and in his ability to make judgments on simple work-related

decisions. (AR 1477–78). Ms. Leiter additionally opined that Plaintiff has extreme limitations in

his understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex instructions, and in his ability to make

judgements on complex work-related decisions. (Id.). Ms. Leiter described marked limitations in

Plaintiff’s ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers, and in his

ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting.

(Id.).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the authority

to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83

(3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to

determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.

2000) (citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The United States Supreme

Court has explained this standard as follows:

Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative

record and asks whether it contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s

factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of substantial in other contexts,

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this

Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means—and means only—such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (cleaned up); see also Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009).

The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and an ALJ’s decision cannot

be set aside merely because a Court “acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.”

Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see e.g.,

Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided

the factual inquiry differently.”) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic or

self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983).

“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of

social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.” Id.

The Court has a duty to “‘review the evidence in its totality,’ and ‘take into account whatever in

the record fairly detracts from its weight.’” K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309,

2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018) (quoting Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp.

277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997)). Evidence is not substantial if “it is overwhelmed by other evidence,”

“really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or “ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict

created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 722 F.2d 1150,

1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language

or adhere to a particular format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient

development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v.

Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

B. Sequential Evaluation Process

The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step, sequential analysis for evaluating a

claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The analysis proceeds as

follows:

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing “substantial

gainful activity[.]” If he is, he is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ moves on to step

two.

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe medically

determinable physical or mental impairment” that meets certain regulatory

requirements. A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” If the claimant

lacks such an impairment, he is not disabled. If he has such an impairment, the ALJ

moves on to step three.

At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal

the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations[.]” If the claimant’s

impairments do, he is disabled. If they do not, the ALJ moves on to step four.

At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity”

(“RFC”) and whether he can perform his “past relevant work.” A claimant’s “[RFC]

is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations.” If the claimant can perform

his past relevant work despite his limitations, he is not disabled. If he cannot, the

ALJ moves on to step five.

At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to

other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] . . . age, education, and work experience[.]”

That examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions posed by

the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” If the claimant can make an adjustment to other

work, he is not disabled. If he cannot, he is disabled.

Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citations and footnote

omitted) (alterations in original).

III. ALJ DECISION

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged substantial gainful activity since

his alleged onset date of January 21, 2020. (AR 19).

At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

emphysema, degenerative disc disease, shoulder disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and anxiety

disorder. (Id.). The ALJ considered these impairments to significantly limit Plaintiff’s ability to

perform basic work activities. (Id.). As for Plaintiff’s substance abuse disorder, the ALJ found that

this condition did not impose more than minimal work-related limitations and was thus non-severe.

(Id.).

At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, individually or in

combination, met or medically equaled the severity of any listing. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ found

moderate limitations in all four broad functional areas: understanding, remembering, or applying

information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting

and managing oneself. (AR 20).

Before making the step four determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to

perform light work subject to the following limitations:

[C]an frequently perform the postural maneuvers, but never climb ladders, ramps

or scaffolds; can only occasionally reach overhead; and must avoid concentrated

exposure to hazards. Additionally, the claimant is capable of simple, routine tasks

that are goal-oriented rather than production-paced in a stable workplace, defined

as one with few, if any, changes of setting, processes and tools, involving only

occasional interaction with supervisors and co-workers, but no significant

interaction with the general public, even by telephone.

(AR 21). In formulating this RFC, the ALJ evaluated the opinion evidence and found the

assessment of Ms. Leiter to be “not persuasive.” (AR 24). Specifically, the ALJ found that Ms.

Leiter’s March 2023 opinion—which assessed marked to extreme limitations in all areas of

functioning, and noted significant trouble with concentrating, short term memory problems,

chronic anxiety, and racing thoughts—was inconsistent with the treatment history as of the date of

examination. (Id.). The ALJ emphasized that the record in its entirety supports Plaintiff’s “good

response to treatment,” and that both Plaintiff’s self-reports and medical professionals’

observations highlighted Plaintiff’s symptom improvement. (AR 25). The records additionally

contained findings that Plaintiff’s more extreme symptoms had been ameliorated through

medication management. (Id.).

At step four, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s RFC along with the physical and mental

demands of a short-order cook, prep cook, warehouse worker, and waiter and found that Plaintiff

was not able to perform any of the jobs as generally performed. (AR 26). Accordingly, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work. (Id.).

At step five, the ALJ, relying on the testimony of the VE, found that a significant number

of jobs—i.e., approximately 220,000 jobs as a sealing operator; approximately 210,000 jobs as an

eyelet machine operator; and approximately 55,000 jobs as an inspector packer—existed in the

national economy and could be performed by an individual of Plaintiff’s vocational profile, which

the ALJ determined to be consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles and the RFC. (AR 27–28). The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act for the relevant time period. (Id.).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his appeal, Plaintiff asserts two alleged errors within the ALJ’s decision. First, Plaintiff

contends that by not accounting for Plaintiff’s inpatient treatment and frequent therapy

appointments in crafting the RFC, the ALJ failed to account for the “total limiting effects” of

Plaintiff’s impairments. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 11). Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed

to properly evaluate Ms. Leiter’s medical opinion. (Id. at 16). The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments

unpersuasive and, for the reasons that follow, affirms the decision of the ALJ.

A. The ALJ Properly Accounted for the Total Limiting Effects of Plaintiff’s

Impairments in Crafting the RFC.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider Plaintiff’s thirty-eight-day

inpatient psychiatric hospitalization beginning on his alleged onset date of disability. (Id. at 14).

He further argues that because of his participation in a partial care program,3 which is necessary

for his continued recovery, he cannot maintain a consistent work schedule. (Id.). The Court is not

persuaded that remand is warranted on either ground.

For a claimant to qualify for DIB, their “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity” caused by an impairment “must last, or must be expected to last, for at least 12 months.”

Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214–15, 225 (2002) (cleaned up) (holding that the Social

Security Administration’s interpretation of the statutory definition of “disability,” as quoted, was

based on a lawful construction of the statute). Thus, short-lived functional limitations that improve

with treatment and resolve within twelve months do not qualify for inclusion in an ALJ finding of

disability. See, e.g., Creegan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 142 F. App’x 567, 569 n.2, 570 (3d Cir.

2005) (“Creegan’s single episode of major depression did not meet the durational requirements of

the Act,” where Creegan “quickly improved with medication”).

The Court agrees that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s time in inpatient care in

crafting the RFC. Although Plaintiff spent thirty-eight days hospitalized at the onset of his alleged

disability, the record shows Plaintiff’s significant improvement with treatment and makes no

mention of any continuing inpatient hospitalization. Further, Plaintiff’s inability to work due to

the inpatient treatment itself did not last twelve months, as he was discharged after thirty-eight

3 Plaintiff’s therapy appointments occur twice weekly, with each appointment lasting six

hours. (AR 50–51).

days with an “adequate” mental examination. (AR 631). Because Plaintiff’s hospitalization did not

prevent him from working for a period of twelve months, and he has improved significantly with

treatment, the hospitalization need not be further considered in crafting the RFC. See Creegan,

142 F. App’x at 569 n.2, 570; Barnhardt, 535 U.S. at 214–15, 225.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider the limiting effect of his ongoing

therapy appointments. Under the Social Security Act, a claimant bears the burden of establishing

their disability as defined by the Act. Messner v. Califano, 496 F. Supp. 1007, 1008 (E.D. Pa.

1980). Where a claimant does not testify that appointments would result in work-related absences

and no medical providers opine on that issue, that fact is “[f]atal” to a challenge if a claimant

appeals on the basis that the ALJ failed to consider work-preclusive absences caused by treatment.

See Curtiss v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35371, 2023 WL 3918687, at *2 (9th Cir. June 9, 2023) (“Fatal to

her challenge here, Curtiss did not present evidence that her monthly appointments would preclude

her from working on a regular and continuing basis.”). Further, partial program obligations are

“clearly scheduled with discrete beginning and end times,” not “sporadic and unpredictable,”

allowing a claimant to maintain a work schedule without creating impermissible absences.

Santiago Hernandez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-18528, 2020 WL 5229373, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept.

2, 2020) (discussing the plaintiff’s partial five hour many days a week hospitalization obligations).

Additionally, this Court has noted that “[m]any applicants might have competing obligations or

scheduling conflicts, even unavoidable ones, that would interfere with regular employment. [Yet,

courts] however, [do not] equate[ ] an obligation, even a court-imposed one, with a disability

within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff did not present evidence at either of his hearings establishing that his

medical appointments would cause work-preclusive absences, nor did any medical provider opine

that these appointments would preclude work attendance. That alone is fatal to Plaintiff’s

challenge. See Curtiss, 2023 WL 3918687 at *2. Even if that were not the case, Plaintiff’s therapy

appointments are “scheduled,” which would allow Plaintiff to maintain a work schedule without

impermissible absences. See Santiago Hernandez, 2020 WL 5229373 at 7. Finally, Plaintiff has

not demonstrated that his therapy appointments are only offered during work hours so as to create

a burdensome scheduling issue, as would be his burden to do. Instead, the record shows that

Plaintiff’s appointments were flexible, often offered via Zoom. (See, e.g., AR 964). The Court

therefore finds that the ALJ did not err in concluding that Plaintiff’s appointments do not preclude

him from maintaining a work schedule.

In short, the ALJ properly accounted for the total limiting effects of Plaintiff’s impairments

in crafting the RFC. The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s consideration, or lack thereof,

of Plaintiff’s inpatient treatment and frequency of therapy appointments.

B. The ALJ Provided a Sufficient and Supported Explanation for Discounting the

Medical Opinion of Ms. Leiter.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion of Ms.

Leiter. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 16–17). Specifically, he argues that the ALJ failed to articulate

how he considered the supportability and consistency factors when determining the persuasiveness

of Ms. Leiter’s opinion, particularly as it relates to Plaintiff’s alleged work-preclusive limitations.

(Id.). Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ’s persuasiveness finding is “not based on substantial

evidence.” (Id. at 20). Plaintiff contends that these alleged deficiencies were not harmless because

the ALJ’s RFC did not adequately reflect his work-preclusive limitations. (Id. at 17). The Court

disagrees.

An ALJ is not required to adopt a medical opinion in full, even when that opinion is deemed

persuasive. Rather, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of medical opinions in accordance

with the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, giving particular consideration to supportability

and consistency. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). The Third Circuit has made clear that it is the ALJ—not treating or examining physicians

or State agency consultants—who must make the ultimate findings on disability and RFC. Id. In

reaching those findings, the ALJ is entitled to weigh all evidence and is not bound to accept any

medical expert’s opinion or theory but may instead weigh the evidence and draw reasonable

inferences. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The ALJ must

consider all relevant evidence and must provide some explanation for rejecting probative evidence.

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The ALJ also has discretion

to resolve conflicts in the evidence and determine the extent to which any opinion should be

credited. Brown, 649 F.3d at 196–97 (citations omitted). The ALJ’s factual findings need not

follow a particular format, so long as the decision includes sufficient development of the record

and explanation of findings to permit meaningful judicial review. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (citation

omitted); see also Jaclyn G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-11101, 2022 WL 2116866, at *6

(D.N.J. June 13, 2022) (noting that ALJ decisions are reviewed “as a whole”) (citation omitted).

Here, the ALJ found Ms. Leiter’s opinion “not persuasive” because it was “not consistent

with the treatment history as of the date of the examination.” (AR 24). Plaintiff claims that the ALJ

has not properly explained his reasoning for discounting these opinions under the supportability

and consistency standard. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 16–20). But the ALJ’s persuasiveness analysis

relied primarily on inconsistency with the overall record, and that inconsistency is well supported

by the record. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff’s symptoms have been largely ameliorated through

medication management and group therapy. (AR 24–25). Plaintiff reported that Wellbutrin

improved his focus and concentration, engages in routine activities like going to the gym, has made

friends in group therapy, and was seeking vocational training as an electrician. (Id.). These

activities are facially inconsistent with Ms. Leiter’s opinion that Plaintiff has marked extreme

limitations in his ability to perform work related activities, such as understanding simple

instructions and interacting appropriately with others. (See AR 1477–78). Although the ALJ’s

discussion of Ms. Leiter’s opinion was brief, he provided supporting analysis and provided an

explanation for finding her opinion unpersuasive. Indeed, the ALJ provided several examples of

how Ms. Leiter’s opinion lacked support from the objective evidence and explained why her

opinion is inconsistent with the record. (AR 24–25). That suffices. See Jones, 364 F.3d at 505

(citation omitted); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (citation omitted); see also Zaborowski v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024) (“[A]dministrative judges [are required] to explain

only the dispositive reasons for their decisions, not everything else that they considered.”); Phillips

v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff also challenges whether the ALJ properly evaluated and explained the

persuasiveness of Plaintiff’s self-described limitations. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 14 at 20–21). Plaintiff

argues that because the ALJ did not adequately consider Ms. Leiter’s medical opinion, the ALJ

could not have properly evaluated Plaintiff’s self-described limitations in relation to the medical

evidence. (Id. at 20). However, as explained above, the ALJ adequately considered the medical

opinion of Ms. Leiter and properly evaluated Plaintiff’s self-described limitations in relation to the

medical evidence.

Accordingly, the ALJ adequately evaluated and explained his findings as to Ms. Leiter.

Though his explanations were concise, they are supported by substantial evidence and the decision,

read as a whole, reveals a clear and rational basis for the weight assigned. The Court finds no

reversible error in the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.

An appropriate Order will follow.

CHRISTINE P. □□ HEARN

United States District Judge

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