Rylander v. Brown

□ Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 11, 2025

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

YUCOB RYLANDER, §

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Plaintiff, §

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V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-2079

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JUDGE SUSAN BROWN, in her Official §

Capacity as Presiding Judge of the Eleventh §

Administrative Judicial Region §

Defendant. §

ORDER

Pending before the Court are several motions: (1) Defendant Susan Brown’s (“Brown”)

Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 8); (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Defer Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss,

(Doc. No. 14); (3) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Brown’s Reply in support of her Motion to Dismiss,

(Doc. No. 15); (4) Brown’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc. No. 16); and (5) Plaintiff's Motion

to Compel and for Sanctions, (Doc. No. 20). After considering the law and arguments of the

parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant Susan Brown’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 8).

Plaintiff's suit is therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed his Complaint against Defendant Susan Brown under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that

Brown, Judge of the 185th Criminal District Court of Harris County and the Presiding Judge of

the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, deprived him of due process and equal

protection rights by failing to recuse, “fabricat[ing a] referral process,” denying him a required

hearing, and “collud[{ing] with opposing counsel” to “extort attorneys’ fees” through fraudulent

means. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Brown entered two orders stating

that a referral from a recused judge had occurred, which Plaintiff alleges did not occur, and that

Judge Brown had no jurisdiction to enter these orders. (/d. at 6). Plaintiff also specifically alleged

in his Complaint that Judge Brown “acted under color of state law and in her official judicial

capacity.” (/d.). In response, Brown moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff had no standing

to sue, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged any of his claims, and any such claims are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity. (Doc. No. 8 at 3-4).

Il. Legal Standard

A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.” FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Similarly, a plaintiff may file a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a counterclaim. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 527 U.S. 1020 (1999). To

defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that

are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court is not bound to accept factual

assumptions or legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for

relief survives a motion to dismiss. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, the court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise

to an entitlement to relief. Jd.

if. Analysis

The Court will start with the question of sovereign immunity because it goes to this Court’s

jurisdiction over the case. See City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (Sth Cir. 2019) (noting

that the district court’s determination of sovereign immunity was jurisdictional). Here, the Court

finds that sovereign immunity applies, and it is therefore without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff s

claims.

“In most cases, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits against

nonconsenting states in federal court.” City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (Sth Cir. 2019).

Here, Plaintiff's suit is against Brown in her official capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Eleventh

Administrative Judicial Region.' An administrative judicial region is a state entity created by

statute. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.042(1). As Brown is being sued in her official capacity as the

Presiding Judge of the Administrative Judicial Region, Plaintiff's suit is properly construed as

against the State of Texas. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

(holding that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather a suit against the official’s office,” which is “no different from a suit against the

state itself”). As such, sovereign immunity would apply to Plaintiff's suit against Judge Brown in

her official capacity. See Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, Tex., 969 F.3d 460,

471 (Sth Cir. 2020) (holding that the immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment “also prohibits

suits against state officials or agencies that are effectively suits against a state”). Thus, because

Both Plaintiff and Defendant refer to Judge Brown as the Presiding Judge of the Second

Administrative Judicial Region, but the statute cited includes Harris County in the Eleventh Administrative

Judicial Region. Further, Judge Susan Brown’s later filings refer to her as Presiding Judge of the Eleventh

Administrative Judicial Region. (Doc. No. 16 at 1).

Plaintiff's claims against Brown are official capacity claims, the suit will be barred by the Eleventh

Amendment unless Texas has consented to the suit, or an exception applies.

First, Texas has not consented to suit. The only avenue for a suit against a governmental

entity here is the Texas Tort Claims Act, which contains a limited waiver of immunity. See Mission

Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 $.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008). This immunity waiver,

however, only applies in Texas state courts and explicitly rejects any waiver of immunity for suits

against judges. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.053 (“(a) This chapter does not apply

to a claim based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this state

acting in his official capacity or to a judicial function of a governmental unit. ‘Official capacity’

means all duties of office and includes administrative decisions or actions.”). As such, Texas has

expressly rejected any waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against judicial officers.

Second, there is no exception to sovereign immunity applicable in this case. There are two

primary exceptions to state sovereign immunity. First, Congress may expressly abrogate state

sovereign immunity. See, e.g., AT&T Commc'ns v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643

(Sth Cir. 2001). Second, the Ex parte Young exception “permits suits for prospective . . . relief

against state officials acting in violation of federal law.” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S.

431, 437 (2004). Here, neither party addresses the question of congressional abrogation so the

question is whether Plaintiffs request of declaratory and injunctive relief is sufficient for the Ex

parte Young exception to apply.

For Young to apply, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) A “plaintiff must name individual

state officials as defendants in their official capacities,” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328

(Sth Cir. 2013); (2) the plaintiff must “allege[ ] an ongoing violation of federal law,” Verizon Md.

Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Ma., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002); and (3) the relief sought must be

“properly characterized as prospective.” Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 471. While Plaintiff does

request injunctive and declaratory relief, his requests do not seek to remedy a continuing violation

of federal law. Plaintiff's Complaint requests that the Court:

“(1) Declare that all judicial orders issued by Defendant Susan Brown related to Plaintiff's

recusal motion are void ab initio; (2) Enjoin Defendant from issuing further orders in

Plaintiff's pending state case or any related matter; (3) Award $5 million compensatory

damages for emotional distress, reputational harm, and attorney’s fees incurred in

attempting to enforce recusal rights. . .; (4) Impose punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 to deter future misconduct by state judicial officers; (5) Award reasonable attorney’s

fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . . .; (6) Refer the matter to the Texas State

Commission on Judicial Conduct for disciplinary proceedings; (7) Grant any additional

relief this Court deems just and proper.”

(Doc. No. 1 at 20-21). The only prospective relief requested is an injunction preventing Brown

from issuing any orders in his case or “any related matter.” (Jd. at 20). Though prospective, the

form of the relief alone is insufficient to trigger Young—there must be a “continuing violation of

federal law.” Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 472. The requested injunction preventing Brown from

“issuing any orders” would not address any continuing violations of federal law. Rather, it asks

this Court to prevent Judge Brown from acting at all—even in legal and permissible ways—to

prevent a potential future violation of federal law. A prophylactic injunction to deter a potential

future unlawful act is not the sort of remedy available through Young. See Green v. Mansour, 474

U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary

to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law[,] . . . [b]ut compensatory or

deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.”). Since

Plaintiff has shown no prospective relief required to end a continuing violation of federal law, the

Young exception to sovereign immunity does not apply.

Finding that Plaintiffs suit is against a state actor in her official capacity, that Texas has

not consented to this suit, and that no exception to sovereign immunity applies, this Court is

without jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 997. As such, the Court

GRANTS Defendant Susan Brown’s Motion to Dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity rendering this Court without

jurisdiction over the case. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant Susan Brown’s Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. No. 8), and DISMISSES Plaintiff's case for lack of jurisdiction.

xX

SIGNED this @ day of August, 2025. \ \

wo — — □□□

Andrew S. Hanen

United States District Judge