“A declaratory judgment plaintiff must 5 plead facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction at the time of the complaint, and post- 6 complaint facts cannot create jurisdiction where none existed at the time of filing.”
How later courts described this case
- “A declaratory judgment plaintiff must 5 plead facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction at the time of the complaint, and post- 6 complaint facts cannot create jurisdiction where none existed at the time of filing.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 Case No.: 25-cv-457-DMS-SBC
PLATFORM SCIENCE, INC.,
12
Plaintiff,
13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
14 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
15 FLEET CONNECT SOLUTIONS LLC, PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
16
Defendant.
17
18
19 Pending before the Court is Defendant Fleet Connect Solutions LLC’s Motion to
20 Dismiss Plaintiff Platform Science, Inc.’s First Amended Complaint for lack of subject
21 matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and improper venue. (“FAC”, ECF
22 No. 18). (“Def.’s Mot.”, ECF No. 19). Plaintiff filed an Opposition, (“Opp’n”, ECF No.
23 24), and Defendant filed a Reply, (“Reply”, ECF No. 28). The matter came on for hearing
24 on July 11, 2025. Christoper S. Marchese and Timothy J. Rawson appeared for Plaintiff,
25 and C. Matthew Rozier and Jonathan L. Hardt appeared for Defendant. For the following
26 reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss
27 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DENIES Defendant’s motion for lack of personal
28 jurisdiction and improper venue.
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Plaintiff Platform Science, a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Diego,
3 California, is a leading manufacturer and provider of modern fleet telematics solutions to
4 customers who operate long-haul, tractor trailer fleets that ship products across the country.
5 (Id. ¶¶ 20, 40); (Opp’n, at 2). Defendant Fleet Connect, a limited liability company based
6 in Texas, is the owner of numerous United States Patents related to fleet management
7 (“patents-in-suit”), including: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,941,223 (“’223 patent”), 7,206,837
8 (“’837 patent”), 7,741,968 (“’968 patent”), 6,429,810 (“’810 patent”), 6,961,586 (“’586
9 patent”), 7,593,751 (“’751 patent”), 8,862,184 (“’184 patent”), 9,299,044 (“’044 patent”),
10 9,747,565 (“’565 patent”), 7,742,388 (“’388 patent”), 7,058,040 (“’040 patent”), 7,260,153
11 (“’153 patent”), 7,596,391 (“’391 patent”), and 7,656,845 (“’845 patent”). (FAC ¶¶ 1, 41).
12 Defendant neither practices the underlying inventions of the patents-in-suit nor
13 competes in the fleet management industry but does actively enforce its intellectual
14 property rights against alleged infringers. (Opp’n, at 2). Plaintiff alleges Defendant has
15 pursued an aggressive enforcement campaign and sued five of its customers in six different
16 lawsuits in California and Texas (“Customer Litigations”) for infringement of the patents-
17 in-suit for use of Plaintiff’s products and services, including Connected Vehicle Device
18 (“CVD”), ELD Tablets, PS DVIR, PS Workflow, PS HOS, PS Navigation, and PS
19 Messages (“Accused Products”). (FAC ¶ 44); (Opp’n, at 3). Plaintiff alleges it has
20 contractual indemnity obligations to customers who use its products and is presently
21 defending two of those customers in the Customer Litigations—Schneider National
22 Carrier, Inc. (“Schneider”) in the Central District of California and Werner Enterprises,
23 Inc. (“Werner”) in Northern District of Texas. To address Defendant’s flurry of lawsuits,
24 Plaintiff filed this action for declaratory judgment of noninfringement of the patents-in-
25 suit.
26 Defendant initiated the Customer Litigations on February 15, 2024, by suing C.R.
27 England, Inc. (“C.R. England”), a Platform Science customer, in the Central District of
28 California for its alleged infringement of the ’810, ’388, ’040, ’153, ’391, and ’845 patents
1 based on C.R. England’s use of products not designed, manufactured, or supplied by
2 Plaintiff. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 4–5); Compl. ¶¶ 1, 17, Fleet Connect Solutions LLC v. C.R. England,
3 Inc., 24-cv-00376 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2024) [hereinafter C.R. England case], Dkt. No. 1.
4 Later, Defendant sought to add claims of infringement of other patents, including the ’837,
5 ’968, ’044, and ’565 patents, based on C.R. England’s “use of the Platform Science
6 Products.” (FAC ¶¶ 4–5); Plt’s Mot. to Am. Compl. at ii., 6, C.R. England case (C.D. Cal.
7 Sep. 30, 2024), Dkt. No. 73. Defendant’s motion to amend to add these claims was denied.
8 (FAC ¶ 4); (Def’s Mot., at 5).
9 Defendant next filed a complaint in the Central District of California on December
10 4, 2024, against Schneider for infringement of the ’223, ’837, ’968, ’586, ’751, ’184, and
11 ’388 patents based on Schneider’s “making, using, [and] selling” of products, which
12 included all of Plaintiff’s Accused Products at issue in the subject declaratory judgment
13 action. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 8–9); FAC ¶¶ 1, 16, 57, 74, 82, 97, 112, 127, 148, Fleet Connect
14 Solutions LLC v. Schneider National Carriers Inc., 24-cv-10435 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2025)
15 [hereinafter Schneider case], Dkt. No. 26.
16 As noted, Plaintiff is actively defending Schneider based on its alleged contractual
17 obligation to defend and indemnify Schneider against Defendant’s infringement claims.
18 (FAC ¶ 19). After the original complaint was filed in Schneider, Defendant’s counsel
19 contacted Schneider’s San Diego-based counsel, Fish & Richardson P.C. (“Fish”), via
20 email about whether Schneider would be open to entering a non-disclosure agreement
21 (“NDA”) with Defendant to facilitate settlement discussion. (FAC ¶ 29); (Opp’n, at 9).
22 During a meet and confer on January 8, 2025, Fish informed Defendant that Fish also
23 represented Plaintiff, and thereafter Defendant’s counsel sent an email to Fish with revised
24 NDA terms that included Plaintiff as a party. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30). The parties agreed to an
25 NDA and discussed settlement, but ultimately were unable to agree on licensing terms. (Id.
26 ¶¶ 31–36).
27 Less than two weeks later, Defendant filed another lawsuit, this time in the Northern
28 District of Texas on January 29, 2025, against Werner for infringement of the ’810, ’388,
1 ’040, ’153, ’391, and ’845 patents based on Werner’s “making, using, [and] selling” of the
2 products, which included Platform Science’s CVD and ELD Tablets. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 10–11);
3 FAC ¶¶ 1, 18, 51, 61, 71, 81, 91, 101, Fleet Connect Solutions LLC v. Werner Enterprises
4 Inc., 25-cv-00233 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2025) [hereinafter Werner case], Dkt. No. 23.
5 Plaintiff is actively defending Werner in that case based on its alleged contractual
6 obligations. (FAC ¶ 19).
7 On February 17, 2025, Defendant sued again, this time naming PACCAR, Inc.
8 (“PACCAR”), a Platform Science partner, in the Eastern District of Texas for infringement
9 not of the patents-in-suit but other Fleet Connect owned patents based on PACCAR’s
10 “making, using, [and] selling” of products, which included all Accused Products in this
11 declaratory judgment action except for the PS DVIR. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 13); (Opp’n, at 5);
12 Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19, 27, 37, 47, 57, 67, 76, Fleet Connect Solutions LLC v. PACCAR Inc., 25-
13 cv-00209 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2025) [hereinafter PACCAR I case], Dkt. No. 1. Defendant
14 voluntarily dismissed PACCAR I when it discovered PACCAR did not engage in any of
15 the allegedly infringing activities. (FAC ¶ 17).
16 On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present action against Defendant, seeking
17 declaratory judgment that none of its Accused Products or use of those products by its
18 customers infringes any of the patents-in-suit. (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 26–27)). After
19 Plaintiff filed this action, Defendant sued Mesilla Valley Transportation (“MVT”), a
20 Platform Science customer, on June 5, 2025, and PACCAR again on June 24, 2025, in the
21 Western and Eastern Districts of Texas, respectively, for infringement of, among others,
22 the ’388, ’040, ’153, and ’845 patents based on PACCAR’s and MVT’s “making, using
23 [and], selling” of products, which include products provided by Platform Science. (Opp’n,
24 at 5–6); Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15–19, 27, 36, 54, 63, Fleet Connect Solutions LLC v. MVT Services,
25 LLC d/b/a Mesilla Valley Transportation, 25-cv-00264 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2025)
26 [hereinafter MVT case], Dkt. No. 1; Compl. ¶¶ 1, 18–22, 30, 39, 57, 66, Fleet Connect
27 Solutions LLC v. PACCAR Inc. d/b/a Peterbilt Motor Co., 25-cv-00658 (E.D. Tex. June
28 24, 2025) [hereinafter PACCAR II case], Dkt. No. 1.
1 Except for PACCAR I, all Customer Litigations are ongoing, with the Schneider case
2 having been stayed pending resolution of the present action. (Opp’n, at 7, 9); Order
3 Granting Def’s Mot. to Stay at 2, Schneider case, (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2025), Dkt. No. 60.
4 Defendant, in its opposition to Schneider’s motion to stay, stated that Plaintiff could
5 potentially be liable for indirect infringement of the patents asserted against Schneider.
6 See Plt’s Opp’n to Def’s Mot. to Stay at 8, 14, 19, 20, Schneider case (C.D. Cal. May 1,
7 2025), Dkt. No. 46. District Judge Hernan Vera, in his order granting Schneider’s motion
8 to stay, identified Platform Science as the “true defendant” and stated Defendant’s
9 “allegations against Schneider are based solely on its use of Platform Science’s products.”
10 Order Granting Def’s Motion to Stay at 2, 5, Schneider case, (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2025),
11 Dkt. No. 60 (emphasis in original).
12 Based on these events, Plaintiff argues there is a substantial controversy of sufficient
13 immediacy and reality between the parties to warrant declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
14 Plaintiff seeks to litigate noninfringement of the patents-in-suit in its home district, the
15 Southern District of California. Defendant disputes subject matter jurisdiction exists for
16 some of the patents-in-suit and argues that for other patents for which subject matter
17 jurisdiction exits and a case is already underway, i.e., Schneider in the Central District of
18 California, Plaintiff must pursue its noninfringement claims in that case and not here in a
19 separately filed declaratory judgment action.
20 II. LEGAL STANDARD
21 Defendant brings this motion to dismiss the FAC in its entirety under Federal Rules
22 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
23 lack of personal jurisdiction, and improper venue, respectively. The governing standard
24 for each is set out below.
25 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
26 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may file a motion to dismiss
27 on the grounds that the Court “lack[s] subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
28 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that an Article III case or controversy existed
1 at the time the claims were filed. Arris Grp., Inc., v. Brit Telecomms PLC, 639 F.3d 1368,
2 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
3 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, a court has subject matter
4 jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action when “the facts alleged, under all the
5 circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
6 legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
7 judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S 118, 127 (2007) (internal
8 quotations omitted). Subject matter jurisdiction generally does not arise when a declaratory
9 plaintiff merely “perceives . . . a patent to pose a risk of infringement, without some
10 affirmative act by the patentee.” SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d
11 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, “a patentee’s aggressive enforcement strategy,
12 even in the absence of direct threats against the declaratory plaintiff” may give rise to
13 subject matter jurisdiction. Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 906 (Fed.
14 Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (holding direct infringement claims against a supplier’s
15 customer by patentee for use of supplier’s products may give rise to indirect infringement
16 liability against supplier and warrant declaratory judgment jurisdiction over supplier’s
17 noninfringement claims). Declaratory judgment jurisdiction must be evaluated on both a
18 “claim-by-claim basis” and a “product-by-product basis.” See Streck, Inc. v. Research
19 Diagnostic Sys., 665 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Jervis B. Webb Co. v. So.
20 Sys., Inc., 742 F.3d 1388, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also DataTern, 755 F.3d at 911 (citing
21 Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 1361, 1373–74 (Fed.
22 Cir. 2004)) (“Declaratory judgment jurisdiction must be determined on a product-by-
23 product basis.”).
24 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
25 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may file a motion to dismiss
26 on the grounds that the Court “lack[s] personal jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In
27 all patent cases, the law of the Federal Circuit applies to determine whether the district
28 court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v.
1 Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to
2 dismiss in the absence of discovery, the plaintiff must present factual allegations that, when
3 viewed as true, create a prima facie case showing personal jurisdiction in the forum state.
4 Id. at 1231.
5 Even where general personal jurisdiction is not available, specific personal
6 jurisdiction may be exercised by a district court in California if the defendant has “certain
7 minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
8 offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
9 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotations omitted); see Goodyear Dunlop
10 Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011); see also Cal. Civ. P. Code
11 §410.10. Such minimum contacts are met under the Federal Circuit’s three-prong test
12 where the plaintiff successfully demonstrates that “(1) the defendant purposefully directed
13 its activities at residents of the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to those activities,
14 and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” Breckenridge Pharm.,
15 Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The relevant activities
16 in a declaratory judgment action are those “which relate in some material way to the
17 enforcement or the defense of the patent[s]” at issue that were purposefully directed at
18 residents of the forum. Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012,
19 1019–20 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324,
20 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because declaratory judgment actions raise non-infringement,
21 invalidity, and/or unenforceability issues central to enforcement of the patents in question,
22 we have looked beyond the ‘arises out of’ inquiry and have found jurisdiction where such
23 ‘other activities’ in some identifiable way ‘relate to’ enforcement of those patents in the
24 forum.” (quoting Breckenridge, 444 F.3d at 1363–67)).
25 C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)
26 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a party may file a motion to dismiss
27 on the grounds that the Court is an “improper venue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Venue for
28 “patent infringement” suits is governed by the patent infringement venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
1 § 1400(b). However, “a declaratory judgment action alleging that a patent is . . . not
2 infringed—the mirror image of a suit for patent infringement—is governed by the general
3 venue statutes, not by § 1400(b).” VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917
4 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by TC Heartland LLC v.
5 Kraft Foods Group Brand LLC, 581 U.S. 258 (2017). The controlling general venue statute
6 provides in relevant part that a civil action “may be brought in … a judicial district in which
7 any defendant resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Entity defendants are “deemed to reside …
8 in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction
9 with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
10 III. DISCUSSION
11 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
12 Subject matter jurisdiction exists for declaratory judgment—satisfying Article III’s
13 “case or controversy” requirements—when “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
14 show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests,
15 of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”
16 MedImmune, 549 U.S at 127 (internal quotations omitted). Defendant argues “there is no
17 actual or imminent injury caused by [Defendant] that is of sufficient immediacy and reality
18 to warrant declaratory relief.” (Mot., at 1.) Defendant contends Plaintiff has not shown
19 that there are or have been “any threats of an infringement suit” against Plaintiff, “demands
20 for royalty payments or licensing agreement, or any actual economic injury as a result of
21 the litigations brought by [Defendant] against [Plaintiff’s] customers based on the
22 customers’ infringement of the [Accused] Patents.” (Id.) (emphasis in original).
23 In Arris, the Federal Circuit held that a supplier has standing to commence a
24 declaratory judgment action “where a patent holder accuses customers of direct
25 infringement based on the sale or use of a supplier’s equipment[] . . . if (a) the supplier is
26 obligated to indemnify its customers from infringement liability, or (b) there is controversy
27 between the patentee and the supplier as to the supplier's liability for induced or
28 contributory infringement based on the alleged acts of direct infringement by its
1 customers.” 639 F.3d at 1375. Plaintiff initially argues it is has standing to bring this
2 declaratory judgment action for 12 of the 14 patents-in-suit because it is contractually
3 obligated to defend and indemnify Schneider and Werner against Defendant’s claims of
4 infringement of those patents. (FAC ¶ 19) (Opp’n, at 14) (“Standing alone, Platform
5 Science’s contractually obligated, customer-tendered defense and indemnity establishes
6 declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”)). “Indemnification obligations aside,” Plaintiff also
7 argues “all of the circumstances” show “tangible and immediate ‘adverse legal interests’”
8 sufficient to “warrant standing to bring this declaratory judgment action as to all patents in
9 the [FAC].” (Id.) These arguments are addressed in turn.
10 1. Platform Science’s Indemnity Obligations
11 Defendant does not challenge that a supplier’s indemnity obligation to a customer
12 may be sufficient to warrant subject matter jurisdiction, but instead argues—as to
13 Schneider—that “this Court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction would be improper
14 since the [subject] action was initiated after the Schneider Litigation.” (Reply, at 3)
15 (emphasis in original). “In that scenario,” Defendant argues, Plaintiff’s “only option is to
16 intervene in the underlying case(s), not to bring a second, later-filed declaratory judgment
17 suit [in another District].” (Id.) This argument concedes subject matter jurisdiction as to
18 the seven patents at issue in Schneider and instead focuses on venue.1
19 Defendant relies on DataTern, which states a supplier “cannot seek a declaration
20 from a New York court on behalf of customers they must indemnify where a suit against
21 these very same customers on all the same issues [is] already underway . . . [and where the
22 supplier] could defend its customers and efficiently and effectively participate in the Texas
23 action.” 755 F.3d at 904 (emphasis in original). Courts have interpreted DataTern to limit
24 the supplier’s ability to seek a declaration of noninfringement to the case already underway,
25 not to file a separate declaratory judgment action elsewhere. See Bambuser AB v. Sito
26
27
28
1 Mobile R&D IP, LLC, No. 23-21757, 2024 U.S. Dist LEXIS 157554, at *10 (D.N.J.
2 Sept. 3, 2024) (“[E]ven an obligation to indemnify ‘would not justify’ what Bambuser
3 seeks here: a case has already been filed against Bambuser’s customer in the Western
4 District of Texas. In agreeing to indemnify their customer, Bambuser could defend SFA
5 and effectively participate in the SFA Action.” (internal citation omitted)); Early Warning
6 Servs., LLC v. Grecia, No. 21-1050, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147548, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
7 6, 2021) (“As Early Warning has an obligation to indemnify Frost Bank against Mr.
8 Grecia's claims, a case or controversy lies between Early Warning and Frost Bank. But
9 [DataTern] instructs us Early Warning should litigate this controversy in connection with
10 the first action.”). Accordingly, Defendant argues—while acknowledging declaratory
11 judgment jurisdiction over the seven patents at issue in Schneider—that Plaintiff’s sole
12 option to litigating noninfringement of those patents is limited to the Central District of
13 California where the Schneider case is pending.2
14 Defendant also argues Plaintiff has no obligation to indemnify Werner, therefore
15 there is no subject matter jurisdiction over the patents at issue in that case.3 Defendant
16 contends that Werner’s “modifications” of Plaintiff’s products and “use” of such products
17 “in combination with other” non-Plaintiff products is the basis for Defendant’s
18 infringement claims against Werner. (Reply, at 5.) “Thus, under the plain terms of
19 Platform Science’s [indemnity] agreement, the enumerated exceptions apply and Platform
20 Science is not obligated to indemnify Werner for any claims of patent infringement.” (Id.
21 at 3-4). However, as Plaintiff points out, Defendant’s claim charts in the Werner case
22 accuse Werner of infringement by “using” Plaintiffs products. (Ex. 18, ECF No. 18-18, at
23 1); (Ex. 23, ECF No. 18-23, at 1); (Ex. 24, ECF No. 18-24, at 1); (Ex. 25, ECF No. 18-25,
24 at 1); (Ex. 26, ECF No. 18-26, at 2); (Ex. 27, ECF No. 18-27, at 1). Plaintiff has sufficiently
25
26
2 Notably, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff must litigate noninfringement of the patents at issue in the
27 Schneider case concedes personal jurisdiction over Defendant in California. This issue is discussed, infra,
at Section III.B.
28
1 demonstrated that it has indemnity obligations to Werner based on Werner’s use of
2 Plaintiff’s allegedly infringing products, and therefore subject matter jurisdiction exists
3 over the patents at issue in Werner.
4 As noted, the Werner case is pending in the Northern District of Texas and is
5 “already underway,” so Defendant would argue that if subject matter exists over the patents
6 at issue in that case, Plaintiff’s sole option is to litigate noninfringement of those patents
7 there and not to bring a separate declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of
8 California. The Court disagrees and finds for the reasons set forth in Section III.C, infra,
9 that venue is proper here.
10 Based upon Plaintiff’s indemnity obligations in the Schneider and Werner cases,
11 Plaintiff has shown that subject matter jurisdiction exists over 12 of the 14 patents-in-suit:
12 the ’223, ’586, ’837, ’751, ’968, ’388, and ’184 patents asserted against Schneider, and the
13 ’810, ’388, ’040, ’153, ’391 and ’845 patents asserted against Werner.4 Regarding the two
14 remaining patents-in-suit, the ’565 and ’044 patents asserted against C.R. England, Plaintiff
15 has not alleged indemnity obligations. Rather, Plaintiff argues other circumstances warrant
16 declaratory judgment jurisdiction over those two patents, and that those circumstances also
17 provide additional grounds for exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction over all the
18 patents-in-suit.
19 2. Other Circumstances
20 In addition to its indemnification obligations, Plaintiff argues:
21 [Defendant] has (1) engaged in an aggressive and systematic campaign to
harass [Plaintiff’s] customers based on mere use of “Accused Products”
22
manufactured by [Plaintiff], (2) the Central District of California [in the
23 Schneider case] found that [Plaintiff] is the “true defendant,” (3)
[Defendant’s] claim charts indicate that it believes [Plaintiff] is at the very
24
least an indirect infringer and extensively rely on Platform Science documents
25 as opposed to documents from other providers or even the customers to show
that alleged infringement, and (4) [Defendant] proposed and drafted an NDA
26
27
4 The ’388 patent is at issue in both Werner and Schneider, so in total 12 of 14 of the patents-in-suit are
28
1 to engage in settlement negotiations with [Plaintiff] in an attempt to resolve
the infringement allegations against the Platform Science products used by its
2
customers.
3
(Opp’n, at 14–15). Regarding the first circumstance—litigation against Plaintiff’s
4
customers based on “mere use” of the Accused Products—it is well established that a
5
supplier’s standing to bring a declaratory judgment action does not automatically exist
6
solely because the supplier’s customers have been accused of infringing a patent based on
7
their use of the supplier’s product. See DataTern, 755 F.3d at 904 (“To the extent that
8
Appellees argue that they have a right to bring the declaratory judgment action solely
9
because their customers have been sued for direct infringement, they are incorrect.”). That
10
Defendant has engaged in an “aggressive and systematic campaign to harass” Plaintiff’s
11
customers adds color to Plaintiff’s characterization of the parties’ dispute, but that
12
allegation is disputed by Defendant and the Court declines to make that finding based on
13
the present record. And the district court’s determination in the Schneider case that
14
Defendant (and not customer Schneider) is the “true defendant” is noted and likely played
15
a role in that court’s determination to stay the action and invite this Court to resolve the
16
larger dispute encompassing the patents-in-suit and Plaintiff’s other customers, including
17
Schneider, but it does not otherwise advance Plaintiff’s argument. These two
18
circumstances, therefore, do not warrant subject matter jurisdiction over any of the patents-
19
in-suit.
20
With respect to the third circumstance—indirect infringement—the Court agrees a
21
controversy exists between the parties regarding induced infringement liability sufficient
22
to confer declaratory judgment jurisdiction over some of the patents-in-suit and some of
23
Plaintiff’s products but not all of them.5 Plaintiff relies on DataTern in support of its
24
argument that there is substantial controversy with Defendant regarding Plaintiff’s liability
25
26
27
5 The Court does not address indirect infringement based on contributory infringement liability because
28
1 for indirect infringement based on an induced infringement theory. DataTern held that a
2 controversy regarding induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) may give rise to
3 declaratory judgment jurisdiction if supported by factual “allegations by the patentee or
4 other record evidence that establish[es] at least a reasonable potential that” the patentee
5 could plausibly bring a claim that “the accused inducer took an affirmative act to encourage
6 infringement with the knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” 755
7 F.3d at 904–05.
8 Specifically, DataTern held that there is a reasonable potential the patentee could
9 plausibly bring a claim of induced infringement when (1) the claim charts provide that the
10 customer allegedly directly infringed the patent based on use of the supplier’s product, and
11 (2) the claim charts show the supplier provided documentation to the customer that instruct
12 for using the product in an infringing manner. See id. at 905. Applying this rule, DataTern
13 reasoned that when the claim charts allege the customer’s direct infringement based on its
14 use of the supplier’s products and documentation, there is an implied assertion of induced
15 infringement when the supplier encouraged acts accused of direct infringement. See id.
16 Finally, DataTern held that “[d]eclaratory judgment jurisdiction must be determined on a
17 product-by-product basis” and refused to find such jurisdiction as to a supplier’s products
18 generally when the use of certain products had not been accused to infringe the patent. Id.
19 at 911 (“The claim charts from the customer suits impliedly asserted indirect infringement
20 based on the use of [SAP’s] BusinessObjects [software], not any other SAP product. While
21 SAP’s complaint and DataTern’s counterclaims invoked SAP products generally, … only
22 BusinessObjects was fairly at issue, and the district court’s judgment could not have
23 extended beyond BusinessObjects.”).
24 Here, Defendant accused Schneider of direct infringement of Claim 19 of the ’223
25 Patent, Claim 1 of the ’837 Patent, Claim 4 of the ’968 Patent, Claim 9 of the ’586 Patent,
26 Claim 6 of the ’751 Patent, Claim 1 of the ’184 Patent, and Claim 1 of the ’388 Patent
27 based on Schneider’s use of each of the Accused Products. (Exs. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
28 22, ECF Nos. 18-15, 18-16, 18-17, 18-19, 18-20, 18-21, 18-22). Instructions extracted
1 from Plaintiff’s website are referenced in each claim element in the claim charts relating
2 to each patent except for the ’388 Patent. Id. Thus, declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists
3 over the ’223, ’837, ’968, ’586, ’751, and ’184 patents because potential liability over
4 Plaintiff’s alleged induced infringement of these patents is apparent given the alleged acts
5 of direct infringement by Schneider and implied allegation of encouragement to infringe
6 by Plaintiff. With respect to alleged infringement of the ’388 Patent, the claim chart cites
7 only to Plaintiff’s documentation in the claim’s preamble, not the claim’s elements. (Ex.
8 22, ECF No. 18-22). Therefore, declaratory judgment jurisdiction over the ’388 Patent is
9 absent as the knowledge element of Plaintiff’s alleged induced infringement is unsatisfied.
10 Because DataTern requires declaratory judgment jurisdiction to “be determined on
11 a product-by-product basis,” each Accused Product also must be separately addressed. 755
12 F.3d at 911. Defendant has accused Schneider of infringing one or more of the patents-in-
13 suit by using “one or more Platform Science fleet management and tracking solutions
14 including, but not limited to, the PS Navigation, PS DVIR, PS Fleet, PS Analytics, PS
15 Telematics, PS Workflow, PS HOS, PS Messages, Fleet Management Software, ELD
16 devices including a connected vehicle device and in-cab Tablets” and “the Connected
17 Vehicle Device (CVD),” a list that includes all of Plaintiff’s Accused Products. (Ex. 15,
18 ECF No. 18-15, at 1); (Ex. 22, ECF No. 18-22, at 1). The “but not limited to” language
19 used by Defendant is found in every claim chart, meaning Defendant could reasonably
20 allege infringement of any asserted patent through use of any of Plaintiff’s “fleet
21 management and tracking solutions” listed in Defendant’s complaint, which contains all of
22 Plaintiff’s Accused Products. (Exs. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, ECF Nos. 18-15, 18-16, 18-
23 17, 18-19, 18-20, 18-21, 18-22); First Amended Complaint ¶ 16, Schneider case (C.D. Cal.
24 Feb. 24, 2025), Dkt. No. 26. Accordingly, because there is potential induced infringement
25 liability against Plaintiff, declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists as to Plaintiff’s claims of
26 noninfringement of the ’223, ’586, ’837, ’751, ’968, and ’184 patents relating to all
27 Accused Products under this theory of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
28
1 Werner has also been accused of directly infringing some of the patents-in-suit,
2 namely Claim 1 of the ’810, ’388, ’040, ’153, ’391, and ’845 patents through its use of
3 Plaintiff’s products. (Exs. 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, ECF Nos. 18-18, 18-23, 18-24, 18-25,
4 18-26, 18-27); FAC ¶¶ 1, 18, 51, 61, 71, 81, 91, 101, Werner case (N.D. Tex. Feb 28,
5 2025), Dkt. No. 23. As noted, Defendant argues that Werner’s infringing activity is not
6 based solely on Werner’s use of the Accused Products, but rather Werner’s use in
7 combination with other products unrelated to Plaintiff. (Reply, at 3–4). However, as also
8 previously noted, each of Defendant’s claim charts in the Werner case belies Defendant’s
9 argument, as each chart clearly accuses Werner of infringement by “using” Plaintiffs
10 products. (Ex. 18, ECF No. 18-18, at 1); (Ex. 23, ECF No. 18-23, at 1); (Ex. 24, ECF No.
11 18-24, at 1); (Ex. 25, ECF No. 18-25, at 1); (Ex. 26, ECF No. 18-26, at 2); (Ex. 27, ECF
12 No. 18-27, at 1). Instructions extracted from Plaintiff’s website also are referenced in each
13 element in the claim charts relating to the ’810 and ’391 patents. (Exs. 18, 26, ECF Nos.
14 18-18, 18-26). However, with respect to the ’388, ’040, and ’153 patents, only the claims’
15 preambles cite to Plaintiff’s documents on how to use the Accused Products in an allegedly
16 infringing manner. (Exs. 23–25, ECF Nos. 18-23, 18-24, 18-25). And the claim chart for
17 the ’845 Patent does not cite to Plaintiff’s documents. (Ex. 27, ECF No. 18-27, at 46–52).
18 Therefore, declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists regarding the ’810 and ’391
19 patents, but not the ’040, ’153, ’845, and ’388 patents. The only Accused Products at issue
20 in the Werner case are the CVD and ELD Tablets. See FAC ¶ 18, Werner case (N.D. Tex.
21 Feb 28, 2025), Dkt. No. 23. Accordingly, declaratory judgment jurisdiction over the ’810
22 and ’391 patents is confined to those two products under this theory of liability. See
23 DataTern, 755 F.3d at 911.
24 C.R. England has also been accused of directly infringing some of the patents-in-
25 suit through use of Plaintiff’s products, but Plaintiff has not presented any claim charts in
26 the FAC relating to the C.R. England case. Thus, any potential indirect infringement
27 liability against Plaintiff originating from the C.R. England case has not been sufficiently
28 pleaded. PACCAR and MVT have also been accused of directly infringing some of the
1 patents-in-suit through use of Plaintiff’s products, but these lawsuits commenced after this
2 declaratory judgment action. (Opp’n, at 5–6). Because Plaintiff must establish subject
3 matter jurisdiction at the time of filing, the Court declines to consider these later-filed
4 customer lawsuits. DataTern, 755 F.3d at 906 (“A declaratory judgment plaintiff must
5 plead facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction at the time of the complaint, and post-
6 complaint facts cannot create jurisdiction where none existed at the time of filing.”)
7 (citation omitted).
8 With respect to the ’565 and ’044 patents, Defendant has attempted to enforce those
9 patents only against one of Plaintiff’s customers, C.R. England, and Plaintiff acknowledges
10 that attempt failed. (FAC ¶ 4); (Opp’n, at 6). As discussed, Plaintiff also has presented no
11 claim charts relating to those patents, let alone one that could serve as a basis for Plaintiff’s
12 indirect infringement liability. That leaves the final circumstance identified by Plaintiff:
13 the NDA and failed licensing negotiations. While the NDA and licensing negotiations
14 appear to have included the ’565 and ’044 patents,6 the collapse of those negotiations and
15 failure to license the ’565 and ’044 patents do not create declaratory judgment jurisdiction
16 over those patents under the circumstances. The Court declines to find on the present
17 record a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant declaratory
18 judgment jurisdiction over the ’565 and ’044 patents.
19 Based on all the circumstances identified by Plaintiff, including its indemnity
20 obligations, declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists for all patents-in-suit except the ’565
21 and ’044 patents. The Court turns to the remaining issues: personal jurisdiction and venue.
22 B. Personal Jurisdiction
23 Specific personal jurisdiction may exist when a patentee purposefully directs its
24 enforcement activities into the forum. See Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1020 (stating where
25 “patentee ‘may be said to purposefully avail itself of the forum and to engage in activity
26
27
6 Plaintiff alleges the NDA and licensing negotiations included Defendant’s “portfolio” of patents, the
28
1 that relates to the validity and enforceability of the patent[,]’” enforcement action may
2 warrant exercise of specific personal jurisdiction) (citation omitted); Kyocera Commc’ns,
3 Inc. v. Potter Voice Techs., LLC, No. 13-CV-0766-H (BGS), 2013 WL 2456032, at *3
4 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) (finding personal jurisdiction in California where patentee sued
5 California resident defendants in other states and sued another defendant in California).
6 Defendant has developed a significant footprint in California through its enforcement
7 activities—itself referring to a “campaign to enforce the Asserted Patents” in California
8 and Texas. (Mot., at 2.)
9 Defendant has filed at least thirteen other patent enforcement actions in California,
10 involving many of the same or related patents to the patents-in-suit. (Opp’n, at 18, Ex. H).
11 Two of those cases, litigated in the Central District of California, are part of Defendant’s
12 enforcement campaign, include many of the patents-in-suit, and have been extensively
13 discussed above: C.R. England and Schneider.7
14 Plaintiff also points out that Defendant retained counsel in California to prosecute
15 its infringement claims in C.R. England and Schneider, (Opp’n, at 18), served process in
16 California on C.R. England and Schneider, both of which are California “residents,” and
17 communicated with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding settlement negotiations through an NDA
18 while its customers—C.R. England and Schneider—were actively defending claims of
19 infringement of many of the patents-in-suit. (Id. at 19–20).8 Clearly, these activities are
20 related to enforcement of the patents-in-suit and purposefully directed at residents of the
21 forum state.
22 Plaintiff also has made clear, and Defendant does not dispute, that the present action
23 commenced precisely because Defendant accused Plaintiff’s customers—through the C.R.
24
25
7 Defendant accused C.R. England of infringing the ’837, ’968, ’810, ’565, ’044, ’388, ’040, ’153, ’391,
26 and ’845 patents, (see C.R. England case (C.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2024), Dkt. No. 73; Compl. ¶ 1, C.R. England
case (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2024), Dkt. No. 1), and Schneider of infringing the remaining four patents-in-
27 suit. (See FAC ¶ 1, Schneider case (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2025), Dkt. No. 26.)
8 Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s allegations that C.R. England and Schneider are “residents of the
28
1 England and Schneider cases—of infringing many of the patents-in-suit through the
2 customers’ use of Plaintiff’s products and services. (FAC ¶¶ 2–9). Defendant argues that
3 because there are no claims in the C.R. England case that accuse C.R. England of
4 infringement based on its use of Plaintiff’s products, the claims in this declaratory
5 judgment action do not relate to Defendant’s enforcement actions in the C.R. England case.
6 (Def.’s Mot., at 19–20). However, Plaintiff is not seeking declaratory judgment based on
7 the C.R. England complaint, but rather on Defendant’s attempt to add claims of
8 infringement of the relevant patents based on C.R. England’s use of Plaintiff’s products
9 and services. (FAC ¶¶ 4–6).
10 Because Plaintiff’s claims of noninfringement arise out of Defendant’s enforcement
11 activities of the patents-in-suit directed at California residents, and include cases filed in
12 California, Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that this Court may exercise personal
13 jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant has not presented any compelling argument that
14 exercising jurisdiction over it would be unreasonable or unfair. Accordingly, Defendant’s
15 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED.
16 C. Venue
17 The parties disagree over whether 28 U.S.C § 1391 or 28 U.S.C § 1400(b) governs
18 venue in this case. Defendant argues the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland
19 controls, which held that venue for a corporate defendant in an action for “patent
20 infringement” is limited under § 1400(b) to its state of incorporation (here Texas for
21 Defendant). 581 U.S. at 267. However, the Court is persuaded by the chorus of district
22 courts that have declined to apply § 1400(b) to declaratory judgment actions for patent
23 noninfringement and instead have applied the general venue statute for civil actions under
24 § 1391. See, e.g., ResMed Corp. v. Cleveland Med. Devices, Inc., No. 23-CV-500 TWR
25 (JLB), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147755, at *12 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2023) (“Venue in a
26 declaratory judgment action for patent noninfringement [] is governed by the general venue
27 statute.” (citation omitted); Knape v. Design Ideas, Ltd., No. 20-cv-1216, 2022 U.S. Dist.
28 LEXIS 238726, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2022) (“By its plain text, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
1 applies only to civil actions for ‘patent infringement.’ [Plaintiff’s] declaratory judgment
2 action is not for ‘patent infringement’ and is governed by the general venue statute, §
3 1391(b), not the patent venue statute, § 1400(b).”); Wenzhou Xin Xin Sanitary Ware Co.,
4 Ltd. v. Delta Faucet Co., No. 23-2038-ES-AME, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168083, at *7
5 (D.N.J. Sep. 21, 2023) (“28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) . . . generally govern[s] venue in civil actions,
6 including this action for a declaratory judgment of patent non-infringement.”); Genesis
7 Attachments, LLC v. Detroit Edge Tool Co., No. 16-cv-402-wmc, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8 72411, at *9 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 30, 2019) (“TC Heartland did not change the venue
9 requirements for declaratory judgment actions involving patents.”); Bristol-Myers Squibb
10 Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146372, at *15 n.8 (D.
11 Del. Sep. 11, 2017) (same). Thus, this Court concludes consistent with other districts
12 courts to have considered the issue that the Federal Circuit’s holding in VE Holding, 917
13 F.2d at 1583 (“a declaratory judgment action alleging that a patent is . . . not infringed—
14 the mirror image of a suit for patent infringement—is governed by the general venue
15 statutes, not by § 1400(b)[]”), was undisturbed by TC Heartland.
16 Under § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in any district where the defendant “resides”—
17 which, according to § 1391(c)(2), is “any judicial district” where the defendant entity “is
18 subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” See
19 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (c)(2). Defendant is clearly subject to personal jurisdiction in
20 California. Defendant has also extended its footprint into this District. As Plaintiff points
21 out, Defendant sued companies with operations in this District, including two lawsuits
22 against Carlsbad-based CalAmp, an upstream supplier of components to Plaintiff;
23 negotiated an NDA and pursued licensing terms over the patents-in-suit with Plaintiff in
24 this District; and conducted part of its self-described “campaign of enforcement” against
25 Plaintiff’s customers for use of Plaintiff’s products “designed, provisioned, sold and
26 supported in this District.” (Opp’n, at 23.)
27 Accordingly, Defendant “resides” in this District for purposes of venue. Further, it
28 would be neither “efficient” nor “effective” to require Plaintiff to “participate in the
1 Werner] Texas action” in the Northern District of Texas and the California Schneider
2 ||action in the Central District of California to address the patents-in-suit. See DataTern,
3 || 755 F.3d at 904. That would require Plaintiff's intervention in different cases—in different
4 || venues and states—to defend itself and its customers against a litigation campaign that
5 ||Defendant initiated. Plaintiff also would have to seek relief from the stay order in
6 || Schneider and invite that court to hear claims it has already passed off to this Court. Under
7 ||the circumstances, litigating the patents-in-suit in one forum—the Southern District of
8 || California—is effective, efficient, and fair. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
9 || for improper venue is DENIED.°
10 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
11 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
12 GRANTED as to Plaintiffs claims of noninfringement of the °565 and ’044 patents, and
13 ||DENIED as to all other patents-in-suit. Defendant’s motions to dismiss for lack of
14 personal jurisdiction and improper venue are DENIED.’ Plaintiff may file a Second
15 || Amended Complaint within 14 days of the filing of this Order.
16 SO ORDERED.
17 || Dated: August 11, 2025 2»
18 jn Yn «
19 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
0 United States District Judge
21
22
23
24
26 ||° Plaintiff also argues that venue is proper in this District under § 1392(b)(2) because “a substantial part
of the events... giving rise to [Plaintiff's] claim[s] occurred” in this District. The Court declines to
27 || address this argument because it finds venue is proper under § 1392(b)(1).
rg ° Defendant's motion to stay discovery pending resolution of Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as
45h