Alexander v. Greene

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LEROY ALEXANDER, Civil No. 3:25-cv-1191

Petitioner . (Judge Mariani)

. □

WARDEN J. GREENE, .

Respondent

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Leroy Alexander (“Alexander”) initiated the above-captioned action by filing

a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) improperly denied him prerelease custody placement in a

halfway house or home confinement due to his parole violations. (Doc. 1). For the reasons

that follow, the Court will deny the habeas petition.

I. Background

Alexander initially entered BOP custody on March 24, 1994, to serve a life sentence

imposed by the Superior Court for the District of Columbia for kidnapping, armed robbery,

sodomy, and possession of a firearm during a crime. (Doc. 7-2, Declaration of BOP Case

Manager Mitchell Cassel (“Cassel Decl.”), at 2 ] 3; Doc. 7-3, Public Information Inmate

Data; Doc. 7-5, Warden Greene’s Recommendation for Denial of Residential Reentry

Center (“RRC”) Placement). He was released on parole on November 6, 2009. (Doc. 7-3).

Since his release on parole in 2009, Alexander has violated the conditions of his parole on

the following, numerous occasions. (/d.).

On July 11, 2012, Alexander was sentenced to a 14-month term of imprisonment for

his conviction of attempted distribution of a controlled substance. (/d.). He was released,

via good conduct time, on December 27, 2012. (Id).

On October 28, 2015, Alexander was arrested in Fairfax County, Virginia, for grand

larceny greater than $200.00, not from a person, and entering property to damage. (/d.).

Then, on December 29, 2015, Alexander was arrested in the District of Columbia for

forgery. (Id.). His parole was revoked. (/d.). He was released, via parole, on February 23,

2018. (Id.).

On March 30, 2019, Alexander was arrested in Charlottesville, Virginia, and charged

with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, reckless driving, driving while

intoxicated, refusal to submit to blood/breath test, and driving with an open container. (/d.).

His parole was revoked. (/d.). He was released, via parole, on May 30, 2020. (/d.).

Alexander's current parole violator term. commenced on August 26, 2024, after

receiving an alleged violation report for numerous positive urinalysis tests for cocaine,

numerous failures to report for urinalysis, and failure to report for supervision and to get

treatment. (/d.).

Alexander's current projected release date is December 13, 2025, via parole. (/d.).

Respondent argues that the habeas petition must be denied on the following

grounds: (1) Alexander has no legal entitlement under the Second Chance Act to a

prerelease custody placement; and (2) the BOP properly considered Alexander for

prerelease custody placement under the five factors stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), and the

BOP did not abuse its discretion in denying Alexander an RRC placement because he hag a

public safety factor of sex offender and he has an extensive history of parole violations.

(Doc. 7). The petition is ripe for disposition.

ll. Discussion

It is well-settled that the award of prerelease custody days under the Second Chance

Act is statutorily committed to the exclusive discretion of the BOP, and thus an inmate has

no right or entitlement to a certain amount of Second Chance Act prerelease custody. See

Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining, with

reference to the Second Chance Act, “that the BOP may assign a prisoner to [prerelease

custody] does not mean that it must”). Alexander’s placement is solely in the discretion of

the BOP and Alexander has no vested liberty interest in a placement in a residential facility

notwithstanding the provisions of the Second Chance Act. See Pisman v. Warden,

Allenwood FC! Low, 2023 WL 6618238, at *1 (3d Cir, 2023) (a prisoner's “pre-release

placement decisions are committed to the BOP’s sole discretion’); s2e also Tapia v. United

States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (“[w]hen a court sentences a federal offender, the BOP

has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over the place of the prisoner's

imprisonment and the treatment programs (if any) in which he may participate”). All that is

required is a good-faith, individualized review of an inmate’s potential transfer to prerelease

custody, which review must consider the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).

See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 251; Brown v. Warden Fairton FCI, 617 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d Cir.

2015) (nonprecedential). Alexander received this individualized determination. (See Doc.

7-2, Cassel Decl., at 2-3 Jj 4-6; Doc. 7-5).

The Second Chance Act provides:

(c) Prerelease custody. —

(1) In general. —The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent

practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a

portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under

conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to

and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such

conditions may include a community correctional facility.

(2) Home confinement authority. —The authority under this subsection may

be used to place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent

of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months. The Bureau of

Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, place prisoners with lower risk levels

and lower needs on home confinement for the maximum amount of time

permitted under this paragraph.

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). The Act requires the BOP “to make an individual determination that

ensures that the placement is ‘of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of

successful reintegration into the community.” Wilson v. Strada, 474 F. App’x 46, 46-47 (3d

Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6)(C)). In doing so, the BOP

must consider the following five factors: “(1) the resources of the facility contemplated; (2)

the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the

prisoner; (4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—(A) concerning the

purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or (B)

recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and (5) any pertinent

policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title

28.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); see also Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012)

(the Court’s “review is limited to whether the BOP abused its discretion.”).

In a nutshell, when considering an individual's eligibility for prerelease placement in

an RRC, the BOP is required to ensure that decisions are made: (A) consistent with the five

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); (B) on an individualized basis; and (C) so that the duration of

the placement period gives the inmate the greatest likelihood of successful community

reintegration. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6).

The record in this case clearly establishes that Alexander's Unit Team gave him

individualized consideration consistent with the five factors of section 3621(b). (Doc. 7-2,

Cassel Decl., at 2-3 J] 4-6; Doc. 7-5). The Unit Team noted that Alexander had numerous

violations and arrests while on parole. (/d.). They noted further that Alexander has a public

safety factor of sex offender. (Doc. 7-4, Male Custody Classification Form). Case Manager

Cassel explains that “[iJnmates assigned a public safety factor of sex offender and those

whose behavior history suggests a substantial or continuing threat to the community, such

as repeated violations, shall not ordinarily participate in community corrections programs.”

(Doc. 7-2, Cassel Decl., at 2-3 5). The Unit Team ultimately found that due to Alexander's

repeated violations and arrests while on parole, and his public safety factor of sex

offender—indicating that he remains a threat to the safety of the community—he was not

appropriate for RRC placement. (Doc. 7-2, Cassel Decl., at 3 ] 6; Doc. 7-5). The Warden

reviewed the Unit Team's recommendation and the relevant factors in Alexander's case and

denied RRC placement. (Doc. 7-5).

After reviewing Alexander's petition and the applicable statutes, the Court finds that

the BOP has the discretion to determine if, and when, to transfer Alexander to an RRC.

Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP individually considered Alexander under the

factors relevant to RRC placement and denied him placement in an RRC. (Doc. 7-5).

Alexander's purported disagreement with the BOP’s decision does not establish a

constitutional violation, as nothing in the Second Chance Act or § 3621(b) entitles an inmate

to any guaranteed placament □□ □□ RRC. See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 244-51 (holding, in

exercising its discretion to make halfway house placement decisions, the Bureau must

consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b); “[hJowever, that the [Bureau] may assign a

prisoner to a halfway house does not mean that it must.”); see also Beckley v. Miner, 125 F.

App’x 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (holding, “[i]t is well settled, and the parties

agree, that the Bureau as nearly exclusive jurisdiction to classify and transfer jorisoners.”).

Alexander's habeas petition must, therefore, be denied.’

Ill. Conclusion

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will deny the petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). A separate Order shall issue.

a ( cf 4

oe LWUU MA

Robert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: August & 2025

1 Although he provides no analysis, Alexander cites to Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024). (Doc. 1, at 5). In Loper Bright. the Supreme Court overruled the Chevron, U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 487 US. 837 (1984; doctrine, which required courts to □□□□□

to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. /d. at 412. Under Loper

Bright, courts are to give due regard to an agency’s expertise in a particular field, but are no longer bound

by the agency’s interpretation of the statute. /d. at 403. Courts must interpret a statute without deferring to

an agency's policy preference that is not expressed in the language of the statute. /d. at 403-04. At most,

Alexander has expressed a personal disagreement with the BOP’s decision regarding his RRC denial. His

reliance upon Loper Bright is meritless.