federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
How later courts described this case
- federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- court not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SIDNEY KEYS, SR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00485-SEP
)
PRESBYTERIAN CHILDREN )
HOME SERVICES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Sidney Keys’s application to proceed in the District Court
without paying fees or costs. Doc. [2]. Having reviewed the application, the Court grants the
motion and allows Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court also dismisses the action
without prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal
conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept
as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must
“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have
formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be
“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff has filed numerous lawsuits in this Court. Over just the past several months, he
has filed approximately 15 new cases in this district. The present action arises from his assertion
that Defendant Luerencia Ford Stykes has failed to follow a child custody and visitation
agreement implemented by the Missouri Department of Children and Family Services and
Presbyterian Children Home Services. Doc. [1] at 5. He claims that, in November of 2023, a
visitation agreement was implemented that provided for visitation with his two sons but
Defendant Stykes has “refused to follow [the visitation agreement].” Id. Plaintiff also states in a
conclusory manner that Stykes violated his HIPAA rights. Id.
Plaintiff seeks damages, visitation with his children, and for Stykes to be placed under
arrest. Doc. [1] at 3, 5 and 6.
DISCUSSION
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858), federal
courts have disclaimed jurisdiction over cases involving domestic relations. See Wallace v.
Wallace, 736 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2013); Khan v. Khan, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994); see
also, Frawley v. Schutt, 2021 WL 5415326, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 19, 2021) (“Family law matters
are state law matters and only in extremely rare circumstances would a federal court have
jurisdiction.”). In Khan, the Eighth Circuit recognized that “[t]he domestic relations
exception . . . divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over any action for which the subject is a
divorce, allowance of alimony, or child custody.” 21 F.3d at 861. Even “when a cause of action
closely relates to but does not precisely fit into the contours of an action for divorce, alimony or
child custody, federal courts generally will abstain from exercising jurisdiction.” Jd.
“The family law exception to federal jurisdiction applies even when a party is alleging a
violation of federal law,” and federal “[c]ourts may not resolve child custody questions . . . even
if there is an allegation of a constitutional violation.” Frawley, 2021 WL 5415326 at *6 (quoting
Quinn v. Kibodeaux, 2020 WL 6701457 at *1 (D. Idaho Nov. 13, 2020)). Here, although
Plaintiff drafted his Complaint to allege federal civil rights violations, his claims are
“imextricably intertwined” with state court determinations of custody and visitation rights
concerning his minor children. See Kahn, 21 F.3d at 860 n.1 (“Courts generally use abstention in
the context of a dispute relating to domestic relations when the controversy does not fall within
the exact purview of divorce, alimony, or child custody but instead 1s closely related.”).
Courts have also repeatedly held that HIPAA does not create a private right of action that
can be privately enforced through either a § 1983 claim or an implied right of action. See Adams
Eureka Fire Prot. Dist., 352 F. App’x 137, 138-39 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Fogle v. Mo.
Dep't of Mental Health, 2008 WL 5234757, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2008). As such, Plaintiff's
HIPAA claims are also subject to dismissal.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Doc.
[2], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Doc.
[3], is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A
separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 8th day of August, 2025.
Fhuak Leg.
SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE