official must be “subjectively aware of the risk of serious harm to the inmate”
How later courts described this case
- official must be “subjectively aware of the risk of serious harm to the inmate”
- explaining that “because the rights and remedies under [the ADA and RA] are the same, case law interpreting one statute can be applied to the other” and rejecting plaintiff’s ADA claim based, in part, on case law interpreting the RA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-40663 Document: 43-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/08/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-40663 August 8, 2025
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Anthony Bernard Wingfield,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Adesunkanmi Adekoya, Correctional Officer,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 9:21-CV-297
______________________________
Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Proceeding pro se in district court and on appeal, Anthony Bernard
Wingfield, Texas inmate # 1896078, challenges the summary-judgment
dismissal of his civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wingfield
contends that Adesunkanmi Adekoya, a correctional officer employed by the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ): acted with deliberate
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 24-40663 Document: 43-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/08/2025
No. 24-40663
indifference to his serious medical needs; and violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo,
using the standard employed by the district court. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684
F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
As an initial matter, to the extent Wingfield sued Adekoya in his
official capacity for deliberate indifference, his claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. E.g., McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407,
412 (5th Cir. 2004). In addition, regarding the deliberate-indifference claim
against Adekoya in his personal capacity, the court properly concluded that
Wingfield did not establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, for
the reasons provided infra (and, in the alternative, that Adekoya was entitled
to qualified immunity).
Wingfield’s deliberate-indifference claim is premised on the
purported delay of medical care, caused by Adekoya, after Wingfield’s
prosthetic leg broke, causing him to strain his groin. Merely delaying medical
care, however, results in an Eighth Amendment violation only “if there has
been deliberate indifference that results in substantial harm”. Easter v.
Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Wingfield failed
to present summary-judgment evidence that: Adekoya caused the injuries of
which he complained; the delay in receiving medical care (purportedly
caused by Adekoya) exacerbated those injuries or delayed their healing; or
Adekoya was subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to Wingfield. E.g.,
Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001); Easter, 467 F.3d
at 463 (official must be “subjectively aware of the risk of serious harm to the
inmate”) (citation omitted).
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No. 24-40663
Turning to Wingfield’s ADA claim, only the public entity, not the
entity’s individual employee, may be sued under the Rehabilitation Act
(RA). E.g., Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1999); see Pace v.
Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
“because the rights and remedies under [the ADA and RA] are the same,
case law interpreting one statute can be applied to the other” and rejecting
plaintiff’s ADA claim based, in part, on case law interpreting the RA).
Because the operative part of Wingfield’s complaint made claims only against
Adekoya, not the TDCJ generally, the district court properly dismissed his
ADA claim to the extent Adekoya is an individual TDCJ employee. (The
district court severed Wingfield’s claims against Adekoya alone and
docketed them as the instant case.)
In any event, Wingfield did not establish an ADA violation. “A
plaintiff states a claim for relief under [the ADA] if he alleges: (1) that he has
a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is
otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such
discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499
(5th Cir. 2011).
Aside from labeling the conditions of his solitary-confinement (the
purportedly ADA-noncompliant housing at issue here) “oppressive and
restrictive”, Wingfield did not specify how the conditions of his confinement
violated the ADA. Nor did he present any competent evidence that the
complained-of discrimination (movement to solitary confinement) was by
reason of his disability. To the contrary, he claimed that he was moved in
retaliation for his filing grievances against Adekoya. And, to the extent he
claims retaliation, Wingfield did not assert any facts bringing his complaint
within the ambit of the ADA’s antiretaliation provision. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a).
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No. 24-40663
In sum, Adekoya is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Wingfield’s deliberate-indifference and ADA claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting summary
judgment and dismissing Wingfield’s claims with prejudice. See McFaul, 684
F.3d at 571.
AFFIRMED.
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