The opinion
[Cite as Klickovich v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2025-Ohio-2783.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Robert Klickovich, :
Appellant-Appellant, : No. 24AP-446
(C.P.C. No. 23CV-7860)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
State Medical Board of Ohio, :
Appellee-Appellee. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on August 7, 2025
On brief: Dinsmore & Schohl, LLP, Elizabeth Y. Collis, and
Heidi W. Doarn; Statman Harris, LLC, Alan J. Statman, and
William B. Fecher, for appellant. Argued: William B. Fecher.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Iris L. Jin, Daniel G.
Wilson, Brandon W. Puckett, and Kyle C. Wilcox, for appellee.
Argued: Iris L. Jin.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant-appellant, Robert Klickovich, appeals from the judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas vacating the October 11, 2023 amended order of
appellee-appellee, State Medical Board of Ohio (the “Board”), finding that appellant
engaged in sexual misconduct with a patient, in violation of R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) and
Adm.Code 4731-26-02, and remanding the matter to the Board for further proceedings.
(July 8, 2024 Jgmt. Entry.) For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand this matter
to the trial court for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The salient facts of this matter are essentially undisputed. On or around April
2017, appellant began to date a person (“Patient 1”) for whom he subsequently provided
No. 24AP-446 2
medical treatment. This medical treatment included treating Patient 1 for a dog bite and
prescribing her antibiotics; treating Patient 1 for a sinus infection and prescribing
antibiotics; treating Patient 1 for a cold sore and prescribing an antiviral medication; and
administering Botox injections into Patient 1’s face on at least four occasions. It is likewise
undisputed that at some point early in the personal relationship between appellant and
Patient 1, the relationship became sexual, and that sexual relationship continued between
2017 and 2020.
{¶ 3} The Board subsequently investigated the matter and on November 10, 2021,
it issued a notice of opportunity for hearing, alleging that appellant had engaged in sexual
misconduct with Patient 1 between June 2017 and August 2020, in violation of R.C.
4731.22(B)(20) and Adm.Code 4731-26-02 (relating to sexual misconduct), and R.C.
4731.22(B)(6) (relating to failure to conform to minimal standards of care). (Nov. 10, 2021
Notice; Nov. 30, 2023 Record of Proceedings, State’s Ex. 3 at 1.) Appellant requested a
hearing on or about December 6, 2021.
{¶ 4} On December 15 and 16, 2022, the Board conducted a hearing. On
September 12, 2023, the hearing examiner submitted to the Board a report and
recommendation, which included proposed findings and a proposed order. The proposed
findings determined that appellant had engaged in sexual misconduct in violation of R.C.
4731.22(B)(6) and Adm.Code 4731-26-02. Specifically, the proposed findings state:
Between May 2017 and August 2020, Dr. Klickovich engaged
in a personal and sexual relationship with Patient 1.
Simultaneously, between November 17, 2018 and January 4,
2020, Dr. Klickovich provided medical treatment to Patient 1,
including prescribing antibiotics, an antiviral, and at least four
separate instances of Botox injections. In addition, at unknown
times, Dr. Klickovich provided Patient 1 with sample
medications such as muscle relaxers, anti-inflammatory
medication, and migraine medication.
(Sept. 12, 2023 Report and Recommendation at 7-9.) The hearing examiner recommended
in the proposed order that appellant’s medical license be suspended for 60 days, followed
by probation, and that appellant be fined $6,000.
{¶ 5} On October 11, 2023, the Board issued an amended order adopting the
proposed findings and amending the proposed order to a reprimand and probation, and on
No. 24AP-446 3
November 2, 2023, appellant appealed the Board’s October 11, 2023 amended order to the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 6} On July 8, 2024, the trial court issued its judgment entry and decision
vacating the amended order by the state medical board and remanding for further
proceedings. (July 8, 2024 Jgmt. Entry.) In its decision, the trial court did not make any
findings as to whether the Board’s amended order was supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence. (See id.) Instead, the trial court determined that the Board’s
amended order fails to make a necessary finding, to wit: whether appellant exploited the
licensee-patient relationship with Patient 1 as set forth in Adm.Code 4731-26-01(H). (Id.
at 1, 7-9.) The trial court vacated the Board’s amended order and remanded it to the Board
with instructions to review the existing record and (1) determine whether there was
exploitation in the first instance, and (2) “address the reason for its determination by either
stating the physician-patient relationship is inherently exploitative or by identifying the
facts that compel a finding of exploitation (or not).” (Id. at 7.)
{¶ 7} This timely appeal followed and is now before us.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} Appellant asserts the following two assignments of error for our review:
[1.] The trial court erred in remanding the case back to the
Board instead of simply vacating the Board’s Order.
[2.] The trial court erred in failing to address each of
Dr. Klickovich’s assignments of error.
III. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} In an administrative appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 119.12, the common
pleas court must consider the entire record to determine whether reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence supports the Board’s order and whether the order is in accordance
with law. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 110-111 (1980). Reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence has been defined as follows:
(1) “Reliable” evidence is dependable; that is, it can be
confidently trusted. In order to be reliable, there must be a
reasonable probability that the evidence is true. (2) “Probative”
evidence is evidence that tends to prove the issue in question;
it must be relevant in determining the issue. (3) “Substantial”
No. 24AP-446 4
evidence is evidence with some weight; it must have
importance and value.
Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 570, 571 (1992).
{¶ 10} The common pleas court’s “ ‘review of the administrative record is neither a
trial de novo nor an appeal on questions of law only, but a hybrid review in which the court
“must appraise all the evidence as to the credibility of the witnesses, the probative character
of the evidence, and the weight thereof.” ’ ” Edmands v. State Med. Bd., 2017-Ohio-8215,
¶ 10 (10th Dist.), quoting Lies v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Bd., 2 Ohio App.3d 204, 207 (1st
Dist. 1981), quoting Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 280 (1955). The
trial court “must give due deference to the administrative resolution of evidentiary
conflicts,” although “the findings of the agency are by no means conclusive.” Conrad at 111.
The common pleas court conducts a de novo review of questions of law, exercising its
independent judgment in determining whether the administrative order is “ ‘in accordance
with law.’ ” Ohio Historical Soc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 466, 471 (1993),
citing R.C. 119.12.
{¶ 11} By contrast, an appellate court’s review of an administrative decision is more
limited than that of the common pleas court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d
619, 621 (1993). The appellate court is to determine only whether the common pleas court
abused its discretion. Id.; Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd.,
40 Ohio St.3d 257, 261 (1988).
{¶ 12} A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises its judgment in an
unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.
Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. The term “abuse of discretion,” “ ‘ commonly employed
to justify an interference by a higher court with the exercise of discretionary power by a
lower court, implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice,
partiality, or moral delinquency.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) Id., quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (2d Ed. 1910). Put another way, an abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s
judgment is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2018-Ohio-3342, ¶ 12; State v. Beavers, 2012-Ohio-3654, ¶ 8 (10th
Dist.).
{¶ 13} On issues of fact, absent an abuse of discretion, this court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the administrative agency or the trial court. Pons at 621. However,
No. 24AP-446 5
even under an abuse of discretion standard, no court is authorized, within its discretion, to
commit an error of law. Badescu v. Badescu, 2020-Ohio-4312, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). Thus, a
court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an error of law or a misapplication of
law to the facts. Id.
{¶ 14} Furthermore, “[a]n appellate court’s scope of review on issues of law is
plenary, including the issue of whether the common pleas court applied the proper
standard of review.” Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 2008-Ohio-4826, ¶ 43, citing Univ.
Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d
339, 343 (1992). We have previously found that “[a] trial court’s application of a standard
of review when reviewing an administrative order is a question of law, which we review de
novo.” Johnson v. Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Assn., 2007-Ohio-6505, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.),
citing Beck v. Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Fin. Insts., 2006-Ohio-60, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.); Univ.
of Cincinnati College of Med., 63 Ohio St.3d at 343.
B. Discussion
{¶ 15} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he asserts the trial court erred in
remanding the case to the Board instead of simply vacating the Board’s order. We agree
the trial court erred in remanding the matter to the Board but disagree that the trial court
erred in failing to vacate the Board’s order. Instead, we find the trial court erred in failing
to conduct the appropriate review of the record and determining whether reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence supports the Board’s order and whether the order is in
accordance with law, as explained below.
{¶ 16} We begin by addressing appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in
remanding this matter to the Board because it lacked the authority to do so in the first
instance. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that common pleas courts reviewing an
administrative decision may remand the cause for further proceedings, including a new
hearing. State ex rel. Chagrin Falls v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2002-Ohio-4906,
reaffirming Superior Metal Products, Inc. v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 41 Ohio
St.2d 143, 146 (1975) (“This court holds that the power to reverse and vacate decisions
necessarily includes the power to remand the cause to the decision maker.”). This court
has likewise acknowledged that a remand for further proceedings may be appropriate in
some circumstances. Citizens for Akron v. Ohio Elections Comm., 2011-Ohio-6387, ¶ 30
No. 24AP-446 6
(10th Dist.). Therefore, appellant’s arguments in support of his position that the trial court
had no authority to remand the matter for further findings are meritless.
{¶ 17} Notwithstanding the foregoing, this does not end the inquiry. The broader
question is should the trial court have remanded the matter for further proceedings, i.e., for
the Board to determine whether appellant’s conduct “exploited the licensee-patient
relationship” with Patient 1. The answer is no, because under the pertinent administrative
rules governing sexual misconduct, there is no need for any specific finding of whether
appellant’s conduct exploited his relationship with Patient 1. Instead, as explained below,
the trial court should have conducted a review of the record to determine whether the order
finding sexual misconduct was supported by reliable, probative, substantial evidence, and
was otherwise in accordance with law.
{¶ 18} Chapter 4731 of the Revised Code vests the Board with broad authority to
regulate the medical profession in Ohio, and to discipline physicians for non-compliant
conduct. Griffin v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2009-Ohio-4849 (10th Dist.). This includes the
authority to impose a wide range of sanctions, pursuant to R.C. 4731.22, ranging from
reprimand to revocation. “The discretion granted to the board in imposing a wide range of
potential sanctions reflects the deference due to the board’s expertise in carrying out its
statutorily granted authority over the medical profession.” Demint v. State Med. Bd. of
Ohio, 2016-Ohio-3531, ¶ 63 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 19} Pursuant to R.C. 4731.22(B)(6), the Board may discipline a licensee for the
licensee’s “departure from, or the failure to conform to, minimal standards of care of similar
practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a
patient is established.” And, pursuant to R.C. 4731.22(B)(20), the Board also may
discipline a licensee for violating any rule adopted by the Board. As pertinent here,
Adm.Code 4731-26-02(A) prohibits sexual misconduct, “as that term is defined in
paragraph (H) of Rule 4731-26-01 of the Administrative Code,” between a licensed
physician and a patient. In turn, Adm.Code 4731-26-01(H) defines the term “sexual
misconduct,” in pertinent part, as follows:
“Sexual misconduct” means conduct that exploits the licensee-
patient relationship in a sexual way, whether verbal or
physical, and may include the expression of thoughts, feelings,
or gestures that are sexual or that reasonably may be construed
by a patient as sexual.
No. 24AP-446 7
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 20} The court’s primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the
legislative intent. Silver Lining Group EIC Morrow Cty. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn. Autism
Scholarship Program, 2017-Ohio-7834, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Banks, 2011-Ohio-
4252, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Hairston, 2004-Ohio-969, ¶ 11. “To determine
legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute.” Id., citing Hubbell v. Xenia,
2007-Ohio-4839, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 1997-Ohio-310. The
statutory language must be considered in context, and the court must construe words and
phrases “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” (Citations omitted.)
Silver Lining Grp. at ¶ 34.
{¶ 21} Where the words in a statute are “ ‘free from ambiguity and doubt, and
express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no
occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.’ ” Id., citing Hairston at ¶ 12, quoting
Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “ ‘It is only
where the words of a statute are ambiguous, uncertain in meaning, or conflicting that a
court has the right to interpret a statute.’ ” Id. at ¶ 35, quoting In re Adoption of Baby Boy
Brooks, 136 Ohio App.3d 824, 829 (10th Dist. 2000). An ambiguity exists only “if the
language of a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id., citing
Columbus v. Mitchell, 2016-Ohio-7873, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 22} Courts “apply the rules of statutory construction to administrative rules as
well.” McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc., 2010-Ohio-2744, ¶ 27, citing State ex rel.
Brilliant Elec. Sign Co. v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.2d 51, 54 (1979) (finding the “ordinary
meaning rule” of statutory construction applies equally to administrative rules). Thus,
“ ‘[t]he interpretation of statutes and administrative rules should follow the principle that
neither is to be construed in any way other than as the words demand.’ We must read
undefined words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of
grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. Turner v. Eberlin, 2008-Ohio-1117, ¶ 14,
quoting Morning View Care Ctr.-Fulton v. Dept. of Human Servs., 2002-Ohio-2878, ¶ 36
(10th Dist.).
{¶ 23} Courts lack authority to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of a
statute under the guise of statutory interpretation or liberal or narrow constructions. State
ex rel. Massie v. Bd. of Edn. of Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools, 76 Ohio St.3d 584, 588
No. 24AP-446 8
(1996). Instead, a court’s duty is to give effect to the words used in a statute, not to delete
or insert words. State v. Maxwell, 2002-Ohio-2121, ¶ 10. “If we were to brazenly ignore
the unambiguous language of a statute, or if we found a statute to be ambiguous only after
delving deeply into the history and background of the law’s enactment, we would invade
the role of the legislature: to write the laws.” Jacobson v. Kaforey, 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 8.
Thus, if “the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite
meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation,” because
“[a]n unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio
St. 312, paragraph five of the syllabus.
{¶ 24} The Supreme Court has recently underscored the foregoing tenet that
unambiguous statutes are to be applied and not interpreted. In TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v.
State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677, the
high court first discussed and ultimately rejected the oft-cited proposition of law that courts
must “defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute, or its
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.” TWISM Ents., L.L.C. at ¶ 42. Instead,
the court declared that while “a court may consider an administrative agency’s construction
of a legal text in exercising its duty to independently interpret the law . . ., an administrative
interpretation should never be used to alter the meaning of clear text. If the text is
unambiguous, the court should stop right there.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 44.
{¶ 25} The Supreme Court went on to explain when consideration of an agency’s
interpretation of a statute or rule might be warranted:
In assessing the persuasiveness of an agency interpretation, it
is appropriate for a court to keep in mind the respective
competencies of the agency and the judiciary. When it comes
to interpretation of text involving common words used in their
ordinary sense, there will rarely, if ever, be a need for a court to
look to an agency interpretation. This task is routinely
performed by courts and is well within the judiciary’s core
competence. On the other hand, in a specialized matter that
involves technical meaning uniquely within the competency of
the agency, the agency’s expertise might prove helpful to a
court in its interpretive task. See Sarasota Mem. Hosp. v.
Shalala, 60 F.3d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir.1995). Even then, it
remains the judiciary’s role to independently interpret the law;
the weight to be given the agency interpretation depends on its
persuasiveness.
No. 24AP-446 9
Id. at ¶ 47. Thus, where a statute or administrative rule is clear and unambiguous, our task
is not to interpret it at all—with or without any consideration of the administrative agency’s
view of its meaning—but rather to construe and apply it according to its plain language.
{¶ 26} Under the rules of statutory construction, the use of the word “means” in
defining the term “sexual conduct” has the clear import that this is the exclusive meaning
of the term. Indeed, the use of the word “means” in defining “sexual misconduct” results
in the term and its definition being interchangeable equivalents. Diller v. Diller, 2021-
Ohio-4252, ¶ 39 (3d Dist.). Put another way, there can be no finding of “sexual misconduct”
in the absence of “conduct that exploits the licensee-patient relationship in a sexual way”
because they are one in the same thing. Adm.Code 4731-26-01(H). Thus, in this case, when
the Board found that appellant had engaged in sexual misconduct via his relationship with
Patient 1, it necessarily found that his conduct had exploited his relationship with Patient
1.
{¶ 27} In Diller, the Third District Court of Appeals aptly explained the important
difference between the use of the words “means” and “includes” in statutory definitions as
follows:
Forms of the words “includes” and “means” are frequently used
to introduce the text of statutory definitions. “The terms
‘means’ and ‘includes’ are not necessarily
synonymous.” Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121,
125 . . . (1934), fn. 1. “The word ‘includes’ is usually a term of
enlargement, and not of limitation.” 2A N. Singer, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction, Section 47:7 (7th Ed.).
“[T]he term ‘including’ is not one of all-embracing definition,
but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general
principle.” Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber
Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 . . . (1941). Thus, “[w]hen a definitional
section says that a word ‘includes’ certain things, that is usually
taken to mean that it may include other things as well.” Scalia
& Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,
226 (2012); see Kish v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-
1244, ¶ 20 . . . (“[T]he General Assembly’s use of ‘includes’
in R.C. 149.011(G) as a preface to the definition of ‘records’ is
an indication of expansion rather than constriction, restriction,
or limitation * * *.”); Helvering at 125, fn. 1 (observing that use
of some form of the word “includes” “indicates that the
particular is not necessarily a substitute for the general term,
excluding more general meanings included within its
scope”); Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th
No. 24AP-446 10
Cir.1968) (noting that the word “includes” “conveys the
conclusion that there are other items includable, though not
specifically enumerated by the statutes”).
By contrast, when ‘a definitional section says that a word
‘means’ something, the clear import is that this is
its only meaning.” (Emphasis sic.) Scalia & Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 226
(2012). Therefore, “ ‘[a]s a rule, [a] definition which
declares what a term “means” * * * excludes any meaning that
is not stated.’ ” Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130,
quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-393 . . .
(1979), fn. 10; see Groman v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 302 U.S. 82, 86 . . . (1937) (“[W]hen an exclusive
definition is intended the word ‘means’ is employed, * * *
whereas here the word used is ‘includes.’ ”). A statutory
definition declaring what a term “means” is less susceptible of
extension by construction than a definition declaring what
a term “includes.” See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutes
and Statutory Construction, Section 47:7 (7th Ed.). Where a
form of the word “means” is employed to define a
term, “the term and its definition are to be
interchangeable equivalents[.]” Helvering at 125, fn. 1.
(Emphasis added.) Diller at ¶ 38-39. Thus, as previously noted, if the Board makes a
finding of sexual misconduct—as it did in this case—then the Board has also implicitly made
a finding of exploitation of the licensee-patient relationship. There simply cannot be sexual
misconduct without exploitation.
{¶ 28} We acknowledge that in the previous case of Seman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio,
2020-Ohio-3342 (10th Dist.), we declined to resolve the issue of “whether the trial court
was ultimately correct in concluding proof of explicit exploitation was not required to
constitute a violation of the sexual misconduct rule” because in that case, the trial court had
found ample evidence of exploitation in the record upon its review. Seman at ¶ 34. We
now hold that a finding of sexual misconduct necessarily includes a finding of exploitation.
Thus, if the record contains reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of exploitation and
the order is otherwise in accordance with law, the trial court must affirm the Board’s order
finding sexual misconduct.
{¶ 29} Therefore, based on the foregoing, the trial court erred as a matter of law
when it found the Board failed to make the necessary finding as to whether appellant’s
conduct exploited the licensee-patient relationship. The trial court likewise erred in
No. 24AP-446 11
vacating the Board’s order on that basis and remanding the matter for further proceedings
to make the finding. As such, this court must reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings so it may conduct the proper
review as set forth in R.C. 119 in the first instance. That is, the trial court must consider the
entire record to determine whether reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports
the agency’s order finding a violation of the sexual misconduct rule, which includes finding
evidence of exploitation, and whether the order is in accordance with law.
{¶ 30} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we sustain in part and overrule in part
appellant’s first assignment of error.
{¶ 31} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in
failing to address each of appellant’s assignments of error. Because we have already
determined that this matter must be remanded for further proceedings as discussed above,
appellant’s second assignment of error is rendered moot, and we need not address it. Croce
v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 2024-Ohio-2138, ¶ 67 (10th Dist.), quoting State v.
Gideon, 2020-Ohio-6961, ¶ 26 (“ ‘[A]n assignment of error is moot when an appellant
presents issues that are no longer live as a result of some other decision rendered by the
appellate court.’ ”), and App.R. 12(A)(1)(c) (an appellate court must decide each assignment
of error “ ‘[u]nless an assignment of error is made moot by ruling on another assignment of
error’ ”).
IV. Disposition
{¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain in part and overrule in part appellant’s
first assignment of error; we find appellant’s second assignment of error moot; and the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas vacating the amended order of
the Board and remanding the matter to the Board for further findings is reversed and
remanded to the trial court with instructions to perform the review of the record required
by the statutory standard of review applicable to the trial court as set forth in R.C. 119.12.
Judgment reversed;
cause remanded with instructions.
EDELSTEIN and DINGUS, JJ., concur.