Elena Lyadina Saville v. Clarence William Webb

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10998

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ELENA LYADINA SAVILLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CLARENCE WILLIAM WEBB,

ROBERT ALLEN WHITWORTH,

RANDY CLARENCE HOPPER,

BILLY DALE MULL,

RANDALL GENE MULL, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00105-SCJ

____________________

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant Elena Saville, proceeding pro se, appeals

the district court’s dismissal of her amended complaint alleging a

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claim

against her neighbor, Clarence Webb, who owns and operates a

scrap metal recycling business on his property; a RICO conspiracy

claim against Webb, his employees, and two local government of-

ficials; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Habersham County, a local

judge, and prosecutor; and state-law claims.

After careful review, we vacate the district court’s dismissal

of Saville’s § 1983 claim against Habersham County based on her

claim the County’s public comment policy deprived her of her First

Amendment rights. Because one of Saville’s federal claims was im-

properly dismissed, we also vacate the district court’s decision not

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. We

remand for further proceedings on these claims. But we affirm as

to all the remaining issues.

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 3

I. Factual Background1

Saville owned property located across a narrow drive from

Webb’s Recycling. Since 2006, Webb operated the business with-

out a business license and in violation of Habersham County’s

land-use ordinances, which did not permit recycling businesses in

low-intensity residential areas. In 2012, Webb obtained a business

license using his middle name to hide his prior criminal history.

Saville also alleged that Webb’s Recycling continuously violated

federal environmental law and was not registered with the Georgia

Sheriff’s Association, as required by state law, until 2019. From

2006 to 2018, “dozens of neighbors” filed complaints with Ha-

bersham Code Enforcement about the scrapyard’s operations.

More than 100 criminal cases have been filed in Habersham

Courts against Webb’s five employees. The employees regularly

violated traffic laws on the road leading to the scrap yard, such as

driving cars without a registration plate or with a covered plate and

parking cars in inappropriate places. From 2017 to 2022, Saville

complained about Webb’s scrapyard operations to Code Enforce-

ment, the Sheriff, and other county officials.

On May 3, 2017, Webb and his son-in-law visited Saville’s

property and demanded a $80,000 “ransom” payment, although

Saville did not explain the purpose of the requested payment. After

1 These facts come from Saville’s amended complaint. Because the district

court dismissed the complaint, we must accept all well-pleaded allegations in

the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016).

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

Saville refused to pay, Webb’s employees and associates began a

“campaign of intimidation” against her. On April 23, 2018, Webb

filed his first application for Saville’s criminal arrest for stalking. At

a hearing on the application Habersham Magistrate Court Chief

Judge Johnson prohibited Saville from taking pictures of Webb’s

business and employees and ordering her to take down security

cameras installed on her property. But Webb’s application was

later dismissed because there was not probable cause to issue an

arrest warrant.

The Habersham County Board of Commissioners sched-

uled a hearing for November 19, 2018, to determine whether to

revoke Webb Recycling’s business license, and Saville planned to

attend. But Saville could not attend the hearing. Earlier that

month, Webb filed a second, identical application for Saville’s crim-

inal arrest for stalking, which Magistrate Judge Thomas granted on

November 13, 2018. This time, Saville was detained. Solicitor Wil-

liam Oliver brought criminal charges against Saville, and she was

released on bail with conditions prohibiting her from contacting

Webb directly or indirectly. This prevented her from attending the

November 19, 2018, license-revocation hearing.

According to the minutes, during the November 19 li-

cense-revocation hearing for Webb’s Recycling, Michael Beecham,

the director of the planning department, reported that the neigh-

bors had complained about trash in the yard. In January 2019, the

Board of Commissioners granted Webb a conditional business li-

cense, which Saville contended was based on false information and

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 5

issued because no one spoke against it at the hearing. She also al-

leged Sheriff Joey Terrell provided the business with a certificate

falsely attesting that the business was properly registered with the

Georgia Sheriffs’ Association.

At other meetings before the Habersham County Board of

Commissioners, the Chairman of the Board demanded that criti-

cism about individual county staff members be handled through

the internal channels and not through a public forum. On August

16, 2021, the Board considered a presentation by the chief magis-

trate judge to expand the court’s authority. Saville spoke during

public comment and accused the judge of mishandling evidence.

She was interrupted and forcefully escorted from the podium. She

also asserted that the time limits applied to public comments are

not applied equally and are only strictly enforced against people

who have unfavorable things to say.

Throughout this time, Webb and his employees threatened

Saville with firearms, dogs, and vehicles. On February 2, 2020,

Saville heard shooting from behind Webb’s property, and his em-

ployee, Randy Hopper, carried a rifle from the scrap yard to an-

other property in view of Saville’s home. On December 20, 2020,

Webb or one of his employees brought a German Sheppard dog to

the scrap yard and induced it to attack Saville on her porch. The

dog chased Saville and forced her to hide inside her house. On Jan-

uary 31, 2021, the dog attacked Saville again. Saville reported the

incident to animal enforcement. Habersham County fined Webb’s

associate for violating animal control regulations but later

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suspended the fine for compliance. The same dog attacked Saville

for a third time on February 2, 2022.

II. Procedural History

In June 2022, Saville sued (1) Webb; (2) four employees of

Webb’s Recycling: Hopper, Robert Whitworth, Billy Mull, and

Randall Mull; (3) Habersham County, Georgia; (4) Planning De-

partment Director Beecham; (5) Sheriff Terrell; (6) Judge Thomas;

and (7) Solicitor Oliver. Saville alleged that Webb had been oper-

ating an illegal scrap yard, he and his employees had threatened her

to thwart her from reporting their illegal activity, and county offi-

cials enabled and assisted Webb’s operation.

In an amended complaint, 2 Saville named the same defend-

ants and raised: (1) a state and federal RICO claim against Webb;

(2) a state and federal RICO conspiracy claim against Webb, his

employees, Planning Director Beecham, and Sheriff Terrell; (3) a

state-law claim for damages caused by gang activity against Webb

and his employees; (4) a state-law malicious prosecution claim

against Webb; and (5) a § 1983 claim against Habersham County,

Judge Thomas, Solicitor Oliver, and Webb.

2 Webb and his employees each filed pro se answers, in which they summarily

denied the accusations. Habersham County, Planning Director Beecham,

Sheriff Terrell, Judge Thomas, and Solicitor Oliver moved to dismiss the com-

plaint, arguing that Saville failed to state a claim and that various immunities

barred her claims. The district court granted the motion to dismiss but, be-

cause Saville was proceeding pro se, granted her leave to file an amended com-

plaint.

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In Count 1, Saville alleged that Webb operated an enterprise

consisting of a network of scrap yards in Habersham County. She

argued that the enterprise operated in violation of federal and state

environmental laws and county ordinances. Saville argued that

Webb’s enterprise relied on a pattern of racketeering activity, in-

cluding the following predicate acts: filing three applications for

Saville’s arrest (Acts 1, 2, and 5), submitting false statements to the

planning department two times (Acts 3 and 4); and inducing a dog

to attack Saville (Act 6). For Act 3, Saville specifically alleged that,

on December 5, 2018, Webb applied for a conditional business li-

cense that falsely stated his legal name and property ownership in-

formation. For Act 4, she alleged that, on December 11, 2018, he

submitted a letter of intent that “falsely claimed that [the Environ-

mental Protection Agency (EPA)] did not find any environmental

violations” at Webb’s Recycling, despite violations issued by the

Georgia Environmental Protection Division.

In Count 2, Saville raised a federal and state RICO conspir-

acy claim against Webb, his employees, Planning Director Bee-

cham, and Sheriff Terrell, alleging that they conspired to further

the criminal enterprise described in Count 1. Saville identified sev-

eral predicate acts, including witness retaliation, threatened mur-

der, and wire fraud. Counts 3 and 4 of the amended complaint al-

leged violations of state law.

Count 5 raised a § 1983 claim against Habersham County,

Judge Thomas, Solicitor Oliver, and Webb. First, against Ha-

bersham County, she argued that Habersham County’s official

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policy3 limiting public comments at the Board of Commissioner’s

meetings imposed impermissible content-based limitations on

speech by prohibiting “improper conduct.” She also argued that

Habersham County should be liable for Judge Johnson’s actions

during the May 8, 2018, hearing on Webb’s first petition for her

arrest. And she alleged that Habersham County should be liable

for its animal control employees, who assisted Webb’s group by

allowing repeated dog attacks against Saville. Saville contended

that Planning Director Beecham and Habersham County’s issuing

business licenses to Webb’s Recycling allowed the business to vio-

late her constitutional rights. Finally, she argued that Sheriff Ter-

rell, by failing to stop the business’s unlawful activity, caused her

to be deprived of her Fourth Amendment right to be secure in her

person, home, and property.

Next, Saville argued that Judge Thomas violated her First

Amendment right to petition the government for redress of griev-

ances by ordering Saville not to contact law enforcement. She ar-

gued that Judge Thomas was acting outside her judicial capacity

because magistrate court judges, when considering an application

for an arrest warrant, lack the authority to enter an injunction.

3 Saville attached an excerpt from the Habersham County Board of Commis-

sioner’s March 2021 Rules of Procedure to her amended complaint. The rules

stated that individuals wishing to speak during board meetings (1) must sign

in; (2) are limited to three minutes, or five minutes if they sign up in advance;

(3) are not permitted to enter into any discussion with board members with-

out permission from the chair; and (4) are not allowed “to make impertinent,

derogatory, offensive, or slanderous remarks.”

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Saville also argued that Judge Thomas and Webb conspired to pre-

vent her from speaking at the license-revocation hearing, in viola-

tion of her right to petition the government for redress of griev-

ances.

Saville argued that Solicitor Oliver deprived her of (1) her

right to petition by criminally charging her for reporting violations

to the sheriff and code enforcement and (2) her Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process and equal protection by keeping

her on bail for nearly three years without a trial. She argued that

Oliver should not be granted prosecutorial immunity because he

acted under a conflict of interest and was essentially acting as a pri-

vate attorney for Webb’s enterprise.

Habersham County, Planning Director Beecham, Sheriff

Terrell, Judge Thomas, and Solicitor Oliver (collectively, the Ha-

bersham County Defendants) moved to dismiss Saville’s amended

complaint, arguing that Saville’s amended complaint failed to state

a claim. Six days after the deadline, Webb filed a pro se motion to

dismiss. Webb’s employees filed nothing in response to Saville’s

amended complaint. Saville responded and sought leave “to ser-

vice supplemental pleading” to add events that had taken place

since her initial complaint in June 2022.

The district court granted the motions to dismiss, dismissed

all claims against the Habersham County Defendants, Webb, and

Webb’s employees, and denied Saville’s motion for a supplemental

pleading. In a footnote, the court noted that it would consider

Webb’s motion to dismiss despite its untimeliness and his

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

previously filed answer because of the leniency afforded to pro se

litigants and because failure to state a claim was a “non-waivable

defect.”

As for Saville’s federal RICO claims, the court found that she

did not allege predicate acts that constituted racketeering activity

under the federal RICO statute nor did she state a claim for RICO

conspiracy using those predicate acts. On the § 1983 claims, the

district court found that the claim against Webb failed because

Saville did not allege anything beyond conclusory allegations to

show that he was acting in concert with the government. For her

claims against Habersham County, the court found that her free-

speech claim was due to be dismissed because she did not show

that her constitutional rights were violated by a policy or custom.

The court found that Saville had not alleged that Habersham

County had a custom or policy of knowingly issuing improper busi-

ness licenses or allowing its animal control officers to knowingly

disregard violations.

As for the claim against Judge Thomas, the court found that

the judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the

complained of acts were squarely within the judge’s judicial capac-

ity. Similarly, the court found that Saville’s claim against Solicitor

Oliver was barred by prosecutorial immunity because the com-

plained of actions were done in his role as county solicitor general.

Because Saville’s federal claims were due to be dismissed,

the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over her state-law claims. As for Saville’s motion to supplement

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 11

the amended complaint, the court found that the supplemental al-

legations failed to state a claim. Because the amendment would be

futile, the motion for supplemental pleading was denied. Saville

timely appealed.

III. Motion to Dismiss

The district court dismissed Saville’s amended complaint,

which alleged RICO, RICO conspiracy, and § 1983 claims against

Webb, his employees, government officials, and Habersham

County.

“We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the

complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2016). A sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim is re-

viewed de novo. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043,

1057 (11th Cir. 2007).

We liberally construe pro se pleadings. Campbell v. Air Ja-

maica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). That “leniency

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party,

or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an

action.” Id. at 1168–69.

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

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is plausible on its face.” 4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads fac-

tual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwar-

ranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as

facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis,

297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).

Saville argues that the district court erred in dismissing her

RICO claim against Webb and her RICO conspiracy claim against

Webb, his employees, and local government officials because she

adequately alleged predicate offenses that formed a pattern of rack-

eteering activity. She also argues that the court erred in dismissing

her § 1983 claim against Habersham County because she ade-

quately alleged the existence of policies or customs that resulted in

the deprivation of her constitutional rights. And she argues that

her § 1983 claims against a judge and prosecutor should not have

been dismissed because they were not protected by absolute im-

munity, and her § 1983 claim against Webb should proceed because

he was conspiring with state actors. We will address each argu-

ment in turn.

4 Exhibits attached to a complaint may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-

tion, as they are considered part of the complaint. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin,

496 F.3d 1189, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2007). But a district court may not consider

the contents of documents attached to earlier versions of the complaint but

were not attached to the most recently amended complaint. Hoefling v. City of

Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016).

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A. Substantive RICO Claim

Saville argues that she sufficiently alleged predicate acts, in-

cluding extortion, fraud, and threats, that constituted racketeering

activity to state a RICO claim against Webb. 5 She asserts that she

complied with the heightened pleading standard for fraud allega-

tions.

To state a civil RICO claim, a private plaintiff must plausibly

allege that “the defendants (1) operated or managed (2) an enter-

prise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that included

at least two predicate acts of racketeering, which (5) caused (6) in-

jury to the business or property of the plaintiff.” Cisneros v. Petland,

Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020). “[R]acketeering activity”

is any indictable act under a list of criminal offenses enumerated in

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), as well as “any act or threat involving murder,

kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing

in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(1). “A plaintiff must put forward enough facts with respect

5 Saville argues that the district court erred by granting Webb’s pro se motion

to dismiss because the filing was late, failed to state a basis for dismissal, and

did not satisfy several technical requirements in the Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

cedure. But considering the leniency given to pro se litigants, Saville fails to

show that the district court erred in granting Webb’s pro se motion to dismiss

despite its technical deficiencies. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–

82 (2003) (explaining that courts have some leeway to recharacterize a pro se

filing “to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling re-

quirements”).

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

to each predicate act to make it independently indictable as a

crime.” Cisneros, 972 F.3d at 1215.

“Civil RICO claims, which are essentially a certain breed of

fraud claims, must be pled with” the “increased level of specificity”

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Ambrosia Coal &

Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007).

Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead allegations of fraud “with par-

ticularity.” Fed R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Plaintiffs must allege (1) the pre-

cise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the

time, place, and person responsible for the statement; (3) the con-

tent and manner in which these statements misled the Plaintiffs;

and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Brooks v.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1380–81 (11th

Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

Saville alleged the following predicate acts:6 (1) witness re-

taliation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b); (2) fraud in connection

with identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028; and

(3) wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

6 On appeal, Saville mentions that she adequately alleged extortion by alleging

that Webb demanded $80,000 on May 8, 2018, and that the purpose of his de-

mand was “to eliminate neighbors as witnesses of his wrongful operations.”

But in her amended complaint, Saville did not list extortion as a predicate of-

fense, nor did she connect the allegation to her RICO claim. While pro se

litigants are given leniency, it does not allow the court “to serve as de facto

counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir.

2014).

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To support the predicate act of witness retaliation, Saville

asserts that she provided sufficient factual allegations about Webb

inducing a dog to attack Saville on her porch. A person illegally

retaliates against a witness when he knowingly “causes bodily in-

jury to another person or damages the tangible property of another

person, or threatens to do so” with the intent to retaliate against

that person for giving information about a possible federal crime to

a law enforcement officer. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2).

Construing Saville’s complaint liberally, she adequately al-

leges that the dog chased her and forced her to hide inside her

house, causing her to feel threatened and intimidated. But Saville

did not offer any details about how Webb “induced” the dog, nor

did she allege any facts, beyond her own belief, to support the in-

ference that the incident with the dog was in retaliation for Saville

reporting Webb to law enforcement. 7 Thus, Saville failed to estab-

lish the predicate act of witness retaliation based on the alleged dog

attack.

To support the predicate act of fraud in connection with

identification documents, Saville asserts that she provided suffi-

cient factual allegations that Webb applied for a conditional

7 Saville argues that she adequately alleged that Webb’s dog physically at-

tacked her, and Webb induced the attack, pointing to photos she attached to

her initial complaint. Even though the court can consider exhibits to the com-

plaint, the court cannot consider contents of documents attached to prior ver-

sions of a complaint but not the operative complaint because the filing of an

amended complaint makes the previous complaints became a “legal nullity.”

Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1277.

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business license under a “falsified legal name.” To be guilty of

fraud in connection with identification documents, the person

must knowingly use, without lawful authority, “a means of identi-

fication of another person . . . in connection with, any unlawful ac-

tivity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (emphasis added).

Saville alleges that Webb used his own middle name—Wil-

liam—to apply for a business license. This is not enough to support

a reasonable inference that Webb used the name of another per-

son. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Saville asserted only in

a conclusory manner that Saville used a false name for an unlawful

reason, she fails to plead her allegations of fraud with particularity.

Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1380–81. Thus, Saville failed to establish the

predicate act of fraud in connection with identification documents

based on Webb’s business license using a false name.

To support the predicate act of wire fraud, Saville asserts

that she adequately alleged wire fraud, and the district court failed

to consider that her wire fraud allegations were part of a broader

predicate act—Webb’s use of fraudulent means to obtain a business

license. To be guilty of wire fraud, the person “(1) intentionally

participates in a scheme to defraud another of money or property

and (2) uses the wires to further that scheme.” Otto Candies, LLC v.

Citigroup Inc., 137 F.4th 1158, 1196 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The phrase “money

or property” is key, meaning “[a] defendant commits federal wire

fraud . . . only if he both engaged in deception and had money or

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property as an object of his fraud.” Kousisis v. United States, 145 S.

Ct. 1382, 1390 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Saville alleges that Webb committed wire fraud based on

(1) his business license application and (2) a letter of intent in which

he allegedly misrepresented his environmental record. But Saville

fails to explain how these statements were part of a scheme to gain

“money or property” from a victim, or who that victim might be.

Kousisis, 145 S. Ct. at 1390. Again, Saville fails to allege fraud with

particularity because she does not provide what Webb “gained by

the alleged fraud,” nor explain what the purpose of the letter of the

intent was. Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1380–81. Thus, Saville failed to es-

tablish the predicate act of wire fraud with Webb’s business appli-

cation and the letter of intent.

The district court did not err in granting Webb’s pro se mo-

tion to dismiss Saville’s RICO claim because she failed to ade-

quately allege predicate acts constituting racketeering activity.

B. RICO Conspiracy Claim

Saville argues that she has adequately alleged Webb, his em-

ployees, Planning Director Beecham, and Sheriff Terrell agreed to

commit two predicate acts, specifically witness retaliation, threat-

ened murder, and wire fraud.

It is “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate” 18

U.S.C. § 1962(c). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). “[A] bare assertion of con-

spiracy will not suffice to prove a RICO conspiracy.” Otto Candies,

137 F.4th at 1201 (quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may estab-

lish a conspiracy either by (1) “showing that the defendant agreed

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18 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

to the overall objective of the conspiracy”; or (2) “showing that the

defendant agreed to commit two predicate acts.” Id.

For witness retaliation, Saville points to: (1) Webb and

Whitworth conspiring to testify falsely at the May 8, 2018, hearing

on Webb’s petition for Saville’s arrest, (2) Webb and Whitworth

doing the same at a June 12, 2018, hearing, (3) Webb and Hopper

conspiring to testify falsely at a November 13, 2018, hearing,

(4) Webb and Hopper conspiring to threaten Saville with a gun,

(5) Webb and Billy Mull conspiring to testify falsely at a July 22,

2020, hearing, and (6) Sheriff Terrell knowingly and willfully failing

to enforce traffic law against Webb’s employees and associates

when, on March 15, 2022, Webb, with Sherrif Terrell’s assistance,

drove his truck down the wrong lane and caused a collision with

Saville’s car.

As noted, a person illegally retaliates against a witness when

he knowingly “causes bodily injury to another person or damages

the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so.” 18

U.S.C. § 1513(b). Testifying, even falsely, does not cause damage

to tangible property nor bodily injury. To survive a motion to dis-

miss based on failure to state a claim, Saville needs to allege that

testifying falsely amounted to threats to cause bodily injury or

damage property. See id. But Saville did not specify what state-

ments were made, so she has failed to state a claim for RICO con-

spiracy based on these predicate acts.

Turning to the claim that Webb and his employee, Hopper,

threatened Saville with a gun, Saville alleged that she heard gun

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 19

shots from behind Webb’s property, and she then saw Hopper car-

rying a shotgun from Webb’s Recycling to another property on the

same street. While carrying a shotgun could be seen as threat,

Saville does not allege that Hopper knew Saville was home, he

walked toward her property, or that there was any interaction

other than seeing Hopper walking down the street to another prop-

erty “fully visible” from Saville’s home. This amounts to “unwar-

ranted deductions of facts” and does not support a claim for witness

retaliation. Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188. Thus, Saville has

failed to state a claim for RICO conspiracy based on the predicate

act.

Turning to Sheriff Terrell’s failure to enforce traffic laws,

Saville only offers conclusory allegations about Sheriff Terrell’s in-

volvement in the traffic accident in March 2022, which cannot meet

her burden. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, Saville has failed to

state a claim for RICO conspiracy based on the predicate act.

For wire fraud, Saville alleges: (1) Planning Director Bee-

cham knowingly hid damaging information about Webb’s business

from the Board of Commissioners at the November 19, 2018, li-

cense-revocation hearing; (2) Webb and Planning Director Bee-

cham conspired to produce two illegal business licenses; and

(3) Planning Director Beecham allowed records of Webb’s business

to be made “unsearchable” in the county database of business li-

censes. Although Saville provides factual details, she does not

show that the challenged acts were part of a scheme to defraud her

or someone else of their money and property, and the amended

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

complaint does not allow the reasonable inference that Webb and

Planning Director Beecham agreed to violate the law. See Brooks,

116 F.3d at 1380–81; see also Kousisis, 145 S. Ct. at 1390; Otto Candies,

137 F.4th at 1201. Saville has thus failed to state a claim for RICO

conspiracy based on wire fraud.

So, the district court did not err in dismissing Saville’s RICO

conspiracy claim because she failed to adequately allege facts show-

ing that the defendants agreed to commit predicate acts constitut-

ing racketeering activity. 8

C. Section 1983 Claims

Next, Saville argues that the district court erred in dismissing

her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Habersham County, Judge

Thomas, Solicitor Oliver, and Webb. Section 1983 provides a

8 As we explained at note 5, supra, the district court did not err when it liberally

construed and ruled on Webb’s pro se motion to dismiss, despite its technical

deficiencies. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 381–82.

Even though Webb’s employees did not move to dismiss the claims against

them, the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing Saville’s claims

against Webb’s employees. We have prohibited sua sponte dismissals for fail-

ure to state a claim where (1) “the defendant had not filed an answer and the

plaintiff still had a right to amend h[er] complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a),”

(2) “the plaintiff brought h[er] claim in good faith,” and (3) “the district court

failed to provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an oppor-

tunity to respond.” Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057

(11th Cir. 2007). While the district court did not find that Saville’s action was

brought in bad faith or expressly give her another opportunity to amend,

Saville was on notice that the other defendants were arguing that she failed to

state a claim, she had an opportunity to respond, and the dismissal was with-

out prejudice. See id.

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 21

private cause of action to sue persons acting under color of law for

the deprivation of constitutional rights. Crocker v. Hakes, 616 F.2d

237, 239–40 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 9 A plaintiff cannot state a

§ 1983 claim based on alleged violations of state or local law unless

she demonstrates the violation affected her constitutional rights.

See id. We address each defendant’s actions in turn.

i. Habersham County

Saville argues that she adequately alleged the existence of

policies or customs by Habersham County that resulted in the dep-

rivation of her constitutional rights.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the ac-

tions of its employees under a respondeat superior theory. Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a municipal-

ity can only be held liable for its official policies. Id. Thus, to state

a claim against a municipality, Saville must show Habersham

County’s action was based on an official policy or “a practice or

custom that is so pervasive, as to be the functional equivalent of a

policy adopted by the final policymaker.” Khoury v. Miami-Dade

Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1131 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks

omitted). Saville has identified Habersham County Board of Com-

missioners’ public comment policy and attached a copy of the pol-

icy to her amended complaint.

9 All decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit before the close of business on

September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v.

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

Next, Saville must show that a county policy or custom

caused the violation of her constitutional rights. Id. Saville asserts

Habersham County public comment policy violated her First

Amendment rights because the policy imposes content-based limi-

tations on speech at public meetings.10

Under the First Amendment, public meetings, such as Ha-

bersham County Board of Commissioners meetings, are typically

considered limited public forums because they are created “for cer-

tain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.” McDonough v.

Garcia, 116 F.4th 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (quotation

marks omitted). In such meetings, the government may limit

speech so long as the regulations do “not discriminate against

speech on the basis of viewpoint” and are “reasonable in light of

the purpose served by the forum.” Id. at 1329 (quotation marks

omitted). But “[r]estrictions that bar offensive or otherwise unwel-

come speech are impermissible, regardless of the forum in which

the government seeks to impose them.” Moms for Liberty-Brevard

Cnty. v. Brevard Pub. Sch., 118 F.4th 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2024).

The question is whether the Habersham County Board of

Commissioners’ public comment policy discriminates based on

viewpoint and is reasonable. We find that policy, which prohibits

comments that are “impertinent, derogatory, offensive, or

10 Saville has adequately alleged that she was injured by this policy because she

alleged that, on August 16, 2021, while she was speaking during public com-

ment, she was “induced to leave” the podium. See Moms for Liberty-Brevard

Cnty. v. Brevard Pub. Sch., 118 F.4th 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024).

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 23

slanderous,” discriminates based on viewpoint. See id. at 1334–35;

see also Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) (“Giving offense is a

viewpoint.”). Thus, the district court 11 erred in dismissing Saville’s

§ 1983 claim against Habersham County based on its public com-

ment policy because she adequately alleged the existence of a

county policy that caused her to be deprived of her constitutional

right to free speech.

Next, Saville argues that Habersham County allowed Judge

Johnson to infringe on her First Amendment right to petition the

government for redress of grievances when it enjoined her from

taking photos of Webb’s alleged criminal activity or reporting it to

law enforcement. Thus, Saville asserts that Habersham County is

liable for Judge Johnson’s acts.

But Habersham County may be held liable under § 1983

“only for acts for which it is actually responsible, acts which the

local government has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Turquitt v.

Jefferson Cnty., 137 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (cita-

tion modified). To determine whether a local government is liable

11 We note two things about Saville’s First Amendment claim. First, the dis-

trict court did not have the benefit of our decision in Moms for Liberty-Brevard

County v. Brevard Public School, when it issued its order. Second, while the Ha-

bersham County Defendants argue that there may have been a legitimate rea-

son that Saville was silenced, and while that may be true after discovery, at

this stage we must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and construe

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunt, 814 F.3d at 1221.

Under that standard, Saville alleged that she was cut off from speaking at a

public meeting because she expressed a viewpoint unflattering to Habersham

County.

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24 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

under § 1983, a court must determine whether the actor responsi-

ble for the allegedly unconstitutional action was acting as a local

government actor or a “policymaker” when he engaged in those

activities. Id. If the actor was acting as an “arm of the State,” then

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars relief. Manders v. Lee, 338

F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). To determine whether

an official acts as an “arm of the State,” we consider “(1) how state

law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State main-

tains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and

(4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id. at 1309.

The question becomes whether Judge Johnson is a local gov-

ernment actor or an “arm of the State.” First, Georgia’s state con-

stitution vests “[t]he judicial power of the state” in several kinds of

courts, including magistrate courts. Ga. Const. art. VI, § 1, ¶ I. Sec-

ond, the state constitution, prohibits counties from taking any

“[a]ction affecting any court or the personnel thereof,” which are

instead regulated by the state legislature. Id. art. IX, § 2, ¶ I. Third,

the county pays for magistrate courts, but Georgia sets salaries for

magistrate judges. O.C.G.A. § 15-10-23(a)(2), (d), (g). Finally,

counties are not liable for judgments against magistrate court

judges. Id. § 36-1-4. Thus, the magistrate judge is an arm of the

state—not a county policymaker. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319

(finding that even though the county funded a sheriff’s office, Geor-

gia state law mandated it, so the sheriff was an arm of the state).

Because Judge Johnson was not a county policymaker, Habersham

County could not be held liable, and the district court did not err

in dismissing that claim.

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 25

Finally, Saville asserts that Habersham County is liable based

on its policy or custom of deliberate indifference to constitutional

violations because its judges, prosecutors, and sheriffs allowed dog

attacks and issued improper business licenses to Webb. But Saville

does not have “a judicially cognizable interest” in Webb’s “prosecu-

tion or nonprosecution.” Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). And Saville can-

not base her claim on Habersham County’s alleged failure to en-

force its zoning and animal control regulations because she has not

shown that this nonenforcement violated any of her constitutional

rights. Crocker, 616 F.2d at 240. Thus, the district court did not err

in dismissing the rest of Saville’s § 1983 claims against Habersham

County.

ii. Judge Thomas and Solicitor Oliver

Saville also argues that the district court erred when it found

that Judge Thomas and Solicitor Oliver were entitled to absolute

immunity on her § 1983 claims because the complained-of actions

were done in their role either as judge or prosecutor.12

First, Saville argues that Judge Thomas is not entitled to ju-

dicial immunity. According to Saville, Judge Thomas enjoined her

from contacting law enforcement to report alleged unlawful activ-

ity by Webb and from contacting Webb directly or indirectly.

Saville contends that this “injunction” was outside the normal

12 We review questions of immunity de novo. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322,

1325 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

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26 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

judicial function and exceeded magistrate authority under Georgia

law.

“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from dam-

ages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial ca-

pacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (in-

ternal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a judge

was acting in his or her “judicial capacity,” we consider whether

(1) the precise act complained of is a normal judicial

function; (2) the events involved occurred in the

judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered

around a case then pending before the judge; and

(4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately

out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.

Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)

(citation modified).

Even though Saville uses the term “injunction” to describe

what Judge Thomas did, Saville’s factual allegations about the hear-

ing show that Judge Thomas was setting bail conditions for Saville,

not issuing an injunction.13 Judge Thomas acted in her judicial ca-

pacity because issuing an arrest warrant and setting bail conditions

13 This is further supported by the state court order from that November 13,

2018, hearing. Although the order setting bail conditions in Saville’s state

court case is not included in the record before us, we may take judicial notice

of this order. See Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651–52 (11th

Cir. 2020); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 27

are normal judicial functions, and setting the bail conditions oc-

curred during a hearing and concerned a petition for arrest that was

properly pending before her. See Dykes, 776 F.2d at 946.

Saville also argues that Judge Thomas exceeded the author-

ity of a magistrate judge in issuing the injunction. Under Georgia

law, magistrate courts have jurisdiction over “applications for and

the issuance of arrest and search warrants,” among other matters,

including setting bond conditions. O.C.G.A. § 15-10-2(a)(1), (a)(2).

Magistrate courts do not have jurisdiction over suits in equity. See

id. § 15-10-2. But Judge Thomas did not issue an injunction, instead

she set bail conditions which falls within magistrate courts’ pow-

ers. 14 Id. § 15-10-2(a)(2). Thus, the district court did not err in dis-

missing Saville’s claims against Judge Thomas. 15

Turning to Solicitor Oliver, Saville argues that Oliver is not

shielded by prosecutorial immunity because he acted under a

14 But even if Judge Thomas’s prohibitions qualified as an injunction, she prob-

ably still enjoys judicial immunity. Acting “in excess of jurisdiction” is not

enough to deprive a judge of absolute judicial immunity—the judge must act

despite “the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356 n.6 (1978). Because “the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be con-

strued broadly” in questions of judicial immunity, id. at 356, Judge Thomas’s

actions likely were not in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356 n.6.

15 In a conclusory fashion, Saville says that declaratory and injunctive relief is

not covered by judicial immunity. Saville has abandoned this claim. Sapuppo

v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[S]imply stating

that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes aban-

donment of that issue and precludes [this court’s] considering the issue on ap-

peal.”).

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28 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

“grave” conflict of interest when he criminally charged her for re-

porting violations to the Sheriff and Code Enforcement. Saville

also asserts that Oliver violated her Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process and equal protection by keeping her on bail for

nearly three years without a trial.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for dam-

ages for activities that are intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–

31 (1976). Prosecutorial immunity extends to all actions that the

prosecutor takes while performing her role as an advocate for the

government, including the initiation and pursuit of criminal prose-

cution, all appearances before the court, examining witnesses, and

presenting evidence. Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271,

1279 (11th Cir. 2002). Absolute immunity can cover “even wrong-

ful or malicious acts by prosecutors.” Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288,

1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Oliver’s initiation and pursuit of Saville’s criminal prosecu-

tion is part of his role as an advocate for the government and thus

entitles him to prosecutorial immunity. See Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1279.

Even though Saville asserts that Oliver conspired with Webb to

prosecute her for malevolent reasons, our case law still provides

absolute immunity for these acts. See Hart, 587 F.3d at 1298. Thus,

the district court did not err in dismissing Saville’s claims against

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 29

Solicitor Oliver because they were protected by absolute immun-

ity. 16

iii. Webb

Saville argues that her § 1983 claim against Webb should

proceed because he was conspiring with state actors. Section 1983

only provides a remedy for acts performed “under color of law.” A

private party cannot be sued under § 1983 except for in the “rare

circumstances” when the party can be viewed as a state actor. Har-

vey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). Although Saville

alleges that Webb conspired with state actors, she did not ade-

quately allege that Webb was acting as a state actor. Thus, the dis-

trict court also did not err in dismissing her § 1983 claim against

Webb because he was not a state actor.

* * *

To recap, the district court erred in dismissing Saville’s

§ 1983 claim against Habersham County based on its public com-

ment policy because Saville adequately alleged the existence of a

county policy that caused her to be deprived of her First Amend-

ment right to free speech. But the district court did not err in

16 Saville also asserts that declaratory and injunctive relief is not covered by

prosecutorial immunity. Unlike her argument against Judge Thomas, Saville

provides more discussion to support her assertion. But Saville’s allegations

were about past events, and she did not allege facts showing a serious risk of

continuing or future harm. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that

Saville was not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief. See Bolin v. Story,

225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

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30 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

dismissing the rest of her § 1983 claims against Habersham County,

Judge Thomas, Solicitor Oliver, and Webb.

IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction on State Law Claims

Saville also argues that the district court should have heard

her state-law claims. A district court’s decision not to exercise sup-

plemental jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Parker

v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006).

A district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over

claims arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A district court

may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that

“form part of the same case or controversy” as claims over which

the district court has original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(a). “When-

ever a federal court has supplemental jurisdiction under section

1367(a), that jurisdiction should be exercised unless section 1367(b)

or (c) applies.” Parker, 468 F.3d at 743.

Because the district court erred in dismissing one of the

claims over which it had original jurisdiction—Saville’s First

Amendment claim against Habersham County—it did not have the

discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law

claims under § 1367(c)(3). See Parker, 468 F.3d at 743. Thus, we

vacate the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental ju-

risdiction and remand for further proceedings. 17

17 Although § 1367(c)(3) does not apply, the district court may decline to exer-

cise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim for other reasons under

§ 1367(c).

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 31

V. Motion to Amend

Next, Saville argues that she should have been allowed to

amend her complaint to add new predicate acts, a new constitu-

tional violation by Habersham County, and new allegations show-

ing the prosecutor was not entitled to immunity.

A district court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint is

reviewed for abuse of discretion, although the underlying legal

conclusion of whether a particular amendment to the complaint

would be futile is reviewed de novo. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428

F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

After review, we agree with the district court’s thorough

analysis of Saville’s motion to supplement. The court correctly

found that the allegations about new business licenses failed to as-

sert the elements of a federal wire fraud violation. And the district

court properly found that Saville’s allegations about animal control

releasing a trapped dog did not plausibly constitute any federal

racketeering activity.

For Saville’s claim against Habersham County related to the

allegedly unconstitutional search, the court appropriately found

that she did not allege that the search was in accordance with a

custom or policy of Habersham County. For her claim against Ha-

bersham County for its adoption of a policy directing certain ap-

peals to the Superior Court of Georgia, the district court correctly

found that Saville did not have standing to challenge the policy be-

cause she failed to allege that she had appealed a decision under the

new policy or otherwise been injured. As to her new allegations

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32 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

against Solicitor Oliver, the court properly found that his subse-

quent judgeship had no bearing on whether he was entitled to pros-

ecutorial immunity for his actions prosecuting her.

Thus, the district court did not err in determining that

Saville’s amendment to her complaint would be futile because her

new allegations would not save any of the claims that were

properly dismissed.

VI. Motion for Sanctions

Finally, Saville argues that the court should have imposed

sanctions against the Habersham County Defendants because they

threatened her by serving her with a motion for sanctions.

After filing her amended complaint, Saville moved for sanc-

tions against the Habersham County Defendants under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 11. She asserted that, on April 13, 2023,

she received an email from the Habersham County Defendants’ at-

torney, who attached a motion for sanctions against Saville. Saville

argued that, because the motion for sanctions was never filed by

the defendants, the email from their attorney constituted a private

threat separate from the judicial process. She also argued that the

defendants were misrepresenting the record by referring to a mo-

tion for sanctions that had not been filed, which was part of the

defendants’ pattern of falsifying records. The district court denied

Saville’s motion for sanctions, finding that the Habersham County

Defendants did not behave improperly by sending her a letter

warning it would seek sanctions because it was required under Rule

11.

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24-10998 Opinion of the Court 33

We review rulings on sanctions for abuse of discretion.

Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1993). Under Rule 11,

a party who believes that its opposing party has submitted a frivo-

lous pleading may move for sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2),

(c)(2). The motion must first be served to the opposing party, “but

it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged

paper . . . is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days

after service or within another time the court sets.” See id. 11(c)(2).

Here, the Habersham County Defendants served Saville

with a motion for sanctions as required under Rule 11 arguing that

the claims in Saville’s amended complaint were frivolous. Also, in

accordance with Rule 11, the Habersham County Defendants did

not simultaneously file anything with the court. Thus, they com-

plied with the Rule 11 requirements, and the district court did not

err in denying Saville’s motion for sanctions because the defend-

ants did not behave inappropriately.

VII. Conclusion

In conclusion, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal of

Saville’s § 1983 claim against Habersham County based on the pub-

lic comment policy allegedly depriving her of her First Amendment

rights. Because one of Saville’s federal claims was not due to be

dismissed, we also VACATE the district court’s decision not to ex-

ercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. We

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34 Opinion of the Court 24-10998

REMAND for further proceedings on these claims. We AFFIRM

as to all other issues. 18

18 Saville also argues that the court erred in its order awarding payment of

expenses to Saville because the court miscalculated the date payments were

due. If a plaintiff requests waiver of service and a defendant, without good

cause, fails to waive service, the court must impose on the defendant the ex-

penses incurred in making service and reasonable expenses involved in a mo-

tion to collect those expenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). But Saville did not make

any argument about the propriety of the order awarding payment of expenses

below, so we will not address it on appeal. See Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp., 270

F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001).