Kelly v. Kellner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSHUA KELLY, : Civil No. 4:22-CV-1555

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

KEVIN KELLNER, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This prisoner civil rights case, which comes before us for consideration of a

motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 50), illustrates a recurring challenge

confronting correctional officials who must address the needs of an aging and

increasingly infirm inmate population. Occasionally, prisoners encounter mobility

issues while incarcerated. These mobility challenges often result in medical

recommendations that prisoners be housed on lower tiers in institutions or assigned

lower bunks in order to avoid unnecessary and potentially hazardous fall risks. The

failure to make or implement such medical accommodations can in turn raise

questions regarding whether an inmate’s conditions of confinement rise to the level

of a Constitutional infraction under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment.

So it is here. Joshua Kelly is a former state inmate who was incarcerated at

the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Mahanoy in July and August 2021. At the

time of his incarceration, Kelly suffered from a pre-existing spinal condition which

limited his mobility and ability to climb stairs. Kelly sought a medical

accommodation for this impairment, which was granted on August 2, 2021, when a

doctor directed that Kelly be moved to a lower tier housing unit to avoid stair

climbing. However, no effort was made to address this medical directive until

August 9, 2021, one week later. As Kelly was moving to his new cell, he fell and

fractured his orbital bone.

This mishap forms the basis of this prisoner civil rights lawsuit, with Kelly

alleging violations of his civil rights by Kevin Kellner, the Unit Manager who was

responsible for his cell assignment, Kellner’s supervisor, Major Thomas Sokaloski,

and the former Corrections Healthcare Administrator at SCI Mahanoy, John

Steinhart. According to Kelly, individually and collectively these officials deprived

him of his rights under the Eighth Amendment by failing to timely ensure that he

was transferred to a cell which accommodated his disabilities.

The defendants have moved for summary judgment in this case, arguing as a

matter of law that the undisputed facts do not demonstrate deliberate indifference by

any defendant to Kelly’s well-being. As we discuss below, at this juncture, when we

are considering a defense motion for summary judgment, we must view the facts in

a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Inmate Kelly. Viewing this case through the

analytical lens prescribed by law, for the reasons set forth below, this summary

judgment motion will be granted, in part, with respect to Defendants Steinhart and

Sokaloski, but denied with respect to Defendant Kellner since there are disputed

issues of fact concerning the state of Kellner’s knowledge regarding the need to

transfer Kelly.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

With respect to Kelly’s Eighth Amendment claim the pertinent facts can be

simply stated: In the Summer of 2021, Joshua Kelly was extradited from Maryland

to commence service of a sentence in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.

(Doc. 51-3). At the time that he arrived in state custody, Kelly suffered from a pre-

existing medical condition, a spinal injury suffered as a result of a 2019 industrial

accident. (Id., at 8). This condition limited Kelly’s ability to walk, stand, and climb

stairs or ladders. (Id.) Over time, while in state custody Kelly’s condition declined.

By August 2021 he was prescribed a cane to assist him in ambulating; by October

of 2022, Kelly was confined to a wheelchair. (Doc. 51-5).

Following his extradition in June of 2021, Kelly was initially housed at SCI

Smithfield, where his impairments were noted, and he was medically assigned to a

lower bunk. (Docs. 51-3 at 10-12; 51-5). On July 8, 2021, Kelly was transferred to

SCI Mahanoy. (Id.) Upon his arrival at this institution Kelly shared his complex

medical history with an intake nurse and underwent a two-week quarantine period.

(Doc. 51-3 at 10-15).

Kelly was released from quarantine on July 23, 2021, and was housed in the

FA unit at the prison. Kelly’s unit manager was Kevin Kellner who initially assigned

Kelly to an upper tier cell, a cell assignment which required Kelly to climb stairs.

(Id. at 15). At the time of this cell assignment, the Department of Corrections had

in place a general policy statement governing medical housing accommodations for

inmates, DC-ADM-006, which stated in part that:

The facility’s health care department, through qualified personnel or

specialists, and in conjunction with the affected inmate, shall make the

diagnosis of a qualified disability, unless previously diagnosed, and

shall determine the level of accommodation needed and provide the

appropriate medical treatment, as required by the condition. Medical

staff shall notify facility staff of any impairment.

(Doc. 57-6 at 8).

While this policy called for medical personnel to inform staff of any necessary

medically determined accommodations, the means by which this information was to

be transmitted was undefined, and in practice at SCI Mahanoy this information was

shared in an unstructured and occasionally haphazard manner. For his part, Unit

Manager Kellner indicated that in nine out of ten times he first learned of these

medical accommodation needs from the inmate. (Doc. 51-6 at 19-20). In addition,

Kellner recalled occasionally receiving this information from medical or

correctional staff. (Id.) The physician at SCI Mahanoy who examined Kelly and

imposed a lower tier restriction on this inmate in August of 2021, Dr. Saikia, stated

that these restrictions would be entered into an inmate’s computerized medical

records, which were accessible to the unit manager, and the inmate would be

instructed to inform his unit manager. However, the doctor denied sharing this

medical information directly with correctional staff. (Doc. 57-11 at 20-24). Kellner’s

immediate supervisor Major Thomas Sokaloski, in turn, stated that unit managers

were expected to use the prison’s computer system, DOCNet, to regularly check on

inmate medical status changes and accommodate those medical conditions. (Doc.

51-7 at 12-14). John Steinhart, the former Corrections Healthcare Administrator at

SCI Mahanoy, acknowledged that there was no single standard operating procedure

in this field but described a slightly different means of sharing this information,

stating that unit managers would rely upon notice through DOCNet, combined with

medical provider calls to receive this information. (Doc. 51-8 at 16-21). Notably,

Unit Manager Kellner indicated that he was well aware of the vagaries in this system

prior to Kelly’s injury and estimated that on ten or more occasions there had been

delays in receiving medical status information relating to inmate accommodation

needs. (Doc. 51-6 at 30-35). Kellner claimed that these communication issues had

been discussed with Major Sokaloski but denied that the prior issues had ever led to

an inmate injury. (Id.) For his part, Sokaloski testified that he did not recall any

discussions with Kellner or other unit managers concerning problems receiving

medical reports of inmate accommodation needs. (Doc, 51-7 at 14-16).

It was against this backdrop that Kelly’s medical concerns remained

unaddressed until the date of his fall and injury, August 9, 2021. On this score,

Kelly’s primary point of contact in terms of securing a lower tier cell assignment

was his Unit Manager, Kevin Kellner. In fact, Kelly had no communications with

Major Sokaloski concerning this issue prior to his August 9 fall, and this issue was

never discussed with Mr. Steinhart, who had retired several months earlier in May

of 2021. (Doc. 51-3 at 42-46, Doc. 51-8 a 9).

With respect to Kelly’s communication of his medical needs to Unit Manager

Kellner there is a stark and irreconcilable conflict in the evidence. For his part,

Defendant Kellner insists that he first learned of Kelly’s lower-tier medical

restriction on August 9, 2021 and was in the process of accommodating that

restriction when Kelly fell and injured himself. (Doc. Doc. 51-6 at 20-25). Kelly

provides a very different account, an account which draws support from some

independent corroborating evidence. According to Kelly, shortly after he arrived on

Kellner’s unit, on July 28, 2021, he fell and required medical attention. (Doc. 51-3

at 19-28). At that time Kelly began pleading his case for a lower tier cell assignment

with correctional officers. (Id.) Kelly says that he also discussed this concern twice

with Unit Manager Kellner, who told him that he was awaiting medical

documentation before granting this request. (Id.)

That documentation calling for Kelly’s placement in a lower tier cell was

entered into Kelly’s files by Dr. Saikia on August 2, 2021 after a sick call encounter

between Kelly and the doctor. (Id.) Two days later, on August 4, 2021, Kelly was

also prescribed a cane, further reflecting the medical evaluation of the severity of his

impairment. (Id.) On August 4, 2021—five days before his fall—Kelly

communicated in writing directly with Kellner regarding the medical directive

instructing him to be placed on a lower-tier cell, stating:

I’m requesting to know when I will be moved to the bottom tier so I

don’t have to continue struggling up/down the steps in pain? On

8/2/2021 [the doctor] made me bottom bunk bottom tier status an [sic]

I also have a walking cane now.

(Doc. 57-12).

There is no evidence that Kellner ever responded to this inmate request or

took any action to move Kelly to a lower tier cell until August 9, 2021, the day Kelly

fell suffering a fractured orbital bone.

Following this injury Kelly filed a grievance against Unit Manager Kellner,

alleging his indifference to Kelly’s medical needs. This grievance was initially

reviewed and denied by Major Sokaloski. That decision was then upheld upon

appeal. (Doc. 51-9).

On these facts, Kelly filed a complaint with this court naming Unit Manager

Kellner, Major Sokaloski, and the former Corrections Healthcare Administrator at

SCI Mahanoy, John Steinhart. as defendants. (Doc. 1). According to Kelly,

individually and collectively these officials deprived him of his rights under the

Eighth Amendment by failing to timely ensure that he was transferred to a cell which

accommodated his disabilities. The defendants have now moved for summary

judgment on this claim, asserting that Kelly has failed to establish either supervisory

civil rights violations or any deliberate indifference to his safety by any of the

defendants. (Doc. 50). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for

resolution. Mindful of the fact that, at this stage, we must resolve all factual disputes

in favor of Kelly, for the following reasons the summary judgment motion will be

granted with respect to Defendants Sokaloski and Steinhart but denied as to Unit

Manager Kellner.

III. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment – Standard of Review

The defendants have has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those

claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.”

Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010).

The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a

sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a

verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.

The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes

shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec.

& Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s claims, “the

non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest

solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.”

Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary

judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also

appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or

speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla

of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the

Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).

Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing

to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual

disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered

in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers

Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne

cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing

any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App’x

896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary

judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere

allegations or denial.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676

F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697

F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue

of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is

also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969).

Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon

bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338,

341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).

Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or

assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in

adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most

favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW,

Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where

the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s

must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the

evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility

determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a

verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see

also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third

Circuit has instructed that:

To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not

match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant.

In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla”

threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court

cannot credit the movant’s version of events against the opponent, even

if the quantity of the movant’s evidence far outweighs that of its

opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the

believability and weight of the evidence.

Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal

quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d

464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).

B. Supervisory Liability—Guiding Principles

Kelly’s complaint names two supervisory officials—Major Sokaloski and the

former Corrections Healthcare Administator at SCI Mahanoy, John Steinhart—as

defendants. As to these supervisory and grievance officials, it is well settled that a

claim of a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the

named defendants were government officials or supervisors when the incidents set

forth in the complaint occurred. Quite the contrary, to state a constitutional tort

claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendants actively deprived him of a right

secured by the Constitution. Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d

Cir. 1997); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Constitutional tort

liability is personal in nature and can only follow personal involvement in the alleged

wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of personal direction or of

actual knowledge and acquiescence in the challenged practice. Robinson v. City of

Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997). In particular, with respect to supervisory

officials, it is well established that: “A[n individual government] defendant in a civil

rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability

cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).

As the Supreme Court has observed:

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. . . .

See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (finding no vicarious

liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also

Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L.Ed. 329 (1812) (a federal

official’s liability “will only result from his own neglect in not properly

superintending the discharge” of his subordinates’ duties); Robertson

v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed. 203 (1888) (“A

public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or

position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions

of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly

employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties”).

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through

the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

Applying these benchmarks, courts have frequently held that, in the absence

of evidence of supervisory knowledge and approval of subordinates’ actions, a

plaintiff may not maintain an action against supervisors based upon the misdeeds of

their subordinates. O’Connell v. Sobina, No. 06-238, 2008 WL 144199, * 21 (W.D.

Pa. Jan. 11, 2008); Neuburger v. Thompson, 305 F. Supp. 2d 521, 535 (W.D. Pa.

2004). Rather, “[p]ersonal involvement must be alleged and is only present where

the supervisor directed the actions of supervisees or actually knew of the actions and

acquiesced in them.” Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App’x 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis

added).

Nor can an inmate sustain a supervisory liability claim against prison

supervisors by simply alleging in a talismanic fashion that they failed to adequately

train, oversee or supervise their subordinate employees. In this regard, we note that

“[n]umerous courts, including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to the viability

and scope of supervisory liability after Iqbal.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366

n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 n.8 (3d

Cir. 2010)). To the extent that supervisory liability survives after Iqbal, the scope of

that liability is clearly and narrowly defined. As the Court of Appeals has observed:

“There are two theories of supervisory liability” one under which

supervisors can be liable if they “established and maintained a policy,

practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm,”

and another under which they can be liable if they “participated in

violating plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the

person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their]

subordinates' violations.”

Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5 (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile

Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004)).

When supervisory liability is premised upon allegations that a supervisor

established or maintained a policy which directly caused a constitutional injury:

A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the

“proximate cause” of his injuries. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199,

1213 (3d Cir. 1996). He may do so by demonstrating an “affirmative

link” between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional

violation he alleges. Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850 (internal quotation

marks omitted). This is done for a custom if [the plaintiff] demonstrates

that [the defendant] had knowledge of “similar unlawful conduct in the

past, ... failed to take precautions against future violations, and that [its]

failure, at least in part, led to [his] injury.” Id. at 851.

Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019).

Furthermore, to the extent that an inmate's supervisory liability claims rest on

the premise that prison supervisors did not after-the-fact act favorably upon past

grievances, it is well settled that an inmate cannot sustain a constitutional tort claim

against prison supervisors based solely upon assertions that officials failed to

adequately investigate or respond to his past grievances. Inmates do not have a

constitutional right to a prison grievance system. Speight v. Sims, 283 F. App'x 880

(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner”)).

Consequently, dissatisfaction with a response to an inmate's grievances does not

support a constitutional claim. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App'x 924 (3d

Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance process not a basis for § 1983

liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995) (holding that

prison officials' failure to comply with grievance procedure is not actionable because

prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional rights

upon prison inmates); see also Cole v. Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617, at *5

(W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[M]ere concurrence in a prison administrative appeal

process does not implicate a constitutional concern”).

As the Third Circuit observed when disposing of a similar claim by another

inmate:

Several named defendants, such as the Secretaries of the Department of

Corrections or Superintendents, were named only for their supervisory

roles in the prison system. The District Court properly dismissed these

defendants and any additional defendants who were sued based on their

failure to take corrective action when grievances or investigations were

referred to them. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d

Cir. 1988) (defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely

on the operation of respondeat superior); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan,

81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (state's inmate grievance procedures

do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process

Clause).

Pressley v. Beard, 266 F. App'x 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008). Indeed, as to such claims,

the Court of Appeals has held that summary dismissal is appropriate “because there

is no apparent obligation for prison officials to investigate prison grievances.”

Paluch v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dept. Corr., 442 F. App'x 690, 695 (3d Cir. 2011)

(citing Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 382 (2d Cir.

1973)). See Brown v. Wetzel, No. 1:21-CV-1828, 2022 WL 2951454, at *7–8 (M.D.

Pa. Apr. 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-01828, 2022

WL 2919283 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2022).

C. Application of the Eighth Amendment to Medically Prescribed Inmate

Cell Placement Instructions.

At bottom, this case involves a recurring issue in corrections; namely, when

does the failure to timely accommodate a medically prescribed lower-tier or lower-

bunk housing requirement rise to the level of a violation of the Eighth Amendment?

As to this question, the controlling legal guideposts can be simply stated:

The Eight Amendment protects prisoners from the infliction of cruel

and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To prevail on any

Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must show: (1) a deprivation that

is objectively, “sufficiently serious;” and (2) “a sufficiently culpable

state of mind” of the defendant official. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to

an inmate's serious medical need when he “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837.

Claims involving failure to assign a proper bunk to accommodate an

inmate's medical needs are considered conditions of confinement

claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and

unusual punishment. See Glazewski v. Corzine, 385 F. App'x 83, 89

(3d Cir. 2010) (treating allegations of being given a top bunk as part of

a conditions of confinement claim); Little v. Ebbert, No. 1:17-CV-

01915, 2018 WL 6504201, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2018).

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim,

a plaintiff must demonstrate both an objective element – that the

deprivation was sufficiently serious, and a subjective element – that the

prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable mind. Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). Prison conditions may objectively violate

the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment when inmates are deprived of “the minimal civilized

measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981). Such necessities include food, clothing, shelter, medical care

and reasonable safety. Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221

F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). “Whether one characterizes the treatment

received by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confinement,

failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is

appropriate to apply the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard articulated in

Estelle.” Wilson at 303.

“Deliberate indifference” in this context is a subjective standard: “the

prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of

the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d

120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). It is not sufficient that the official should have

known of the risk. Id. at 133. A plaintiff can, however, prove an

official's actual knowledge of a substantial risk to his safety “in the

usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 842. In other words, “a factfinder may conclude that a

prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk

was obvious.” Id.

Cameron v. Swartz, No. 2:17-CV-00816-AJS, 2020 WL 7496317, at *5

(W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-

00816-AJS, 2020 WL 7490229 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2020). Applying these

guideposts, an inmate like Kelly may establish an Eighth Amendment claim when

the evidence reveals a knowing failure by staff to accommodate a medical directive

instructing staff to place the prisoner in a lower tier, lower bunk cell. See.eg., Little

v. Ebbert, No. 1:17-CV-01915, 2018 WL 6504201, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2018).

Thus, “if a reasonable jury could conclude that one or more [defendants] knew that

[the inmate] should have been housed on the lower tier, and that those [defendants]

were able to have him assigned to the lower tier but did not do so, it follows that a

reasonable jury could infer that [defendants’] failure to have him housed on the lower

tier was deliberate.” Zamichieli v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 19-3305, 2022

WL 777201, at *4 (3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022). In contrast, mere negligence in terms of

inmate housing decisions will not suffice to state and Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim.

It is in the light of these legal cairns that we evaluate the legal sufficiency of

Kelly’s allegations against the three defendants named in this complaint.

D. The Motion for Summary Judgment Will Be Granted in Part and

Denied in Part.

As we have noted, Kelly’s complaint names three defendants: Unit Manager

Kellner, Major Sokaloski, and the former Corrections Healthcare Administrator at

SCI Mahanoy, John Steinhart. (Doc. 1). According to Kelly, individually and

collectively these officials deprived him of his rights under the Eighth Amendment

by failing to timely ensure that he was transferred to a cell which accommodated his

disabilities.

Turning first to Defendant Steinhart, the former Corrections Healthcare

Administrator at SCI Mahanoy, we have little difficulty concluding that Kelly’s

claims against this defendant fail as a matter of law. It is undisputed that Mr.

Steinhart retired in May of 2021, nearly three months prior to Kelly’s injuries. Thus,

Kelly does not allege that Steinhart played any role in his cell placement, nor can he.

Instead, Kelly seems to endeavor to hold Steinhart personally liable for an injury he

suffered months after Steinhart’s retirement based upon what he views as the failure

to adopt more rigorous procedures for communicating inmate accommodation needs

to correctional staff.

However, in our view this is simply too temporally and topically remote a

connection to sustain supervisory civil rights liability in this case. The fact that

Steinhart had left the Department of Corrections months before this incident is fatal

to any attempt to blame him as a supervisor of allegedly adopting a constitutionally

infirm procedure which was the proximate cause of Kelly’s injury. Further, while

there is some evidence of communication shortcomings when it came to transmitting

notice of inmate medical restrictions to unit managers, it is also clear that at least

three avenues of communication were believed to exist: direct reports by prisoners;

review of DOCNet computerized treatment notes by unit managers; and direct calls

from medical staff to unit managers. And while these is also some indication of

prior occasions when there were delays before unit managers received this medical

information, there is no evidence that any delay led to an inmate injury. Therefore,

at most, the failure to impose more rigorous and structured reporting procedures

amounted to negligence, and did not constitute deliberate indifference to Kelly’s

safety. Finally, we note that the evidence—while contested—indicates that Kellner

was actually notified by Kelly both of his medical impairments and of the medical

directive that he be placed on a lower-tier cell on August 4, 2021, at least five days

prior to Kelly’s injury. Therefore, the reporting system as described by Defendant

Kellner, which relied upon the inmate self-reporting his medical limitations,

arguably appears to have worked in this case placing Kellner on notice days before

this injury of Kelly’s need for a lower-tier cell.

Similar considerations lead us to conclude that, while Kelly’s claims against

Major Sokaloski present a somewhat closer case, these claims still fail to meet the

rigorous standards required by law for supervisory civil rights liability. To be sure,

unlike Steinhart, Sokaloski held a supervisory post at the prison in August of 2021

when Kelly suffered his injury. Further, Unit Manager Kellner has testified that the

issue of delays in receiving medical information had recurred in the past and was

discussed with Sokaloski. However, it remains undisputed that, first, Sokaloski

played no role the making housing decisions for Kelly; second, Kelly never

discussed his concerns with Sokaloski prior to his August 9, 2021 injury; and third,

according to Kellner the communication delays that were discussed by unit

managers with Sokaloski had never led to an inmate injury prior to August 2021. On

these facts, we conclude that any failure by Sokaloski to impose more rigorous and

structured reporting procedures prior to August 2021 amounted to nothing more than

negligence and did not constitute deliberate indifference to Kelly’s safety. Finally,

it is well-settled that Kelly may not premise civil rights liability upon Major

Sokaloski based upon the defendant’s failure to act more favorably upon a grievance

that Kelly submitted after-the-fact regarding this incident.

The same cannot be said for Unit Manager Kellner. At this juncture, where

we are obliged to view the evidence in a light most favorable to Kelly, we conclude

that there are unresolved issues of fact which preclude summary judgment in favor

of Mr. Kellner. As unit manager Kellner was responsible for implementing

medically determined housing accommodations for Kelly. The evidence indicates

that prior to August 2, 2021, Kelly fell and discussed his medical impairments

several ties with Kellner who told him that he was awaiting medical documentation

before transferring Kelly to a lower-tier cell. That medical documentation was

prepared by Dr. Saikia on August 2, 2021, a full week prior to Kelly’s injury fall,

and was available to Kellner through DOCNet. Further, by August 4, 2021—five

days prior to his injury—Kelly wrote directly to Kellner asking:

I’m requesting to know when I will be moved to the bottom tier so I

don’t have to continue struggling up/down the steps in pain? On

8/2/2021 [the doctor] made me bottom bunk bottom tier status an [sic]

I also have a walking cane now.

(Doc. 57-12).

Despite these instructions and entreaties, it is Kellner’s testimony that he

made no effort to move Kelly until August 9, 2021, the day the plaintiff fell and

suffered injuries while attempting to navigate the upper tier stairs. While we

appreciate that Kellner’s position is also that he first learned of Kelly’s lower-tier

restrictions on August 9, at a minimum, this evidence presents a disputed issue of

fact concerning the state of Kellner’s knowledge which must be addressed at trial.

Moreover, we are mindful of the Third Circuit’s admonition in this setting that: “if

a reasonable jury could conclude that one or more [defendants] knew that [the

inmate] should have been housed on the lower tier, and that those [defendants] were

able to have him assigned to the lower tier but did not do so, it follows that a

reasonable jury could infer that [defendants’] failure to have him housed on the lower

tier was deliberate.” Zamichieli v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 19-3305, 2022

WL 777201, at *4 (3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022). Here, the evidence—while vehemently

disputed—permits an inference that Kellner knew that Kelly should have been

housed on a lower-tier cell and had the power to assign him to a lower tier cell, bur

delayed making this assignment for a week. Therefore, “it follows that a reasonable

jury could infer that [defendant’s] failure to have him housed on the lower tier was

deliberate.” Id. Accordingly, the claim against Defendant Kellner is not subject to

summary judgment dismissal but rather should be resolved through trial.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ summary judgment

motion (Doc. 50), will GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: summary

judgment will be GRANTED in favor of Defendants Steinhart and Sokaloski but

DENIED as to Defendant Kellner.

An appropriate order follows.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: August 6, 2025