holding careless handcuffing resulting in swollen and bleeding wrists does not support an excessive force claim
How later courts described this case
- holding careless handcuffing resulting in swollen and bleeding wrists does not support an excessive force claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-40286 Document: 145-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/06/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 6, 2025
No. 24-40286
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Steven Kurt Baughman,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Jimmy Bowman, Warden, Powledge Unit; Vernon Mitchel,
Assistant Warden, Powledge Unit; Ronnie Stanhope, Lieutenant,
Powledge Unit; Krystal Poe, Correctional Officer, Powledge Unit;
Betty Reeves, Correctional Officer, Powledge Unit; Yolanda Ellis,
Correctional Officer, Powledge Unit; Melissa Ballard, Registered Nurse,
Powledge Unit; Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice; Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division; Texas Board of
Criminal Justice; Texas Department of Criminal
Justice; Karen S. Clakley, Correctional Officer, Powledge Unit;
Brandi Bingham, Sergeant, Powledge Unit,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:20-CV-560
______________________________
Before Wiener, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Case: 24-40286 Document: 145-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/06/2025
No. 24-40286
Per Curiam:*
Steven Baughman, a Texas state prisoner, sued Texas state agencies
and several Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) officials, alleging
multiple violations of the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA). The district court
dismissed some of Baughman’s claims for failure to state a claim and granted
summary judgment to Defendants for the remaining claims. We affirm.
I.
Baughman’s claims arise from his confinement at TDCJ Powledge
Unit (Powledge) from 2019 to 2022. Powledge is a medical facility that
houses geriatric, disabled, or chronically ill prisoners. Baughman argues that
he is disabled due to his morbid obesity and related conditions, including
cellulitis and diabetes.
The dormitories at Powledge lack air conditioning, and Baughman
alleges he and other Powledge prisoners faced a substantial risk of serious
medical harm from extreme heat, particularly those with heat-sensitive
health conditions.
Powledge also only allows one wheelchair-bound prisoner at a time in
its medical department waiting room. Baughman argues that this policy
systematically discriminates against disabled prisoners. He alleges that in
March and September 2019, in part because of this policy, Defendants denied
him access to his scheduled medical appointments for his cellulitis and
insulin. He alleges this delay exacerbated his illnesses, though he tacitly
admits—and medical records show—he ultimately received treatment for
each missed appointment.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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Powledge also maintains an administrative segregation area for
quarantining sick prisoners. The showers in that area contain shower
benches, but they are not fully wheelchair accessible. Baughman asserts that
this denies disabled prisoners the ability to shower because the facilities do
not have the shower hoses and adjustable shower heads needed for the water
to reach the bench.
Baughman was confined to administrative segregation for eight days
due to a positive COVID-19 diagnosis. He alleges that he was unable to
maintain his hygiene because his alleged disabilities prevented him from
standing to use the shower. The record indicates there was running water
suitable for sponge baths, but Baughman filed a grievance alleging insufficient
water to wash with or drink at the time. But he never asked for a shower
pass—which would have given him access to an ADA shower—to
accommodate his needs during that time.
In addition to these policy-based issues, Baughman alleges several
instances of staff misconduct. First, he alleges that after he filed a grievance
against Defendant Poe, she denied him a non-pork alternative meal option,
wrote him up for being “out of place,” and he was then found guilty of a
disciplinary infraction, resulting in fifteen days of commissary restriction.
This disciplinary action was ultimately overturned and expunged. Second,
Baughman pleads that Defendant Bingham bound him in normal-sized
handcuffs while taking him to medical treatments on several occasions,
resulting in severe pain and nerve damage. Medical records show that
Baughman has gout but do not indicate nerve damage. Third, he claims that
Defendants Clakley, Bowman, and Collier confiscated and damaged his
LeBron James Special Edition tennis shoes, valued at $250–$300.
Baughman sued pro se, claiming that Defendants violated the Eighth,
Fifth, First, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the ADA and RA.
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A magistrate judge ordered Texas to prepare a Martinez report
covering Baughman’s medical conditions, wheelchair access at Powledge,
the handcuffing incidents, the alleged nerve damage, and exposure to
excessive heat.
The magistrate judge recommended that Baughman’s deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, retaliation, and property claims be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. The district court adopted the
recommendation and dismissed the claims with prejudice.
Defendants then moved for summary judgment, raising arguments
including immunity, the unavailability of compensatory damages under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) without physical injury, and standing.
They also argued that the Martinez report and record show no violation of
the law.
The magistrate judge recommended granting Defendants’ motion
and dismissing all remaining claims. The district court adopted the report,
awarded summary judgment, and dismissed all claims.
Baughman appealed.
II.
The Defendants first raise three jurisdictional arguments: (1)
Institutional Defendants—Texas Board of Criminal Justice (TBCJ) and
TDCJ—are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from Baughman’s
§ 1983 claims; (2) sovereign immunity and Ex Parte Young preclude
Baughman’s § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants in their official
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No. 24-40286
capacity; and (3) Baughman lacks standing to seek injunctive relief against
the Individual Defendants because he is no longer held in the Powledge Unit.1
Baughman does not respond to these arguments. “Although we
liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that
arguments must be briefed to be preserved.” Price v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, Baughman forfeited these issues. So we affirm the dismissal of
Baughman’s § 1983 claims against the Institutional Defendants, the
monetary damages claims against the Individual Defendants in their official
capacity, and the claims for prospective and declaratory relief under § 1983
and the ADA/RA.
III.
Turning to the merits, we consider the dismissal of Baughman’s
Eighth Amendment, ADA/RA, and Due Process claims in turn.2
We review grants of summary judgment de novo and apply the same
standards on appeal as the district court, viewing all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is
appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. But if record
_____________________
1
Defendants raised their Eleventh Amendment defense for the first time on appeal.
But “sovereign immunity is jurisdictional,” and “a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 280
(5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).
2
Baughman initially brought retaliation claims under the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, he mentions the retaliation claims in his statement
of facts, but he does not brief any challenge to their dismissal. These issues are forfeited,
and the district court is affirmed. See Price, 846 F.2d at 1028.
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evidence clearly contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations, a court “should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
In reviewing whether a district court properly dismissed a prisoner’s
complaint for failure to state a claim, we apply the same standard as
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). See Davis v. Lumpkin, 35 F.4th 958, 962 (5th
Cir. 2022). We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings and arguments liberally.
See id. And where a pro se litigant’s allegations conflict with a Martinez
report, we accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, not the record in the
report. See id. at 964.
A.
Baughman raises three distinct Eighth Amendment claims. First, he
argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs, specifically by delaying his medical care due to the wheelchair policy.
Second, he contends that Defendants maintained unconstitutional
conditions of confinement due to the excessive heat he experienced. Third,
he claims that Defendant Bingham repeatedly used excessive force by placing
him in tight handcuffs.
The district court dismissed his deliberate indifference and excessive
force claims with prejudice and awarded summary judgment on his heat
claim. We take each in turn.
Prisoners state a cognizable injury under the Eighth Amendment
when they demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to
their medical needs. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
“A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if (A) he
knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and (B) he
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No. 24-40286
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Gobert
v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.”
Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice
do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement
with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Gobert, 463
F.3d at 346.
Baughman’s deliberate indifference complaints largely amount to
disagreements with the timing of his medical care. His complaint tacitly
admits—and the record confirms—that he received care, just later than
desired. The district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
His conditions of confinement claim fares no better. He argues that
Defendants chose “to expose [him] and other prisoners to the high apparent
temperatures inside the housing areas, and unnecessarily and wantonly
caused [him] pain, suffering and mental anguish,” which he insists is an
“unreasonable risk to [his] future health.”
To state an Eighth Amendment challenge to the conditions of
confinement, the prisoner must satisfy two prongs. First, the prisoner must
show that he faced “conditions so dire as to deprive him of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” LaVergne v. Stutes, 82 F.4th 433, 437
(5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Second, he must show “that the responsible
prison officials were ‘deliberately indifferent’ to [his] health or safety.” Id.
But conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions are not accepted as true. See DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383,
386–87 (5th Cir. 2019).
Baughman’s claim fails on prong two. The uncontested summary
judgment evidence showed that Defendants employ heat-mitigation
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No. 24-40286
measures and procedures. Even if Baughman believes those measures are
insufficient, negligent, or amount to malpractice, that does not constitute
deliberate indifference. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.
The district court did not err in awarding summary judgment.
Baughman’s final Eighth Amendment claim is that Defendant
Bingham repeatedly used excessive force by placing him in standard
handcuffs instead of handcuffs appropriate for his weight and allegedly
instructed other guards to do the same. Allegedly, this caused him severe
pain and nerve damage. The magistrate judge concluded that Baughman’s
injury was no more than de minimis and pointed to evidence in the Martinez
report, which suggested that Baughman has gout, not nerve damage. The
district court agreed and dismissed the claim with prejudice, concluding that
“[w]ithout more, tight handcuffing does not establish a constitutional
violation for excessive force.” We agree.
An excessive-force claim turns on “whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Nothing in the record shows that Defendant Bingham acted
sadistically or maliciously to cause Baughman harm. Negligently handcuffing
a prisoner too tightly, even when it causes severe pain, is insufficient to
support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278,
283 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding careless handcuffing resulting in swollen and
bleeding wrists does not support an excessive force claim). We thus conclude
that dismissal of Baughman’s excessive force claim was proper.
B.
Baughman’s ADA/RA failure to accommodate and intentional
discrimination claims largely overlap with his Eighth Amendment deliberate
8
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No. 24-40286
indifference claims. He alleges disability discrimination based on (1)
exposure to extreme heat; (2) denial of medical care by the wheelchair rule;
and (3) denial of wheelchair-accessible showers.
We evaluate ADA and RA claims “under the same legal standards,
and the same remedies are available under both Acts.” Valentine v. Collier,
993 F.3d 270, 289 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
To recover compensatory damages under the ADA, “a plaintiff must
also prove that the discrimination was intentional.” Cadena v. El Paso Cnty.,
946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff must show
(1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied
benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity
is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the
public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination is by reason of his disability.
Valentine, 993 F.3d at 289 (citation omitted).
Baughman’s delay of care claim fails because “the ADA is not
violated by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its
disabled prisoners.” Hale v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 F.4th 399,
404 n.† (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). And he tacitly admits he later
received care.
The heat exposure claim fails because Baughman alleges no facts
showing he was uniquely exposed to heat. He merely claims his disability
makes him more sensitive to heat, not that he was treated differently. Being
“treated the same as ‘everybody’” is a fatal admission to an ADA claim. Id.
(citing Providence Behavior Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448,
459 (5th Cir. 2018)).
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Similarly, Baughman was provided the same showering facilities as
any other inmate in quarantine. Accordingly, this claim fails too. Id.
C.
Baughman’s final claim is that he was deprived of his property without
due process of law because Defendants Clakley, Bowman, and Collier
confiscated and ruined his shoes. The district court dismissed his claim
under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. On appeal, Baughman does not
challenge the court’s application of Parratt/Hudson, but instead raises an
inadequate administrative process argument. This issue is forfeited. See
Price, 846 F.2d at 1028.
***
We AFFIRM.
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