The opinion
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
JAMIE G., ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE
OF TONI G.) v. DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES*
(SC 20997)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (§ 4-160 (a)), ‘‘the Claims Commissioner . . . may autho-
rize suit against the state on any claim which . . . presents an issue of law
or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable,’’
and ‘‘[t]he state may file an opposition . . . based solely on jurisdictional
grounds . . . or . . . judicial, quasi-judicial or legislative immunity.’’
Pursuant further to statute (§ 4-160 (h)), ‘‘[i]n each action authorized by the
Claims Commissioner . . . the state waives its immunity from liability and
from suit . . . and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosy-
nary or governmental nature of the activity complained of, and . . . the
rights and liability of the state . . . shall be coextensive with and shall
equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances.’’
The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, the Department
of Children and Families (DCF), for, inter alia, the death of T, the plaintiff’s
four year old daughter, who wandered unattended and drowned in a pond.
Prior to the drowning incident, the Probate Court had removed the plaintiff
and T’s biological mother as guardians and vested temporary custody of T
in T’s maternal relatives, A and L. To assist it in determining whether to
grant a full transfer of guardianship to A and L, the Probate Court commis-
sioned DCF to conduct a study of the home of A and L and to generate a
report of its findings. DCF submitted the report to the Probate Court, but,
before that court could hold a hearing to determine whether to transfer
guardianship, T died. The plaintiff, as the administrator of T’s estate, there-
after sought and was granted permission by the claims commissioner to
bring an action against the state. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
negligence of DCF personnel in investigating T’s living situation and in
advising the Probate Court that A and L’s home was a suitable placement
for T was a proximate cause of T’s death. Specifically, the plaintiff included
allegations in his complaint of negligence that related both to DCF’s recom-
mendations to the Probate Court regarding T’s best interest and to DCF’s
alleged failure to properly execute various independent duties to protect T
from abuse and neglect. DCF filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because DCF is entitled to
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity for its activities integral to the
judicial process, such as conducting a court-ordered investigation and issu-
ing court-ordered recommendations. The trial court granted the motion,
concluding that DCF was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity while
functioning as an arm of the Probate Court, that the claims commissioner
cannot waive such immunity, and that the plaintiff’s allegations were insuffi-
cient to overcome DCF’s immunity. The plaintiff appealed from the trial
court’s dismissal of his action, claiming, inter alia, that, when the claims
commissioner allows a private party to bring an action against a state agency,
such as DCF, the state waives not only its sovereign immunity, but other
common-law immunities, such as quasi-judicial immunity. Held:
The trial court correctly concluded that the claims commissioner’s waiver
of sovereign immunity under § 4-160 does not bar the state from raising a
jurisdictional claim of absolute quasi-judicial immunity, but this court
reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings insofar as some of the plaintiff’s allegations may have exceeded
the scope of that immunity.
The plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that the legislature
clearly evinced an intent, through § 4-160, to abolish common-law judicial
or quasi-judicial immunity for purposes of that statute, as the text of § 4-
160 allows the state to assert any defenses and immunities available to a
private defendant and expressly permits the state to preserve the right to
assert a common-law immunity, such as quasi-judicial immunity, even though
the claims commissioner has waived the state’s sovereign immunity.
Moreover, the principle that courts are to narrowly interpret statutes in
derogation of the common law militated against construing the waiver con-
templated by § 4-160 to include not only sovereign immunity, but other
common-law immunities, this court would not lightly assume that the legisla-
ture had chosen to infringe on the traditional immunities fashioned by the
judiciary to safeguard the essential character and function of the judicial
branch of government, and the legislative history of § 4-160 supported a
construction of that statute that did not contemplate the waiver of quasi-
judicial immunity.
This court concluded that the language in § 4-160 (h) (1) providing that the
state ‘‘waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or
governmental nature of the activity complained of’’ does not apply to the
judicial or quasi-judicial immunity referenced in § 4-160 (a) and (d) (1), and,
instead, the ‘‘all defenses’’ language was strictly construed to apply only to
defenses such as governmental immunity, the public duty doctrine, and
related eleemosynary defenses.
This court agreed with the plaintiff that, although certain acts that DCF
personnel performed at the direction of the Probate Court were shielded
by absolute quasi-judicial immunity as a matter of law, the trial court should
not have dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety insofar as at least some
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
of the allegedly negligent conduct at issue may not have been undertaken
by DCF personnel as an arm of the Probate Court and may have involved
the performance of legal duties independent of those carried out at the
direction of that court.
With respect to most of the plaintiff’s allegations, the nature of the claim
was not sufficiently clear and the record was not sufficiently developed for
this court to determine whether absolute quasi-judicial immunity applied,
and, accordingly, the case was remanded so that, with respect to those
particular allegations, the trial court could make those determinations in
the first instance once an adequate record is established and could decide
whether to hold additional hearings on DCF’s motion to dismiss to enable
the establishment of the necessary jurisdictional facts, or to defer those
factual determinations until trial.
Argued January 30—officially released August 5, 2025
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for the wrongful death of
the plaintiff’s decedent as a result of the defendant’s
alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,
where the court, D’Andrea, J., granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from
which the plaintiff appealed. Reversed in part; fur-
ther proceedings.
Stephanie Z. Roberge, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Thadius L. Bochain, assistant attorney gen-
eral, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general,
and Carolyn Signorelli and Christopher Groleau, assis-
tant attorneys general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. This case arises from a tragic accident
in which four year old Toni G. drowned after the Pro-
bate Court had vested her temporary custody in her
maternal relatives. To assist it in determining whether
to grant a full transfer of guardianship to those relatives,
the Probate Court commissioned the defendant, the
Department of Children and Families (DCF), to conduct
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
a study of their home and to produce a report of its
findings. DCF did so and submitted the report to the
Probate Court. Before that court could hold a hearing to
determine whether to transfer guardianship, however,
Toni died. Her estate sought permission to bring the
present action, which alleges that the negligence of
DCF social workers, in investigating Toni’s living situa-
tion and advising the Probate Court that the maternal
relatives’ home was a suitable placement for Toni, was
a proximate cause of her death. After a hearing, the claims
commissioner waived the state’s sovereign immunity
and authorized the estate to sue the state.
The primary issue presented on appeal is whether
the claims commissioner’s authorization to sue the state
under General Statutes § 4-160 (a) and (h)1 not only
waives the state’s sovereign immunity, but also abro-
gates the common law to preclude the state from raising
a claim of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.2 We agree
with the trial court that a waiver of sovereign immunity
under that statute does not bar the state from raising a
jurisdictional claim of absolute quasi-judicial immunity
before that court. As we will explain, we are compelled
to construe narrowly legislative waivers of sovereign
immunity, and we will interpret a statute to have abro-
gated the common law only when the statutory language
evidences a clear intent to do so. The latter principle
applies with particular force to purported encroach-
ments on common-law judicial and quasi-judicial immuni-
ties, the abrogation of which would raise serious separa-
tion of powers issues. Because we perceive in § 4-160
no clear and unequivocal legislative intent to abrogate
DCF’s quasi-judicial immunity, we reject the plaintiff’s
1
Section 4-160 was the subject of amendments in 2022, 2023 and 2024;
see Public Acts 2024, No. 24-44, § 12; Public Acts 2023, No. 23-131, § 10;
Public Acts 2022, No. 22-37, §§ 3 and 4; that have no bearing on the merits
of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, unless otherwise indicated, we
refer to the current revision of the statute.
2
The relevant statutory language is set forth in part II of this opinion.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
contention that the claims commissioner waived that
immunity. Nevertheless, we remand the case for further
proceedings because some of the allegations in the com-
plaint appear to exceed the scope of that immunity.
I
The following relevant facts are alleged in the com-
plaint or are uncontroverted.3 Toni was born in April,
2008, to her father, the plaintiff, Jamie G., who brought
the present action as administrator of her estate, and
her mother, Ashley. Toni’s brother, Dominic, was born
in 2010.
Throughout Toni’s short life, DCF had repeated
involvements with the family. Only one allegation of
neglect was substantiated, arising from a June, 2010
domestic violence incident between the plaintiff and
Ashley. Nevertheless, DCF provided the children treat-
ment and other services for a total of approximately
ten months between 2008 and late 2010, when Ashley
relocated the children to the home of her birth mother
in Massachusetts. DCF made a referral to its Massachu-
setts counterpart and closed the case. DCF claims to
have received no new allegations of neglect after Octo-
ber, 2010.
In 2011, Ashley and her children returned to Connecti-
cut. On June 7, 2011, Ashley’s adoptive sister, April,
and her adoptive mother, Lorri, filed a petition with
the Probate Court, seeking custody of the children and
removal of the plaintiff and Ashley as guardians. They
also asked the court to grant them temporary custody
of the children. The petitioners alleged that Ashley was
homeless and unable to care for her children, that she
was ‘‘trying to run from the law’’ or expected to be
arrested imminently, that she had asked them ‘‘to take’’
3
The plaintiff has not contested the factual accuracy of the study for
removal of guardianship that DCF submitted in support of its motion to
dismiss.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
the children, and that she had ‘‘no intentions of taking
[her] children back.’’ They indicated that the plaintiff
was incarcerated and, therefore, unable to care for
the children.
On the basis of these representations, on June 8,
2011, the Probate Court granted immediate, temporary
custody of the children to April and Lorri. However,
the court found that it had insufficient information to
determine the best interests of the children with respect
to ongoing custody and guardianship. The court appointed
an attorney for the children and, pursuant to General
Statutes § 45a-619,4 ordered DCF to conduct an investi-
gation and to submit a report.
The children’s legal status remained in limbo through-
out the following year.5 In December, 2011, DCF submit-
ted a report to the Probate Court, signed by a DCF
social worker, her supervisor, and the DCF program
manager, summarizing the investigation and recom-
mendations. At that time, DCF referred only to April
as the proposed guardian.
In its report, DCF did not find any new allegations
of abuse or neglect while the children were in April’s
care. But DCF did express some concerns regarding
4
General Statutes § 45a-619 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any proceeding
under sections 45a-603 to 45a-624, inclusive . . . in which the probate judge
has reason to believe that the minor may have been abused or neglected, the
Court of Probate shall request the Commissioner of Children and Families
or any organization, agency or individual licensed or approved by the com-
missioner, to make an investigation and written report to it . . . . The
report shall indicate the physical, mental and emotional status of the minor
and shall contain such facts as may be relevant to the court’s determination
of whether the proposed court action will be in the best interests of the
minor, including the physical, social, mental, and financial condition of the
parties, and such other factors which the commissioner or agency finds
relevant to the court’s determination of whether the proposed action will
be in the best interests of the minor. . . .’’
5
In July, 2011, the plaintiff notified the Probate Court that he had no
objection to the appointment of the temporary guardians, but he requested
that the children be allowed to visit him at the correctional facility.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
April’s then current housing situation. Although April
and her own children had been living independently,
in September, 2011, they moved in with April’s parents,
Lorri and George. In addition, although April initially
denied it, she later admitted that her boyfriend, Christo-
pher, also had moved into the family home in Plymouth
(family home). George, Lorri, and Christopher each had
significant child protective histories.
Ultimately, DCF found that, by virtue of the plaintiff’s
incarceration, he had failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of responsibility for the children, and that, for
various reasons, Ashley also had ‘‘failed to provide the
care, guidance, or control necessary for her children’s
physical, educational and emotional well-being . . . .’’
Accordingly, DCF concluded that neither parent was
an appropriate caretaker.
DCF further concluded that both children had ‘‘spe-
cial needs due to developmental delays . . . [and that
they were] in need of a stable, safe and appropriate
home and caretaker, as well as consistency in their
lives, in order for them to get the services that they
need.’’ DCF deemed April to be an appropriate care-
taker because, among other things, she ‘‘has ensured
that the . . . mental health, physical and medical, as
well as educational, needs [of Toni and Dominic] are
being evaluated and addressed. . . . [She appears] to
love and care for the children very much and to have
a strong bond [with] them. [She] also appear[s] to be
very proactive in regard to the children’s needs and [is]
making sure that the children are evaluated appropri-
ately for their needs and are involved in the appropriate
services . . . .’’ Accordingly, despite its concerns
about the housing situation, DCF recommended that
the parents be removed as guardians and that April be
appointed as guardian for both children.
The Probate Court, having received DCF’s report and
recommendations in December, 2011, scheduled a hear-
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
ing on the petition for February 7, 2012. That hearing
was rescheduled to March, 2012, because Ashley’s attor-
ney was unable to attend, and it was postponed again
when the plaintiff, who recently had been released from
prison, failed to appear for the March hearing.
On July 7, 2012, before a hearing could be held and
while the Probate Court’s initial temporary custody
orders were still in effect, Toni wandered, unattended,
outside the family home. Her body was discovered
shortly thereafter in a neighbor’s pond.
In 2013, the plaintiff filed a timely notice of claim
with the claims commissioner, requesting permission
to sue the state. The claims commissioner dismissed
the claim in 2016. The plaintiff sought review by the
legislature; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-158
(b); which, in 2017, vacated the decision of the claims
commissioner and remanded the claim for a hearing
on the merits. See Substitute House Joint Resolution
No. 67, File No. 644 (March 31, 2017). Following an
opportunity for the parties to conduct discovery, a mag-
istrate judge who was authorized to assist the claims
commissioner; see Public Acts 2016, No. 16-127, § 5;
conducted a hearing in June, 2018. The following month,
the magistrate recommended that the claims commis-
sioner grant the plaintiff’s request to sue the state. The
claims commissioner accepted the magistrate’s recom-
mendation three years later, in September, 2021, and
the plaintiff filed the present action in 2022.
The complaint alleges that DCF’s negligence was the
proximate cause of Toni’s suffering and death. The alle-
gations of negligence relate both to DCF’s recommenda-
tions to the Probate Court regarding the children’s best
interests and to DCF’s alleged failure to properly exe-
cute various independent duties to protect the children
from abuse and neglect.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
DCF moved to dismiss the action, contending that
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the state is entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial
immunity for its activities integral to the judicial pro-
cess. In particular, DCF argued that all of its challenged
actions were performed in the course of conducting a
court-ordered investigation and issuing court-ordered
recommendations. The trial court agreed with DCF’s
analysis and dismissed the action. The trial court con-
cluded that the DCF workers (and, by extension, DCF
and the state) were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity while functioning as an arm of the Probate
Court, that the claims commissioner cannot waive that
immunity, and that ‘‘[t]he bare-boned negligence allega-
tions of [the] complaint’’ were insufficient to overcome
DCF’s immunity.
The plaintiff timely appealed to the Appellate Court,
and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant
to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-
1. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court
improperly dismissed the action because (1) the legisla-
ture has waived the state’s quasi-judicial and sovereign
immunities in this matter, and (2) even if DCF maintains
its quasi-judicial immunity, some of the allegations in
the complaint exceed the scope of that immunity.
II
The plaintiff first argues that, under § 4-160, when
the claims commissioner allows a private party to bring
a legal action against a governmental agency of the
state, such as DCF, the state waives not only its sover-
eign immunity, but also other common-law immunities,
such as quasi-judicial immunity. Specifically, he argues
that this waiver is evident in the following language of
the statute: ‘‘the state waives its immunity from liability
and from suit in each such action and waives all
defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
governmental nature of the activity complained of
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 4-160 (h) (1). The plaintiff
highlights the sweeping nature of the phrase ‘‘all
defenses which might arise from,’’ and he contends that
quasi-judicial immunity, which, in this case, arises from
DCF’s support of the Probate Court, is quintessentially
governmental in nature.6 We are not persuaded that this
language abrogates the common law such that it waives
quasi-judicial immunity.
A
A colorable claim of ‘‘absolute immunity from suit
. . . implicates [a trial] court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion.’’ Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120, 136,
314 A.3d 583 (2024). We review de novo a trial court’s
dismissal of an action based on a claim of absolute
immunity. See, e.g., id., 136–37.
The plaintiff’s claim that § 4-160 waives sovereign
immunity as well as judicial or quasi-judicial immunity
presents a question of statutory interpretation. Our
analysis is guided by General Statutes § 1-2z and the
‘‘general rules of statutory construction . . . subject to
a significant qualification.’’ (Citations omitted.) Bifolck
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 324 Conn. 402, 447, 152 A.3d 1183
(2016); see also, e.g., id., 446–54 (discussing application
of § 1-2z to statutes in derogation of common law). That
is, where, as here, the claim is that the legislature has
abrogated the common law, ‘‘[w]e recognize only those
alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed
in the language of the statute . . . . [We do so] because
6
According to the plaintiff, the quintessential activities protected by the
functional immunities—judging, legislating, and prosecuting—are all govern-
mental in nature, insofar as they are public functions that ordinarily are
performed by government officials. Judges, for example, are public officers,
and many of the individuals who can avail themselves of quasi-judicial
immunity either are themselves public employees or, if private individuals,
qualify for immunity because they play an instrumental role in assisting
judges and facilitating the state’s judicial process.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
the traditional principles of justice [on] which the com-
mon law is founded should be perpetuated.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257
Conn. 365, 381–82, 778 A.2d 829 (2001). Indeed, it is
well established that, ‘‘[w]hen a statute is in derogation
of common law or creates a liability where formerly
none existed, it should receive a strict construction and
is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in
its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caciopoli v. Lebo-
witz, 309 Conn. 62, 70, 68 A.3d 1150 (2013).7
Common-law judicial and quasi-judicial immunities,
like other common-law rules, are subject to this princi-
ple and will not be deemed to have been abrogated in
the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent.
See, e.g., Cordero v. University of Connecticut Health
Center, 308 Conn. 215, 224–25, 61 A.3d 514 (2013); see
also, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 362, 132 S. Ct.
1497, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012) (‘‘[United States Supreme
Court] cases have proceeded on the assumption that
common-law principles of . . . immunity were incor-
porated into our judicial system and that they should
not be abrogated [in the absence of] clear legislative
intent to do so’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18
L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) (presuming that Congress would
have clearly indicated its intent to abolish by statute
legislative or judicial immunity); A. Olowofoyeku, Suing
7
One corollary of this rule is that, because statutes that waive the state’s
sovereign immunity do so ‘‘in derogation of the common law, [a]ny statutory
waiver of immunity must be narrowly construed’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 555, 569 A.2d 518 (1990); ‘‘and
its scope must be confined strictly to the extent the statute provides.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn.
601, 612, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023). Because the issue in the present case is
whether § 4-160 (h), which waives the state’s sovereign immunity, also
encompasses a broader waiver of other common-law immunities, this princi-
ple helps to inform our analysis.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1993) p. 163 (‘‘the attitude adopted by the
American courts to common-law immunities is that
these immunities are applicable unless expressly abol-
ished’’). Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the
common-law rules and then turn to the statute. See,
e.g., Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., supra, 324 Conn. 447.
B
Both of the immunities at issue in this appeal, sover-
eign immunity and judicial immunity, rest on well estab-
lished and long-standing legal principles with deep roots
in Connecticut law. The principle of sovereign immu-
nity—that the state cannot be sued without its con-
sent—originates in ancient common law. E.g., Marland
v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 350 Conn.
830, 835, 326 A.3d 1096 (2024). ‘‘Historically, the legisla-
ture of this state would grant compensation, through
the enactment of special acts, to citizens who were
injured or who had other claims against the state.
Indeed, prior to 1959, before the legislature created
. . . the claims commission, the General Assembly in
the first instance considered what action, if any, was
appropriate on claims made against the state. . . .
[The predicate for waiving sovereign immunity and
allowing suit against the state] was not that the state
was liable for such compensation, but, rather, that jus-
tice and equity required that . . . the state respond
to an action as if it were a private person.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 837–38. As we will further
explain, this means that, after the state waives its right
to assert its sovereign immunity, it remains free to assert
both defenses to, and immunity from, liability ‘‘as the
general law recognizes.’’ Bergner v. State, 144 Conn.
282, 286, 130 A.2d 293 (1957).
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity also long
predates § 4-160 and has its origins in English common
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
law. See, e.g., Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn. 1,
19–20, 295 A.3d 855 (2023). Judges, like legislators and
prosecutors,8 have long enjoyed their own traditional
common-law immunities intended to shield them from
the potentially chilling effects of threatened litigation.9
See, e.g., Gross v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 246–47, 40 A.3d
240 (2012). In the case of judicial immunity, ‘‘[i]t is well
established that a judge may not be civilly sued for
judicial acts he undertakes in his capacity as a judge.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrubba v.
Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 540, 877 A.2d 773 (2005). ‘‘If
judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions,
the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous
but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for
judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke
such suits. . . . The resulting timidity would be hard
to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract
from independent and impartial adjudication.’’ (Citation
omitted.) Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226–27, 108
S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988); see also, e.g., Car-
rubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 540 (‘‘judicial immunity
serves to promote principled and fearless decision-mak-
ing by removing a judge’s fear that unsatisfied litigants
may hound him with litigation charging malice or cor-
ruption’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Importantly, ‘‘[this] mantle of judicial immunity cov-
ers not only judges, but all adjuncts to the judicial pro-
8
Before the trial court, DCF argued that any of its alleged misconduct
that was not subject to quasi-judicial immunity was nevertheless protected
by prosecutorial immunity. Because the trial court concluded that all of the
challenged actions were protected by quasi-judicial immunity, it did not
address the issue of prosecutorial immunity. On remand, the trial court will
have the opportunity to consider those arguments in the first instance.
9
These officials, like all state officers and employees, now enjoy statutory
immunity from personal liability for negligent conduct within the scope of
their employment. See General Statutes § 4-165. Nevertheless, the common-
law immunities continue to serve an indispensable purpose by shielding
public officials from the intrusive and chilling effect of having their work
and decision processes subjected to the scrutiny of discovery and litigation.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
cess.’’ DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 242,
597 A.2d 807 (1991). Still, ‘‘[a]lthough we have extended
judicial immunity to protect other officers in addition
to judges, that . . . protection extends only to those
who are intimately involved in the judicial process
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gross v.
Rell, supra, 304 Conn. 246–47. We have used the term
‘‘quasi-judicial immunity’’ to refer to the judicial immu-
nity enjoyed both by these individuals who are so instru-
mental to the judicial process as to be considered an
arm of the court; see, e.g., id., 247–48; and by individuals
who play an essential role in certain adjudicatory set-
tings outside of the formal judicial context, such as
administrative tribunals. See, e.g., Khan v. Yale Univer-
sity, supra, 347 Conn. 19–20.
In addition to judges and law clerks, it is well estab-
lished that certain private individuals enjoy the protec-
tion of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. See, e.g.,
Gross v. Rell, supra, 304 Conn. 246–48. Indeed, private
individuals, such as court-appointed social workers,
court-appointed psychologists, and guardians ad litem,
are entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity when
functioning as an arm of the court. See, e.g., id., 248, 258;
see also part III of this opinion (describing functional
approach to be followed in assessing claims of immunity).
Applying these principles, the trial court in this case
concluded that, notwithstanding the claims commis-
sioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity, DCF, operating
through a social worker and her supervisors, was enti-
tled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for acts that
were authorized or approved by the Probate Court. The
plaintiff challenges this conclusion on appeal. He argues
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the state’s
waiver of its sovereign immunity also waives related
immunities, such as quasi-judicial immunity.10
10
In part III of this opinion, we address the plaintiff’s alternative argument
that, even if the state did not waive its quasi-judicial immunity, not all of
DCF’s allegedly negligent conduct falls within the ambit of that immunity.
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C
As we explained in part II A of this opinion, the
plaintiff bears a heavy burden. He must establish that
the legislature, in drafting § 4-160, clearly evinced its
intent to abolish common-law judicial and quasi-judicial
immunities, in addition to waiving the state’s sovereign
immunity. With these principles in mind, we turn to the
statute at issue, § 4-160. Subsections (a), (d) and (h) of
that statute are relevant to the parties’ dispute.
Subsection (a) of § 4-160 provides in relevant part:
‘‘Whenever the Claims Commissioner deems it just and
equitable, the Claims Commissioner . . . may autho-
rize suit against the state on any claim which, in the
opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue
of law or fact under which the state, were it a private
person, could be liable. . . . The state may file an oppo-
sition . . . based solely on jurisdictional grounds . . .
or prosecutorial, judicial, quasi-judicial or legislative
immunity.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (d) (1) of § 4-160, which sets forth a proce-
dure by which a special deputy may assist the claims
commissioner in assessing claims against the state, like-
wise provides in relevant part: ‘‘If a claim is referred
to a special deputy . . . such special deputy shall
review the notice of claim . . . [and] the state’s notice
of opposition . . . . Consideration of the state’s oppo-
sition to such claims shall be limited to jurisdictional
grounds or prosecutorial, judicial, quasi-judicial or leg-
islative immunity. . . . A special deputy shall authorize
suit against the state if the claim, in the opinion of the
special deputy, presents an issue of law or fact under
which the state, were it a private person, could be
liable. If the resolution of the state’s opposition to the
claim is based on a dispute of a material fact, the special
deputy shall grant permission to sue the state and pre-
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
serve the state’s right to pursue such defense in court.’’
(Emphasis added.)
Consistent with the ‘‘private person’’ standard set
forth in subsections (a) and (d), subsection (h) of § 4-
160 details the implications that flow from a decision
to authorize a suit against the state. Section 4-160 (h)
provides in relevant part: ‘‘In each action authorized by
the Claims Commissioner . . . [e]xcept as provided in
subsection (d) of this section, (1) the state waives its
immunity from liability and from suit in each such
action and waives all defenses which might arise from
the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activ-
ity complained of, and (2) the rights and liability of the
state in each such action shall be coextensive with and
shall equal the rights and liability of private persons
in like circumstances.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Three conclusions flow from this statutory language,
each of which is inimical, if not fatal, to the plaintiff’s
position. First, under § 4-160, the state ‘‘stands in the
same shoes as a private person tortfeasor . . . .’’ Cord-
ero v. State, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2010 WL
4885344, *2 (Conn. Super. November 8, 2010). It sub-
jects itself to suit in those circumstances under which
a private person could be liable, but it also retains the
same rights as any private defendant. We must read the
statute as a whole and interpret subsection (h) (2) of
§ 4-160 in light of the ‘‘private person’’ language. See,
e.g., Manginelli v. Regency House of Wallingford, Inc.,
347 Conn. 581, 598, 298 A.3d 263 (2023) (‘‘[w]e construe
a statute as a whole and read its subsections concur-
rently in order to reach a reasonable overall interpreta-
tion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we discussed,
and will elaborate in part III of this opinion, quasi-
judicial immunity is not limited to public officers and
employees. A private social worker who is commis-
sioned by a court to investigate and advise in a child
custody matter may be entitled to quasi-judicial immu-
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
nity and will not be personally liable to the extent that
his or her actions are shielded by that immunity. Thus,
the ‘‘private person’’ language used throughout § 4-160
suggests that DCF and its employees retain those same
rights and limits to liability. Indeed, if they did not, the
statute would have the perverse effect of exposing the
state to greater liability than a private party and would
incentivize courts to rely on private, rather than public,
entities for assistance. That would be flatly inconsistent
with the statutory language.
Second, this court previously has recognized that
‘‘[t]he sole purpose of § 4-160 . . . is to remove the bar
of sovereign immunity when the claims commissioner
determines that it would be ‘just and equitable’ to permit
a claimant to seek redress against the state.’’ Chotkow-
ski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 270, 690 A.2d 368 (1997).
As we discussed, judicial immunity is a fundamentally
different type of immunity, one with origins, purpose,
and constitutional status distinct from those of sover-
eign immunity. We consider it implausible that the legis-
lature intended to authorize the claims commissioner,
or the claims commissioner’s deputies, to abrogate this
long-standing and vital immunity by burying such a
seismic legal change11 in a vaguely worded provision
11
The plaintiff has failed to identify a single instance, in this state or
nationally, in which a legislature has enacted a blanket waiver of judicial
or quasi-judicial immunity. Indeed, such a waiver would appear to be unprec-
edented. See, e.g., 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 895B (3), p. 400 (1979)
(‘‘[e]ven when a [s]tate is subject to tort liability, it and its governmental
agencies are immune to the liability for acts and omissions constituting
. . . the exercise of a judicial . . . function’’); id., comment (c), pp. 402–403
(general immunity to liability also applies to quasi-judicial conduct); W.
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 131, p.
1046 (‘‘[e]ven where the sovereign immunity of the state has been abolished, a
. . . judicial immunity is retained to protect against liability for . . . judicial
decisions’’); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2018) (subjecting United States
to tort liability ‘‘in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances’’ but clarifying that ‘‘the United States
shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial . . . immunity
which otherwise would have been available’’). Nor has the plaintiff identified
a single case in which our legislature has permitted any individual party to
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
in the middle of subsection (h) of § 4-160. See, e.g.,
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S. Ct. 783,
95 L. Ed. 1019 (1951) (‘‘[w]e cannot believe that Con-
gress . . . would impinge on a tradition so [well-
grounded] in history and reason by covert inclusion in
the general language before us’’); In re Sundance Corp.,
Inc., 149 B.R. 641, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Wn. 1993) (in absence
of language clearly and unambiguously waiving judicial
immunity, court will assume that ‘‘Congress simply
didn’t consider this’’ issue). Rather, it seems clear from
the language and structure of the statute that the legisla-
ture sees functional immunities from suit, such as judi-
cial and quasi-judicial immunities, as fundamentally
distinct from sovereign immunity. Whereas the latter
is waived whenever the claims commissioner deems it
just and equitable to permit a claimant to sue the state,
other traditional immunities from suit, along with other
jurisdictional claims, are not waived under the current
version of the statute.
Third, and relatedly, the statute leaves open the
opportunity for the state to pursue claims of judicial and
quasi-judicial immunities in the trial court. See General
Statutes § 4-160 (d) (1). The fact that the state retains
the right to litigate its common-law immunities even
after the claims commissioner waives sovereign immu-
nity is incompatible with the plaintiff’s theory that the
waiver of sovereign immunity operates to waive these
other immunities as well.
In short, the plaintiff’s interpretation of § 4-160 is
inconsistent with (1) the well established purpose of
the statute, which is merely to set forth the rules by
which the claims commissioner waives sovereign
immunity and grants permission to sue the state, and
(2) the text of the broader statute, which allows the
hold the state liable in tort because that party was dissatisfied with the
outcome of a judicial ruling.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
state to retain any defenses and immunities available
to a private defendant and expressly permits the state to
preserve the right to assert its common-law immunities,
even after the claims commissioner waives sovereign
immunity.12
D
Even if we were to conclude that the statutory lan-
guage is ambiguous, however, DCF would still prevail.
First, as discussed, we will narrowly construe a statute
in derogation of the common law. This principle of
construction militates against broadly construing the
waiver contemplated by § 4-160 to encompass not only
sovereign immunity, but all other common-law immuni-
ties from suit.
Second, there are constitutional reasons why we do
not lightly assume that the legislature has chosen to
infringe on the traditional immunities fashioned by the
judiciary to safeguard the essential character and func-
tion of the judicial branch of government. As we
explained, those immunities have long been seen as
essential to the proper, independent functioning and
integrity of the judicial process. See, e.g., DeLaurentis
v. New Haven, supra, 220 Conn. 241 (‘‘The judge on the
bench must be free to administer the law under the
protection of the law, independently and freely, without
fear of consequences. No such independence could
exist if he were in daily apprehension of having an
action brought against him, and his administration of
justice submitted to the opinion of a jury. . . . Were
he not immune, no man but a beggar or a fool would
be a judge . . . because in every suit there is a loser
12
Because we reject the plaintiff’s reading of the statute on other grounds,
we need not consider DCF’s argument that the legal distinction between
defenses and immunities means that § 4-160 (h) (1), which waives only
defenses, leaves the state free to assert claims of judicial and quasi-judi-
cial immunities.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
eager to avenge his loss, and in every unsuccessful
prosecution there is an accused eager to exact a penalty
for his ordeal.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)); see also, e.g., Carrubba v. Moskowitz,
supra, 274 Conn. 541–42 (immunities protect individuals
who perform actions or functions that are ‘‘integral
to the judicial process’’). Although we see no obvious
reason why legislators could not opt to waive their own
legislative immunities (except to the extent that those
immunities are constitutionally conferred), a statute
purporting to abridge judicial immunities ‘‘would raise
serious constitutional questions under the separation
of powers doctrine.’’ Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P. v.
Bridgeport, 320 Conn. 332, 382, 133 A.3d 402 (2016).
Whenever possible, we must construe statutes to avoid
those potential constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., id.;
see also, e.g., In re Sundance Corp., Inc., supra, 149
B.R. 660 (court observed that language in statute did
‘‘not clearly and unequivocally waive federal judicial
immunity’’ and concluded that, ‘‘in the absence of spe-
cific language to this effect, [it must decline] to interpret
the statute as creating a serious constitutional conflict
involving Congress’ power to waive judicial immunity
with its detrimental impact on judicial independence’’).
Third, to the extent that it is appropriate to consult
the legislative history of the statute in a case such as
this; see, e.g., Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 399–400, 978
A.2d 49 (2009) (Katz, J., concurring); id., 406 (Palmer,
J., concurring);13 we would conclude that the history
13
In Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra,
293 Conn. 382, a majority of the court determined that, when the common
law requires a clear indication of legislative intent, a failure by the legislature
to include such a clear indication of legislative intent is dispositive, and
there is no reason to consult extratextual sources to resolve any statutory
ambiguities. See id., 388–391. Both concurring justices, by contrast, con-
cluded that legislative history properly may be consulted in such circum-
stances, consistent with § 1-2z. See id., 399–400 (Katz, J., concurring); id.,
406 (Palmer, J., concurring).
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
supports DCF’s interpretation of § 4-160. The legislative
history of the original 1959 statute; see General Statutes
(Supp. 1959) § 4-160; provides no insight into the intent
of the legislature with respect to the governmental
defenses language. In 2021, however, the legislature
added language to the statute specifically addressing
‘‘prosecutorial, judicial, quasi-judicial or legislative
immunity.’’ Public Acts 2021, No. 21-91, § 6 (P.A. 21-
91); see also General Statutes § 4-160 (a) and (d) (1).
The amendments provide that the state is not barred
from raising those defenses before the claims commis-
sioner or a ‘‘temporary deputy’’14 and that, at least under
some circumstances, the defenses can be reserved and
raised before the trial court. P.A. 21-91, § 6; see also
General Statutes § 4-160 (d) (1) (‘‘[i]f the resolution of
the state’s opposition to the claim is based on a dispute
of a material fact, the special deputy shall grant permis-
sion to sue the state and preserve the state’s right to
pursue [a prosecutorial, judicial, quasi-judicial or legis-
lative immunity] defense in court’’).
This new language supports DCF’s position, insofar
as the fact that the state can retain the right to pursue
a functional immunity defense in court after the claims
commissioner or a temporary deputy has authorized
suit against the state suggests that such defenses are
not automatically waived in tandem with sovereign
immunity. In addition, the history of the 2021 amend-
ments provides some illumination. The original version
of the proposed 2021 amendments did not reference
the functional immunities, providing only that ‘‘[a]ny
notice of opposition . . . shall be limited to opposition
of the claim based solely on jurisdictional grounds.’’
Raised Bill No. 6506, 2021 Sess., § 3. Attorney General
William Tong expressed concerns before the Judiciary
14
Public Acts 2024, No. 24-44, § 12, made a technical change by substituting
the term ‘‘special deputy’’ for the term ‘‘temporary deputy’’ throughout
§ 4-160.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
Committee that the proposed amendments, as initially
drafted, might preclude the state from raising functional
immunity defenses before the claims commissioner,15
as permitted by existing practice,16 creating ‘‘a massive
influx of cases into the judicial system.’’17 In accordance
with Attorney General Tong’s testimony, the legislature
amended the bill, adding express references to the func-
tional immunities. This left no doubt that the state can
raise those immunities before the claims commissioner
and need not wait and engage in the more resource
intensive process of litigating those claims in the Supe-
rior Court. The legislative history, then, supports DCF’s
view that, prior to the passage of the 2021 amendments,
the state could raise a defense of quasi-judicial immu-
nity even after the claims commissioner had authorized
15
See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2021
Sess., p. 6157, written testimony of Attorney General Tong (arguing that
‘‘[a] certificate of merit system would preclude the [s]tate from raising valid
defenses, (e.g. recreational use of land, judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutorial
and other immunities), and create a massive influx of cases into the judi-
cial system’’).
16
See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2021
Sess., p. 6031, remarks of Representative Craig Fishbein (noting concern
that bill ‘‘would impede the Attorney General’s Office from asserting certain
defenses at the [claims commissioner level] that are legitimate and are in
conformance with the current process’’).
17
Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2021 Sess.,
p. 6157, written testimony of Attorney General Tong.
In addition, attorneys testifying before the Judiciary Committee sought
to reassure members that the goal of the bill was simply to bypass the
lengthy discovery process and factual hearings on the merits, which were
duplicative of the process that would ensue in the Superior Court, and to
allow all colorable claims to proceed. See id., pp. 6031–44. The witnesses,
some of whom had been involved in the drafting of the legislation, offered
assurances during the hearings that the bill would not bar the state from
raising functional immunity defenses either before the claims commissioner
or in the Superior Court. See id.; see also id., pp. 6031–32, remarks of
Representative Craig Fishbein; id., pp. 6031–32, remarks of Attorney Lincoln
Woodard (testifying that ‘‘[m]any of the jurisdictional issues are protected
by being able to be raised in the Superior Court’’ and that ‘‘[t]he [b]ill is
not designed to [alter] that process’’ or ‘‘to eliminate those jurisdictional
defenses’’).
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
suit against the state and that the state retained that
right following the passage of the 2021 amendments.
E
This analysis leaves open one question. If the ‘‘prose-
cutorial, judicial, quasi-judicial or legislative immunity’’
referenced in § 4-160 does not qualify as a defense that
‘‘might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental
nature of the activity complained of,’’ then what sorts
of defenses did the legislature have in mind? After all,
we ‘‘must construe [the statute] if possible, such that
no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void
or insignificant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. King, 346 Conn. 238, 260, 288 A.3d 995
(2023). DCF posits that the only defenses that are
waived when the state consents to suit are those that
are inherently governmental, that is to say, those that
are essentially extensions of the state’s sovereign immu-
nity and that could never be raised by a private defen-
dant. But DCF offers no theory or example of what
such an inherently governmental defense (let alone an
eleemosynary defense) might look like.
One set of likely suspects could be found, we believe,
in the years immediately preceding the original enact-
ment of § 4-160 in 1959. In 1957, as the legislature was in
the process of considering and preparing the legislation
that would create the Office of the Claims Commis-
sion,18 this court addressed the question of whether,
after the legislature waives the state’s sovereign immu-
nity and grants a claimant permission to sue, the state
remains free to raise a defense of ‘‘governmental immu-
18
See, e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Appropriations, Pt.
3, 1959 Sess., p. 920, remarks of George Oberst, director of the legislative
council (legislature directed legislative council to study issue in 1953,
received report of legislative council and prepared necessary constitutional
amendment in 1955, and submitted amendment to electorate for approval
in 1958).
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
nity’’ from liability.19 Bergner v. State, supra, 144 Conn.
283–84. Bergner answered that question in the negative,
with this court concluding that a necessary corollary
of the decision to waive sovereign immunity from suit
in a specific case is that the legislature waives govern-
mental immunity from liability as well. See id., 287–89;
see also id., 287 (explaining that legislature’s decision
to authorize suit would be ‘‘utterly useless and meaning-
less’’ if state could nevertheless claim governmental
immunity from liability). The legislature is presumed
to have been aware of Bergner and other contempora-
neous decisions of this court addressing the closely
related public duty doctrine; see footnote 20 of this
opinion; and it is reasonable to assume that they
informed the drafting process and that the language
at issue in § 4-160 merely represented the legislature’s
decision to codify the holding of this court’s recently
decided Bergner case. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Daar,
346 Conn. 80, 111, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023) (legislature is
presumed to be aware of this court’s decisions when
it acts); see also, e.g., Cohen v. General Hospital Society
of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 190–91, 199, 154 A. 435
(1931) (rejecting argument that eleemosynary corpora-
tion was entitled to immunity from liability because it
performed governmental charitable function).
19
The term ‘‘governmental immunity’’ traditionally has been limited to
claims of immunity by municipalities and other subdivisions of the state. It
is unclear whether the state’s claim of ‘‘governmental immunity’’ in Bergner
was simply an attempt to argue that immunity from liability may survive
a waiver of immunity from suit, or whether the state intended to invoke
some distinct immunity, such as that conferred by the public duty doctrine.
See, e.g., Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 166, 544
A.2d 1185 (1988) (opining that this court first articulated public duty doctrine
in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589–90, 116 A.2d 429 (1955)); see also,
e.g., Torres v. Dept. of Correction, 50 Conn. Supp. 72, 79–85, 912 A.2d 1132
(2006) (tracing history of public duty doctrine and concluding that this
doctrine is type of defense, governmental in nature, envisioned by § 4-160,
as it applies only to public duties exercised by public officials and, therefore,
that it is waived in tandem with state’s sovereign immunity).
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the primary
purpose of the statutory scheme is to establish proce-
dures by which the state can waive its sovereign immu-
nity. If a legal action could proceed against a private
party, it ought not be barred simply because the defen-
dant happens to be the state, and, thus, once the claims
commissioner authorizes suit against the state, the state
is precluded from raising any defense—from suit or
liability—that is founded solely on its special status as
the sovereign. But we can discern no legislative intent
also to waive specific immunities that are essential to
carrying out key public duties, including those under-
taken as part of the judicial process, even when the
immunities could be raised by a private defendant and
are not included within the scope of sovereign immu-
nity. The plain language of § 4-160 unambiguously puts
the state in the same position as a private person once
sovereign immunity is waived, and, at that juncture, the
state retains all the rights and liabilities of a private
person. In order to construe the statute as a harmonious
whole, to avoid serious constitutional problems, and to
properly apply the requirements for statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law, we must strictly construe the
‘‘all defenses’’ language contained in § 4-160 (h) (1) to
apply only to defenses such as governmental immunity,
the public duty doctrine, and related eleemosynary
defenses.
F
In summary, § 4-160 places the state in the shoes of
a private defendant. Subsection (h) of § 4-160 provides
that a decision by the claims commissioner to authorize
suit against the state waives the state’s sovereign immu-
nity from suit, as well as any related defenses that derive
from the state’s sovereign status. The statute does not
waive common-law defenses, such as quasi-judicial
immunity, that are not inherently governmental and that
could be raised in like circumstances by a private party.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
To adopt the plaintiff’s broader reading of the statu-
tory waiver, by contrast, would require us to conclude
that the claims commissioner has been delegated an
unprecedented authority—to permit discontented par-
ties to sue the state for, among other things, damages
on the basis of allegations that a judge erroneously
issued (or failed to issue) a ruling, causing harm to a
claimant (for example, by admitting a piece of evidence
or imposing a certain sentence)—and that the commis-
sioner’s waiver would not be subject to review either
by the courts or by the legislature itself. The Office
of the Claims Commissioner has long eschewed such
authority,20 and, in light of the serious constitutional
concerns implicated were we to construe § 4-160 in this
manner, we reject the plaintiff’s proposed construction
in the absence of a clear and unambiguous statement of
legislative intent making the construction unavoidable.
For these reasons, we agree with the conclusion of the
trial court that a waiver of sovereign immunity by the
claims commissioner does not bar the state from
arguing before the court that it nevertheless is shielded
by quasi-judicial immunity.
III
In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that, even if
the claims commissioner lacks the authority to waive
DCF’s absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and even if cer-
tain acts that DCF employees performed at the direction
of the Probate Court in the present case were shielded
20
See, e.g., In re Rondeau, Office of the Claims Commissioner, Claim No.
20140 (March 1, 2006) (‘‘The [c]ommissioner has consistently held that the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity applies to shield the [s]tate from
liability in instances where claims have been related to injuries or losses
suffered where an order issued by a judicial authority is implicated. This
is so even if the action complained of was accomplished or initiated by an
agent or arm of the [c]ourt as long as a sufficient nexus existed between
the act or initiative and a lawful judicial proceeding. [See In re Phelps,
Office of the Claims Commissioner, Claim No. 16859 (June 18, 1997); In re
Doe, Office of the Claims Commissioner, Claim No. 15650 (1996)].’’).
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
by that immunity, the trial court should not have dis-
missed the action in its entirety. The plaintiff contends
that at least some of the negligent conduct alleged in
the complaint may not have been undertaken by DCF
as an arm of the Probate Court and may have involved
the performance of legal duties independent of those
carried out at the direction of the court pursuant to
§ 45a-619. We are persuaded.
A
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. In paragraph 15 of the complaint,
the plaintiff alleges that DCF was negligent in one or
more of the following ways:
‘‘a. in that it failed to conduct an adequate and appro-
priate investigation;
‘‘b. in that it failed to reopen and/or initiate a new
investigation and/or family treatment plan;
‘‘c. in that it caused, allowed, and/or permitted [Toni]
to remain at the [family] home . . . when it knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,
that it constituted a danger to [Toni];
‘‘d. in that it failed to adequately supervise, train, and/
or instruct said placement;
‘‘e. in that it failed to follow up on and act [on] docu-
mented information about claims of neglect;
‘‘f. in that it failed to remove [Toni] from [the family]
home when it knew or should have known of the dan-
gers that existed;
‘‘g. in that it failed to adequately [ensure] the safety
and supervision of [Toni];
‘‘h. in that it failed to follow its own policies and pro-
cedures;
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
‘‘i. in that it failed to adequately train, supervise and/
or oversee its employees, including social workers;
‘‘j. in that it failed to respond to potential abuse and/
or neglect;
‘‘k. in that it recommended, permitted and/or acqui-
esced to the placement of Toni in a dwelling with mem-
bers of a household with DCF histories [that] includ[ed]
multiple instances of substantiation of neglect and sex-
ual abuse;
‘‘l. in that it failed to recognize the risks associated
with one or more of the foregoing; and
‘‘m. in that it failed to follow safe and effective policies
and procedures associated with Toni’s placement.’’
In support of its motion to dismiss, DCF argued that
all of these claims should be dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because they arose in the con-
text of an investigation that was integrally related to a
judicial proceeding and was performed at the direction
of the Probate Court. In his opposition to the motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that the allegations of
negligence in the complaint are not limited to the tasks
that DCF performed at the direction of the Probate
Court, namely, investigating and making recommenda-
tions regarding Toni’s placement in the family home.
The trial court acknowledged the plaintiff’s argument
that certain allegations in the complaint are not subject
to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, but the court did
not directly address that argument in its memorandum
of decision. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion
for reargument or reconsideration, contending that the
trial court did not address his allegations of negligence
that are separate and distinct from DCF’s report to
the Probate Court. The trial court denied the motion,
without further elaboration.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
The plaintiff renews the argument on appeal.21 He
specifically directs our attention to the recommenda-
tion of the magistrate judge to the claims commissioner.
That recommendation states that, at the hearing before
the magistrate, the parties gave conflicting testimony
as to one material fact: ‘‘According to [the plaintiff],
approximately two weeks before Toni’s death, he was
driving to the [family home] for a visit with her. As he
was driving up the street, he saw Toni, approximately
200 yards from the . . . property, in a neighbor’s yard.
He picked her up, brought her back to the [family home],
and told Lorri . . . where he had found Toni. [Lorri]
said she did not realize Toni was gone. [The plaintiff]
testified that he then called the DCF caseworker and
reported the incident, and was told by the worker that
she would call the [family]. The caseworker testified
that [the plaintiff] never called her.’’22
B
The following well established principles govern our
resolution of this claim. ‘‘[I]n general our cases have
followed a functional approach to immunity law.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gross v. Rell, supra,
304 Conn. 249. That is to say, ‘‘[a]bsolute immunity
flows not from rank or title or location within the [g]ov-
ernment . . . but from the nature of the responsibili-
21
DCF claims that the plaintiff waived these arguments by failing to ade-
quately present them in his principal appellate brief. We need not determine
whether the claim was adequately briefed at the outset because, after the
issue arose at oral argument before this court, we ordered the parties to
submit supplemental briefs ‘‘addressing whether there are any allegations
in the plaintiff’s complaint . . . that are not subject to the defense of quasi-
judicial immunity.’’
22
The plaintiff apparently did not enter the hearing transcripts into the
record before the trial court. DCF has moved to strike that portion of the
plaintiff’s supplemental brief that relies on the findings and recommenda-
tions of the magistrate judge. We consider those findings and recommenda-
tions only to the extent that they shed further light on the nature of the
plaintiff’s (as yet unproven) allegations.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
ties of the individual official.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. Absolute quasi-judicial immunity, for exam-
ple, ‘‘extends only to those who are intimately involved
in the judicial process . . . . [E]ven judges are not enti-
tled to immunity for their administrative actions, but
only for their judicial actions.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 247.
Under this functional approach, we apply a three
factor test to determine whether a person should be
afforded absolute immunity. Id., 248. We ask ‘‘[1]
whether the official in question perform[s] functions
sufficiently comparable to those of officials who have
traditionally been afforded absolute immunity at com-
mon law . . . [2] whether the likelihood of harassment
or intimidation by personal liability [is] sufficiently
great to interfere with the official’s performance of his
or her duties . . . [and] [3] whether procedural safe-
guards [exist] in the system that would adequately pro-
tect against [improper] conduct by the official.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 248–49.
C
As a general matter, we agree with DCF that, under
this three factor test, social workers—whether private
sector or public employees—are entitled to quasi-judi-
cial immunity for their acts and omissions23 to the extent
that they are operating under the direction of the Pro-
bate Court and assisting that court in carrying out the
quintessentially judicial task of assessing the best inter-
est of a child. With respect to the first factor, in Gross
v. Rell, supra, 304 Conn. 234, we explained that a court-
appointed conservator was entitled to absolute judicial
immunity when he or she acts as an agent under the
23
It is well established that the failure to act also can be subject to
absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity when the decision whether to
act is instrumental to the judicial process. See, e.g., Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day
(Conn.) 315, 329 (1804).
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
supervision and control of the Probate Court. See id.,
250–53. The same reasoning applies to social workers
who conduct court-ordered investigations. ‘‘[T]heir
function is not merely comparable to those of officials
who have traditionally been afforded absolute immunity
at common law . . . . [R]ather, they function as the
Probate Court.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 252; see also,
e.g., Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 274 Conn. 537, 544
(court-appointed attorney for minor child, like guardian
ad litem, is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity
for performance of functions that are integral to judicial
process, such as making reports and recommendations
as to best interest of child).
With respect to the second factor, we agree with the
trial court that ‘‘[c]ircumstances such as those [in this
case] present an even stronger case for quasi-judicial
immunity than the circumstances involving court-appointed
conservators. To deny immunity to . . . DCF social
worker[s] would make them a litigation lightning rod
for parties disgruntled with a judicial order based on
their report. Ensuring the DCF social worker is covered
by quasi-judicial immunity while functioning as the Pro-
bate Court ensures that court’s fearless and principled
decision-making.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) See, e.g., Ammar I. v. Dept. of
Children & Families, 351 Conn. 656, 672, 332 A.3d 180
(2025) (‘‘[f]ailing to apply the litigation privilege [to
DCF’s] actions taken in connection with a termination
of parental rights proceeding would hamper [its] mis-
sion to protect children who are abused, neglected, or
uncared for . . . out of fear of future retaliatory litiga-
tion by disgruntled parents’’ (citation omitted)); Car-
rubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 274 Conn. 543 (‘‘the threat
of litigation from a disgruntled parent, unhappy with
the position advocated by the attorney for the minor
child in a custody action, would be likely . . . to inter-
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
fere with the independent [decision-making] required
by this position’’).
Turning to the third factor, we have recognized with
respect to related positions, such as guardians ad litem
and attorneys for the minor child, that the threat of
litigation is not necessary to incentivize professional
conduct and that ‘‘sufficient procedural safeguards
[exist] in the system to protect against improper con-
duct . . . .’’ Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 274 Conn.
543. In Carrubba, for example, we concluded that ade-
quate safeguards were in place because an attorney for
the minor child who was appointed by the court could
also be removed by the court and was subject to disci-
pline for violations of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct. Id. Similarly, professionals appointed by the
Probate Court to serve as investigators are subject to
the court’s removal, and decisions of the court itself
are subject to the normal appellate process.
At the same time, every social worker, whether
employed in the public or private sector, has certain
independent obligations, such as to report suspected
child abuse and neglect encountered in the ordinary
course of his or her employment. See General Statutes
§ 17a-101 et seq. And DCF has its own distinct statutory
obligations with respect to at-risk children. See, e.g.,
General Statutes § 17a-3 (duty to provide preventative
services, clinically indicated placements and services,
and outreach and assistance to persons caring for chil-
dren); General Statutes § 17a-101g (depending on seri-
ousness and immediacy of risk to child, DCF may have
duty to conduct timely investigation, to submit referral
for family assessment and services, to refer case to local
law enforcement, or to remove child for up to ninety-
six hours).
At oral argument before this court and in its supple-
mental brief, DCF acknowledged that, if, in the course
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
of carrying out a court-ordered investigation, it became
aware that a child was being abused or neglected, and
the agency did not act to secure the child’s safety, its
failure to act would not be shielded by absolute judicial
immunity. See, e.g., Gross v. Rell, supra, 304 Conn.
253–54 (conservators do not have absolute immunity
with respect to acts not authorized or approved by
Probate Court). The undeveloped state of the record,
in tandem with the conclusory nature of many of the
plaintiff’s allegations, makes it difficult, at this stage in
the proceedings, to determine as a matter of law which
of DCF’s allegedly negligent actions and omissions are
shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity because
they were instrumental to DCF’s work as an arm of
the Probate Court, and which ones implicate alleged
violations of DCF’s independent duties.
Some of the allegations clearly fall within the scope
of quasi-judicial immunity as a matter of law. For exam-
ple, the allegations that DCF failed to conduct an ade-
quate and appropriate investigation and that it
negligently recommended that Toni remain in April’s
custody directly challenge DCF’s performance of the
specific task delegated to it by the Probate Court,
namely, to independently and objectively assess the
best interest of the child in this matter.24
Other allegations likely would not be subject to a
claim of quasi-judicial immunity. These include the alle-
gations that DCF failed to follow up and act on docu-
mented claims of neglect (such as the plaintiff’s alleged
report that Toni had wandered off unnoticed two weeks
before her death) and that DCF failed to take the neces-
sary steps to remove Toni from the family home once
the serious risks of remaining there became apparent.
24
Because we conclude that these activities were protected by quasi-
judicial immunity, we need not consider DCF’s alternative argument that
they also were protected by the litigation privilege. See, e.g., Ammar I. v.
Dept. of Children & Families, supra, 351 Conn. 665–66, 671–72, 676–78.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
If, in the ordinary course of business, DCF received a
credible report that a child was being neglected or was
at serious risk of abuse or neglect, it would be legally
obligated to follow up on that report and, potentially,
to take action up to and including removal of the child.
The fact that DCF happened to be performing an investi-
gation at the behest of the Probate Court when it received
such reports or became aware of such risks does not
obviate any independent duty to secure the child’s safety.25
For most of the plaintiff’s allegations, however, the
nature of the claim is not sufficiently clear, and the
record is not sufficiently developed, for us to say, at
this juncture, whether absolute quasi-judicial immunity
applies. Many of the claims, such as those alleging inad-
equate training and failure to follow established proce-
dures, might relate to either category of claims, and the
particular procedures and standards at issue are not a
matter of record. On remand, it will fall to the trial
court to make those determinations in the first instance
once an adequate record has been established. Given
that any surviving claims ultimately would be tried to
the trial court; see General Statutes § 4-160 (k); it also
will fall to that court to determine whether to hold
additional hearings on DCF’s motion to dismiss to estab-
lish the necessary jurisdictional facts, or to defer those
factual determinations to trial. See, e.g., Graham v.
Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 428
n.14, 195 A.3d 664 (2018).
25
We emphasize that we express no opinion as to the factual or legal
merits of the plaintiff’s claims that fall outside the scope of quasi-judicial
immunity. As the record currently stands, the allegations that underlie those
claims appear to be limited to (1) the contested charge that DCF received,
and failed to timely respond to, a single report that Toni had, on one occasion,
wandered unattended into a neighbor’s yard, and (2) the uncontested fact,
which DCF reported to the Probate Court, that several members of the
household had abused or neglected other children, in most instances, more
than one decade earlier. Our holding is limited to our determination that
not all of the plaintiff’s allegations, if substantiated, would be shielded by
absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit.
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Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families
The judgment is reversed as to any allegations in the
complaint that are not subject to quasi-judicial immu-
nity as a matter of law and the case is remanded for
further proceedings according to law; the judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.