ALONZO v. TERRA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD E. ALONZO, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JOE TERRA, et al., :

Defendants. : No. 23-cv-2532

MEMORANDUM

KENNEY, J. August 5, 2025

Defendants Superintendent Joe Terra, Lieutenant DiGuardi, Corrections Officer Wagner

and Corrections Counselor Jordan move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Ronald E. Alonzo’s

claims that his placement in administrative custody, change in program code, and prison transfer

violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and his state law claim for sexual assault.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Court will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim for sexual assault and will therefore

DISMISS that claim without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts underlying Mr. Alonzo’s Complaint stem from a March 28, 2021 incident

involving Defendant Corrections Officer Wagner, as further described below.

A. March 28, 2021 Incident and Misconduct Process

On March 28, 2021, Plaintiff Alonzo, a prisoner then-incarcerated at SCI Phoenix, was

cleaning the prison’s staff bathroom while Officer Wagner, a female corrections officer at SCI

Phoenix, was monitoring the nearby staff dining hall. See ECF No. 72-4 at 2. Officer Wagner

stated that at this time, she saw Mr. Alonzo stop cleaning the staff bathroom and begin openly

masturbating with the door ajar while looking at her. Id. Based on her account, she filed a

misconduct report in connection with this incident, alleging sexual harassment and indecent

exposure. See id. Ahead of the misconduct hearing, Mr. Alonzo was placed in pre-hearing

confinement on March 29, 2021. See ECF No. 2 at 13.

Several days later, on March 31, 2021, a disciplinary hearing was held before a hearing

examiner, where Mr. Alonzo pleaded not guilty to the misconduct charges and claimed he was

only cleaning the bathroom. ECF No. 72-5 at 2. Mr. Alonzo argued the sexual harassment and

indecent exposure charges should be dismissed under the Prison Rape Elimination Act’s

(“PREA’s”) voyeurism provisions, ECF No. 1 ¶ 14 n.1, which prohibit “[v]oyeurism by a staff

member . . . mean[ing] invasion of privacy of an inmate . . . unrelated to official duties,” 28 C.F.R.

§ 115.6. The hearing examiner found Officer Wagner’s version of events credible and Mr. Alonzo

guilty of indecent exposure, but the examiner dismissed the sexual harassment charge. See ECF

No. 2 at 13; ECF No. 72-5 at 2. Mr. Alonzo lost his job and was sanctioned to thirty days in

disciplinary custody, including his time served beginning March 29, 2021, setting his release date

from disciplinary custody at April 27, 2021. See ECF No. 2 at 13.

On March 29, 2021, the day after filing the misconduct and a couple of days prior to the

disciplinary hearing, Officer Wagner submitted a separation request from Mr. Alonzo, claiming

he “lurk[ed]” near her during her lunch hour, stood in “close proximity” to her after being

previously asked not to, and deliberately waited until the dining hall was empty to request

bathroom access, after which he would stand very close to her while she opened the door. ECF

No. 72-11 at 2. Officer Wagner expressed concern for her safety and feared retaliation for filing

the misconduct report. See id. An internal security lieutenant reviewed the request the same day

and recommended approval, stating that failing to separate Mr. Alonzo could “cause a disruption

to the safe and secure operation of the facility.” ECF No. 72-12 at 2–3.

On March 31, 2021, the day after the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Alonzo appealed his

misconduct to the Program Review Committee, claiming Officer Wagner intentionally positioned

herself with a view of the men’s bathroom and suggesting ulterior motives behind the misconduct.

See ECF No. 72-6 at 2; ECF No. 2 at 13. The Committee received the appeal on April 1, 2021,

and upheld the hearing examiner’s decision on April 7, 2021. See ECF No. 2 at 13.

On April 13, 2021, Mr. Alonzo appealed the Program Review Committee’s decision to

Superintendent Sorber, who is responsible for reviewing appeals of disciplinary charges at SCI

Phoenix. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 9, 14, n.1; ECF No. 72-8 at 2; see also ECF No. 2 at 9. His appeal to the

Superintendent mirrored the appeal to the Committee, with him again alleging voyeurism. ECF

No. 72-8 at 2. The Superintendent received the appeal on April 14, 2021, id., and upheld the

findings on April 15, 2021, crediting Officer Wagner’s account. ECF No. 72-9 at 2.

At some later point, Mr. Alonzo also appealed the misconduct decision to the Chief

Hearing Examiner. See ECF No. 2 at 11. The record does not indicate when Mr. Alonzo filed his

final appeal to the Chief Hearing Examiner or when he received a response, but states only that by

September 17, 2021, Mr. Alonzo had received a final review of his misconduct. See id.

B. PREA Investigation

The same day as the March 28, 2021 incident between Mr. Alonzo and Officer Wagner,

Mr. Alonzo authored a statement to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) coordinator

disputing Officer Wagner’s version of events and claiming that she ordered him to masturbate

while she watched from a few feet away, sitting with her legs spread.1 ECF No. 2 at 4.

On April 22, 2021, Mr. Alonzo was interviewed by Lt. DiGuardi, a correctional lieutenant

who investigates PREA complaints at SCI Phoenix. See ECF No. 72-17 at 8. Mr. Alonzo alleges

Lt. DiGuardi “accosted” him with his PREA statement regarding Officer Wagner’s conduct and

then ceased investigating Mr. Alonzo’s PREA claim. ECF No. 1 ¶ 15; ECF No. 28 at 3 n.1.

A PREA special investigator ultimately concluded that Mr. Alonzo’s allegations were

unsubstantiated. See ECF No. 72-17 at 4.

C. Administrative Custody and Prison Transfer

On April 28, 2021, Mr. Alonzo was placed in administrative custody, after appearing for a

hearing before the Program Review Committee. ECF No. 72-10 at 2; see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.

According to Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ leadership, it is the standard policy of the

Department to place an individual in administrative custody while there is a pending separation

request against the individual. ECF No. 72-14 at 3 (declaration of the Director of the Bureau of

Population Management of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections). As set forth in Mr.

Alonzo’s Inmate Record, the Committee informed Mr. Alonzo that he would be placed in

1 The purpose of the Prison Rape Elimination Act is to “establish a zero-tolerance standard for the

incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States.” 34 U.S.C. § 30302(1). The Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections designates a PREA coordinator to “develop, implement, and oversee”

efforts to comply with National PREA Standards. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., DC-ADM 008 § III(C).

administrative custody pending a decision on Officer Wagner’s Separation Request.2 ECF No.

72-10 at 2. In his deposition, Mr. Alonzo stated that he was told his placement was due to an

“operational need.” ECF No. 72-2 at 28. Mr. Alonzo further claims that the authorizing form was

fabricated, noting that it is dated April 27, 2021, at “16:00,” even though he was released from

disciplinary custody at “08:00” that same day. See id. at 20–21. His Inmate Record indicates that

at the April 28, 2021 hearing, the Committee explained his appeal rights and that Mr. Alonzo raised

no further questions or concerns. ECF No. 72-10 at 2.

On April 29, 2021, the Bureau of Personnel Management approved Officer Wagner’s

separation request. ECF No. 72-13 at 2–3. When the Bureau approves a separation request, it is

standard policy to hold the individual in administrative custody until the individual is transferred.

ECF No. 72-14 at 4. Mr. Alonzo remained in administrative custody until shortly after his transfer

date of July 1, see id. at 4–5, and was released to the general prison population on July 9, 2021,

ECF No. 72-2 at 18.

D. H-Code Assignment

In July 2021, Mr. Alonzo received an H-Code designation. See ECF No. 72-10 at 2. An

“H-Code” is a housing status code used by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to indicate

that an inmate should be placed in a single cell for administrative or security reasons and is

assigned when an inmate is identified as a heightened risk, including those with a history of sexual

violations. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr., DC-ADM 11.2.1 at 10; see also ECF No. 74 at 34. This

designation can influence where the inmate is housed throughout their incarceration. See Pa. Dep’t

2 A Program Review Committee review on April 21 noted plans to release Mr. Alonzo to general

housing, pending a COVID test. ECF No. 72-10 at 3. On April 22, the same day as Mr. Alonzo’s

PREA interview, his Inmate Cumulative Adjustment Record (“Inmate Record”) was updated to

reflect a “Correction to Previous Entry,” indicating he would instead be transferred to

administrative custody based on Officer Wagner’s pending separation request. Id.

of Corr., DC-ADM 11.2.1 at 10. Mr. Alonzo’s H-Code assignment form stated that he

“demonstrate[d] sexually inappropriate behaviors towards staff” and referenced the incident on

March 28, 2021. See ECF No. 72-15 at 2.

It is unclear from the record the exact date on which Mr. Alonzo was informed of his H-

Code assignment. Mr. Alonzo maintains that he first learned of the assignment on July 9, 2021,

when he was denied a kitchen job at SCI Chester. See ECF No. 72-2 at 38–39; ECF No. 2 at 19.

The Program Review Committee’s vote sheet lists a staffing date of June 30, 2021, but all

signatories hand-dated the form as July 6, 2021. ECF No. 72-15 at 2. Mr. Alonzo’s Inmate Record

notes that, as of June 30, he was to be informed once the Department of Corrections issued a final

decision. ECF No. 72-10 at 3. Those records also indicate that the H-Code was formally added

to his classification record on July 26, 2021. Id.; see also ECF No. 71 at 13.

Mr. Alonzo states that, after being assigned an H-Code, he was prohibited from having any

job assignments outside of his housing unit and was required to move cells every 90 days. ECF

No. 72-2 at 24–25. Additionally, he detailed that because of the H-Code, he could not return to

higher-paying jobs such as kitchen work and instead remained a block worker earning minimum

pay. Id. at 16. Mr. Alonzo also claimed that the H-Code restricted him from participating in

programs for older inmates (like the Senior Life Enhancement Program) and prevented him from

taking other positions within the prison that he was otherwise eligible for. Id. at 42–43.

E. Procedural Background

On June 29, 2023, in connection with the above events, Mr. Alonzo filed a complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, seeking damages and injunctive relief, for violations of his

First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.3 ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 18. Mr. Alonzo also brought

a state law claim against Officer Wagner for sexual assault. Id. ¶ 1 (citing to a Pennsylvania

criminal statute and referring to the “torts for sexual assault . . . in an institutional setting”).

Mr. Alonzo moved for summary judgment on January 15, 2025. ECF No. 62. On March

3, 2025, Defendants also moved for summary judgment and filed an Omnibus Brief opposing Mr.

Alonzo’s Motion. ECF No. 71. On April 1, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Alonzo’s Motion and

directed him to respond to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. ECF No. 77 at 1–2. Mr.

Alonzo was granted an extension on April 23, 2025, ECF No. 80 at 1, and he filed his

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on May 16, 2025.

ECF No. 83 at 50.

On July 3, 2025, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefing on three issues relevant

to its jurisdiction: (1) the state of which Officer Wagner is a citizen, (2) Mr. Alonzo’s residential

address prior to incarceration, and (3) whether Mr. Alonzo is eligible for parole under his life

sentence. See ECF No. 89 at 1; see also infra Section III.B. On July 10, 2025, Defendants

responded that Officer Wagner is a lifelong resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. ECF

No. 90 at 2. They further confirmed that Mr. Alonzo is serving a life sentence without the

possibility of parole and that their records list his last city of residence prior to incarceration as

Philadelphia. Id. Mr. Alonzo responded that he was born in Pennsylvania and “has always lived

3 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Wagner were previously dismissed by this Court,

leaving only a state law claim against Defendant Wagner. See ECF No. 31 at 2. Additionally, Mr.

Alonzo sued four other defendants, who have since been dismissed (Hensley, Yodis, Sorber, and

SCI Phoenix). ECF No. 10 at 2; ECF No. 31 at 1. Mr. Alonzo also previously sought declaratory

relief, but this Court dismissed his claims for declaratory relief on October 11, 2023. See ECF No.

10 at 2.

in the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth,” though he states that at one point he resided in New

Jersey. See ECF No. 93 at 3 & n.1, 9.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court must grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding the motion, the Court must view

the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951

F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020). However, “[s]peculation” and “conclusory allegations” are

insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Ultimately, only disputes based on which a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party” can support the denial of a motion for summary judgment. Id. (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment as to Mr. Alonzo’s federal claims, arguing these

claims were not exhausted, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a), and fail on the merits. See ECF No. 71 at 11–31. Defendants likewise move for

summary judgment as to Mr. Alonzo’s state law claim against Officer Wagner, contending this

claim is barred by sovereign immunity and fails on the merits, or that this Court should decline

supplemental jurisdiction with respect to it. Because this Court grants Defendants’ Motion on

exhaustion grounds, it need not reach the merits of Mr. Alonzo’s constitutional claims. As this

grant resolves all federal claims, and there are no factors that justify retaining jurisdiction, this

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Alonzo’s remaining state law claim.

A. Exhaustion

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must properly exhaust all administrative remedies that are

“available”—meaning remedies that are “capable of use to obtain some relief for the action

complained of.” Webb v. Dep’t of Just., 117 F.4th 560, 567 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see

also Perttu v. Richards, 145 S. Ct. 1793, 1798 (2025). Proper exhaustion gives prisons an

opportunity to resolve complaints internally, screen out claims that lack merit, and develop an

administrative record to assist any later litigation. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001).

The Supreme Court has recognized three scenarios where a remedy, though formally in place, is

not available: when “it operates as a simple dead end,” it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically

speaking, incapable of use,” or prison officials “thwart inmates from taking advantage of [it]

through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257,

266–67 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016)).

Mr. Alonzo does not argue in his summary judgment briefing that he filed any grievance

about his administrative custody, transfer, or H-Code that was ignored or rejected.4 See ECF No.

83 at 5. Yet, he was aware of the grievance process and had previously filed grievances. See ECF

No. 72-19 at 7–10. Accordingly, Mr. Alonzo has not demonstrated that the grievance process was

unavailable to him. Because Mr. Alonzo did not follow the required steps under prison policy and,

as discussed below, none of the recognized exceptions excuse his noncompliance, he failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as the PLRA requires. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Rinaldi, 904

F.3d at 266–67.

4 Mr. Alonzo’s appeal of the original misconduct charge does not satisfy the PLRA’s requirements

because it focused solely on the indecent exposure charge filed by Officer Wagner and did not

mention his placement in administrative custody, his transfer to SCI Chester, or his H-Code

classification—all of which occurred after his initial misconduct hearing and multiple levels of

appellate review for the misconduct. See ECF No. 2 at 9; ECF No. 72-8 at 2; see also ECF No.

72-2 at 44 (Mr. Alonzo testified in his deposition that he “did all that” in response to a general

question about whether he was aware of the exhaustion requirement). An appeal of a misconduct

charge does not substitute for a grievance challenging later retaliatory conduct. Cf. Washington-

El v. Beard, 562 F. App’x 61, 64–65 (3d Cir. 2014) (appeal regarding other grievances did not

satisfy the exhaustion requirement).

a. Prison Transfer and H-Code Assignment

Mr. Alonzo did not exhaust the prison’s available administrative remedies for his prison

transfer and H-Code assignment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 266–67.

Defendants argue, and Mr. Alonzo does not dispute in his opposition, that he did not file grievances

regarding his transfer from SCI Phoenix to SCI Chester or his H-Code designation. See ECF No.

71 at 13. Mr. Alonzo instead contends that prison officials thwarted his efforts to grieve these

issues. See ECF No. 83 at 5. However, the record does not support the claim that officials misled

or prevented Mr. Alonzo from filing any grievance, nor does it indicate that the grievance process

was otherwise unavailable.

First, regarding the H-Code designation, Mr. Alonzo did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections requires an inmate to file

a grievance within fifteen working days of the underlying event, using the designated grievance

form. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., DC-ADM 804 §§ 1(A)(5), 1(A)(8). If that deadline is missed, the inmate

may request an extension by submitting a written explanation to the Facility Grievance

Coordinator, who may grant additional time. Id. § 1(C)(2). This extension request is part of the

grievance process and must be used once any temporary obstacle is removed. See Talley v. Clark,

111 F.4th 255, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2024) (inmate who lacked writing materials was required to seek

an extension once he procured writing implements). Failure to request an extension or pursue the

required appeals means the inmate has not fully exhausted the administrative remedies available

under Policy 804. See id.

Mr. Alonzo testified that he learned of his H-Code designation on July 9, 2021, when a

kitchen supervisor at SCI Chester informed him of it.5 See ECF No. 72-2 at 39. Even using the

date that the H-Code was formally added to his record, July 26, 2021, ECF No. 72-10 at 2, he did

not file a grievance within the fifteen working days of July 26, 2021 required under DC-ADM 804

or request an extension to do so. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr., DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8). Indeed, the

record reflects that he never filed any grievance about his H-Code and instead filed grievances

about unrelated issues, like mail, during the same period. See ECF No. 72-18 at 6, 8.

Likewise, Mr. Alonzo failed to grieve his transfer from SCI Phoenix to SCI Chester. The

transfer occurred on July 1, 2021, see ECF No. 72-14 at 5, which set the grievance deadline as July

23, 2021. ECF No. 72-10 at 2; Pa. Dep’t of Corr., DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8). However, Mr. Alonzo

did not file any grievance about the transfer or request an extension, despite actively using the

grievance system for other matters during this same timeframe. See ECF No. 72-18 at 8. Because

he did not pursue the required steps under Policy 804, he did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies for either the H-Code or the transfer. See Talley, 111 F.4th at 262–63.

Mr. Alonzo contends that he was excused from exhausting administrative remedies

because prison staff allegedly thwarted grievance efforts. To establish thwarting, an inmate must

show that officials affirmatively blocked his use of the grievance process “through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” See Ross, 578 U.S. at 644; Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109,

112–13 (3d Cir. 2002) (dispute of fact existed as to whether prison staff thwarted inmate from

exhausting remedies by telling the inmate to wait to file a grievance after an investigation

5 The record is mixed on when Mr. Alonzo learned of his H-Code designation. The prison’s

records show a staffing date of June 30, handwritten signoffs dated July 6, and a final formal

classification date of July 26. See ECF No. 2 at 19; ECF No. 72-2 at 39; ECF No. 72-10 at 2; ECF

No. 72-15 at 2.

concluded).6 But unlike plaintiffs who have successfully invoked the thwarting exception, Mr.

Alonzo does not point to any instances of thwarting and did not engage with the grievance process

at all for his H-Code designation or transfer, which renders his assertion invalid. Mr. Alonzo relies

primarily on Croak, where the Third Circuit excused a prisoner’s failure to exhaust because staff

members gave the prisoner misleading instructions. See 312 F.3d at 112. But here, unlike the

inmate in Croak, Mr. Alonzo does not identify any threat or misleading instruction by staff that

prevented him from filing grievances about the H-Code or transfer. Rather, he knew how to use

the grievance system and did so for other unrelated issues during this same period. See ECF No.

72-18 at 8. He also does not allege that he asked for information about how to grieve and was

misinformed or denied an explanation. See Hardy v. Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 587–88 (3d Cir. 2020)

(misrepresentation requires a false or misleading statement on which an inmate would be entitled

to rely). The record therefore does not support that prison officials thwarted Mr. Alonzo’s ability

to file grievances.

Nor does Mr. Alonzo show that the grievance process operated as a “dead end” or was “so

opaque that it [became], practically speaking, incapable of use.” See Ross, 578 U.S. at 643. Unlike

the inmates who have successfully invoked an exception to exhaustion in other cases, Mr. Alonzo

does not claim in his briefing that he unsuccessfully attempted to file grievances, or that he filed

6 Mr. Alonzo cites Ross v. Blake for the proposition that a grievance procedure is unavailable where

prison officials thwart an inmate’s efforts to exhaust administrative remedies. See ECF No. 83 at

7. In Ross, the Supreme Court concluded that a prison’s routine dismissal of grievances on

procedural grounds raised questions about whether the process was available, and it remanded for

the district court to consider this issue. See 578 U.S. at 645–48. The plaintiff in Ross mistakenly

believed that the prison’s internal investigations were a substitute for the grievance process, and

there was some evidence supporting the reasonableness of that belief. Id. Notably, the defendants

could not identify a single instance in which a grievance was considered on the merits while an

investigation was pending. Id. at 647. By contrast, Mr. Alonzo has not introduced any comparable

evidence that Defendants have systematically rejected grievances or represented to prisoners that

any internal investigations were a substitute for the grievance procedure.

grievances and received no response. See Shifflett v. Korsniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365–66 (3d Cir.

2019) (grievance process is a dead end where prison officials fail to respond to grievances within

the timeframe mandated by their own policy); see also Bond v. Horne, 553 F. App’x 219, 222 (3d

Cir. 2014) (process was a dead end where the plaintiff’s grievances were ignored multiple times).

Instead, he simply did not file them. And though he claims confusion about why he received an

H-Code, see ECF No. 72-2 at 28–29, he does not contend that the grievance procedures themselves

were too confusing to follow, especially given that he used them for other matters at around this

same time. See Moco v. Janik, No. 22-307, 2023 WL 6632952, at *3–4 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2023).

In sum, Mr. Alonzo did not file grievances for his transfer or H-Code, and he has not shown

that prison staff thwarted his efforts or that the grievance process was a dead end or opaque.

Accordingly, Mr. Alonzo failed to exhaust his transfer and H-Code claims as required by the PLRA

and does not satisfy any of the exceptions to exhaustion. Summary judgment to Defendants is

therefore warranted on this ground. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 266–67.

b. Administrative Custody

Next, Mr. Alonzo did not exhaust the prison’s administrative remedies for his placement

in administrative custody. The proper avenue to challenge the reasons for or duration of

administrative custody is prison policy DC-ADM 802, see ECF No. 72-20 at 17; see also Pa. Dep’t

of Corr., DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(7), which provides two working days to appeal the outcome of an

administrative custody hearing. See ECF No. 72-20 at 15. Any other challenge related to

administrative custody is governed by prison policy DC-ADM 804, id. at 17, which provides “15

working days after the event upon which the claim is based” to file a grievance. Dep’t of Corr.,

DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8).

Mr. Alonzo’s First Amendment claim challenges the reasons for administrative custody,

since he argues that he was placed in administrative custody for a retaliatory purpose. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 1 at 6. He was therefore required to file an appeal within two working days of his

administrative custody hearing. See ECF No. 72-20 at 15, 17. Turning to Mr. Alonzo’s Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment claims, it is unclear whether these claims challenge the reasons for or

duration of Mr. Alonzo’s administrative custody, or some other aspect of administrative custody.7

However, liberally construing Mr. Alonzo’s complaint, see Liggon-Redding v. Estate of

Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011), Mr. Alonzo was entitled to fifteen working days to

file a grievance in connection with his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Pa. Dep’t

of Corr., DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8).

Mr. Alonzo did not satisfy the above requirements. He does not argue that he filed any

grievances challenging his administrative custody placement—whether within two or fifteen

working days of his hearing or when his administrative custody began. See ECF No. 83 at 3–9

(arguing that Mr. Alonzo was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies). As discussed

above, he appealed the misconduct he received, but that appeals process challenged his misconduct

charges, and all appeals related to the misconduct except the final level of appellate review

occurred before his administrative custody hearing and placement in administrative custody. See

ECF No. 72-6 at 2 (appeal to Program Review Committee); ECF No. 72-7 at 2 (decision); ECF

7 In particular, construing Mr. Alonzo’s complaint liberally, it is possible that his Eighth

Amendment claim challenges the conditions of his administrative custody as cruel and unusual,

rather than the reasons for or duration of his administrative custody. See ECF No. 1 at 6. On the

other hand, Mr. Alonzo clarified at his deposition that his Eighth Amendment claim was based on

it being cruel and unusual to retaliate against him for filing his PREA complaint, which is a

challenge to the reasons for administrative custody. See ECF No. 72-2 at 32. Regardless, whether

Mr. Alonzo was afforded two or fifteen working days to bring his grievances, he failed to properly

exhaust his administrative remedies.

No. 72-8 at 2 (appeal to Superintendent); ECF No. 72-9 at 2 (decision).8 Mr. Alonzo therefore did

not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to administrative custody. See Talley, 111

F.4th at 262–63.9

Mr. Alonzo argues that he is excused from the exhaustion requirement because Defendants

did not inform him of his right to appeal his administrative custody placement. See ECF No. 83

at 9 n.1 (Plaintiff “swears under the ‘penalties of perjury’ that lead defendant Joe Terra did not

inform him of his appellate rights” at his administrative custody hearing and weekly administrative

custody reviews). As an initial matter, this statement is contradicted by the record. Mr. Alonzo’s

inmate record states that he “was explained his appeal rights” at the hearing during which he was

placed in administrative custody. See ECF No. 72-10 at 3. And it is unclear whether a single

statement in Mr. Alonzo’s summary judgment opposition brief, without additional evidence, is

sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact on this issue. See Vega v. Rell, 611 F. App’x 22, 26–

27 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendants on exhaustion grounds

8 The record does not indicate when the final level of appellate review for Mr. Alonzo’s misconduct

occurred—only that it took place sometime before September 17, 2021. See ECF No. 2 at 11; see

also supra Section I.A.

9 Though Mr. Alonzo does not claim that he filed grievances related to his administrative custody,

the Court notes that his grievance summary sheet indicates that he filed two grievances related to

“Conditions” in June 2021. See ECF No. 72-19 at 8. It is unclear what these grievances pertained

to, see id., although it is possible that they could relate to Mr. Alonzo’s Eighth Amendment claim,

insofar as that claim is based on the living conditions in administrative custody. But see ECF No.

72-2 at 32 (stating that Mr. Alonzo’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on the retaliatory nature

of his administrative custody placement). Nonetheless, those grievances would have come after

any filing deadline. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr., DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8). And in any case, Mr. Alonzo

has not provided any evidence that the conditions in his administrative custody cell were so poor

as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment, indicating that his Eighth Amendment claim would

fail on the merits. See ECF No. 72-2 at 30–32 (stating that Mr. Alonzo was permitted to watch

TV in administrative custody, leave his cell about six times per day, and purchase certain items

from the commissary); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (the mere fact of being

placed in administrative custody is not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment).

where the plaintiff “offered no evidence beyond his conclusory allegation that grievance forms

were not available to him” and the record showed that the plaintiff “was provided a form on which

he could have grieved his complaint, but elected not to use it”).

Nonetheless, even assuming Mr. Alonzo was not specifically told that he could appeal his

administrative custody placement, that alone fails to satisfy one of the three exceptions to

exhaustion. Mr. Alonzo does not satisfy the first two exceptions to exhaustion because the record

does not support that the prison’s grievance process was either a dead end or so opaque that an

“ordinary prisoner” could not “discern or navigate it.” See Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44. Though Mr.

Alonzo claims that he was not specifically told of his right to appeal his administrative custody

placement, he was generally aware that the prison had a grievance process and, indeed, had filed

a number of grievances before. See ECF No. 72-2 at 43–45; ECF No. 72-19 at 7–10. Moreover,

he does not argue that he inquired about the process for challenging administrative custody but

was given opaque instructions. See Dollar v. Coweta Cnty. Sheriff Office, 446 F. App’x 248, 251

(11th Cir. 2011) (looking to whether inmate “could not have discovered” grievance process

through “reasonable effort”). And even if Mr. Alonzo showed some confusion about which

specific grievance policy applied, see ECF No. 72-2 at 44–45, Mr. Alonzo does not argue in his

summary judgment papers—and there is no evidence—that he filed a grievance regarding his

administrative custody placement. See Moco, 2023 WL 6632952, at *3–4 (where plaintiff had

“general understanding of the existence of a grievance procedure,” he was not excused from taking

steps to exhaust it); Vontz v. Winger, No. 24-1386, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28304, at *3–4 (6th

Cir. Nov. 6, 2024) (pointing to fact that plaintiff was generally aware of prison’s grievance

policies).

Likewise, Mr. Alonzo does not satisfy the final exception to exhaustion—thwarting—

because nothing in the record reflects that prison officials thwarted his use of the grievance process

“through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” See Ross, 578 U.S. at 644. To be sure,

Mr. Alonzo’s claim that he was never informed of the right to appeal administrative custody can

be construed to be an argument about misrepresentation. See ECF No. 83 at 9 n.1. However, to

establish misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show—among other things—that officials made a

statement that a reasonable inmate would (1) “be ‘entitled to rely on’” and (2) find “so misleading

. . . as to interfere with his use of the grievance process.” See Hardy, 959 F.3d at 587–89 (3d Cir.

2020) (citation omitted) (where prison official incorrectly told the plaintiff to fill out another

grievance, rather than to appeal his grievance rejection, misrepresentation occurred). The mere

failure to inform an individual about an aspect of the grievance process, by itself, is insufficient to

establish thwarting. See Johnson v. District of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40–41 (D.D.C.

2012) (“Courts have distinguished ‘failure to inform’ cases” for exhaustion purposes “from cases

in which affirmative action by prison staff prevented access to remedies”); Gonzales-Liranza v.

Naranjo, 76 F. App’x 270, 272–73 (10th Cir. 2003) (the fact that a prisoner is personally unaware

of a grievance procedure, so long as that procedure is available, does not excuse the requirement

to exhaust administrative remedies); Brock v. Kenton County, 93 F. App’x 793, 797 (6th Cir. 2004)

(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that he was not informed of the grievance process).10

10 A prison’s failure to inform its inmates about aspects of the grievance process could certainly

establish that the grievance process is opaque. See Wiley v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-5368, 2020

WL 12933851, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2020). However, for the reasons discussed above, the

opacity exception to exhaustion does not apply here because Mr. Alonzo was generally familiar

with the grievance process and does not appear to have inquired about the grievance process or

taken steps to challenge his placement in administrative custody.

Here, Mr. Alonzo alleges only that Defendants failed to inform him that he could challenge

his administrative custody placement. See ECF No. 83 at 9 n.1. He does not point to a misleading

statement made by Defendants on which he was entitled to rely—such as that he was incorrectly

instructed about how to use the grievance process, see Hardy, 959 F.3d at 587–88, or was

affirmatively told that his administrative custody placement was unappealable, cf. Manemann v.

Garrett, 484 F. App’x 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2012) (where “[n]othing in the record” showed that

inmate “asked for information about filing a grievance and was refused such information,”

grievance process was not unavailable). And in fact, as discussed above, Mr. Alonzo had used the

grievance process numerous times before. See ECF No. 72-19 at 7–10. He therefore cannot show

that prison officials misrepresented, or otherwise thwarted, his use of the grievance process.

Accordingly, Mr. Alonzo did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to being placed

in administrative custody and does not qualify for an exception to exhaustion.

* * * *

Because Mr. Alonzo did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his H-

Code designation, transfer, and administrative custody placement, this Court will grant summary

judgment to Defendants as to Mr. Alonzo’s claims under federal law.

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim

Having granted summary judgment to Defendants on Mr. Alonzo’s federal law claims, this

Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Alonzo’s state law claim. When

a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction before trial, it must

decline to adjudicate the remaining claims unless considerations of “judicial economy,

convenience, and fairness” support retaining jurisdiction. Talley, 111 F.4th at 266 n.6 (citation

omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Because this Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Mr.

Alonzo’s federal law claims, no claims remain over which there is original jurisdiction. Though

original jurisdiction may be based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), this Court lacks

diversity jurisdiction over Mr. Alonzo’s sole remaining claim—a Pennsylvania state law claim for

institutional sexual assault, as both Mr. Alonzo and Officer Wagner are domiciled in

Pennsylvania.11 See ECF No. 90 at 2. Likewise, neither the Pennsylvania criminal statute which

Mr. Alonzo cites as the basis for his sexual assault claim, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5551(7), nor any

potential tort would provide a basis for original jurisdiction.12

This Court therefore must dismiss Mr. Alonzo’s state law claim, unless “judicial economy,

convenience, and fairness” support retaining jurisdiction. Talley, 111 F.4th at 266 n.6. None of

those considerations justify retaining jurisdiction here. The case is at the summary judgment stage,

no significant judicial resources have been expended on the state-law claim, and there is no

11 Officer Wagner is a citizen of Pennsylvania. See ECF No. 90 at 2; Pierro v. Kugel, 386 F. App’x

308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts generally presume that a prisoner remains a citizen of the state

where they were domiciled before incarceration. See Pierro, 386 F. App’x at 309. Defendants

state that Mr. Alonzo’s correctional records show that he resided in Pennsylvania immediately

prior to his current incarceration. See ECF No. 90 at 2. Likewise, Mr. Alonzo states that he was

born in Pennsylvania and “has always lived” in Pennsylvania, though he mentions that at one point

in time he lived in New Jersey. See ECF No. 93 at 3 & n.1, 9. Based on this record, the Court

concludes that Mr. Alonzo is more likely than not a Pennsylvania citizen. See McCann v. George

W. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that the standard for

showing state citizenship is preponderance of the evidence). That conclusion is bolstered by the

fact that Mr. Alonzo is serving a life sentence with no possibility of parole at SCI Chester in

Chester, Pennsylvania. Strausbaugh v. Greentree Servicing LLC, 857 F. App’x 92, 96 (3d Cir.

2021) (courts may consider possibility of parole and “any other [relevant] factors” in determining

a prisoner’s citizenship). Mr. Alonzo’s brief reference to living at one point in New Jersey is

insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact on this issue.

12 Mr. Alonzo cites a provision of Pennsylvania criminal law as the basis for his state law claim

for “the torts [of] sexual assault.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. That provision states that certain offenses,

including the crime of institutional sexual assault under Pennsylvania law, are not subject to a

statute of limitations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5551(7); 8 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.2. Liberally construing

the Complaint, Mr. Alonzo may be asserting a common-law tort claim for assault or battery.

indication that requiring Mr. Alonzo to proceed in state court would be so unfair or inconvenient

as to justify retaining jurisdiction. See id. (affirming district court’s decision to decline

supplemental jurisdiction over pro se prisoner’s state law claims after dismissing all federal

claims); Murrell v. Consiglio, 841 F. App’x 357, 358, 360 (3d Cir. 2021) (affirming district court’s

decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction and clarifying that dismissal did not preclude pro se

prisoner from pursuing state law claims in state court). In fact, Mr. Alonzo’s state law claim

presents potentially novel questions under Pennsylvania law as to whether coerced self-touching

could constitute a battery or assault and whether sexual assault claims are barred by governmental

immunity—questions more appropriately resolved by Pennsylvania courts.

The primary fairness concern in declining supplemental jurisdiction would be if Mr.

Alonzo was time-barred from refiling his state law claim in state court. That concern is not present

here. When a federal court declines to hear a state law claim under § 1367(c), the statute of

limitations is tolled while the claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after dismissal. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(d); see also Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 459 (2003). This lawsuit

therefore does not prejudice Mr. Alonzo from now bringing his state law claim in Pennsylvania

court.

Accordingly, because no basis for original jurisdiction remains and none of the factors

favor retaining jurisdiction, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as

to Mr. Alonzo’s § 1983 claims. The Court will decline supplemental jurisdiction over Mr.

Alonzo’s state law claim for sexual assault and dismiss it without prejudice. If Mr. Alonzo

chooses to file his state claim for sexual assault in state court, he is directed to be mindful of

the fact that his deadline for doing has been paused during the course of this lawsuit and for

30 days after this Court issues the present Opinion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). An

accompanying Order will follow.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney

_________________________

CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE