Doe v. Prairie View

Case: 24-20128 Document: 84-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/05/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________ United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-20128 FILED

August 5, 2025

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

John Doe, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Prairie View A and M University; Alexis Boyd; Latoya

Douglas; Daniel Hernandez; Keith T. Jemison; Anwar

Phillips; Steven Ransom,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CV-1019

______________________________

Before Stewart, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

In federal court, a claim’s viability turns on what is alleged and what

is not. Prairie View A&M University (the “University”) expelled John Doe

for violating the school’s sexual misconduct policy. Doe sued six university

officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to expunge the disciplinary finding

from his record. Three of them, he admits, have no power to do that. As for

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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the others, he offers no evidence that they retain authority over student

records.

The district court dismissed Doe’s § 1983 claims under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), concluding that none of the named

officials could provide prospective relief and that the remaining claims were

barred by qualified immunity. Doe now appeals that ruling.

Having considered the parties’ arguments and the record in full, we

AFFIRM.

I

John Doe was one semester away from graduation at Prairie View

A&M University when the University opened a Title IX proceeding against

him. It ultimately expelled him for violating its sexual misconduct policy. The

University concluded that Doe had facilitated an assault by allowing his

roommate to enter his bedroom shortly after Doe had engaged in what he

describes as consensual sex with the complainant, Jane Roe. Doe’s roommate

then engaged in a sexual act with Roe.

According to Roe, she believed she was still with Doe during the

second encounter and did not realize that the person with her had changed

until after the encounter ended. The University did not accuse Doe of

committing the assault. Instead, it charged him with “sexual exploitation”

and “complicity” based on his alleged role in facilitating the incident. The

roommate identified by Roe accepted an informal resolution and graduated.

Doe declined a similar resolution, which would have required him to accept

responsibility, and elected to proceed to a formal hearing.

The University’s Title IX Coordinator, Alexis Boyd, initiated the

process by sending Roe several outreach letters. After Roe filed a formal

complaint, Boyd notified Doe, initially omitting details about the underlying

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conduct. Doe received additional information only after his attorney

requested it.

LaToya Douglas, a university official, served as the Title IX

investigator. Doe alleges that Douglas disregarded exculpatory evidence—

particularly written statements that he and others provided to law

enforcement—and failed to obtain documents he requested. He further

claims that university staff told him that a police officer who reviewed those

materials would testify at the hearing. That officer never appeared. Douglas

not only conducted the investigation; she also attended the hearing, testified

before the panel, and, according to Doe, took an active role in questioning

witnesses. He contends that her dual role undermined the impartiality of the

proceeding and violated University policy. Douglas testified and, according

to Doe, stated that the allegations were substantiated. He further alleges that

she questioned witnesses in a manner inconsistent with the University’s

policies and her investigative role.

Daniel Hernandez presided over the hearing as the decisionmaker.

The hearing concluded with a finding of responsibility and a sanction of

expulsion. Doe appealed. Steven Ransom, the University’s appellate officer,

affirmed the decision. In doing so, Ransom acknowledged that some police

records referenced by Doe were no longer available and could not be

reviewed.

Doe then filed suit in federal court. He brought a claim under Title IX

of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., against the

University and § 1983 due process claims against six individual University

officials—Boyd, Douglas, Hernandez, Ransom, Keith Jemison, and Anwar

Phillips (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”). He sought damages and

prospective relief, including the expungement of his disciplinary record. The

district court dismissed the § 1983 claims under Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It held that the defendants were not proper

parties for prospective relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and

that the remaining claims were barred by qualified immunity. The court

allowed the Title IX claim to proceed to trial. A jury returned a verdict for

the University. Doe appeals only the dismissal of his § 1983 claims.

II

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district

court’s final judgment dismissing Doe’s § 1983 claims. We review that

dismissal “de novo,” accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th

741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024); see Bunker v. Dow Chem. Co., 111 F.4th 683, 685 (5th

Cir. 2024). We review the “denial of leave to amend pleadings” for abuse of

discretion. Robertson v. Intratek Comput., Inc., 976 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir.

2020) (citing Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 734 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir.

2013) (per curiam)).

III

Doe’s appeal raises two issues: (A) Did the district court correctly

dismiss the Individual Defendants in their official capacities; and (B) did the

district court correctly dismiss the Individual Defendants in their individual

capacities. We decide each issue in turn.

A

We first consider whether Doe named a proper defendant for

prospective relief under § 1983? He says yes. He named six university

officials. But he concedes that three of them—Douglas, Jemison, and

Phillips—no longer hold positions with any authority over his student record.

As for the remaining three—Ransom, Boyd, and Hernandez—he points to

their past roles in the Title IX process. Ransom, he says, had some role in his

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appeal. Jemison and Phillips, he notes, were senior administrators when the

expulsion occurred. Boyd, he posits, was the Director of Title IX Compliance

and the Title IX Coordinator at the University and oversaw and managed

complaints of sexual harassment and misconduct. He then asserts that

Hernandez was the decisionmaker in Doe’s case. Thus, according to Doe,

Ransom, Hernandez, and Boyd have the required “scintilla of enforcement”

to be proper defendants.

The University sees it differently. It argues that Doe misunderstands

the applicable precedent. None of the officials, it explains—whether former

or current—has the legal authority to expunge Doe’s records. Jemison and

Phillips were not involved in his disciplinary proceeding. Ransom once

served as an appellate officer, but no longer works at the University. And Doe

alleges no facts showing that any defendant holds continuing authority over

student records or disciplinary findings. In short, the University argues, there

is no ongoing violation and no proper target for injunctive relief.

The district court found the University’s argument persuasive. It

dismissed the official-capacity claims after concluding that Doe failed to

plead facts showing that any defendant could provide the relief he requested.

We agree.

Ex parte Young permits suits for injunctive or declaratory relief against

state officials in their official capacities when those officials are allegedly

violating federal law. See 209 U.S. at 155–56. Simple enough, but there are

conditions. The plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation of federal law and

must seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. See Saltz v. Tenn.

Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992); Raj v. La. State Univ.,

714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013). And critically, the official sued must have

the power to provide that relief. See Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th

669, 672 (5th Cir. 2022). Otherwise, there is no live controversy and no

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jurisdiction to speak of. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426–27 (5th Cir.

2001) (en banc) (holding that when defendants lack the power to redress the

purported injury, “the plaintiffs have no case or controversy with these

defendants that will permit them to maintain this action in federal court. . . .

[A] state official cannot be enjoined to act in any way that is beyond his

authority to act in the first place.”).

We have said as much before. In Fairley v. Stalder, a prisoner sought

to enjoin the conditions of his confinement. See 294 F. App’x 805, 812 (5th

Cir. 2008) (per curiam). He sued the Secretary of the Louisiana Department

of Public Safety and Corrections, who had no control over the parish jail

where the prisoner was held. We held that a defendant “not in a position to

provide the requested relief” is not a proper party under Ex parte Young. Id.

That logic also applies here with equal force. The rule follows that “[w]here

a state actor or agency is statutorily tasked with enforcing the challenged law

and a different official is the named defendant, our Young analysis ends.”

Lewis v. Scott, 28 F.4th 659, 663 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).

The injunction Doe seeks reads: “Order Defendant Prairie View

A&M University to expunge John Doe’s transcript and college record of any

reference to his wrongful sanctions and finding of ‘responsibility’ for any and

all sexual misconduct.” He did not urge the district court to compel any

specific defendant to carry out that act. And he alleged no facts showing that

any of them—Boyd, Douglas, Hernandez, Ransom, Jemison, or Phillips—

has the legal authority to do so. The district court noticed Doe’s omission. It

wrote that “Doe does not allege how any of the Individual Defendants are in

a position to enforce or provide the relief requested.” That omission is the

heart of the matter.

Doe has not pleaded that Boyd, Hernandez, or Ransom has any power

to alter a student’s academic or disciplinary record—authority that, by all

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indications, lies elsewhere. Nor does he allege that Jemison or Phillips played

any role in his case or retain any official capacity to grant the relief he seeks.

Ransom once did—but does no longer, as he does not currently work at the

University. Past involvement, without more, is not enough. See Lewis, 28

F.4th at 663 (requiring “ongoing violations of federal law”). Thus, Doe failed

to state a claim under Ex parte Young. He was required to name an official

who could provide the relief he requested. He did not. For that reason, we

hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Doe’s official capacity

claims.

As an aside, Doe says that even if we conclude that these defendants

were not proper defendants under Ex parte Young, he should be given leave

to amend his complaint for injunctive relief. But he never made this request

in the district court. It is a longstanding rule that a district court need not

grant leave to amend sua sponte when the plaintiff never expressly requested

it. See McClaine v. Boeing Co., 544 F. App’x 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (“[W]e will not review a court’s refusal to grant the plaintiff leave to

amend when the plaintiff has not expressly requested leave.” (citing United

States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387

(5th Cir. 2003))). We determine therefore that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Doe leave to amend his complaint.

B

Alongside his request for expungement, Doe sued the Individual

Defendants in their individual capacities for money damages. He claimed

they violated his right to procedural due process during the University’s

Title IX proceeding. The district court dismissed those claims, holding that

each defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. We agree.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from personal

liability unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing both that a constitutional

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right was violated and that the right was clearly established at the time. See

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). This immunity gives “breathing

room” to officials who make reasonable mistakes on unsettled questions of

law—shielding all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly break

the rules. Id. at 743. To overcome it, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable

official in the defendant’s position would have understood the conduct in

question to be unlawful. See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir.

2011) (en banc).

Doe’s allegations fall short. He must show that each defendant,

“through the official’s own individual actions,” violated his rights. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676. And he must do so with specificity. Backe v.

LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). The complaint cannot lump

defendants together or rely on abstract grievances. See Meadours v. Ermel, 483

F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2007). Doe cites two alleged flaws in the hearing

process: the loss of potentially useful evidence and what he calls the

“investigator’s undue influence.” Neither allegation is sufficient.

We begin with his lost evidence theory. Doe and a witness provided

written statements to law enforcement on the night of the incident. By the

time the Title IX proceeding began, those documents had disappeared—lost,

it seems, during a police records system transition. But there’s no allegation

that University officials caused the loss. And testimony showed that the

contents of those statements were summarized in the police report shared

with both parties. Moreover, an audio recording from that night captured

Doe giving an account consistent with his roommate’s—an account he later

changed. Whatever those missing documents might have added, their

absence does not establish a due process violation. Cf. California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) (holding that there is no due process

violation where any potential exculpatory evidence can be established by

other means).

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On appeal, Doe reframes the claim. He argues that Boyd and Douglas

failed to request the statements in time and that this delay alone violated due

process. But that argument finds no support in precedent. As the district

court noted, “Doe does not cite to any authority suggesting Douglas’s

inability [to] obtain prior statements made by witnesses she was able to

interview, and whom Doe had the opportunity to cross-examine, renders the

whole investigation. . . so deficient as to constitute a violation of his due

process rights.”

Now to his second theory—that Douglas overstepped by asking

questions during the hearing. According to Doe, Douglas’s participation

blurred the line between investigator and decisionmaker. But that too lacks

legal footing. Title IX regulations require only that the ultimate

decisionmaker be distinct from the investigator. See Nondiscrimination on

the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal

Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30367 (May 19, 2020) (to be

codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). They say nothing about whether investigators

may attend or participate in hearings. And Doe cites no case clearly

establishing that such participation violates Title IX.

That leaves Hernandez and Ransom. Doe identifies their roles—

Hernandez as the hearing officer, Ransom as the appellate reviewer—but

pleads no specific facts showing that either violated his due process rights.

He offers no legal theory connecting their conduct to a constitutional

violation. That alone forecloses relief. So with each defendant, Doe comes up

short. He alleges no individualized conduct that violated clearly established

law. He names four officials but describes none who crossed a constitutional

line. For these reasons, the district court correctly held that qualified

immunity bars these claims.

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IV

Given the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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