The opinion
NOTICE
This Order was filed under
2025 IL App (4th) 241213-U FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
August 5, 2025
not precedent except in the
NO. 4-24-1213 Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
HUMANE FARMING ASSOCIATION, a California ) Appeal from the
Non-Profit Organization; SHOWING ANIMALS ) Circuit Court of
RESPECT AND KINDNESS (SHARK), an Illinois Non- ) Boone County
Profit Organization; and STEVE HINDI, in His ) No. 23MR30
Individual Capacity, )
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
v. )
THE BOONE COUNTY BOARD; THE BOONE )
COUNTY BUILDING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT; )
THE BOONE COUNTY ZONING BOARD OF )
APPEALS, )
Defendants, )
and )
PEDRO MORALES and GRACIE H. ROBLES, )
Real Parties in Interest )
(The Boone County Board; The Boone County Building ) Honorable
and Zoning Department; and The Boone County Zoning ) Donald P. Shriver,
Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ amended
complaint, finding they lacked standing to challenge a Boone County zoning
officers’ issuance of temporary use permits for “Mexican Rodeos,” because
(1) Illinois does not recognize “aesthetic” injury as a basis for standing, (2) plaintiff
organizations’ individual members did not have standing to sue in their own right,
(3) the organizations did not suffer any “organizational” injury, and (4) plaintiffs
were not “aggrieved” under the local zoning ordinance.
¶2 Plaintiffs, Humane Farming Association (HFA), Showing Animals Respect and
Kindness (SHARK), and Steve Hindi, were appalled by the treatment of animals they observed at
certain Boone County “Mexican Rodeos.” They brought their grievances to the local zoning
officer, urging him to stop granting temporary use permits (TUPs) to event organizers who
mistreated animals. When the zoning officer continued granting the permits, plaintiffs attempted
to appeal the officer’s decisions to the Boone County Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning Board),
but the Zoning Board refused to hear their appeals. Plaintiffs sued the Boone County Board, the
Boone County Building and Zoning Department, and the Zoning Board in the circuit court of
Boone County. The court dismissed their amended complaint for lack of standing.
¶3 Plaintiffs appeal, arguing defendants’ refusal to hear their appeal injured their
legally cognizable rights or interests, and the trial court erred by dismissing their amended
complaint.
¶4 We affirm.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 Because plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West
2024)) based on lack of standing, we take as true all well-pleaded allegations in plaintiffs’ amended
complaint. See Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass’n v. County of Cook, 2022 IL 127126,
¶ 12.
¶7 A. Coleadero
¶8 According to plaintiffs, for years, Boone County has hosted “charreadas”—
traditional Mexican equestrian competitions, similar in some ways to American rodeos. Each
charreada involves a series of separate events, including the “coleadero.” In the coleadero, a
competitor on horseback chases a bull around an arena, with the goal of catching the bull by the
tail. Once he catches the bull, the competitor tries to drag the bull to the ground by wrapping the
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bull’s tail around the competitor’s leg. Plaintiffs claim that the Mexican Federation of Charrería
publishes rules and regulations for charreadas, including the requirement that animals “shall be
treated humanely and with respect by each and every federated member.” These rules also prohibit
the use of injured or physically impaired animals.
¶9 B. Boone County Zoning Ordinances
¶ 10 Boone County, through the Zoning Board, has adopted ordinances governing the
use of buildings, structures, and land. See Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 1.1 (eff. May 20,
2009). “Zoning enforcement officers” enforce those ordinances. See Boone County Zoning
Ordinance § 2.2.1 (eff. July 9, 2008). The ordinances provide for TUPs for “certain transitory or
seasonal uses.” Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 4.2.1 (eff. July 20, 2011). Applications for
TUPs must be submitted to the zoning officer “at least 14 days before the commencement of the
temporary use,” and the “zoning enforcement officer is authorized to issue a permit” if the
proposed use satisfies the ordinances’ requirements. Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 4.2.2 (eff.
June 9, 2022). The ordinances also provide:
“The zoning enforcement officer shall issue a [TUP] only if the following
conditions have been met:
***
D. All conditions specified in the specific regulations of this section are met;
***
F. The zoning enforcement officer shall have the authority to deny a [TUP]
if the applicant has a demonstrated and documented failure to comply with the
regulations of a similar previously granted temporary use. The zoning enforcement
officer reserves the right to deny the issuance of the [TUP] for a specified time,
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based on non-compliance with section 4.2.” Boone County Zoning Ordinance
§ 4.2.6 (eff. June 9, 2022).
¶ 11 Section 4.2.3(A)(1) regulates any “Animal Show/Rodeo.” In early 2023, section
4.2.3(A)(1)(b) required compliance with any rules promulgated by “the Mexican Federation of
[Charrería] or any other appropriate regulatory authority for animal shows/rodeos.” Boone County
Zoning Ordinance § 4.2.3(A)(l)(b) (eff. June 9, 2022). The ordinances also stated:
“a. Prohibited activities: Horse poling or tripping, horse tailing, and horse
heeling are prohibited. All rodeos and charreadas must comply with the laws of the
State of Illinois. Events that cause the intentional harm of an animal or are in
violation of the Animal Welfare Act (225 ILCS 605) and the Illinois Humane Care
for Animal Act (510 ILCS 70) are also prohibited.” Boone County Zoning
Ordinance § 4.2.3(A)(l)(a) (eff. June 9, 2022).
These ordinances were amended in March 2024, and Boone County no longer prohibits “events
that cause the intentional harm of an animal” in violation of Illinois law. Boone County Zoning
Ordinance § 4.2.3(A)(1)(a) (eff. March 22, 2024).
¶ 12 Finally, section 2.9 governs appeals of zoning officer decisions. Section 2.9.1
states:
“An appeal to the zoning board of appeals may be made by any person, firm,
or corporation, or by any office, department, board, or bureau aggrieved by a
decision of the zoning enforcement officer under this ordinance in accordance with
Illinois Compiled Statutes” Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 2.9.1 (eff. July 9,
2008).
Section 2.9.3 provides that an “appeal stays all the proceedings in furtherance of the action
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appealed from.” Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 2.9.3 (eff. July 9, 2008). Section 2.9.4 states,
“The zoning board of appeals shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of the appeal and give due
notice thereof to the parties and decide the same within a reasonable time.” Boone County Zoning
Ordinance § 2.9.4 (eff. July 9, 2008).
¶ 13 C. Plaintiffs
¶ 14 HFA is a nonprofit organization headquartered in California. According to the
amended complaint, they “work to protect farm animals through groundbreaking legislation, anti-
cruelty investigations, legal action, and direct care for abused animals. In advance of its
organizational mission to protect farm animals, and separate from this lawsuit, HFA has expended
organizational resources to counteract animal cruelty at rodeo events.” SHARK, another nonprofit
organization, is located in Geneva, Illinois. Their aim is to address “animal abuse whenever and
wherever possible.” According to the amended complaint, they have “worked tirelessly to
document the animal abuse and cruelty that occurs at modern animal rodeos throughout Illinois,
and nationwide.” Hindi is SHARK’s founder and president. He has attended many Boone County
rodeo events. He is “deeply affected by the animal cruelty he witnesses at these events and suffers
physical manifestations of the emotional distress he experiences during the events and in the days
following similar to the symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.”
¶ 15 D. Plaintiffs’ Advocacy Efforts
¶ 16 Plaintiffs claim they have attended Boone County charreadas for years,
“documenting the extensive animal cruelty on display at these Animals Shows.” For example, they
allege they have observed bulls dragged to the ground so forcefully that their horns, backs, or legs
are broken. Further, they allege that competitors continued chasing and wrestling these injured
cattle. Additionally, according to plaintiffs, the competitors sometimes “deglov[e]” the cattle,
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“ripping the entire skin sheath and skirt/mane off of animals’ tails as the animals are thrown to the
ground.” Plaintiffs add, “In some cases, La Charreada riders wave the tail remnants in the air as a
sign of victory.” Plaintiffs have campaigned against Boone County’s charreadas by sending
personnel and drones to observe and document this alleged cruelty to animals and by speaking at
meetings of the Boone County Board to educate elected officials.
¶ 17 As part of their campaign, on March 6, 2023, plaintiffs sent a letter to defendants
asking that they stop issuing TUPs for any events featuring “Mexican Rodeos,” or coleaderos.
They argued that section 4.2.3(A)(1)(a) and (b) of the Boone County zoning ordinances prohibited
animal cruelty, Boone County coleadero event operators violated this ordinance, and defendants
should deny any further TUPs for such events. Plaintiffs also stated they intended to appeal any
TUPs issued for charreadas to the Zoning Board.
¶ 18 On March 31, 2023, an event organizer applied for a TUP for a “Mexican Rodeo”
that would take place on April 15, 2023. Plaintiffs sent defendants a letter opposing the TUP,
claiming they had documented animal cruelty at a previous event at the same location as the
proposed April 15 event. Plaintiffs repeatedly contacted defendants, seeking confirmation that the
TUP had been issued so they could appeal to the Zoning Board. Defendants did not respond to
plaintiffs’ requests.
¶ 19 On April 14, 2023, plaintiffs, assuming that the zoning officer granted or would
grant the TUP, submitted an appeal of the presumed decision by e-mail. The event took place on
April 15, 2023. On April 17, defendants’ attorney informed plaintiffs that the TUP was approved
at around 9 p.m. on April 14, 2023, through defendants’ “Cloud Permitting software,” and, at the
time plaintiffs submitted their appeal, there was not yet any TUP for plaintiffs to appeal. On May
4, 2023, plaintiffs attempted to appeal again. Initially, defendants scheduled a hearing on the TUP
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for May 23, 2023. The hearing was then continued until June 27, 2023.
¶ 20 Meanwhile, plaintiffs learned of another application for a TUP for a “rodeo event”
scheduled for June 10, 2023. Plaintiffs again sent defendants a letter opposing the application.
Defendants did not respond to plaintiffs’ letter, and plaintiffs submitted a “presumptive appeal” on
June 8, 2023. Defendants responded that the Zoning Board could not provide any remedy, and the
appeal was dismissed as moot. Defendants also canceled the hearing for June 27, 2023. Plaintiffs
made further efforts to appeal the decision, which defendants also refused.
¶ 21 In August 2023, HFA and SHARK filed a four-count complaint in trial court. First,
they sought a writ of mandamus ordering defendants to comply with Boone County Zoning
Ordinance section 2.9.1, which allows appeals to the Zoning Board by any “aggrieved” person.
Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 2.9.1 (eff. July 9, 2008). Second, they sought a writ of
mandamus ordering defendants to comply with the ordinances’ prohibition on events that cause
intentional harm to animals. See Boone County Zoning Ordinance § 4.2.3(A)(l)(a) (eff. June 9,
2022). Specifically, HFA and SHARK asked the court to order defendants to deny TUPs to any
event operators proven to have caused the intentional harm of animals or to have violated the
Animal Welfare Act (225 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 2022)) or the Humane Care for Animals Act
(510 ILCS 70/1 et seq. (West 2022)). Third, they sought administrative review of defendants’
decisions to issue TUPs for the events on April 15, 2023, and June 10, 2023. Fourth, they asked
for declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order compelling defendants to comply with
the zoning ordinances’ appeals process.
¶ 22 Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-619.1 (West 2024)). The trial court granted defendants’ motion, finding that HFA and SHARK
lacked standing. The court reasoned that neither organization had any legal interest in the animals
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at these events. They also were not parties to the administrative proceedings before the Zoning
Board. Although HFA and SHARK claimed they were injured by seeing the animals mistreated,
state and local law permitted the rodeos, so the court could not grant any relief that would address
this alleged harm. Furthermore, HFA and SHARK had not shown that “their ability to provide
services or their operations” would be affected by defendants’ actions. The court allowed plaintiffs
leave to replead.
¶ 23 Plaintiffs then filed the amended complaint that provides the basis for this appeal.
This amended complaint added Hindi as a plaintiff and detailed his distress resulting from Boone
County’s charreadas and defendants’ actions, but it otherwise asserted the same claims and sought
the same relief as the first complaint.
¶ 24 Defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing. The
trial court agreed. It found the amended complaint did not remedy the problems that resulted in
the dismissal of the previous complaint. It added that an “aggrieved party would be the party that’s
applied for the permit, not a general member of the public who went to one of the rodeos.” The
court concluded that HFA, SHARK, and Hindi all lacked standing, so it dismissed the amended
complaint.
¶ 25 This appeal followed.
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
the amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code,
which allows a defendant to seek dismissal under both section 2-615 (id. § 2-615) and section 2-
619 (id. § 2-619). “A section 2-615 motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the nonmovants’ claim
whereas a section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of their claim but asserts affirmative
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defenses or other matters that avoid or defeat it.” Grassroots Collaborative v. City of Chicago,
2020 IL App (1st) 192099, ¶ 21.
¶ 28 The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint based on their lack of
standing. “Lack of standing is an ‘affirmative matter’ that is properly raised under section 2–
619(a)(9).” Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999). “Because it is an affirmative
defense, it is defendant’s burden to plead and prove lack of standing.” Illinois Road &
Transportation Builders Ass’n, 2022 IL 127126, ¶ 12. When considering a motion to dismiss for
lack of standing, the court should accept all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint as true
and make reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Our review is de novo.
Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 220.
¶ 29 Generally, plaintiffs have standing if they suffered some injury in fact to a legally
cognizable interest. Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass’n, 2022 IL 127126, ¶ 13. “The
claimed injury may be actual or threatened, and it must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly
traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by
the grant of the requested relief.” Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221 (citing Greer v. Illinois Housing
Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93 (1988)).
¶ 30 Plaintiffs here seek relief in the form of direct administrative review of an agency’s
action, mandamus, an injunction, and declaratory relief. Although slightly different standing rules
apply to each form of relief, all require a plaintiff to have suffered some injury to a recognized
right or interest. See Cedarhurst of Bethalto Real Estate, LLC v. Village of Bethalto, 2018 IL App
(5th) 170309, ¶¶ 21-33. Administrative review is available only “to parties of record before the
administrative agencies and then only when their rights, duties or privileges are adversely affected
by the decision.” Board of Education of Roxana Community School District No. 1 v. Pollution
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Control Board, 2013 IL 115473, ¶ 20. To seek a writ of mandamus, a party must have a
“sufficiently protectable interest pursuant to statute or common law which is alleged to be injured.”
Hill v. Butler, 107 Ill. App. 3d 721, 725 (1982); see Cedarhurst, 2018 IL App (5th) 170309, ¶ 31.
“A court will only grant mandamus if the plaintiff has established: (1) a clear, affirmative right to
relief; (2) a clear duty of the public officer to act; and (3) clear authority in the public officer to
comply.” McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 16. A party seeking an injunction must
“establish that he has a clearly ascertainable right or interest which needs protection. Generally,
the doctrine of standing makes it necessary for a party seeking such relief to allege an injury in
fact to some substantive interest he possesses which is recognized by statute or common law.”
Village of Lake in the Hills v. Laidlaw Waste System, Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 285, 292 (1986). For
declaratory relief, “there must be an actual controversy between adverse parties, with the party
requesting the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right which is capable of
being affected by the grant of such relief.” Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493.
¶ 31 For all four forms of relief, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to allege any
injury to a legally cognizable right or interest. Plaintiffs own no real estate affected by defendants’
implementation of the zoning ordinances. According to defendants, plaintiffs were not parties of
record before the administrative agency. See Board of Education of Roxana Community School
District No. 1, 2013 IL 115473, ¶ 20. The trial court agreed. It also found that neither HFA nor
SHARK had any legal interest in the mistreated animals and neither showed that the TUPs affected
“their ability to provide services or their operations.” Defendants ask us to affirm the trial court’s
findings that plaintiffs have suffered no injury and that they lack standing under all four counts.
¶ 32 Plaintiffs respond that defendants should have recognized them as parties to the
administrative proceedings. For counts I, III, and IV, plaintiffs insist that they had a right to appeal
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the zoning officer’s issuance of the TUPs to the Zoning Board and that defendants denied them
this procedural right and otherwise failed to comply with the ordinances’ appeals procedures. For
count II, plaintiffs rely on aesthetic, associational, and organizational interests to establish
standing.
¶ 33 A. Right to Appeal a TUP
¶ 34 Before turning to plaintiffs’ claims of aesthetic, associational, and organizational
interests, we consider whether Boone County’s municipal ordinances guaranteed plaintiffs a right
to appeal the zoning officer’s decisions. “Municipal ordinances, such as the zoning ordinance at
issue here, are interpreted under the general rules of statutory construction and interpretation.”
Platform I Shore, LLC v. Village of Lincolnwood, 2014 IL App (1st) 133923, ¶ 10. Our aim is “to
determine the legislative intent, which is best indicated by the statutory language, given its plain
and ordinary meaning.” Id. If “a statutory term is not defined, we assume the legislature intended
for it to have its popularly understood meaning. Likewise, if a term has a settled legal meaning,
the courts will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate that established meaning
into the law.” Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 29. The proper
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Michigan Avenue
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000).
¶ 35 Section 2.9.1 of Boone County’s zoning ordinances states:
“An appeal to the zoning board of appeals may be made by any person, firm,
or corporation, or by any office, department, board, or bureau aggrieved by a
decision of the zoning enforcement officer under this ordinance in accordance with
Illinois Compiled Statutes and the following:” (Emphasis added.) Boone County
Zoning Ordinance § 2.9.1 (eff. July 9, 2008).
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Thus, whether plaintiffs had a right to appeal turns on whether they qualify as “aggrieved” under
the ordinance. The zoning ordinances do not define the term “aggrieved,” so we consider whether
the term has any “settled legal meaning.” See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 29.
¶ 36 We begin with our supreme court’s decision in Rosenbach. There, the court
considered section 20 of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) (740 ILCS 14/20 (West
2016)), which provided a private right of action to “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation” of the
statute’s restrictions on the use of “biometric identifiers and information,” such as fingerprints or
retina scans. See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 19-21. Because BIPA did not define “aggrieved,”
the court considered the term’s “popularly understood” and “settled legal” meaning. Id. ¶ 29. The
court defined “aggrieved” as “ ‘having a substantial grievance; a denial of some personal or
property right.’ ” Id. ¶ 30 (quoting Glos v. People, 259 Ill. 2d 332, 340 (1913)). The court added
that “ ‘[a] person is prejudiced or aggrieved, in the legal sense, when a legal right is invaded by
the act complained of or his pecuniary interest is directly affected by the decree or judgment.’ ”
(Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting Glos, 259 Ill. 2d at 340). The Rosenbach court determined that
BIPA “codified that individuals possess a right to privacy in and control over their biometric
identifiers and biometric information,” and any violation of that right qualified an individual as
“aggrieved.” Id. ¶ 33. “No additional consequences need be pleaded or proved.” Id.
¶ 37 We also take guidance from our recent decision in Rylatt v. Christensen, 2025 IL
App (4th) 240032-U. There, four plaintiffs tried to appeal a decision by a Rockford zoning officer
finding a new “Rockford Family Planning Center” exempt from certain zoning requirements. The
Zoning Board of Appeals found the plaintiffs lacked standing under the local ordinance, which
stated, “ ‘An appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals may be taken by any person aggrieved or by
any officer, department, board or bureau of the City.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 57 (quoting
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Rockford Zoning Ordinance § 66-001 (eff. Apr. 3, 2008)). When reviewing this decision, we
observed:
“This ordinance mirrors section 11-13-12 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/11-13-12 (West 2022)) (‘An appeal to the board of appeals by any person
aggrieved or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality.’). A
person’s standing to appeal a zoning decision in Rockford thus turns on whether he
has been ‘aggrieved’—a term left undefined by the local ordinance and state statute.
So we look to the common law.” Id.
We interpreted the term “aggrieved” using Illinois case law on standing, which required that “ ‘the
plaintiff is not merely curious or concerned about the outcome, but possesses some personal claim,
status or right, a distinct and palpable injury which is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct
and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of such relief.’ ” Id. ¶ 58 (quoting
Westwood Forum, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 261 Ill. App. 3d 911, 921 (1994)). We determined
that two of the plaintiffs had not shown “any injury to a legally cognizable interest.” Id. ¶ 70. The
remaining two plaintiffs alleged the zoning officer’s determination would negatively affect their
property value and quiet enjoyment of their property. Id. ¶ 71. We found those alleged injuries
sufficient to establish standing under Illinois law and therefore sufficient to show these two
plaintiffs were “aggrieved” under the zoning ordinance. Id. ¶ 83.
¶ 38 We interpret the zoning ordinance at issue here in light of Rosenbach, Rylatt, and
Illinois common law, and we conclude that plaintiffs were “aggrieved” if the zoning officers’
decisions injured their rights or legally cognizable interests. See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 29;
see also Rylatt, 2025 IL App (4th) 240032-U, ¶ 70.
¶ 39 Plaintiffs claim that they “qualify as aggrieved parties because they suffer[ed]
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cognizable injuries to their aesthetic interests, associational interests, and organizational
missions.” That is, plaintiffs claim they are “aggrieved” based on the same injuries they relied on
for their mandamus claim in count II. If plaintiffs suffered such an injury, then they were
“aggrieved” persons entitled to appeal the TUPs, and the Zoning Board further injured them if it
failed to respect their appeal rights. If, however, plaintiffs were not “aggrieved,” they had no right
to appeal the TUPs, and the Zoning Board did not injure them by refusing to allow their appeal.
¶ 40 This leaves us to consider whether plaintiffs suffered any injury to a “legally
cognizable interest” that could both qualify them as “aggrieved,” with a right to appeal the TUPs,
as asserted in counts I, III, and IV, and provide standing to file their claim in count II with the trial
court.
¶ 41 B. Aesthetic Injury
¶ 42 First, plaintiffs allege that Hindi suffered “aesthetic injury.” According to the
amended complaint, Hindi has spent many hours personally advocating for the animals at the
Boone County events, and he “is deeply affected by the animal cruelty he witnesses” there. He
likens the “physical manifestations of the emotional distress” he experienced to post-traumatic
stress disorder. He has “been hospitalized due to the stress and frustration resulting from
witnessing animal cruelty at La Charreada events.”
¶ 43 Plaintiffs rely on a series of federal cases to show that “aesthetic injury” based on
cruelty to animals can confer standing. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court reasoned, “Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic
well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.” In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
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U.S. 555, 563 (1992), the Court found that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even
for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” Plaintiffs
particularly highlight Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (1998). There, the
plaintiffs alleged they suffered aesthetic injury after viewing primates living in inhumane
conditions. Id. at 431-32. Based on this injury, the federal circuit court of appeals found the
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Department of Agriculture’s regulations permitting those
conditions. Id. at 432-437.
¶ 44 Although Illinois courts “tend to find federal law persuasive on the issue of
standing, we are not bound to follow it.” Grassroots Collaborative, 2020 IL App (1st) 192099,
¶ 23; see Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 574. Unlike federal courts, Illinois courts have not found “aesthetic
injury” sufficient for standing. In Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois v. City of Chicago,
125 Ill. 2d 164 (1988), three organizations dedicated to preserving and appreciating significant
architecture sued the City of Chicago, challenging the City of Chicago’s efforts to decertify the
façades of the McCarthy Building as a landmark. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the
supreme court affirmed. It found that at least two of the organizations’ “only interest appears to be
the ability to view this private property from a public street.” Id. at 175. These organizations did
not suffer an injury to any legally cognizable interest because “aesthetic interests, while not to be
disregarded, are not controlling on the question of standing.” Id.; see Harris Trust & Savings Bank
v. Duggan, 95 Ill. 2d 516, 525 (1983); see also Penrod Premium Consignment Cigars Ltd. v. City
of Chicago, 2023 IL App (1st) 221330-U, ¶ 36 (finding that a business did not have standing to
challenge a landmark commission’s decision permitting the construction of a screen wall on a
privately owned building in a landmark district because “[t]The Illinois Supreme Court has
squarely rejected appearance-based concerns as a basis for standing”).
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¶ 45 Our supreme court’s decision in Glisson is also instructive. There, the City of
Marion planned to construct a dam and reservoir on Sugar Creek, in Williamson and Johnson
Counties. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 214. Joseph Glisson, the plaintiff, was a “naturalist” who used
Sugar Creek for “ ‘food gathering, recreation, spiritual, and educational activities.’ ” Id. at 217. He
sued the City of Marion and its mayor, claiming that the construction would destroy the natural
habitat of two endangered species, the least brook lamprey and the Indiana crayfish, and he would
suffer “ ‘intense harm’ ” from the destruction of the species’ habitat. Id. The supreme court found
that Glisson lacked standing because “a party cannot gain standing merely through a self-
proclaimed interest or concern about an issue, no matter how sincere.” Id. at 231 (citing
Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 175).
¶ 46 We find plaintiffs’ alleged aesthetic injury does not provide standing. Landmarks
clearly states that aesthetic injury, alone, is not sufficient. Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 175.
Admittedly, Landmarks considered the plaintiffs’ “aesthetic interests” in viewing a building in
downtown Chicago, rather than in viewing animals free from exploitation. Id. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs cite no contrary Illinois cases recognizing any aesthetic injury at all as a basis for
standing. Furthermore, although Glisson does not discuss aesthetic injury, we see little difference
between plaintiffs’ allegations here and the alleged injury in Glisson. Certainly, plaintiffs here
provide more specific details describing the emotional distress Hindi suffered than the Glisson
plaintiff provided. Nevertheless, just as in Glisson, plaintiffs’ sincere interest in or concern for
animal welfare does not confer standing. See Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 231. Therefore, we find that
plaintiffs’ aesthetic interest is not a “legally cognizable interest.” Illinois Road. & Transportation
Builders Ass’n, 2022 IL 127126, ¶ 13.
¶ 47 C. Associational Standing
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¶ 48 Plaintiffs next rely on associational standing. Through the doctrine of associational
standing, “an organization may assert the legal rights of its members in certain circumstances.”
Winnebago County Citizens for Controlled Growth v. County of Winnebago, 383 Ill. App. 3d 735,
740 (2008). An organization has associational standing if “ ‘(a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’ ” International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 148, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 47 (2005)
(quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
¶ 49 To show that their “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right,” HFA and SHARK rely on the “intense emotional and aesthetic injury” suffered by their
members, including Hindi, resulting from the cruel treatment of animals at charreadas. In addition
to the allegations of Hindi’s distress, the amended complaint alleges that HFA’s and SHARK’s
other members and staff also “have a deep respect for animals,” and “seeing animals suffer at
La Charreada events, repeatedly, has a profound emotional impact.” Their members are further
distressed by defendants’ issuance of TUPs and refusal to hear their appeals of those TUPs.
¶ 50 As indicated above, under Illinois law, aesthetic interests are not “legally
cognizable” for standing. Nor is sincere concern for an issue. See Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 231.
Because Illinois law does not recognize these alleged injuries, plaintiffs also have not established
that their individual members were “aggrieved” under the zoning ordinance, so they had no right
to appeal the zoning officer’s decisions to the Zoning Board. HFA and SHARK have not shown
that their individual members have standing to sue in their own right, so their associational standing
claim fails.
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¶ 51 D. Organizational Standing
¶ 52 Finally, HFA and SHARK rely on organizational standing. They allege that they
suffered distinct injuries as organizations, apart from any harm to their individual members.
Specifically, they allege they expended resources investigating charreadas that received TUPs and
challenging defendants’ issuance of those TUPs. For example, they sent people and drones to
observe charreadas and document the treatment of animals there. They further allege that
defendants’ conduct caused them to narrow their focus, preventing them from deploying resources,
like personnel and drones, to advance their core mission. But for defendants’ actions, HFA and
SHARK would have “direct[ed] services toward providing care and sanctuary to farmed animals,
conducting anti-cruelty investigations, and crafting legislation to halt cruelty in the farming
industry, rather than devoting significant time and energy to this one county in Illinois.”
¶ 53 The foundational federal case for organizational standing is Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). There, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), an
organization whose “activities included the operation of a housing counseling service, and the
investigation and referral of complaints concerning housing discrimination,” sued Havens Realty
Corp. (Havens), the owner of two apartment complexes, and an employee of Havens. Id. at 368.
HOME alleged that Havens violated the federal Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3604 et seq. (1976))
by falsely telling Black applicants that they had no available apartments. Havens, 455 U.S. at 368.
HOME alleged, “ ‘Plaintiff HOME has been frustrated by defendants’ racial steering practices in
its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services. Plaintiff
HOME has had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic]
racially discriminatory steering practices.’ ” Id. at 379. The United States Supreme Court found
this sufficient for standing, reasoning:
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“If, as broadly alleged, [Havens’s] steering practices have perceptibly impaired
HOME’s ability to provide counseling and referral services for low-and moderate-
income homeseekers, there can be no question that the organization has suffered
injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s
activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes
far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Id.
¶ 54 Recently, the Court clarified Havens. In Food & Drug Administration v. Alliance
for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), pro-life doctors and medical associations sued the
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), challenging changes to FDA regulations that made
the abortion drug mifepristone easier to obtain. The associations claimed they had “standing not
based on their mere disagreement with FDA’s policies, but based on their incurring costs to oppose
FDA’s actions.” Id. at 394. These costs included conducting their own studies on mifepristone,
drafting citizen petitions to the FDA, and other advocacy efforts. Id.
¶ 55 The Court held that the medical associations had not alleged sufficient injury to
confer standing. It reasoned that “an organization that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by
a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather
information and advocate against the defendant’s action. An organization cannot manufacture its
own standing in that way.” Id. The Court clarified that, under Havens, a plaintiff’s diversion of
resources in response to the defendant’s actions is not sufficient injury for standing. Id. at 395.
Instead, in Havens, “[c]ritically, HOME not only was an issue-advocacy organization, but also
operated a housing counseling service.” Id. Because Havens’s illegal racial steering impaired
HOME’s counseling and referral services, “Havens’s actions directly affected and interfered with
HOME’s core business activities—not dissimilar to a retailer who sues a manufacturer for selling
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defective goods to the retailer.” Id. The Court cautioned, “Havens was an unusual case, and this
Court has been careful not to extend the Havens holding beyond its context.” Id. at 396.
¶ 56 As stated above, Illinois courts treat federal precedents on standing as merely
persuasive, not controlling. See Grassroots Collaborative, 2020 IL App (1st) 192099, ¶ 23. Few
Illinois cases have directly addressed Havens and organizational standing, but
Grassroots Collaborative is a notable exception. There, two nonprofit organizations sued the City
of Chicago, claiming that the City of Chicago administered its tax policies in a racially and
ethnically discriminatory way by illegally directing funds to predominately White neighborhoods
and depriving predominately Black and Hispanic neighborhoods of the opportunity for economic
development. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. In response to the City of Chicago’s policy, the nonprofit organizations
prepared a report on the policy, organized various community events, presented testimony at
Chicago Board of Education meetings, and engaged in other advocacy efforts, at the expense of
other projects. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. They claimed “the frustration of their missions and diversion of their
resources to counteract that frustration” were injuries to their legally cognizable interests. Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 57 The trial court dismissed their complaint for lack of standing, and the appellate
court affirmed. The appellate court found that “frustration of mission and diversion of resources”
did not constitute injuries sufficient for standing. Id. ¶ 25. Interpreting Havens, the appellate court
reasoned:
“[A]n organization is injured for purposes of standing when the provision of its
services or the performance of its activities is impaired by the defendant’s actions.
Although the drain on or diversion of resources that may accompany that
impairment might compose a portion of the organization’s injury, we see no basis
in Havens to conclude that it alone qualifies as an injury sufficient to confer
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standing on an organization.” Id. ¶ 28.
The court found that the plaintiffs “made no allegations that they have suffered any impairment to
the provision of their services or the performance of their daily operations.” Id. ¶ 32. Even if the
City of Chicago’s conduct caused the plaintiffs to shift the target of their advocacy efforts, “the
fact that plaintiffs reallocated their resources to counter the effects of the City of Chicago’s actions
does not represent a palpable and distinct injury.” Id. ¶ 36.
¶ 58 Considering Havens, Alliance, and Grassroots Collaborative, we find that plaintiffs
have not alleged sufficient injury for organizational standing. Because their work consists of
investigating, litigating, and “crafting legislation” to prevent cruelty to animals, HFA’s and
SHARK’s activities are more similar to the “issue-advocacy” in Alliance than the referrals and
counseling in Havens. See Alliance, 602 U.S. at 396. Frustration of their advocacy efforts does not
constitute an injury. See Grassroots Collaborative, 2020 IL App (1st) 192099, ¶ 25.
¶ 59 Indeed, HFA and SHARK have not alleged that defendants impaired their
“services” or their daily operations. See id. ¶ 28. Although HFA and SHARK have cursorily
alleged that they provide direct care for animals, they have not connected that care to Boone
County’s zoning ordinances or charreadas, except by alleging they diverted resources from their
care for other animals to their advocacy efforts at issue here. They have not alleged, for example,
that they provide emergency veterinary care for animals in Boone County, and this service is
burdened by widespread animal abuse at events authorized by TUPs. Instead, they allege only that
defendants caused them to devote more resources to issue-advocacy in Boone County instead of
engaging in other activities.
¶ 60 This diversion of resources does not confer standing. See id. As the United States
Supreme Court said in Alliance, an organization cannot acquire standing “simply by expending
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money to gather information and advocate against the defendant’s action.” See Alliance, 602 U.S.
at 394.
¶ 61 Plaintiffs cite Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2019).
There, the Indiana legislature passed Senate Enrolled Act 442 (Act 442) (2017 Ind. Acts 280 (eff.
July 1, 2017) (amending Ind. Code § 3-7-38.2-5(d)-(e)), a statute aimed at purging the state’s voter
rolls of individuals suspected of being ineligible to vote. Common Cause, 937 F.3d at 948. Three
“voter-advocacy organizations” sued, arguing that Act 442 violated the National Voter
Registration Act (52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-11 (West 2018)). Common Cause, 937 F.3d at 949. Two
federal district courts granted the organizations preliminary injunctions that stopped Act 442 from
taking effect. Id. In upholding the injunctions, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged organizational standing. The court explained that each of the
plaintiff organizations “advocates for voter access, conducts voter education to promote voter
access, helps voters overcome any challenges they face trying to vote, and helps voters register to
vote (or re-register if needed).” Id. at 951. The court reasoned that if Act 442 took effect, the
organizations would
“be required to increase the time or funds (or both) spent on certain activities to
alleviate potentially harmful effects of Act 442, such as voter confusion, erroneous
registration removal, and chaos at the polling place; and their missions will be
thwarted, because even with those extra efforts, confusion around Act 442 and the
need to combat it will displace other projects they normally undertake.” Id. at 952.
¶ 62 The defendant argued that Act 442 simply prompted the plaintiffs to do the same
kind of work they normally did, and this was not sufficient injury for standing. Id. at 953. The
court rejected this argument. First, the court found that Act 442 caused the organizations to
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“undertake the extra efforts they describe and cease other activities. By adding to their workload,
Act 442 costs them time and money they would have spent differently or not spent at all.” Id. at
954. Second, the court reasoned that although an organization “cannot convert[ ] ordinary program
costs into an injury in fact,” an organization has suffered an injury if the challenged conduct
imposed additional or new burdens, the disruption to the organization was real, and its response
was warranted. Id. at 955 (quoting National Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428,
1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Finally, the court reasoned that Act 442 caused the injury, even if the
plaintiffs chose how to allocate their resources, because the organizations’ actions “were
undertaken because of the challenged law.” Id. at 956.
¶ 63 The court acknowledged that “abstract disagreement” with a public policy was not
an injury. Id. It explained:
“We have no problem ruling out standing for lobbying efforts in Indiana’s
legislature, but that is not the activity on which the Organizations are relying. In
‘helping others contend’ with or prepare for Act 442, the Organizations perform
concrete work, voter-by-voter, polling place by polling place. Act 442 created the
problem, and so causation exists.” Id.
Because the injunctions would counteract the problem that necessitated this work, the
organizations had standing to sue. Id.
¶ 64 Common Cause does not change our analysis. First, as a federal case,
Common Cause is not controlling here. See Grassroots Collaborative, 2020 IL App (1st) 192099,
¶ 23. Second, the Common Cause court focused on the organizations’ work “ ‘helping others
contend’ with or prepare for Act 442.” Common Cause, 937 F.3d at 956. By, for example, helping
to reregister voters wrongfully removed from the voter rolls, the Common Cause plaintiffs
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provided a discrete service to individual clients, like the counseling and referral services in Havens,
and this service was distinct from any policy advocacy. HFA and SHARK do not allege they
provided any clients with any services that helped them contend with the TUPs or charreadas.
Although they advocated for the well-being of the animals at the Boone County events, this
advocacy is more comparable to the lobbying efforts that Common Cause found were insufficient
for standing than to the voter registration work. See id. Finally, to the extent that plaintiffs cite
Common Cause to show that diversion of resources is a basis for standing, we note that
Common Cause predates Alliance, which clearly rejected diversion of resources as an injury that
confers standing. See Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395.
¶ 65 Even if HFA and SHARK diverted resources away from other work to their
advocacy against the charreadas and defendants’ zoning decisions, we hold this diversion of
resources does not constitute organizational injury.
¶ 66 Plaintiffs’ claims of aesthetic injury, associational standing, and organizational
standing fail. Therefore, they were not “aggrieved” persons under Boone County’s zoning
ordinances, and they had no right to appeal the zoning officer’s decisions. Plaintiffs have not
alleged any injury to a legally cognizable interest, so they lack standing. See Illinois Road &
Transportation Builders Ass’n, 2022 IL 127126, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of the amended complaint.
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 69 Affirmed.
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