Montgomery, Jr. - Adams-II v. Anderson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CINDY ADAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2432

CONSUELLEO ANDERSON, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendants Eastern State Hospital (“ESH”) and Dr.

Joanna Gratton’s motion to dismiss.1 Plaintiff opposed the motion.2 For the

following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a series of disjointed events that occurred

throughout plaintiff’s life.3 Plaintiff Cindy Adams initially filed a complaint

in this Court pro se in October 2024,4 and retained counsel in December

2024. Counsel filed a first amended complaint in January 2025, in which

plaintiff alleged causes of action against nineteen named defendants, as well

1 R. Doc. 107.

2 R. Doc. 117.

3 R. Doc. 11.

4 R. Doc. 1.

as Does 1 through 20 and six unknown insurance companies.5 The complaint

asserted claims for a range of disconnected conduct dating back to 2002.6

Prior to their motion, the Clerk entered default for these two

defendants.7 Two defendants named in the suit, ESH and Dr. Joanna

Gratton, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),

12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6).8

The Court considers the motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Personal jurisdiction “is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a

district court, without which it is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (internal citation

omitted). When a nonresident defendant moves the court to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden to

show that personal jurisdiction exists. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185,

1192 (5th Cir. 1985). When the court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in the

present case, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing.

5 R. Doc. 11.

6 Id.

7 R. Docs. 75 & 76.

8 R. Doc. 107.

Godhra v. United States Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999).

The allegations of the complaint, except as controverted by opposing

affidavits, must be taken as true, and all conflicts in the facts must be

resolved in favor of plaintiffs. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d

1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985).

A court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if

(1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that

defendant, and (2) the forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction complies with

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Latshaw v. Johnson,

167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). Because Louisiana’s long-arm statute, La.

Rev. Stat. § 13:3201, et seq., extends jurisdiction to the full limits of due

process, the Court’s focus is solely on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction

in this case satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc.

v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing La. Rev. Stat.

§ 13:3201(B)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself

of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum

contacts” with that state, and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the

defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wa., 326 U.S. 310,

316 (1945)).

There are two ways to establish minimum contacts: specific

jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th

Cir. 1994). General jurisdiction will attach, even if the act or transaction sued

upon is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, if the

defendant has engaged in “continuous and systematic” activities in the forum

state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415

(1984); Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. Contacts between a defendant and the forum

state must be “extensive” to satisfy the “continuous and systematic” test.

Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419

(5th Cir. 2001); see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131

S.Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation

it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at

home.”).

Specific jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant “has

purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results

from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Panda

Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir.

2001); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. Minimum contacts may be

established by actions, or even just a single act, by the nonresident defendant

that “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).

“When the cause of action relates to the defendant’s contact with the

forum, the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement is satisfied, and ‘specific’

jurisdiction is proper, so long as that contact resulted from the defendant’s

purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activity of the plaintiff.” Bearry v.

Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Hanson v.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The unilateral activity of those who

claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the

requirement of contact with the forum State.”). This restriction on the

minimum contacts inquiry ensures that the defendant “purposefully availed”

itself of the benefits of the forum state such that it could “reasonably

anticipate being haled into court there.” Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB,

205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474);

see also Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff did not indicate how the Court has personal jurisdiction over

each defendant individually; rather, she made one declaration that applied

to all defendants generally. In her amended complaint, plaintiff stated that

the Court has personal jurisdiction over all defendants because they are

“domiciled in the District, have transacted business in this District, and/or

because the Defendants have committed various acts proscribed by law in

this District.”9 In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues

that the effects test permits jurisdiction where out of state conduct results in

serious and intended harm within Louisiana.10

Plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing that ESH and Dr. Gratton

are subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana. ESH is not subject to

general jurisdiction because, as plaintiff stated in her complaint, it is a

hospital in Virginia.11 Similarly, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gratton is a resident

of Virginia.12 Plaintiff has not shown that either ESH or Dr. Gratton has had

any contacts with this forum whatsoever, much less any contacts that are

9 R. Doc. 11 at 2.

10 R. Doc. 117 at 3.

11 R. Doc. 11 at 9.

12 Id at 10.

sufficiently systematic and continuous to support an assertion of general

jurisdiction.

Further, the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over either ESH

or Dr. Gratton. Plaintiff alleges that ESH wrongfully confined plaintiff for

several months for psychological testing, and that Dr. Gratton conspired with

her first husband to help him wrongfully obtain custody of her children and

move them across state lines.13 None of these alleged actions has any

connection to Louisiana. Plaintiff made no factual allegations that even

suggest ESH or Dr. Gratton purposefully directed its activities at Louisiana

or that they invoked the benefits and protections of Louisiana’s laws. Though

plaintiff now argues that the defendants’ conduct was expressly aimed at

Louisiana,14 there is no specific allegation to support that claim. The mere

fact that an effect was felt in Louisiana is not sufficient under the cases that

plaintiff cite, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Revell v. Lidov, 317

F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002). See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d at 473 (The Fifth

Circuit has held “that the plaintiff’s residence in the forum, and suffering of

harm there, will not alone support jurisdiction under Calder.”). Those cases

specify that, to satisfy the effects test—which is but one facet in the minimum

13 Id. at 9–10.

14 R. Doc. 117 at 3.

contacts analysis—the defendant must direct their actions at the forum in

such a way that the forum is the focal point of the actions and the harm

suffered. Revell, 317 F.3d at 473–75. Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts

that support her assertion that ESH and Dr. Gratton did so. Therefore, the

Court does not have personal jurisdiction over ESH or Dr. Gratton and must

grant their motion to dismiss.

The Clerk has entered default for these two defendants.15 Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governing defaults and default judgments,

“[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” As the Court

did not have personal jurisdiction over ESH or Dr. Gratton, the Court lacked

jurisdiction to make an entry of default. The Court finds that there is good

cause to set aside the entry of default and orders the Clerk to do so.

Plaintiff requests for the Court to transfer her case to the appropriate

federal court in Virginia, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), should the Court find

that there is no jurisdiction here.16 Section 1406(a) states that the “district

court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division

or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case

to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” Courts have

15 R. Docs. 75 & 76.

16 R. Doc. 117 at 8.

interpreted Section 1406(a) to apply even when the transferring court does

not have personal jurisdiction. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463,

466 (1962) (“The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize

the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his

case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal

jurisdiction over the defendants or not.”); Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., 730

F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2013) (Section 1406(a) “specifically refers to ‘laying

venue in the wrong division or district,’ but a transfer can be made due to the

absence of personal jurisdiction in a district where venue is otherwise

proper.”).

The Court finds that it is not in the interest of justice to transfer this

case. This is a large case—almost twenty named defendants—and some have

already been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not

presented evidence of any prejudice she faces, and the reasons for dismissal

are apparent. Additionally, this Court clearly did not have personal

jurisdiction. In a prior order dismissing four defendants for lack of personal

jurisdiction, the Court pointed out that those defendants were obviously not

subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana, which counsel should have

known.17 The Court explicitly encouraged plaintiff to review the filings and

17 R. Doc. 124 at 9–10.

reevaluate any claims against defendants that are not warranted by existing

law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing

existing law.18 Plaintiff apparently failed to do so. The Fifth Circuit has noted

that “it is obviously not in the interest of justice to allow § 1406(a) to be used

to aid a non-diligent plaintiff who knowingly files a case in the wrong

district.” Seville v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 53 F.4th 890, 894 (5th Cir. 2022)

(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813,

816 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967)). Numerous other circuits also have recognized that

when “a plaintiff's attorney files in the wrong jurisdiction not ‘because they

. . . made an erroneous guess with regard to an elusive fact,’ but because

[they] made an obvious error, transfer under section 1406 is inappropriate.”

Stanifer v. Brannan, 564 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nichols v.

G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1201 (4th Cir. 1993)); Nichols, 991 F.2d at

1201 (“[A] district court acts within its discretion when it finds that the

interest of justice is not served by allowing a plaintiff whose attorney

committed an obvious error in filing the plaintiff's action in the wrong court,

and thereby imposed substantial unnecessary costs on both the defendant

and the judicial system, simply to transfer his/her action to the proper court,

with no cost to him/herself or his/her attorney.”); Spar, Inc. v. Info. Res.,

18 Id.

Inc., 956 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]e conclude that allowing a

transfer in this case would reward plaintiffs for their lack of diligence in

choosing a proper forum and thus would not be in the interest of justice.”);

Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1544 (oth

Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is not in the interest of justice to transfer where a plaintiff

either realized or should have realized that the forum in which he or she filed

was improper.”); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding

a district court’s decision not to transfer a case when “[e]lementary

prudence” would have indicated to the lawyer the proper jurisdiction).

Therefore, the Court denies plaintiff's motion to transfer.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Eastern State Hospital

and Dr. Joanna Gratton’s motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2). Additionally, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to set aside

the entry of default.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th _ day of August, 2025.

dernk Varvan

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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