The opinion
J-S25012-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EZAIS QUILES :
:
Appellant : No. 1875 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 10, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001826-2019
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 4, 2025
Ezais Quiles appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on February
10, 2023, for his convictions of attempted involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse with a child, unlawful contact with minor, corruption of minors,
endangering welfare of children, and indecent assault. 1 Quiles challenges the
verdict as against the weight of the evidence, asserts the trial court erred in
failing to give a prompt complaint jury instruction, and argues the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) 2 is facially
unconstitutional. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history:
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i), 4304(a)(1), and
3126(a)(7), respectively.
2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.75.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In late summer or fall of 2017, [] Quiles was showering with his
sons, E.Q. and J.Q. While showering, [] Quiles brought his penis
close to E.Q’s face, and instructed him to “suck it.” During this
exchange, [] Quiles’ penis touched the outside of E.Q.’s cheek and
mouth. [] Quiles threatened to hit E.Q. with a belt if he did not
perform oral sex. When E.Q. refused, [] Quiles hit him with a belt
on his buttocks, leaving “little red marks.” J.Q. witnessed the
whole encounter. E.Q. was 7 years old at that time, and J.Q. was
6 years old.
During that time, E.Q. and J.Q. were residing with foster parents,
[] Barbara Ginorio [(“Ginorio”)] and her husband, Raphael. Prior
to visiting his father, E.Q. expressed a desire to live with [] Quiles
and expressed frustration that [] Quiles was not doing enough to
get him back. Around the time of the offense, [] Ginorio noted
that E.Q.’s behavior changed, and he did not want to go to []
Quiles’ house.
In November 2017, [] Ginorio heard the boys arguing in the
bathroom. She intervened, and J.Q. explained that E.Q. asked him
to “suck his wee-wee.” J.Q. further explained that he was not
going to do “the same thing E.Q. did to [] Quiles.” [] Ginorio pulled
E.Q. aside and inquired further. At first E.Q. denied that his father
did anything to him, but when she pressed him, he disclosed the
encounter with his father. [] Ginorio reported the matter to
authorities. E.Q. and J.Q. were each separately interviewed at the
Philadelphia Children’s Alliance (PCA) on December 28, 2017. In
E.Q.’s interview he recounted that [] Quiles brought his penis close
to his face in the shower and instructed him to “suck it.” He also
recounted that [] Quiles hit his buttocks with a belt because he
did not acquiesce to his father’s demand. In J.Q.’s separate
interview, he described the incident occurring between [] Quiles
and E.Q. At the time of the PCA interviews, E.Q. was 7 ½ years
old, and J.Q. was 6 ½ years old.
In addition to the aforementioned incident in the shower, E.Q. and
J.Q. reported that [] Quiles would regularly hit them with belts as
a form of discipline.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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[] Quiles was charged with attempted involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse (IDSI) with a child, unlawful contract with a minor —
sexual offenses, corruption of a minor, endangering the welfare of
a child, and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.
The case was consolidated with Commonwealth v. Quiles, CP-
51-CR-9508-2021, which involved charges related to interactions
[] Quiles had with his other son, J.Q. The jury trial was held in
November 2022. Pursuant to the tender years doctrine, both E.Q.
and J.Q.’s statements to [] Ginorio and to the PCA forensic
interviewer were admitted at trial as substantive evidence. []
Quiles was found guilty of all charges in the present case.
At the charge conference, [d]efense [c]ounsel requested that the
[trial court] give a prompt complaint instruction when charging
the jury. The [trial court] determined that the facts of the case
rendered the prompt complaint instruction unnecessary. Defense
objected to the failure to give the prompt complaint instruction
after the jury was charged. The [trial court] also charged the jury
with the general credibility of witness instruction, Section 4.17 of
the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions.
On February 10, 2023, the [trial court] sentenced [] Quiles to an
aggregate sentence of six (6) to twelve (12) years of incarceration
followed by three (3) years of probation. Defense filed a timely
[p]ost-[s]entence [m]otion raising the claim that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence and requesting a new trial.
Following a hearing, the [trial court] denied the motion.
Defense timely filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal on July 11, 2023. The
[trial court] issued an [o]rder pursuant to Pa.R.[A.]P. 1925(b) on
July 13, 2023. Defense filed a timely statement of errors[.]
Trial Court Opinion, date, at 1-4 (record citations, brackets, and footnotes
omitted).
Quiles raises three issues for our review:
[1.] Is the verdict of guilty with respect to all charges against the
weight of the evidence and so contrary to the evidence that it
shocks one’s sense of justice in light of the evidence presented at
trial?
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[2.] Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
denied defendant’s request to give Pennsylvania Suggested
Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 4.13A?
[3.] Should the SORNA lifetime registration requirement imposed
as part of the sentence in the matter sub judice be vacated
because the SORNA statute is facially unconstitutional?
Appellant’s Brief, at 7 (suggested answers and trial court answers omitted).
Quiles asserts the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because
there was no physical or forensic evidence, victim E.Q. had a motive to lie,
and E.Q.’s testimony was not corroborated by his foster mother, Ginorio. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19. Further, because E.Q. delayed reporting, he should
not be believed. See id. at 21. We disagree.
The standard regarding weight of the evidence claims is well-settled:
A verdict is against the weight of the evidence only when the jury’s
verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice. It is well established that a weight of the evidence claim
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and a new trial
should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony
or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a
different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court is to
determine whether, notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give
them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice.
In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the
function of an appellate court is to review the trial court’s exercise
of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather than to
consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of the
evidence. Appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted
where the facts and inferences of record disclose an abuse of
discretion.
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Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 331 A.3d 26, 32-33 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation
omitted).
The trial court provided a very detailed decision addressing Quiles’
weight of the evidence claim:
The [trial court] disagrees with some of [d]efense’s
characterizations of the evidence. In particular, [d]efense
contends that at trial E.Q. did not remember [] Quiles’ command
to suck his penis until prompted by leading questions. This does
not accurately recount E.Q.’s testimony. After some initial
introductory questions, E.Q.’s testimony proceeded as follows:
Q. Okay [E.Q.], did something happen at one of those
unsupervised visits that made you feel
uncomfortable?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you please tell the ladies and gentlemen
what happened.
A. I was going to the house when [Ginorio] dropped
me off, and then he told us to take a shower. And then
we took a shower, and then when we took a shower,
while we were in the shower, he told us to take off our
clothes and get in the shower, and he came in, too,
with no clothes. And then he put his private part near
me, and then he told me that—I don’t feel comfortable
saying this.
***
Q. Did the defendant say anything to you when he was
getting closer with his private parts?
A. I don’t remember, but I know he said “suck it.”
Q. He said “suck it?”
A. Yes, that’s what he said. I remember that.
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N.T., 11/02/2022, at 88-92. It is clear from the testimony that
E.Q. initially remembered that [] Quiles said something to him. He
did not initially share what was said because he expressed
discomfort in saying that part. That is not an unusual experience
for any witness, particularly a 12-year-old boy sitting in a room
full of adults being asked to recount crude and sexualized
statements. The Commonwealth addressed the witness’
discomfort by moving to other topics, and then circling back to the
question of what [] Quiles said. At that point, the questions asked
of E.Q. were not leading, and the witness provided the answer
without anyone suggesting what the answer should be.
Ultimately, all of the other issues argued by [d]efense come down
to the question of witness credibility. If the victim’s testimony is
found to be credible by the jury, then the lack of corroborating
physical evidence alone will not undermine that victim’s
testimony. [See] Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047
(Pa. Super. [] 2016). Moreover, this is not a case of a single
complaining witness’ testimony. E.Q.’s accounts of the evidence
in question were corroborated by the eye-witness accounts of
J.Q.[a]
[a] The [trial court] recognizes that there is a
discrepancy between J.Q’s account and E.Q’s account.
Specifically, J.Q. consistently reported that [] Quiles’
penis went inside of E.Q.’s mouth, which E.Q. has
consistently denied. Nevertheless, J.Q.’s account
corroborates the charge of attempted IDSI of a child.
It is also the jury’s prerogative to decide the amount of weight to
place on suppositions of a victim’s potential motive for fabrication.
See [Commonwealth v.] Clay, 64 A.3d [1049,] 1056-57 [Pa.
2013]. The lack of a prompt complaint may produce a doubt as to
whether the offense indeed occurred, or whether it was fabricated
by the witness. [See] Commonwealth v. Lane, 555 A.2d 1246,
1250 (Pa. 1989). When there is a delayed report, the sincerity of
the complaint is at issue if the delay was unreasonable or
unexplained. See [] Commonwealth v. Bradford, 198 A.2d 412
(Pa. Super. [] 1964); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d
1327 (Pa. Super. [] 1982). While [d]efense argued that the
evidence suggest[s] that E.Q. had a motive to fabricate because
he wanted to stay with his foster parents, E.Q. provided
alternative explanations. In particular, he explained that he was
torn; part of him wanted to stay with his foster parents, while
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another part of him “really wanted to go back home.” N.T.,
11/02/2022 at 111-12. He also provided an explanation for the
delayed report. In particular, he explained that he was scared that
his foster mother would be disgusted by him and that he would be
removed from his foster parents’ home.
***
The [trial court] acknowledges the various inconsistencies in the
witnesses’ testimony as described by [d]efense, but those
inconsistencies are not so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
them or give them equal weight would deny justice to [] Quiles.
Inconsistencies within testimony or between testimony and prior
statements are not unusual in any case, and particularly so in a
case involving young children and a delay of more than 5 years
between the time of the incident and the time of trial. The young
age of E.Q. (7 years old at the time of the incident) also explains
his hesitancy in disclosing the incident, including his initial denials
when confronted by [] Ginorio. Despite all of these challenges, the
core nature of the accusations remained consistent once E.Q.
chose to disclose. When E.Q. told [] Ginorio in November 2017,
when he told PCA during the forensic interview a month later, and
when he testified five years later in court, he recounted the same
incident where [] Quiles exposed his penis in the shower,
instructed E.Q. to “suck it,” and touched E.Q.’s face with his penis.
E.Q. and J.Q. also both shared their experiences with [] Quiles
repeatedly hitting them with a belt to enforce discipline in the
home.
The jury had the opportunity to consider all of the competing
evidence, including the lack of physical evidence, E.Q’s possible
motives to fabricate, the delayed report, evidence of [] Quiles’
good character, and all of the inconsistencies between the
witnesses’ testimony and prior statements as noted by [d]efense,
and, after considering everything, the jury determined that the
witnesses’ testimony was truthful and accurate and that the
totality of the evidence was adequate to prove the elements of the
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. It would be improper
for the [trial court] to discard the determinations of the jury. The
evidence in support of the verdict is not so tenuous, vague, and
uncertain that the resulting verdict shocks the conscience, nor
does it deny justice; therefore, the verdict is not against the
weight of the evidence.
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Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/23, at 6-9 (some record citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, and after closely scrutinizing the
trial court’s evaluation of the evidence, we cannot find the trial court abused
its discretion, and find that the trial court’s decision in this regard is well
founded and clearly explained. Therefore, Quiles first claim does not merit
relief.
Quiles next argues the trial court erred in failing to provide a prompt
complaint jury instruction. See Appellant’s Brief, at 23. Quiles asserts this
instruction was required because E.Q. delayed reporting the assault for
months. See id., at 24. We disagree.
Our scope and standard of review regarding the failure to provide a
specific jury instruction is as follows:
When considering a trial court’s failure to give a requested jury
instruction, the relevant inquiry for this Court is whether such
charge was warranted by the evidence in the case. Moreover, our
scope of review is to determine whether the trial court committed
a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the
outcome of the case.
If we find that the court should have included the
instruction, then we must determine whether its
omission prejudiced the defendant. If we determine
the decision not to give an instruction was an error of
law which might have prejudiced the defendant, then
we must determine the error was not harmless before
granting a new trial.
Commonwealth v. Dula, 262 A.3d 609, 635-36 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
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The specific instruction Quiles requested is Pennsylvania Suggested
Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 4.13A, which provided 3:
1. Before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime charged
in this case, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that the act charged did in fact occur and that it occurred without
[name of victim]’s consent.
2. The evidence of [name of victim]’s [failure to complain] [delay
in making a complaint] does not necessarily make [his] [her]
testimony unreliable, but may remove from it the assurance of
reliability accompanying the prompt complaint or outcry that the
victim of a crime such as this would ordinarily be expected to
make. Therefore, the [failure to complain] [delay in making a
complaint] should be considered in evaluating [his] [her]
testimony in deciding whether the act occurred [at all] [with or
without [his] [her] consent].
3. You must not consider [name of victim]’s [failure to make]
[delay in making] a complaint as conclusive evidence that the act
did not occur or that it did occur but with [his] [her] consent.
[Name of victim]’s failure to complain [at all] [promptly] [and the
nature of any explanation for that failure] are factors bearing on
the believability of [his] [her] testimony and must be considered
by you in light of all the evidence in the case.
Pa. SSJI (Crim.) § 4.13A.
This Court has explained:
The premise for the prompt complaint instruction is that a victim
of a sexual assault would reveal at the first available opportunity
that an assault occurred. The instruction permits a jury to call into
question a complainant’s credibility when he or she did not
complain at the first available opportunity. However, there is no
____________________________________________
3 We note that, as of September 2024, the suggested standard criminal jury
instruction 4.13A has been deleted from the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard
Criminal Jury Instructions, and the subcommittee has specifically discouraged
the use of the former instruction. Trial in this case was held in 2022, therefore,
we do not consider its deletion in our review of the trial court’s decision not to
provide this instruction to the jury.
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policy in our jurisprudence that the instruction be given in every
case.
The propriety of a prompt complaint instruction is determined on
a case-by-case basis pursuant to a subjective standard based
upon the age and condition of the victim. For instance, where an
assault is of such a nature that the minor victim may not have
appreciated the offensive nature of the conduct, the lack of a
prompt complaint would not necessarily justify an inference of
fabrication.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
“Furthermore, in cases where the victim is a child, [our Supreme] Court
commented on the importance of questioning whether the immaturity of the
child occasioned the delay as opposed to a design to deceive.”
Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 138 (Pa. 2007) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “This is especially true where the
perpetrator is one with authority or custodial control over the victim.”
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted). Notably, “in a case such as this, where some evidence favored a
prompt complaint instruction and some did not, it fell within the trial court’s
discretion to deny this instruction.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 A.3d
722, 737 (Pa. Super. 2022).
The trial court explained its reasoning for not instructing the jury
pursuant to section 4.13A:
In the present case, there was a delay in reporting the incident of
approximately 4-5 months. At the time in question, E.Q. was 7
years old. The perpetrator of the offense was his father. [] Quiles
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used corporal punishment in relation to the sexual offense in
question, and he also more routinely used corporal punishment to
enforce E.Q.’s compliance with household rules. E.Q. also
explained that he was afraid to report the incident because he was
afraid that his foster mother would see him with disgust and that
he would be taken away from his foster home. Based on all of the
above, the evidence supported the [trial court’s] determination
that E.Q. did not understand the offensive nature of the conduct,
and, therefore, the prompt complaint instruction was not
appropriate.
Even if the [trial court’s] failure to give the prompt complaint
instruction was an error, it was harmless. The [trial court] still
instructed the jury on the considerations for evaluating credibility
of witnesses generally. Section 4.17 of the Pennsylvania
Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions can provide the
factfinder with the sufficient framework to question the victim’s
credibility. The general credibility of witness instruction addresses
any possible biases, prejudices, and motives of the complainant.
Lastly, the [trial court] did not limit [d]efense’s ability to elicit
testimony about the delayed report during trial, nor did the [trial
court] limit [d]efense’s ability to argue those facts to the jury. In
closing arguments, [d]efense argued that the delayed report
evidenced that E.Q. was lying about the sexual offense. Thus, the
[d]efense was not prejudiced by the lack of the prompt
complain[t] instruction.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/23, at 10-11 (record citations and citations
omitted).
Just as in Williams, there was some evidence that favored a prompt
complaint instruction and some that did not. See Williams, 274 A.3d at 737.
The trial court’s analysis contains no legal error and is logically explained;
consequently, we again find no abuse of discretion in its analysis. Quiles has
failed to convince us he was prejudiced by the lack of a prompt complaint
instruction. Therefore, this claim does not merit relief.
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Finally, Quiles argues SORNA is facially unconstitutional and therefore
he should not be required to register as a sex offender. See Appellant’s Brief,
at 28-41. As our Supreme Court held SORNA is constitutional in
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77 (Pa. 2024), Quiles is not entitled
to relief.
Quiles brief was filed before the decision in Torsilieri, so he did not
have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s analysis. Quiles argues SORNA’s
irrebuttable presumption that all sex offenders are at high risk for reoffending
does not survive scrutiny and SORNA constitutes criminal punishment. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 34. Our Supreme Court in Torsilieri disagreed with both
propositions.
We begin by noting that “[g]enerally, the constitutionality of legislation
is a pure question of law for which the scope of review is plenary, and the
standard of review is de novo.” Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 86 (citation omitted).
“[L]egislation carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, which
will not be overcome unless the legislation is clearly, palpably and plainly in
violation of the Constitution.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Statutes creating irrebuttable presumptions are not per se violative of
the constitution.” Id. at 92 (citation omitted). In Torsilieri, the evidence
defendant presented to defeat this presumption actually supported it. See id.
at 99 (“[R]ather than refuting it, the evidence supports the legislative
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presumption; the evidence validates the statutory underpinnings of
Subchapter H.”) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original). Other than the
evidence presented to the trial court in Torsilieri, Quiles has not provided any
evidence to rebut the presumption that sex offenders reoffend at a higher rate
than individuals convicted of other crimes. See Appellant’s Brief, at 33-34. As
that evidence supported SORNA’s irrebuttable presumption that sex offenders
reoffender more than other offenders, this claim cannot merit relief.
As to the second proposition, Quiles again solely relies on the trial
court’s findings in Torsilieri, which our Supreme Court rejected. See id. at
34-36; Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 109 (“In our view, weighing the Mendoza-
Martinez[4] factors does not compel the conclusion that Subchapter H is
punitive.”). Our Supreme Court found SORNA does not qualify as criminal
punishment. See Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 110. As such, we are bound by our
Supreme Court’s decision in Torsilieri and Quiles’ final claim is meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/4/2025
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4 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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