Udoh v. New York City Department of Probation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CHARLES B. UDOH,

Plaintiff,

~ against — OPINION & ORDER

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 24-cv-03982 (ER)

PROBATION, NATASHA SEGERS,

MARYANN BROWN, LISA

AMBROSIA,

Defendants.

RAMOS, D.J.:

Charles B. Udoh, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the New York City

Department of Probation (“DOP”), Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and Lisa

D’ Ambrosia on May 17, 2024, alleging that the DOP discriminated against him on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability. Doc. 1 at 3-4.

Before the Court is DOP’s motion to partially dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 26. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true for purposes of

the instant motion. /n re Parmalat Securities Litigation, 477 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607

(S.D.N.Y. 2007). And “in deciding a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, it is

appropriate to consider materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are

consistent with the allegations in the complaint[.]” Rivera v. Royce, No. 19 Civ. 10425

(PMH), 2021 WL 2413396, at *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (quoting Davis v. County

of Suffolk, No. 18 Civ. 303 (JMA) (AKT), 2020 WL 7699919, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,

2020)).

Udoh is a fifty-eight-year-old Black male from Nigeria, Africa who began

working for the DOP as a probation officer on September 12, 2022. Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 30

at 2. He was initially placed at a location in the Bronx temporarily, with plans to be

assigned to Manhattan on a more permanent basis. Doc. 1 at 8. On his first day, he met

Lisa D’Ambrosia, the head of the Bronx DOP, to whom he explained he was sent there

only temporarily—through the week—to which she allegedly assented. Id. She told him

he would first go to the intake unit and then to client development. Id. He would later

allege that D’Ambrosia “was one of the people who caused the Plaintiff’s termination

and reputable harm.” Doc. 30 at 4. On that first day he also met bureau chief Natasha

Segers, the head of client development, and bureau chief Maryann Brown, his immediate

supervisor. Doc. 1 at 8.

Over the next few days, while Brown was on vacation, Segers assigned Udoh

forty cases and instructed him to begin his work, meet his clients, and visit them at their

homes. Id. Udoh was given no equipment with which to do his work, and after weeks of

being “overworked, overwhelmed, and very stressed,” he reached out to Segers who

reassured him that he should continue his work, that she was monitoring him, and that he

was doing a “great job.” Id. at 8–9. From that day on, Udoh alleges he was “harassed

every day,” “denied late lunch breaks due to his medication,” threatened with

termination, denied overtime, deducted pay for taking a lunch break, denied work

assignments, denied transfer to another unit, denied accommodations for medical and

“African religion fasting and practices,” spat at, poked in the chest, and yelled at. Id. at

9–11.

Segers once told him to do as she said, and if he continued to listen to the other

officers she would make sure he did not make it through the year. Id. at 10. He was

constantly denied overtime, even after submitting requests both orally and in writing. Id.

All of the other probation officers received overtime when requested. Id. Udoh alleges

that he was frequently left alone in the building from 1 pm to 10 pm on Wednesdays and

Saturdays—the same days on which he had requested to take late lunches due to medical

reasons and religious practices. Id. at 11. He also claims that most other officers left by

8 pm. Id. He was often left alone inside his office which had become infested with rats

and mice. Id. When Udoh complained about the rats, Segers responded by telling him he

was “making a big deal out of this” and asked “don’t they have rats in Africa?” Id. at 12.

At one point, Udoh was referred to as an “old African n-word,” a “fucking lying old

man,” and other racial slurs, as well as being told: “I don’t understand what you are

saying, speak good English so I can hear you, I cannot understand your accent.” Id. at 9.

Udoh alleges that Segers and Brown also intentionally gave better work assignments to

non-Black employees, expressly telling him that his national origin was the basis for their

unjust treatment towards him. Id. at 11.

Udoh also claims he was targeted by his supervisors for something he never did.

Id. at 12. Specifically, Probation Officer (“PO”) Brown had asked Udoh to join her on a

field visit, assuring Udoh that she had already spoken with her supervisor and Udoh’s

supervisor, Brown. Id. This was not the case, however. PO Brown’s supervisor, Mr.

Session, had only authorized the field visit for PO Brown’s car/fab key.1 Id. Udoh went

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on the field visit as requested, but was later reprimanded by his supervisors. Id. As a

result, Segers called and asked him to sign a “memorandum” in the presence of Kory

Blackwell.2 Id. Meanwhile, PO Brown was not reprimanded or asked to sign any

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document. Id. Udoh refused to sign the memorandum because he believed what it stated

was untrue, and Antoine Sherman3 had asked him not to sign anything without him being

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there. Id. Udoh was not provided a union representative even though he paid union dues,

and was not given time to file a grievance. Id. Later that day, Segers called Udoh inside

her office, threatened him, and used abusive and racist language, calling him a “fucking

1 Udoh does not explain what the “car/fab key” is.

2 Udoh does not explain Kory Blackwell’s role in the DOP.

3 Udoh does not explain Antoine Sherman’s role in the DOP.

n-word” and telling him to “get out of [her] office.” Id. The following day she told

Udoh: “fucking old man, you better look for another job; [I] will show you who is the

boss here, sign or not.” Id.

Udoh describes a similar situation in which he was allegedly called into Brown’s

office to sign a memorandum which stated that he had failed to notify SPO of a field

visit.4 Id. at 9. As he explained to Brown why he would not sign the document, he

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alleges that Segers walked in and proceed to yell at him, point her fingers “in front of his

chest”, spit in his face, and threaten to “take the matter higher if [he] refused.” Id. After

that event, he “went straight to Mr. Shermans’s office and reported what happened,”

begging Sherman to speak to Blackwell about his transfer from the unit or out of the

borough. Id.

Udoh complained to Brown, Sherman, and Blackwell on multiple occasions. Id.

He specifically alleges that he “complained to Ms. Brown many times about these

treatments,” “complained to Mr. Antoine Sherman in his office over 8 times,” and

“complained to Kory Blackwell in his office over 6 times; and inside the building, front,

and hallway over 6 times.” Id. Blackwell told Udoh he would look into it, but nothing

ever came of that assurance. Id. at 9–10. Other officers advised him to request a transfer,

claiming that Segers and Brown would not stop until Udoh was either fired or forced to

quit. Id. at 11.

As a result of the issues he was facing at work, Udoh alleges that he had to be

hospitalized. Id. at 9. In his opposition papers, he clarifies that he allegedly suffered

from high blood pressure, chest pain, back pain, anxiety, panic attacks, physical

disability, emotional distress, mental abuse, and cardiac issues. Doc. 30 at 15. Udoh

emailed Sherman many times before requesting, on June 6, 2023, to be transferred upon

his return from the hospital. Id. at 9–10. When he returned, he presented Brown,

4 Udoh does not explain what “SPO” means.

Blackwell, and Sherman with his discharge papers. Id. at 10. The following day, Brown

called Udoh into her office and asked him to sign an evaluation. Id. He refused because

Sherman had told Udoh not to sign any documents without him present. Id. Segers and

Brown retaliated by writing to human resources to terminate Udoh’s employment. Id.

Udoh claims that on June 21, 2023, he was asked to bring in his work equipment and

informed that, based on his evaluation, he was being let go. Id. The DOP acknowledges

that June 21, 2023 was the day he was officially terminated, Doc. 26 at 13, which Udoh

confirms in his opposition by stating he was terminated on that day via email, Doc. 30 at

2.

On the day that he was terminated, a young female probation officer under the age

of forty took his office. Id. at 10. Furthermore, the DOP did not allow Udoh to clean out

his office, rather he was told to “pack and move out” or they would have armed officers

escort him out of the building. Id. Udoh alleges that Segers and the DOP hired new

probation officers under the age of forty, but does not specify how many they hired or

when they did so. Id.

On January 18, 2024, Udoh filed a charge with the New York State Division of

Human Rights (“DHR”) against the DOP for discrimination on the basis of age, religion,

disability, race, and national origin. Doc. 26 at 39–50. Udoh received a response to that

charge on July 8, 2024, and was given the opportunity to submit a rebuttal “in order to

further the investigation of [his] case.” Doc. 30 at 55. The record before the Court does

not include a rebuttal by Udoh, nor does Udoh allege that he undertook any further efforts

to work with the DHR to further the investigation.

Meanwhile, on April 1, 2024, Udoh filed a charge with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for discrimination on the basis of disability, race,

national origin, and retaliation. Doc. 26 at 34–37.

Finally, on May 17, 2024 Udoh filed the instant complaint alleging that the DOP

discriminated against him on the basis of disability, race, national origin, color, religion,

sex, and age. See generally Doc. 1. On December 18, 2024, the DOP filed the instant

motion to partially dismiss the complaint for failure to: (1) exhaust the administrative

remedies for sex-based discrimination and retaliation claims; (2) state a cause of action

for sex, religion, and disability discrimination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6); (3) plead a qualifying disability, discriminatory intent, or adverse

employment action based on his purported disability pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act

(“RA”), Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), New York State Human Right Law

(“NYSHRL”), and New York City Human Right Law (““NYCHRL”); (4) establish that he

had a property interest in his employment with DOP and thus a claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment; (5) allege D’ Ambrosio was personally involved in any alleged

unlawful treatment; and (6) show that the DOP is a suable entity. See Doc. 26 at 12.°

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all

factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Koch v. Christie's International PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d

Cir. 2012).

“(T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept a

complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s

elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” /d. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Jd. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This “plausibility standard is not akin to a

> Defendants are not moving to dismiss the race discrimination, national origin discrimination, age

discrimination, and hostile work environment claims.

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a plausible claim,

the plaintiff must “‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of

the wrongdoing alleged, ‘even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

improbable.’” Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 380 (2d. Cir. 2018)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Ifthe plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across

the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly,

550 USS. at 570.

Pro se litigants’ “pleadings and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest

claims they suggest.” See Sharikov v. Philips Medical System MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159,

166 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156-58

(2d Cir. 2017)). In general, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without

“granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any

indication that a valid claim might be stated.” See Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170

(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)).

HiIl. DISCUSSION

A. New York City Department of Probation is Not a Suable Entity

The New York City Department of Probation is not a suable entity, and therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims against the DOP must be dismissed. “[A]ll actions and proceedings for

the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the

City of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by

law.” N.Y. City Charter Ch. 17 § 396; Albritton v. Fredella, No. 22 Civ. 4512 (AS), 2024

WL 3905270, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2024) (“[F]ederal claims against the New York

City Department of Probation must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New

York is not an entity that can be sued.”); Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d

385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal

agency.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against the DOP is

granted.

B. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The Court finds that Udoh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his

Title VII sex discrimination claim. “[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the

EEOC stands as an essential element of Title VII’s statutory scheme, and one with which

defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply.” Gibb v. Tapestry, Inc., No. 18

Civ. 6888 (LAP), 2018 WL 6329403, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018) (quoting Francis v.

City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, “alleging Title VII

claims in an EEOC charge 1s a ‘precondition to bringing such claims in federal court,’

unless the claims are ‘reasonably related’ to claims that were alleged before the EEOC.”

Grant v. United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 00018 (LGS), 2014

WL 902638, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree

Italiane, 8.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001)).

When Udoh filed his EEOC complaint, he did not list sex discrimination as a

claim he was pursuing. Thus, the only way he can bring that discrimination claim in

federal court is if it is “‘reasonably related’ to the claim filed with the agency.” Williams

v. New York City Housing Authority, 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Butts v. City

of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 990 F.2d 1397,

1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds.). “[A] claim is considered

reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of the EEOC

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was

made.” /d. at 70 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359-60 (2d Cir.

2001)). “The central question is whether the EEOC would have had adequate notice to

investigate both the discrimination mentioned in the EEOC complaint and the

discrimination that was not mentioned in the EEOC complaint.” Edwards v. New York

State Unified Court System, No. 12 Civ. 46 (WHP), 2012 WL 6101984, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 20, 2012) (citing Williams, 458 F.3d at 70).°

The Court finds that the EEOC did not have adequate notice to investigate the sex

discrimination claims. The EEOC charge makes no mention of “sex” at all. Udoh

specifically alleges he was “discriminated against because of [his] race, national origin,

disability, and retaliation for [his] complaints and oral and written requests for transfer,”

but did not include sex. Doc. 26 at 35. The only related reference he makes merely

states that a “female young officer under the age of 40 took [his] office the day [he] was

asked to return all [his] equipment.” Doc. 26 at 35. That mention alone is insufficient to

give the EEOC adequate notice to investigate a sex discrimination claim. See Parker v.

Israel Discount Bank of New York, Inc., No. 21 Civ. 7196 (VEC), 2022 WL 16833626, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2022) (“[P]assing references to gender are inadequate.”); Holmes v.

Fresh Direct, No. 13 Civ. 4657 (NGG) (CLP), 2015 WL 4885216, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

5, 2015) (holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies in regards to her

sex discrimination claim as nothing in the EEOC charge “mention[ed] conduct related to

her sex.”). Accordingly, Udoh’s Title VII sex discrimination claim must be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.’

Although Defendants argue that Udoh’s Title VII retaliation claims must also be

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Doc. 26 at 16, Udoh does list

retaliation as a basis of alleged discrimination in his EEOC charge, and specifically states

that he was retaliated against for his complaints and transfer requests. Doc. 26 at 34-35.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the retaliation claim on the basis of failure to exhaust

must be denied.

6 Udoh also failed to list religion as a basis for discrimination in his EEOC charge, but the Court finds that

it is “reasonably related” to the claim filed with the agency as he specifically alleges a failure to

accommodate on the basis of his religion in the charge. Doc. | at 10. Regardless, as discussed below, that

claim fails on the merits in any event.

7Tn any event, Udoh also fails to sufficiently plead a Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Defendants also mention that Udoh “failed to check off on his []DHR charge that

he was pursuing claims of sex discrimination and retaliation and makes no mention of

any sex-based allegations in his charge.” Doc. 26 at 15. To the extent they are seeking to

dismiss those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court must deny

because the “NYSHRL and NYCHRL do not require exhaustion of administrative

remedies.” Brock v. Prime Now LLC, No. 20 Civ. 9055 (VEC) (OTW), 2021 WL

4267849, at *4 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2021) (citing Medina v. Waste Connections of

New York, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 291 (RA), 2019 WL 3532048, at *5 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,

2019)).8

7F

Accordingly, Udoh’s Title VII sex discrimination claim and any Title VII

retaliation claim made in relation to sex-based discrimination must be dismissed.

C. Disability Claims

Disability Discrimination

The Court finds that Udoh failed to state a claim of disability discrimination under

the ADA, RA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. A disability discrimination claim is evaluated

using the same standard for each of these statutes. See Walker v. City of New York, 367

F. Supp. 3d 39, 51 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[C]laims under the ADA and the [RA] are

evaluated using the same standards”); Jernigan v. Dalton Management Co., LLC, 819 F.

Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“In this Circuit, a disability-based discrimination

claim under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL involve the ‘same elements’ as an ADA

claim.”) (quoting Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2010)). Thus,

to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, RA, NYSHRL, and

NYCHRL,a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) his employer is subject to the [statutes];

(2) he is disabled within the meaning of the [statutes]; (3) he is otherwise qualified to

8Although the Defendants do not make the argument, because Udoh initially brought a charge with the

DHR, it would seem that his claims pursuant to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL would be subject to the

election of remedies bar. Regardless, as the Court discusses below, the disability, religion, and sex

discrimination claims allfail on the merits.

perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and

(4) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Garcia v. Kings

County Hospital Center, No. 16 Civ. 3151 (ER), 2018 WL 389212, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.

11, 2018) (citing Rios v. Department of Education, 351 Fed. App’x. 503, 505 (2d Cir.

2009)).

Udoh has failed to show that he has a qualifying disability pursuant to the ADA,

RA, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL. To plausibly state a claim of disability discrimination

under the ADA or RA, a person must show they have “an actual ‘physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,’ or . . . [that] she is

‘regarded as having such an impairment’ or [that] there otherwise is a ‘record of such an

impairment.’” Johnson v. Mount Sinai Hospital Group, Inc., No. 23-466, 2024 WL

3289475, at *1 (2d Cir. July 3, 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C § 12102(1)(A)-(C)). Udoh’s

complaint only makes vague, conclusory references to “medical conditions,”

“medications,” “medical reasons,” and “medical issues,” Doc. 1 at 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, but a

“medical condition alone, even a serious one, is not a per se disability under the ADA; it

must substantially limit a major life activity.” Pagan v. Morrisania Neighborhood

Family Health Center, No. 12 Civ. 9047 (WHP), 2014 WL 464787, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.

22, 2014). Udoh has failed to plausibly show that his medical conditions substantially

limit any major life activities. “[A] plaintiff must do more than proffer ‘conclusory

statements’ to adequately assert a substantial limitation for the purposes of stating a claim

under the ADA and RA.” Dominguez v. Board of Education of Yonkers City School

District, No. 23 Civ. 2460 (NSR), 2025 WL 1285862, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2025).

While the NYSHRL and NYCHRL do not require “any showing that the

disability substantially limits a major life activity,” even under those statutes which “have

a broader definition of ‘disability’ than does the ADA,” Udoh fails to show a plausible

qualifying disability. Reilly v. Revlon, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 524, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

The NYSHRL defines “disability” as:

(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from

anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which

prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable

by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques

or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by

others as such an impairment, provided, however, that in all

provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be

limited to disabilities which, upon the provision of reasonable

accommodations, do not prevent the complainant from performing

in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or

occupation sought or held.

New York Executive Law § 292(21). The NYCHRL defines disability as “any physical,

medical, mental or psychological impairment, or a history or record of such impairment.”

New York City Administrative Code § 8-102.

Even under these broader definitions, the mere mention of a “medical condition”

is not enough. See Karupaiyan v. CVS Health Corp., No. 19 Civ. 8814 (KPF), 2021 WL

4341132, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021) (“[V]ague references to pain and difficulty,

untethered to any underlying condition or impairment, do not make out a claim under

these statutes”); see also Lee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 22 Civ. 08618 (DEH) (RWL),

2024 WL 3928876, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024), Report and Recommendation

rejected in part by Lee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 22 Civ. 8618 (DEH) (RWL), 2025

WL 4367257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024) (holding that plaintiff’s general references to her

disabilities failed to show they actually had any of those disabilities under the NYSHRL

and NYCHRL).

And to the extent that Udoh asserts additional information to bolster his disability

discrimination claim in his opposition to the motion, Udoh still fails to show he has a

qualifying disability. Specifically, he alleges that the “causes and effects from the job”

led him to suffer high blood pressure, chest pain, back pain, anxiety, panic attacks,

physical disability, emotional distress, mental abuse, and cardiac issues, “all because . . .

they subjected [him] to[] discrimination, harassment, and [a] hostile workplace

environment.” Doc. 30 at 15. Again, that is not sufficient to establish a qualifying

disability. See, e.g., Lee v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 418,

425 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[MJental and/or physical fallout from the discrimination that was

allegedly practiced against [a plaintiff] does not give rise to an independent claim for

disability discrimination[.]”; Lenhoff'v. Getty, No. 97 Civ. 9458 (LMM), 2000 WL

977900, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (“[J]ob-induced stress cannot be considered a

disability under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL.”); Davis v. Carty, No. 24 Civ. 6674 (LTS),

2025 WL 843709, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2025) (holding that a plaintiff alleging that

her employment “caused . . . her disability (depression and anxiety) . . . does not state a

claim under the Rehabilitation Act.”).

And neither has Udoh made any plausible showing that he was “regarded as

having such an impairment” or that there was a “record of such an impairment.”

Accordingly, Udoh cannot show a plausible qualifying disability pursuant to the ADA,

RA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL.

2. Failure to Accommodate

Even if he had adequately alleged that he had a disability, Udoh has failed to

plead a failure-to-accommodate claim pursuant to the ADA, RA, NYSHRL, and

NYCHRL. To make out a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) [p]laintiff is a person with a disability under the

meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability;

(3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the

job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations. Vega v.

Department of Education, No. 19 Civ. 6963 (ER), 2020 WL 6727803, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 16, 2020) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Products Manufacturing Co., Inc.,

583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)). This standard is the same under the RA, NYSHRL, and

NYCHRL. See Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York, No. 17 Civ. 8024, 2019 WL

13

652593, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Courts apply the same standard for failure to

accommodate cases under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL.”)

(citing Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Torres

v. MMS Group, LLC, No. 22 Civ. 6142 (DEH), 2024 WL 3274310, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July

2, 2024) (“The elements necessary to state [a failure-to-accommodate] claim under . . .

the ADA . . . RA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL are substantially the same.”).

As noted by the DOP, Udoh “pleads none of the elements required to overcome a

motion to dismiss.” Doc. 26 at 22. Udoh’s mention of “medical conditions” fails to

qualify as a disability within the definitions of the relevant statutes. And neither has

Udoh shown that the DOP had notice of any purported disability. The only plausible

inference that may be made is that he gave them notice of his “medical conditions” when

asking for a “late lunch,” and yet that still fails to lift his claim to the level required to

adequately plead a claim for failure-to-accommodate. See Karupaiyan, 2021 WL

4341132, at *19 (a “[p]laintiff’s vague assertion of a need to attend an unquantified

number of medical appointments, for an unspecified purpose, and for an uncertain

duration cannot be viewed as putting [d]efendants on notice of a disability requiring

accommodation under any of the ADA, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL.”). “[F]ailure to

provide notice of [a] disability to [defendants] or to allege some other means by which

they might have had an opportunity to consider her need for accommodations is fatal to

[plaintiff’s] claim.” Castillo v. Hudson Theatre, LLC, 412 F. Supp. 3d 447, 451

(S.D.N.Y. 2019). Accordingly, Udoh has failed to plausibly allege a failure-to-

accommodate claim and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to

accommodate are granted.

D. Religious Discrimination

Udoh next claims that he suffered discrimination on the basis of his religion

because the DOP failed to accommodate his “African religion fasting and practices.”

Doc. 1 at 10. The Court finds that Udoh failed to sufficiently plead a claim for religious

discrimination. When making a claim for religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII

through a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he had a bona fide

religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his

employer of this belief; and (3) was disciplined for failing to comply with the

employment requirement. Cagle v. Weill Cornell Medicine, 680 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435

(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Knight v. Connecticut Department of Public Health, 275 F.3d

156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)). To bring a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of religion

pursuant to Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected

class; (2) he is qualified for his position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;

and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. Green v. Jacob &

Co. Watches, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 458, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Vega v.

Hempstead Union Free School District, 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015)). And finally, to

bring a discrimination claim on the basis of religion pursuant to the NYSHRL and

NYCHRL, a plaintiff must “‘show differential treatment—that he was treated less well—

because of a discriminatory intent.” Livingston v. City of New York, 563 F. Supp. 3d 201,

234 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mitchell v. Planned

Parenthood of Greater New York, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 68, 106–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)

(“[T]he standards for employment-discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and

NYCHRL are now largely the same.”).

Udoh fails to adequately plead discrimination on the basis of his religion under

any of these standards. The only mention of religion in his complaint was that he had

requested that the DOP “accommodate [his] African religion fasting and practices,” and

that it was denied. Doc. 1 at 10. For a failure to accommodate, “[b]ald allegations that a

plaintiff has a religious belief and that those religious beliefs conflict with an

employment requirement are insufficient to state a claim for religious discrimination

under Title VII.” Cagle, 680 F. Supp. 3d at 435. The complaint does not sufficiently

allege a failure to accommodate claim because Udoh neither “allege[s] any non-

conclusory facts about [his] religious beliefs,” nor alleges that his beliefs “conflict with

[a] requirement.” Id.

The same is true for any potential claims of disparate treatment. Not only does

Udoh fail to describe his “religion,” or “religious beliefs,” but he also fails to establish

that he suffered an adverse employment action or that he was treated “less well” because

of his religion. As such, his claim for discrimination on the basis of his religion fails.

See Karupaiyan, 2021 WL 4341132, at *20 (dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII, NYSHRL,

and NYCHRL religious discrimination claim because they failed to “provide any

additional evidence, direct or circumstantial, to suggest that he was terminated because he

was Hindu.”); see also Ochei v. The Mary Manning Walsh Nursing Home Co., Inc., No.

10 Civ. 2548 (CM) (RLE), 2011 WL 744738, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 1, 2011) (“[N]aked

assertions by plaintiff that some protected demographic factor motivated an employment

decision, without a fact-specific allegation of a causal link between defendant’s conduct

and the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, are simply too conclusory to

withstand a motion to dismiss.”) (citing Reyes v. Erickson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 632

(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for

religious discrimination are granted.

E. Sex Discrimination

The Court finds that Udoh has also failed to adequately plead a claim for sex

discrimination. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must establish a Title VII sex

discrimination claim by showing that: (1) he was within the protected class; (2) he was

qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4)

the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination. Menaker v. Hofstra University, 935 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting

Walsh v. New York City Housing Authority, 828 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 2016)). For a claim

brought pursuant to the NYCHRL, the plaintiff “need only ‘show differential treatment—

that he was treated less well—because of a discriminatory intent.” Livingston, 563 F.

Supp. 3d at 234. NYSHRL claims are also analyzed under this standard. See Moore v.

Hadestown Broadway Limited Liability Co., 722 F. Supp. 3d 229, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)

(“Courts must now scrutinize discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL

under the same lenient pleading standard described above under which NYCHRL

discrimination claims are analyzed.”).

Udoh has not “nudged” his sex discrimination claim “across the line from

conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The only allegations Udoh

makes in regards to his sex discrimination claim is that a “female young officer under the

age of 40 took [his] office the day [he] was asked to return all his equipment.” Doc. 1 at

10. That allegation, without more, is not sufficient to make up a plausible sex

discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL. There is nothing to

show or even give rise to the inference that he was terminated, replaced or treated “less

well” because of his sex. While true that “an inference of discrimination may arise when

an employer replaces a terminated employee with an individual outside the employee’s

protected class,” such an inference should not be made in isolation, and instead must

include an analysis of “whether the ‘factual content’ in a complaint ‘allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”

Franchino v. Terence Cardinal Cook Health Care Center, Inc., 692 F. App’x 39, 43 (2d

Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Marcus v. Leviton Manufacturing

Co., Inc., 661 F. App’x 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Without more, the mere fact that a

[member of a protected class] was replaced by [someone outside the protected class] does

not plausibly indicate discriminatory motive.”). As the DOP points out, neither does

Udoh allege that the female probation officer “replaced him, just that she took his office,”

“leav[ing] open the very plausible possibility that she was just taking over his former

office space and had already been employed by [the DOP].” Doc. 26 at 25. Udoh’s sex

discrimination claim has not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs claims for sex discrimination are granted in

their entirety.

F. Fourteenth Amendment

The Court finds that Udoh did not adequately plead a Fourteenth Amendment

claim. To sustain a Due Process claim, a plaintiff must: (1) identify a property right; (2)

show that the state has deprived him of that right; and (3) show that the deprivation was

effected without due process. Salemo v. Murphy, No. 11 Civ. 2525, 2014 WL 804029, at

*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2014) (citing Local 342, Long Island Public Service Employees,

UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO y. Town Board of the Town of Huntington, 31 F.3d 1191, 1194 (2d

Cir. 1994)). Thus, Udoh must establish that he possessed a property interest in his

continued employment as a probationary officer. He has failed to do so.

In their memorandum of law in support of their motion, the DOP asserts that

Udoh is a “probationary [probation [o]fficer.” Doc. 26 at 27. Udoh does not contest that

claim in his opposition to the DOP’s motion. In this Circuit, “[p]robationary or at-will

employees lack a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement,’ and therefore lack a property interest

in the expectation of continued employment.” Fitzgerald v. Feinberg, No. 98 Civ. 8885

(RWS), 1999 WL 619584, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1999) (quoting Donato v. Plainview-

Old Bethpage Central School District, 96 F.3d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Catania

v. United Federation of Teachers, No. 21 Civ. 1257 (GHW), 2025 WL 638625, at *9

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2025) (“Under New York law, it is well settled that a probationary

employee, unlike a permanent employee, has no property rights in his position and may

be lawfully discharged without a hearing and without any stated specific reason.”)

(quoting Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1297 (2d Cir. 1996)). As a probationary

employee, Udoh does not a have a property interest in his position, and as such, any

potential Due Process claim must be dismissed.

Furthermore, “[t]o plead discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause, a plaintiff must ‘point to a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the

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basis of race,’ ‘identify a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an

intentionally discriminatory manner,’ or ‘allege that a facially neutral statute or policy has

an adverse effect and that it was motivated by discriminatory animus.’” Velasquez v. City

of New York Department of Buildings, No. 19 Civ. 9687 (PKC), 2020 WL 2614826, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020) (quoting Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York, 221 F.3d 329,

337 (2d Cir. 2000)). As the DOP points out, Udoh has not pointed to a statute or policy

that was discriminatory. Doc. 33 at 18. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Udoh’s Fourteenth Amendment claims is granted.

G. Whistleblower Protection Act

Udoh also alleges a Whistleblower Protection Act Claim. Doc. 1 at 12.

Assuming he is bringing a claim pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. §

2302(b)(8)-(9) (“WPA”), Udoh has failed to adequately plead the claim. “The Civil

Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), as amended by the WPA, ‘governs claims for

retaliation against whistleblowing activities brought by federal employees against their

federal employers.’” Chinniah v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 18 Civ.

8261 (VSB), 2022 WL 392904, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2022) (emphasis added) (quoting

Ghaly vy. United States Department of Agriculture, 228 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (S.D.N-Y.

2002)). Udoh was not a federal employee—he was an employee of the City of New

York. The WPA does not apply here. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Udoh’s WPA claim

is granted.

H. Liability of Individual Defendants

Even if Udoh could adequately plead the above claims or bring them before the

Court, most of those claims cannot be brought against individual defendants. This District

has long held that Title VII does not “provide for individual liability against the agents of

an employer, including individuals who hold supervisory responsibilities.” Blige v. City

University of New York, No. 15 Civ. 8873 (GBD) (KHP), 2017 WL 498580, at *8

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2017) (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-14 (2d Cir.

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1995)); see also Guerra v. Jones, 421 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order)

(holding that Title VII does not subject “individuals, even those with supervisory liability

over the plaintiff, to personal liability.”).

This is true for claims pursuant to the ADA and the RA as well. See Williams v.

Dudley, No. 23 Civ. 11018 (JPC) (RFT), 2025 WL 1042336, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,

2025), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part by Williams v.

Dudley, No. 23 Civ. 11018 (JPC) (RFT), 2025 WL 842896 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2025)

(“[I]ndividual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held

personally liable under the ADA for employment discrimination.”) (citing Givens v. City

of New York, No. 11 Civ. 2568 (PKC) (JCF), 2012 WL 75027, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,

2012)); Lovallo v. New York City Department of Education, No. 23 Civ. 834 (MKV),

2024 WL 1329793, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024) (holding that the RA does not

“subject[] individuals, even those with supervisory liability over the plaintiff, to personal

liability.”) (citing Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2022)), cert. denied sub nom.

Goe v. McDonald, 143 S. Ct. 1020 (2023)). And insofar as Udoh raises Fourteenth

Amendment claims against the individual defendants, those must be dismissed as he has

failed to allege any facts sufficient to support the claim that they violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process or equal protection rights. As such, all Title VII, ADA, RA and

Fourteenth Amendment claims brought against Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and

Lisa D’Ambrosia must be dismissed.

Furthermore, “the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL impose liability on individuals

only where they are ‘personally involved’ or ‘actually participated’ in the alleged

violations.” Telfair v. Le Pain Quotidien U.S., No. 16 Civ. 5424 (PAE) (GWG), 2017

WL 1394384, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2017) (collecting cases). Udoh has presented no

evidence which implicates D’Ambrosia in any of the discriminatory conduct alleged in

his complaint. The only mention of D’Ambrosia in the complaint establishes that he met

D’Ambrosia on his first day, that he told her he was only sent there temporarily, and that

she informed him he would first go to the intake unit and then to client development.

Doc. | at 8. And in his opposition, Udoh alleges that “[D’ Ambrosia] was one of the

people who caused the Plaintiffs termination and reputable harm,” but those allegations

are purely conclusory. Doc. 30 at 4. Accordingly, all of the claims against Defendant

D’ Ambrosia must be dismissed. See Neiblas-Love v. New York City Housing Authority,

165 F. Supp. 3d 51, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims

against a defendant because “[p]laintiff produces no evidence linking [defendant] to his

termination” or “implicat[ed] [defendant] in any discriminatory acts that contributed to a

hostile work environment”); see also Marchuk v. Faruqi & Farugqi, LLP, 100 F. Supp. 3d

302, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (a Plaintiff must “prove at least some minimal culpability on

the part of [defendants].”).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII, ADA, RA and

Fourteenth Amendment claims against each individual defendant, as well as the

NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims against D’ Ambrosia is granted in its entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to partially dismiss the

complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The parties are directed to appear

for a conference on August 11, 2025 at 11 a.m., in Courtroom 619 of the Thurgood

Marshall Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007. The Clerk of Court

is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 26.

It is SO ORDERED.

pace Now York New York a Vb □□□

~ EDGARDORAMOS, U.S.DJ.

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