The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WAYNE TAYLOR CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS CASE NO. 24-2479
ALTERNATIVE SOLAR, LLC, ET AL. SECTION: “G”(3)
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Omnidian, Inc.’s (“Omnidian”) Motion to Dismiss.1
In this litigation, Plaintiff Wayne Taylor (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants Alternative Solar,
LLC d/b/a The Alternative Solar Home Solutions a/k/a Solar Home Solutions (“Alternative
Solar”), Carlos Gudino (“Gudino”), Solar Mosaic, LLC d/b/a Mosaic (“Mosaic”), Wakefield &
Associates (“Wakefield”), and Omnidian (collectively, “Defendants”) are liable to Plaintiff for
claims arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (the
“FDCPA”), for actions taken in the collection of a debt related to the installation of solar panels
on Plaintiff’s residence.2
In the instant motion, Omnidian asserts Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Omnidian upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff failed to allege: (1) that Omnidian is
a “debt collector” under the FDCPA or (2) that Omnidian engaged in any conduct in violation of
the FDCPA.3 The instant motion was set for submission on July 23, 2025.4 Pursuant to Local Rule
1 Rec. Doc. 29.
2 Rec. Doc. 1.
3 Rec. Doc. 29.
4 Rec. Doc. 29-2.
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7.5, opposition to a motion must be filed eight days before the noticed submission date. To date,
no party has filed an opposition and the motion for summary judgment is therefore deemed to be
unopposed. This Court has the authority to grant an unopposed motion, although it is not required
to do so.5 Considering the motion, the memorandum in support, the record, and the applicable law,
for the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion and dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against
Omnidian.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”6 A motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”7 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”8 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”9 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow the
court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”10
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.11 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
5 Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
7 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
11 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
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facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.12 “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”13
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” will not suffice.14 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.15 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”16 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
element of the asserted claims.17 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”
bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.18
Omnidian argues that Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails as a matter of law because it is not a
“debt collector” subject to the FDCPA.19 Omnidian asserts the Complaint is devoid of any
allegations that Omnidian attempted to collect a debt from Plaintiff.20
12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
13 Id. at 679.
14 Id. at 678.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
18 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
19 Rec. Doc. 29-1 at 7.
20 Id.
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The FDCPA applies to “debt collectors” and defines the term as “any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which
is the collection of any debts . . . owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”21 The FDCPA
defines a creditor as “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is
owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or
transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for
another.”22 Pursuant to the 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), the term debt collector only applies to a creditor
“who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would
indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.”
The Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to show that Omnidian is a “debt
collector.” The Complaint alleges that Omnidian contacted Plaintiff “to discuss [his] solar power
system’s Permission to Operate (PTO)” and notified Plaintiff that it was working with Mosaic to
evaluate the “experienced delays in the installation of [his] solar system.”23 The Complaint is
devoid of any other factual allegations against Omnidian.24 Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, Plaintiff has alleged that Omnidian was attempting to assist Plaintiff with the installation of
the solar panels, not to collect a debt. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that support an FDCPA claim
against Omnidian that is plausible on its face. Plaintiff has not responded to this motion or
21 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).
23 Rec. Doc. 1 at 7.
24 Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that “[i]t is believed that Omnidian regularly collects or
attempts to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” is insufficient to support that Omnidian
is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Id. at 3. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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presented any argument to show that Omnidian could be considered a debt collector under the
FDCPA. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Omnidian’s Motion to Dismiss” is GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 30th day of July, 2025.
NANNETTE JOLYVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25 Rec. Doc. 29.