The opinion
2025 IL App (4th) 240936-U
NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under
July 30, 2025
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0936
not precedent except in the
Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ILLINOIS STATE ) Petition for Review of the
UNIVERSITY, ) Order of the Illinois
Petitioner, ) Educational Labor Relations
v. ) Board
THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR )
RELATIONS BOARD and THE AMERICAN ) No. 23-RS-0029-C
FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL )
EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, )
Respondents. )
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board’s conclusion that snack bar supervisors do not spend a
preponderance of their work time performing supervisory functions was clearly
erroneous.
¶2 On January 8, 2024, the Board of Trustees of Illinois State University (University)
petitioned this court for judicial review of an order of certification issued by the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) adding five Illinois State University (ISU) employees
in the position of “food court/snack bar supervisor” (snack bar supervisor) to an existing collective
bargaining unit. The University contends the IELRB erred in adding the snack bar supervisors to
the bargaining unit because they are “supervisors” as the term is defined in section 2(g) of the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Act) (115 ILCS 5/2(g) (West 2024)) and therefore not
entitled to organize for collective bargaining.
¶3 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the IELRB’s determination and remand
for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On April 30, 2023, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, Council 31 (Union) filed a petition with the IELRB, seeking to add four ISU
employees in the position of snack bar supervisor to an existing collective bargaining unit
comprised of approximately 300 other ISU employees. The University opposed the petition,
arguing that the snack bar supervisors were excluded from the Act’s coverage by virtue of being
“supervisors” under section 2(g). See id. On October 23, October 24, and December 27, 2023, a
hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The following information was
presented at the hearing.
¶6 ISU is located in Normal, Illinois. Approximately 20,000 students attend the
university, and approximately 6,800 people are employed at the Normal campus. The campus
offers eight different retail dining establishments for students, faculty, and staff: Qdoba Mexican
Grill, The Landing, Timbers Grill, McAlister’s Deli, the Business Bistro, the High School Student
Store concession stand, and two Starbucks locations. Most of these restaurants are located in the
Bone Student Center.
¶7 All eight retail dining establishments are operated by the Event Management,
Dining, and Hospitality Department (EMDH). EMDH staff is organized as follows: approximately
300 student workers comprise the majority of the retail dining staff. Included within the
approximately 300 student workers are 8 to 10 student managers. Above the student workers are
snack bar attendants, of which there were 12 at the time of the hearing. Above the snack bar
attendants are four snack bar supervisors. University witness Heather Berrocales, the senior
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assistant director of the EMDH, testified that snack bar supervisors are similar to shift supervisors
“[i]n the outside world.” Above the snack bar supervisors are administrator Is, administrator IIs,
and administrator IIIs. Berrocales compared these roles to an assistant manager, general manager,
and district manager, respectively. Above the administrators are the senior assistant director, the
associate director, and, at the top, the director. At the time of the Union’s petition, only snack bar
attendants were represented for purposes of collective bargaining.
¶8 A. Snack Bar Supervisors
¶9 Snack bar supervisors are full-time, hourly employees who, according to
Berrocales, serve as the “manager on duty” of the establishment to which they are assigned. As
stated, at the time of the hearing, four snack bar supervisors worked at the campus’s retail dining
establishments: Michael Stevenson worked at McAlister’s Deli, while Jacob Cisco, Breana
Osborne, and Jessica Schoenbrun worked at the Starbucks in the Bone Student Center. Snack bar
supervisors’ venue assignments are not permanent, and they may be moved to different venues by
administrators depending on the retail needs of each venue. Snack bar supervisors report to the
administrator of the venue to which they are assigned.
¶ 10 Snack bar supervisors have numerous duties, often related to overseeing the work
of their subordinate employees. For example, they, along with administrators and student
managers, may make initial station assignments for staff members at the beginning of each shift.
Snack bar supervisors then continue to make assignments throughout the shift as needed,
accounting for factors such as the departure and arrival of student workers, the number of
customers, and specific workers’ strengths and weaknesses. They also have the authority to assign
work to both student workers and snack bar attendants, although Stevenson, Schoenbrun, and
Osborne testified that they rarely assigned snack bar attendants work or moved them from the
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stations they were assigned to at the start of their shift.
¶ 11 Snack bar supervisors do not decide student workers’ schedules, nor do they have
access to the student scheduling system. Snack bar supervisors, snack bar attendants,
administrators, student managers, and other students are all responsible for training student
workers. Student managers are hired by administrators, but they typically receive letters of
recommendation from snack bar supervisors.
¶ 12 Snack bar supervisors frequently monitor the work of subordinate employees to
ensure they are carrying out their assigned tasks and meeting the appropriate standards of
performance and sanitation. If they observe a student worker’s subpar performance, they are
expected to address it by stopping the behavior, retraining the employee, or issuing discipline.
Berrocales testified that snack bar supervisors are expected to spend “about 80 percent of their day
*** monitoring, checking, evaluating and dealing with things in a supervisory capacity.” However,
on cross-examination, she acknowledged that she had not done a time analysis of how the snack
bar supervisors actually spend their time day-to-day.
¶ 13 If snack bar supervisors witness student worker misconduct, they have several
options. They can ignore the misconduct, as in the case of a student who, for example, is late for
her shift but provides a reasonable excuse. They can engage in verbal counseling with the student,
explaining the inappropriate behavior and working with the student to correct it. They may also
choose to issue an infraction form, which is a written record of the misconduct, or report the
employee’s misconduct to a superior administrator. Although snack bar supervisors may confer
with a superior for advice on how to address a particular instance of misconduct, it is within the
supervisors’ discretion as to which discipline option they choose.
¶ 14 The snack bar supervisors’ issuance of infraction notices is the first step in a
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disciplinary process. Once issued, the infraction form is forwarded to the EMDH personnel office,
where a set number of discipline points are added to the student’s disciplinary record. Berrocales
explained that accumulating a certain number of points resulted in a more formal warning or
possible dismissal. While all snack bar supervisors testified to being unaware of the point totals of
individual students, Stevenson acknowledged that he had previously viewed a PowerPoint
presentation explaining the point system generally, and Cisco testified that he knew accumulating
a certain number of points resulted in termination. Additionally, Lisa Mayr, an administrator I,
testified that she knew of the point system when she previously worked as a snack bar supervisor,
and Berrocales testified that before termination, lower levels of point accumulation result in
written warnings which are delivered to and discussed with student workers by snack bar
supervisors.
¶ 15 Snack bar supervisors are also expected to maintain appropriate staffing levels
throughout a shift. If the venue becomes overstaffed, they are authorized to send student workers
home or, if appropriate, to a separate venue for temporary assistance. Similarly, if the
establishment is understaffed, they may ask student workers to come in. There are no guidelines
for managing staffing levels; the decision to call in students or send students home is based on the
individual snack bar supervisor’s experience and discretion. Snack bar supervisors need not ask
permission from a superior before sending student workers home or asking them to come in.
¶ 16 Stevenson testified that for the majority of his shift, he generally performed the
same work that the students and attendants did, including making sandwiches, interacting with
customers, operating the register, running food out, busing tables, and cleaning. However, he
acknowledged that even when performing these tasks, he will “check up on” the attendants and
student workers often. Cisco also testified that he spends most of his day in the “back of house,”
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restocking, taking inventory, and placing orders, but that he also was “always checking as, as
needed” on attendants and student workers. Osborne and Schoenbrun echoed this sentiment, with
Osborne stating, “I’m keeping an eye out and making sure everything is still running smoothly
while I’m doing my stuff.” Both Osborne and Schoenbrun testified that they monitor the work of
snack bar attendants and student workers while simultaneously performing their own tasks. Mayr
explained that snack bar supervisors “can’t have blinders on. [They] have to continually keep
[their] head on a swivel and see what other people are doing.” Stevenson testified that he spent
approximately 35% of his work time overseeing student workers, while Osborne and Schoenbrun
testified that they spent the majority of their work time doing so. Cisco did not testify as to the
amount of work time he spent overseeing student workers.
¶ 17 At the hearing, a copy of the job description for snack bar supervisors was admitted
without objection. The job description contained a breakdown of the duties snack bar supervisors
are expected to perform, with a number beside each one denoting the percentage of time a snack
bar supervisor is expected to spend on a particular task. The duties are as follows: (1) “[p]romotes
quality customer service. Focus on speed, courtesy, and accuracy of service. Continually interacts
with customers in dining area to evaluate satisfaction levels”—30%; (2) “[o]versees and ensures
food preparation and sanitary standards are maintained in food preparation and in the food prep,
services areas, and Front of House areas. Assists with food preparation as staffing and business
dictates”—30%; (3) “[t]rains, supervises, and evaluates employees on assigned shift”—20%;
(4) “[e]stablishes and maintains simple account records, manages cash handling processes, and
completes daily cash deposits”—5%; (5) “[a]ssists in planning, development, pricing, and rollout
of new franchise directives (i.e. merchandising, menu items, etc.)”—5%; and (6) “[p]erform other
duties as assigned”—5%. Additionally, snack bar supervisors are expected, at all times, to maintain
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regular attendance and “[d]emonstrate full knowledge and acceptance of principles of diversity.”
¶ 18 B. Snack Bar Attendants
¶ 19 Snack bar attendants are full-time employees that are members of a collective
bargaining unit represented by the Union. As a result, the terms of their employment are
determined by a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the University. The
agreement sets out the procedures by which the snack bar attendants bid on their work schedules
and venue assignments for the upcoming academic year and determines their hourly pay rate. The
agreement also governs procedures for overtime work. Accordingly, snack bar supervisors do not
have the authority to ask snack bar attendants to come in to work or work overtime and may not
send them home before the end of their shift. Snack bar supervisors also do not recommend or
issue discipline to snack bar attendants. They may make an initial report of a snack bar attendant’s
misconduct to an administrator, but this is their only involvement in the disciplinary process. Other
staff members, like an administrator, fellow snack bar attendant, student manager, or student
worker, may also make such reports. Additionally, performance evaluations for snack bar
attendants are performed by the administrators who oversee their venue. Snack bar supervisors
have no input or role in these evaluations.
¶ 20 Although snack bar supervisors have the authority to move snack bar attendants to
different stations during their shift, both Stevenson and Osborne testified that they typically do not
assign work to snack bar attendants. Stevenson testified that he spent approximately 5% of his
work time monitoring, overseeing, and correcting the work of snack bar attendants. The other
snack bar supervisors provided similar testimony, with Cisco and Osborne testifying that they
spend less than 5% of their time monitoring, overseeing, and correcting the snack bar attendants’
work and Schoenbrun testifying that she spends approximately 10% of her work time monitoring
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and observing the work of snack bar attendants.
¶ 21 C. ALJ’s Recommended Decision and Order
¶ 22 On March 25, 2024, the ALJ issued a recommended decision and order. The ALJ
found that snack bar supervisors lacked the authority to perform any one or more of the enumerated
supervisory functions listed in section 2(g) of the Act (115 ILCS 5/2(g) (West 2024) with respect
to snack bar attendants. He specifically stated:
“There is no evidence snack bar supervisors are able to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, reward, or discipline snack bar attendants, or
effectively recommend such action. Nor do snack bar supervisors have any role in
adjusting the grievances of the snack bar attendants. In fact, the record indicates
snack bar attendants are supervised by the administrator or administrators
overseeing the venues at which they work.”
The ALJ further found that snack bar supervisors “devote a negligible amount of their employment
time” to overseeing snack bar attendants. He therefore concluded that snack bar supervisors were
not supervisors within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act.
¶ 23 The ALJ acknowledged the University’s argument that snack bar supervisors act as
supervisors under the Act primarily with respect to the student workers, not snack bar attendants.
However, he found that
“the relevant inquiry is limited to whether the snack bar supervisors have authority
to perform one or more of the enumerated supervisory functions, or to effectively
recommend such performance, with regard to other employees within the
appropriate bargaining unit. There is no dispute the appropriate unit for the
placement of the snack bar supervisors is that proposed by the Union, which
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includes the snack bar attendants, and there is no assertion or anticipation that
student workers will or could be added to the proposed unit. Therefore, examining
whether snack bar supervisors are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(g)
of the Act, with regard to student workers, is immaterial.” (Emphasis in original.)
As a result of this conclusion, the ALJ offered no analysis of the authority snack bar supervisors
exercise over student workers.
¶ 24 The University filed exceptions to the ALJ’s order, taking issue with multiple
factual findings and arguing that the ALJ should have considered the snack bar supervisors’
authority over student workers when determining their supervisory status. The Union filed a
response to the exceptions, and the case proceeded to review by the IELRB.
¶ 25 D. IELRB’s Opinion and Order
¶ 26 On June 18, 2024, the IELRB issued its opinion and order. It began by adopting the
factual findings of the ALJ, including, among other things, the findings that Stevenson spends
approximately 40% of his work time overseeing the work of subordinate employees and
Schoenbrun and Osborne spend over 50% of their work time doing so. The IELRB then agreed
with the ALJ’s reasoning with respect to snack bar supervisors’ authority over student workers. It
noted that, under section 2(g), a supervisor is defined as
“any individual having authority in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or discipline other employees
within the appropriate bargaining unit and adjust their grievances, or to effectively
recommend such action if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment. The term
‘supervisor’ includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their
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employment time to such exercising authority.” (Emphasis in original)
As a result, the IELRB concluded that the supervisory authority snack bar supervisors have over
student workers, who are not members of a bargaining unit, was irrelevant.
¶ 27 The IELRB further distinguished the two cases on which the University attempted
to rely. It acknowledged that in Chicago Principals Ass’n v. Educational Labor Relations Board,
187 Ill. App. 3d 64 (1989), we held that, despite the phrase “other employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit” in the corresponding section to the current section 2(g) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp.,
ch. 48 ¶ 1702(g)), an individual did not need to supervise employees within the same bargaining
unit in order to be considered a “supervisor” under the Act. Chicago Principals Ass’n, 187 Ill.
App. 3d at 70. However, the IELRB noted that in 2023, Public Act 102-1138 (eff. Feb. 10, 2023)
amended sections 2(b) and (o) of the Act (115 ILCS 5/2(b), (o)), changing their application to
employees of the Chicago Board of Education. The IELRB noted that, “[a]s a result, the holding
in Chicago Principals Association on the supervisory exclusion is no longer applicable to the
position at issue in that very case.” It therefore found the reliability of Chicago Principals Ass’n
after Public Act 102-1138 to be “tenuous.”
¶ 28 The IELRB also addressed one of its own prior decisions, University Professionals
of Illinois, Local 4100, 33 PERI ¶ 73 (IELRB 2016), in which it cited Chicago Principals Ass’n
and held that the authority to perform supervisory functions over employees outside of the
bargaining unit was relevant in determining supervisory status. It factually distinguished both this
case and Chicago Principals Ass’n, stating, “In contrast to school principals and university
department chairs, the petitioned-for employees in this case are hourly employees who are front-
line workers working in food court venues under the direction of multiple levels of supervisors.”
It concluded that the prior decisions were “influenced by the type of employees at issue.” However,
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the IELRB also noted, “Even if we were to apply Chicago Principals Association here, *** the
record does not indicate that the petitioned-for employees exercise supervisory authority over
student workers.” It based this conclusion on the finding that snack bar supervisors do not spend
the preponderance of their time exercising supervisory authority over student workers.
Specifically, it repeated the ALJ’s finding that Stevenson spends only 40% of his work time
performing supervisory activities and stated:
“The University’s conclusion [that Stevenson spends the preponderance of his work
time overseeing subordinate employees] is based on Stevenson’s testimony that he
did not mean that he was not looking at, watching, or observing student workers
and snack bar attendants during the remaining 60% of his day, and that he will
check on them often. Even assuming, arguendo, that looking at, watching,
observing, and checking on amounted to supervisory authority, there is nothing in
the record to substantiate the University’s claim that it accounts for an additional
52% of Stevenson’s work time. What is more, there is nothing to indicate that it
accounts for the additional 11% [of Stevenson’s work time] that could meet the
preponderance requirement necessary for supervisory status.”
The IELRB therefore affirmed the ALJ’s recommended decision.
¶ 29 On June 21, 2024, pursuant to the IELRB’s decision, the executive director of the
IELRB issued an order of certification adding snack bar supervisors to the petitioned-for collective
bargaining unit.
¶ 30 The University petitioned this court for review of the IELRB’s decision. We
allowed the Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association (IPELRA) to file an
amicus curiae brief in this matter.
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¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 The University generally contends that the IELRB erred in its interpretation of
section 2(g) of the Act to limit an analysis of supervisory authority to individuals within the
supervisor’s proposed collective bargaining unit. It argues that the IELRB was obligated to follow
our contrary interpretation in Chicago Principals Ass’n, as well as its own past decisions. It then
argues that, when appropriately considering the supervisory authority that snack bar supervisors
exercise over student workers, we should find that they are supervisors under section 2(g).
¶ 33 The Union and the IELRB maintain that the IELRB was correct in considering only
the supervisory authority snack bar supervisors exercise over snack bar attendants, members of
their proposed bargaining unit. They argue that Chicago Principals Ass’n was legislatively
overturned by Public Act 102-1138, and, even if it had not been, it is factually distinguishable from
the instant case. They note that the IELRB is entitled to depart from its own prior decisions where
that departure is not arbitrary or capricious. They further argue that, under any interpretation of
section 2(g), snack bar supervisors are not supervisors under the Act because they do not exercise
supervisory authority with respect to snack bar attendants or student workers.
¶ 34 The IPELRA, in its amicus curiae brief, urges us to reaffirm our holding in Chicago
Principals Ass’n, asserting that the IELRB’s decision “risks upsetting approximately 35 years of
stable labor relations across the State of Illinois by now calling into question this Court’s
pronouncement that an individual can be a ‘supervisor’ within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the
[Act] *** even though his or her subordinates are unorganized.”
¶ 35 The applicable standard of review for IELRB decisions depends on whether the
question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. Board of
Education of City of Chicago v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 2015 IL 118043, ¶ 14. Questions
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of law, such as issues of statutory construction, are reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 15. In contrast, an
agency’s factual findings are held to be prima facie true and correct and will be reversed only if
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.; see 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2024).
Mixed questions of law and fact, which concern whether the established facts satisfy the applicable
legal standard, will be reversed only when “clearly erroneous” or when the reviewing court is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Board of Education of City of
Chicago, 2015 IL 118043, ¶ 16.
¶ 36 A. “Other Employees Within the Appropriate Bargaining Unit”
¶ 37 The Act grants “educational employees” the right to organize for collective
bargaining. Chicago Principals Ass’n, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 66. However, section 2(b) of the Act
excludes “supervisors” from the definition of “educational employees” who are so entitled. Id.
Section 2(g) defines a “supervisor” as
“any individual having authority in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or discipline other employees
within the appropriate bargaining unit and adjust their grievances, or to effectively
recommend such action if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment. The term
‘supervisor’ includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their
employment time to such exercising authority.” Id. § 2(g).
If an individual falls within the Act’s definition of “supervisor,” she is “excludable from labor
organizations which otherwise represent those employees and act to protect their rights.” Board of
Education of Community Consolidated High School District No. 230, 165 Ill. App. 3d 41, 56
(1987).
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¶ 38 1. Past Interpretations of Section 2(g)
¶ 39 In Chicago Board of Education, 4 PERI ¶ 1074 (IELRB 1988), the IELRB analyzed
the meaning of section 2(g)’s phrase “other employees within the appropriate bargaining unit.”
There, the Chicago Principals Association (CPA), a group of Chicago school principals, filed a
complaint with the IELRB, alleging that the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Board)
violated the Act by refusing to bargain with them or meet with the CPA’s president. Id. Following
a hearing on the matter, a hearing officer issued a recommended decision and order finding the
principals were “supervisors” as defined by section 2(g) and, therefore, the Board was not required
to bargain with them or meet with their representative. Id.
¶ 40 The case proceeded to review by the IELRB. The CPA argued that whatever
supervisory authority the principals exercised, they exercised it over employees outside of the
bargaining unit they sought to create. Id. Because section 2(g) requires that supervisory authority
be exercised over “other employees within the appropriate bargaining unit,” the principals
maintained that they could not be considered supervisors under the Act. (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 41 The IELRB disagreed. It stated:
“A literal reading of the phrase ‘within the appropriate bargaining unit’
leads to the absurd result of negating the very exclusion in which the language
appears. It would allow individuals who are truly ‘supervisors’ to avoid that
appellation and become ‘educational employees’ under the Act merely by seeking
an all-supervisory unit. As long as the individuals did not supervise anyone ‘within
the appropriate bargaining unit,’ they could avoid a determination of supervisory
status. Such a construction would effectively and impermissibly negate Section
2(g) and rewrite the definition of ‘educational employee.’ We find nothing in the
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language of Section 2(g) or elsewhere in the Act to authorize such a result. *** It
is therefore irrelevant whether an individual’s supervisory authority is over
employees within or outside of the bargaining unit.” Id.
It concluded that an individual was a supervisor under section 2(g) if he exercised “supervisory
authority over other educational employees.” Id. It subsequently determined that, under this
interpretation, the principals in question were supervisors and therefore excluded from the Act’s
coverage. Id.
¶ 42 The CPA appealed the IELRB’s decision to this court, and in Chicago Principals
Ass’n, we addressed the meaning of section 2(g). We reasoned:
“[The] CPA contends the word ‘other’ when qualifying the word ‘employees’ must
be taken to mean that a person is only a supervisor within the meaning of section
2(g) of the rule when that person is also an employee in the same bargaining unit
as those that person supervises. ***
If the General Assembly had intended to permit individuals who devote a
majority of their time exercising labor-related supervisory powers over others to
organize for collective-bargaining purposes as long as their organization was
separate from that of those they supervised, the General Assembly would have so
stated directly and not in the extremely indirect manner suggested by CPA.
Justifiable concern was expressed by the IELRB that the interpretation promulgated
by CPA would virtually eliminate the position of supervisor and would limit those
who could not require collective bargaining to those in the managerial category
[citation] and the few people in the confidential exclusion to section 2(n) of the Act
[citation]. We agree with the IELRB that the legislature did not intend the
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interpretation maintained by CPA.” Chicago Principals Ass’n, 187 Ill. App. 3d at
70.
We affirmed the conclusion of the IELRB that the principals in question were supervisors under
the Act. Id.
¶ 43 In University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100, 33 PERI ¶ 73 (IELRB 2016),
the IELRB repeated its prior interpretation of section 2(g). There, in determining the supervisory
status of department chairs at the University of Illinois, the IELRB noted our holding in Chicago
Principals Ass’n that “in spite of the language of Section 2(g), the statutory exclusion for
supervisors is not limited to individuals who supervise employees within the same unit.” Id. It
therefore concluded that it would consider the department chairs’ supervisory authority over
adjunct professionals, who were not members of the bargaining unit the department chairs sought
to join. Id.
¶ 44 The IELRB and the Union acknowledge these past decisions but argue that Chicago
Principals Ass’n is not controlling, as it has been legislatively overturned and is factually
distinguishable. They further assert that the IELRB was entitled to depart from its own prior
precedent in Chicago Board of Education and University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 if
its departure was not arbitrary or capricious. We will address each issue in turn.
¶ 45 2. Effect of Public Act 102-1138
¶ 46 Prior to 2023, the language of section 2(b) of the Act defined an “educational
employee” who was entitled to organize for collective bargaining as “any individual, excluding
supervisors, managerial, confidential, short term employees, student, and part-time academic
employees of community colleges employed full or part time by an educational employer.” 115
ILCS 5/2(b) (West 2022). Following the passage of Public Act 102-1138 in February 2023, this
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language was amended to define an educational employee as
“any individual, excluding supervisors, managerial, confidential, short term
employees, student, and part-time academic employees of community colleges
employed full or part time by an educational employer ***. However, with respect
to an educational employer of a school district organized under Article 34 of the
School Code, a supervisor shall be considered an educational employee under this
definition unless the supervisor is also a managerial employee.” (Emphasis added.)
115 ILCS 5/2(b) (West 2024).
¶ 47 At the same time, the definition of “managerial employee” in section 2(o) of the
Act was amended to include the following language: “with respect to an educational employer of
a school district organized under Article 34 of the School Code, [a managerial employee is] an
individual who has a significant role in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements or who
formulates and determines employer-wide management policies and practices.” Id. § 2(o).
¶ 48 The IELRB and the Union assert that these amendments, which occurred after our
decision in Chicago Principals Ass’n and which would allow the principals in that case to organize
for collective bargaining if the case were decided today, demonstrated the General Assembly’s
intent to contravene the holding in that case.
¶ 49 It is indisputable that Public Act 102-1138 had the effect of allowing the principals
of the Chicago Principals Association to organize for collective bargaining after its enactment. The
clear language of the amended Act removed Chicago principals from the definition of supervisor
unless they are also a manager who plays a “significant role in the negotiation of collective
bargaining agreements or who formulates and determines employer-wide management policies
and practices.” Pub. Act 102-1138 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending 115 ILCS 5/2(o)). However,
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nothing in the amended language of the Act undermines the reasoning we employed in Chicago
Principals Ass’n for finding that the phrase “other employees within the appropriate bargaining
unit” should not be read to limit an analysis of supervisory authority to those individuals within
the same bargaining unit as the supervisor.
¶ 50 In attempting to determine the intent of the legislature in making these amendments,
we find it telling that the amendments to section 2(b) and (o) are specifically limited in their
application to “educational employer[s] of a school district organized under Article 34 of the
School Code.” 115 ILCS 5/2(b), (o) (West 2024). So, even when presented with the opportunity
to amend section 2(g) more generally and disrupt our prior interpretation of the phrase “other
employee within the appropriate bargaining unit” in section 2(g) by changing or clarifying that
particular phrase, the legislature chose not to. Instead, it merely added language removing Chicago
principals from the reach of our holding. From this, we conclude that the General Assembly did
not seek to overturn our reasoning in Chicago Principals Ass’n, only its ultimate result as it related
to Chicago principals. See Moon v. Rhode, 2016 IL 119572, ¶ 33 (finding legislative acquiescence
where, “despite *** numerous amendments, the legislature has not amended the [statutory]
language in a way that would indicate a disagreement with our appellate court’s consistent and
repeated construction of the statute”).
¶ 51 It may be argued that the General Assembly focused on Chicago school principals
in drafting its amendments because this was the group of individuals who sought to organize for
collective bargaining in the only case in which we applied our interpretation of section 2(g). So,
undoing the result of Chicago Principals Ass’n might be seen as a direct criticism of our
interpretation. However, as we stated in Chicago Principals Ass’n, “[i]f the General Assembly had
intended to permit individuals who devote a majority of their time exercising labor-related
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supervisory powers over others to organize for collective-bargaining purposes as long as their
organization was separate from that of those they supervised, the General Assembly would have
so stated directly.” Similarly, we conclude that if the General Assembly had intended to overrule
our interpretation of section 2(g), it would have done so explicitly, rather than merely carving out
an exception from our ruling for Chicago principals.
¶ 52 To conclude, we find nothing in the amended language of section 2 of the Act that
overturns our interpretation of that section in Chicago Principals Ass’n. We therefore find no
reason to depart from our prior interpretation, and we determine that it should apply to the instant
case.
¶ 53 3. Factual Distinction
¶ 54 We are also unconvinced by the IELRB’s attempt to distinguish the instant case
factually from Chicago Principals Ass’n and University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 based
on the nature of the roles of the respective employees in each case. In its opinion and order in the
present case, the IELRB stated that it found the Union’s suggestion that the prior decisions were
“influenced by the type of employees at issue, school principals” to be “compelling.” However,
the IELRB did not offer any further analysis of this issue, nor did it articulate how the difference
in the type of employee at issue had any bearing on an interpretation of the phrase “other employee
within the appropriate bargaining unit” in section 2(g). Indeed, on appeal, the IELRB and the
Union still do not explain the significance of the difference in positions, instead stating only that
the position of a Chicago school principal differs from that of an ISU snack bar supervisor, a fact
we do not dispute.
¶ 55 In Chicago Principals Ass’n, we did not base our interpretation of section 2(g) on
the type of employee we were tasked with analyzing in that particular case. Rather, we based our
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reasoning on principles of statutory construction by discerning the legislative intent through the
plain language of the statute and not interpreting any part of it so as to render another part
superfluous. Chicago Principals Ass’n, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 70. Similarly, in University
Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100, the IELRB did not indicate that its interpretation of section
2(g) was in any way influenced by the nature of the department chairs’ positions. See University
Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100, 33 PERI ¶ 73 (IELRB 2016). The IELRB merely cited our
decision in Chicago Principals Ass’n and our concern that interpreting section 2(g) to consider
supervisory authority only as it relates to employees within the same bargaining unit as the
supervisors would allow supervisors to circumvent the Act’s supervisor exclusion by deliberately
organizing collective bargaining units so as to contain only supervisors. The IELRB and the Union
have not presented us with any reason to conclude that the interpretation of section 2(g) in these
cases was dependent on the nature of the employees at issue, nor that the differences between
principals, department chairs, and snack bar supervisors should so distinguish the instant case as
to trigger an entirely contradictory reading of section 2(g) than the one that has been previously
accepted.
¶ 56 4. Departure From Prior IELRB Decisions
¶ 57 The Union and the IELRB nevertheless argue that the IELRB is entitled to depart
from its past decisions if its reasoning for doing so is not arbitrary or capricious. While true,
whether or not the IELRB was entitled to depart from its prior decisions is irrelevant because we
have concluded that our interpretation of section 2(g) in Chicago Principals Ass’n remains correct.
Therefore, even if it provided nonarbitrary reasons for doing so, the IELRB erred in changing
course to interpret section 2(g) to state that supervisory authority is relevant only where it extends
to members of the supervisors’ proposed bargaining unit.
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¶ 58 In summary, we find the amendments made to section 2 of the Act did not
legislatively overturn our reasoning in Chicago Principals Ass’n. We further find the instant case
is not factually distinguishable from past decisions of this court and the IELRB based on the
relative types of employees seeking to organize in each case. As a result, we conclude that our
interpretation of section 2(g) in Chicago Principals Ass’n controls this case. Therefore, the inquiry
before us is whether the ISU snack bar supervisors exercised supervisory authority over any
subordinate workers, not merely the snack bar attendants who were included in the bargaining unit
in which they sought inclusion.
¶ 59 B. Application of Section 2(g) to Snack Bar Supervisors
¶ 60 We have previously broken down the definition of a supervisor under section 2(g)
into three components. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board, 235 Ill. App. 3d 709, 717 (1992). To be a supervisor under section 2(g), an
individual must (1) have authority in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, reward, or discipline other employees or effectively recommend
such action; (2) exercise such authority using independent judgment and not in a merely clerical
or routine nature; and (3) spend a preponderance of his work time exercising that authority. Id.
When reviewing the IELRB’s determination that an individual qualifies as a supervisor under
section 2(g), we apply a clearly-erroneous standard of review. See Board of Trustees of University
of Illinois v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board., 2018 IL App (4th) 170059, ¶ 84. Under
the clearly-erroneous standard, we will reverse only if we are “ ‘left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Id. (quoting Board of Education of Glenview
Community Consolidated School District No. 34 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,
374 Ill. App. 3d 892, 899 (2007)).
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¶ 61 1. Limitations of the IELRB’s decision
¶ 62 As stated, both the ALJ and the IELRB determined that Chicago Principals Ass’n
did not apply to the instant case. As a result, the ALJ limited his analysis to the supervisory
authority snack bar supervisors exercised over snack bar attendants and did not consider the
authority exercised over student workers, which the evidence showed was substantially greater.
The IELRB, in turn, stated in its opinion and order, “Even if we were to apply Chicago Principals
Association here, for the reasons discussed below, the record does not indicate that the
petitioned-for employees exercise supervisory authority over student workers.” However, despite
this statement, the IELRB only provided an analysis of the authority exercised over student
workers with respect to the third element in the three-part supervisor test, the “preponderance of
time” requirement. Specifically, the IELRB addressed the University’s exception to the ALJ’s
finding that Stevenson devoted only 40% of his work time to supervising snack bar attendants and
student workers when the correct total was 92%. The IELRB stated:
“The University’s conclusion is based on Stevenson’s testimony that he did not
mean that he was not looking at, watching, or observing student workers and snack
bar attendants during the remaining 60% of his day, and that he will check on them
often. Even assuming, arguendo, that looking at, watching, observing, and
checking on amounted to supervisory authority, there is nothing in the record to
substantiate the University’s claim that it accounts for an additional 52% of
Stevenson’s work time. What is more, there is nothing to indicate that it accounts
for even the additional 11% that could meet the preponderance requirement
necessary for supervisory status.”
As for the remaining two elements, the IELRB merely repeated the conclusions the ALJ made
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regarding the snack bar supervisors’ authority over snack bar attendants, not student workers.
¶ 63 When reviewing a decision of the IELRB, we do not consider the record evidence
anew. Instead, we examine the IELRB’s factual findings to determine if they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence, and we examine the IELRB’s resulting legal conclusions to
determine if they are clearly erroneous. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2015 IL 118043,
¶ 15. As the correct consideration in the instant case is whether snack bar supervisors exercise
supervisory authority over both snack bar attendants and student workers and the IELRB only
considered the third element with respect to these two groups, we find our review limited to that
element.
¶ 64 2. Preponderance of Time
¶ 65 The IELRB has previously determined that a “preponderance” of time under the
Act refers to an amount of time greater than 50%. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,
4 PERI ¶ 1030 (IELRB 1987). In Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, the IELRB
clarified this standard, stating:
“Of course, in analyzing whether the preponderance or majority of time
standard is met, we shall consider the time spent performing various tasks every
day over a period of time. However, the inquiry will be more than just a simple
calculation of the time an individual spends in any particular day or week overtly
performing functions listed in Section 2(g). We shall take into account the
responsibilities inherent in the position which are exercised on a continual,
on-going basis, but are not always overtly or visibly manifested. When an
individual exercises significant supervisory authority on a continuing basis with
respect to a substantial number of educational employees, that individual, in most
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instances, will meet the ‘preponderance…exercising’ test even though the time
spent recording or acting on the results of the supervision may be small.” Id.
¶ 66 We accepted this interpretation in Chicago Principals Ass’n, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 69.
There, in the underlying administrative order, the IELRB found that the principals in question
exercised a “ ‘continual on-going teacher evaluation process,’ which did not consist merely of
giving advice to and conferring with teachers, but also involved the day-to-day responsibility of
being cognizant of the teachers’ performance.” Id. We affirmed that where the evidence showed
that the “ ‘ongoing’ responsibility of evaluation *** predominated the time of the principals,” the
“preponderance” requirement was met. Id.
¶ 67 We note that in Chicago Principals Ass’n, we did not conclude that the actual
amount of time an individual spends exercising supervisory authority is irrelevant to determining
whether the “preponderance of time” requirement was met. Rather, we determined that the time
spent maintaining an awareness of subordinate employees, although not time spent performing one
of the enumerated supervisory functions of section 2(g), such as hiring, firing, rewarding, or
disciplining, might still be considered in determining if the individual is a supervisor. See id.
Indeed, in Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, the IELRB concluded that a general
foreman of electricians at Southern Illinois University did not spend the preponderance of his time
performing supervisory functions where the evidence established that he spent 50 to 60% of his
time estimating the man-hours and materials needed to complete various projects. Board of
Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 4 PERI ¶ 1030 (IELRB 1987). Although the IELRB
considered “other duties which may be considered in determining whether an individual is a
supervisor,” such as time spent overseeing subordinates’ work, where these additional activities
did not total more than 50% of the foreman’s work time, the IELRB concluded the “preponderance
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of time” requirement was not met. Id.
¶ 68 The University argues that snack bar supervisors exercise supervisory authority in
directing and assigning work to both snack bar attendants and student workers, as well as
disciplining student workers. For purposes of our analysis here, we will assume that these are
supervisory activities, and we will assume that the snack bar supervisors use their independent
judgment when performing these activities.
¶ 69 In his recommended decision and order, the ALJ made the following factual
findings: all snack bar supervisors spend the majority of their shifts performing nonsupervisory
tasks like those performed by their subordinate employees, such as food preparation, restocking,
and cleaning. However, they also spend a significant amount of their work time monitoring their
subordinate employees to ensure they are carrying out their assigned tasks correctly and to
determine if they need to be moved to a different station in the venue. Stevenson spends
approximately 5% of his work time monitoring snack bar attendants and 35% of his work time
monitoring student workers, for a total of 40%. Osborne spends approximately 5% of her work
time monitoring snack bar attendants and more than 50% of her work time monitoring student
workers, for a total of more than 55%. Schoenbrun spends approximately 10% of her work time
monitoring snack bar attendants and “slightly more than 50 percent” of her work time monitoring
student workers, for a total of more than 61%. The ALJ found that when Cisco worked with a
snack bar attendant in the past, he spent less than 5% of his work time monitoring the snack bar
attendant. No evidence was offered, and the ALJ made no findings, as to the time Cisco spends
overseeing student workers.
¶ 70 In its opinion and order, the IELRB stated that it would “adopt the facts as set forth
in the underlying” ALJ’s recommended decision. At no other point in its opinion did it express
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disagreement with the ALJ’s factual findings. Therefore, we will take the factual findings stated
above as those of the IELRB. Because these facts are supported by the testimony of the witnesses,
we conclude that the IELRB’s factual findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 71 However, we take issue with the IELRB’s conclusion, from these facts, that snack
bar supervisors do not spend the preponderance of their time performing supervisory functions.
As stated, for our purposes, we make the same assumption that the IELRB made in its decision,
that the time snack bar supervisors spend monitoring and assigning work to their subordinate
employees constitutes time spent performing supervisory activities and that they use their
independent judgment in performing these activities. Making this assumption, the IELRB’s
conclusion stands in direct conflict with at least half of its factual findings. The ALJ found that
both Schoenbrun and Osborne spend over 50% of their work time monitoring their subordinate
employees. This differs from the testimony of Stevenson, who stated that he spent only
approximately 40% of his time monitoring the work of his subordinates. This conflict did not
present an issue for the ALJ, as the ALJ only considered the time snack bar supervisors spent
overseeing the work of snack bar attendants, which, by all accounts, was less than the majority of
their work time. However, the IELRB purported to consider both the time spent overseeing snack
bar attendants and student workers in drawing its conclusion. Yet from findings showing that
Osborne and Schoenbrun spent the majority of their time overseeing student workers, the IELRB
somehow concluded that snack bar supervisors, as a whole, do not. We find this irreconcilable.
¶ 72 The IELRB was entitled to discount the testimony of Osborne and Schoenbrun and
give more weight to that of Stevenson. However, it did not state here that it did so. Rather, it
adopted all the factual findings of the ALJ without amendment, including the finding that two of
the four snack bar supervisors spent the majority of their time performing supervisory activities.
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The IELRB may also have concluded that evidence showing that one member of the group of
petitioned-for employees not performing supervisory activities for the majority of his work time
was sufficient to conclude that all members of that group were not supervisors under the Act. Yet,
the IELRB did not state that conclusion outright, and we will not assume its reasoning. Indeed, the
IELRB provided very little analysis to assist us in reviewing its decision, merely pointing to the
amount of time Stevenson testified to overseeing his subordinate employees and concluding that
snack bar supervisors do not perform supervisory activities for the majority of their work time,
simply ignoring any contrary findings it purported to have adopted.
¶ 73 We acknowledge the deference we are to give to the IELRB regarding mixed
questions of law and fact. See Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2015 IL 118043, ¶ 16.
However, where, as here, the IELRB’s conclusion directly contradicts certain factual findings,
with no explanation, we find its conclusion to be clearly erroneous.
¶ 74 C. Remand
¶ 75 Because the IELRB did not draw any conclusions regarding the first two elements
as they relate to the combined authority snack bar supervisors exercise over snack bar attendants
and student workers, we are unable to review these issues, as we would be conducting a de novo
review. We therefore remand this case so that the IELRB may consider, in light of our holding
here regarding the applicability of Chicago Principals Ass’n, whether snack bar supervisors are
supervisors under the Act with respect to snack bar attendants and student workers. Additionally,
we urge the IELRB to clarify its reasoning with respect to the “preponderance of time” element
and explain why, if it accepted the findings that Schoenbrun and Osborne spend the majority of
their time overseeing the work of their subordinate employees, it did not consider that testimony
in reaching its ultimate conclusion.
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¶ 76 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 77 For the reasons articulated above, we reverse and remand this case to the IELRB
for further consideration.
¶ 78 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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