Moultrie v. Cenlar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ISAIAH MOULTRIE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-CV-2012(EK)(PK)

-against-

CENLAR a/k/a CENTRAL LOAN

ADMINISTRATION & REPORTING AS

SERVICER FOR CITIBANK,

Defendant.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Isaiah Moultrie entered into a home equity

line of credit with Citibank. Defendant Cenlar serviced the

line of credit. An alleged bookkeeping error caused Moultrie to

overdraw the line of credit, so Cenlar increased his monthly

payment. Cenlar applied Moultrie’s next two payments to the

principal only, then notified Moultrie that he had defaulted on

two months’ interest payments.

Moultrie, who is represented by counsel, now brings

state-law claims for negligent accounting, breach of contract,

and violation of state mortgage-servicing regulations. He also

brings a claim under an unspecified provision of the Dodd-Frank

Act.1 Cenlar moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

For the reasons set forth below, that motion is granted.

Background

The following facts are drawn from the complaint, and

are presumed true for purposes of this order. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Moultrie entered into a $260,000 home equity line of

credit (“HELOC”) with Citibank on January 8, 2020. Compl. ¶ 2,

ECF No. 1–2. On October 5, 2023, “a bookkeeper made a payment”

of $32,495.69 — apparently erroneously — to Moultrie’s HELOC,

thereby freeing up a corresponding amount for Moultrie’s use.

Id. ¶ 5. Moultrie then drew down the newly available funds,

bringing him back up to the credit limit. Id. Subsequently,

however, “the payment [made by the bookkeeper] was returned” —

that is, clawed back by the bank — bringing Moultrie’s credit

usage above the $260,000 limit. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.

In light of the overdraft, Cenlar increased Moultrie’s

monthly payments, which Moultrie continued to make. Id. ¶ 7.

On January 5, 2024, Moultrie received a letter from Cenlar

stating that he was in default on the past two months’ interest

payments. Id. ¶ 9. According to Moultrie, Cenlar should have

applied the payments to both the interest and principal

1 In his complaint, Moultrie refers to this statute as the “Dobbs Frank

Act.” Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1-2.

outstanding, and its failure to do so caused him to default on

the interest payments. Id. ¶ 8. He claims that this default

harmed his credit rating, his business, and his ability to

refinance. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, 14.

Moultrie filed suit in New York State Supreme Court on

January 25, 2024. Compl. 7. Cenlar removed, invoking this

Court’s federal-question jurisdiction. This Court has general

jurisdiction over Cenlar because it is incorporated in New York.

Notice of Removal ¶ 8, ECF No. 1; see Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). Venue is

proper because this is the “district and division embracing the

place” where this action was originally filed. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a).

Legal Standard

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. E.g., Lundy

v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d

Cir. 2013). Only “a plausible claim for relief survives a

motion to dismiss.” LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC,

570 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2009).2 A claim is plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.

Discussion

A. Moultrie’s Dodd-Frank Claim

Moultrie’s Dodd-Frank claim fails for two reasons.

First, he identifies no specific provision of that sprawling

statute that Cenlar allegedly violated. Second, to the extent

Moultrie accused Cenlar of unfair or deceptive mortgage

servicing practices, Dodd-Frank does not provide a private right

of action.

A complaint must allow a court to discern “the

requirements of whatever statute [the plaintiff] is suing under”

and “how each defendant violated that statute.” Harding v. CIT

Grp./Consumer Fin., Inc., No. 13-CV-1178, 2013 WL 1136401, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. March 18, 2013); see also Nasions v. Two Unknown

B.I.C.E. Agents at Arapahoe Cnty. Just. Ctr., 492 F.3d 1158,

1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (Rule 8 requires plaintiffs to indicate a

specific legal right that was allegedly violated); Parker v.

Atlanta Cap. Assets, LLC, No. 24-CV-00468, 2024 WL 4251730, at

*2 (N.D. Ga. August 14, 2024) (dismissing complaint where

plaintiff “mentioned the Dodd-Frank Act in her Complaint with no

reference to any specific provision of the Act”). Here,

Moultrie alleges that Cenlar’s conduct violated the Dodd-Frank

Act, Compl. ¶ 18, but he never identifies how the alleged

conduct contravenes any particular provision of that 848-page

statute. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). That

is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.3

In any event, Moultrie does not have a private right

of action under the Dodd-Frank Act. While the Act did create a

private right of action for whistleblowers, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

6(h)(1)(B)(i), Moultrie does not allege any facts suggesting he

is a whistleblower. Instead, the conduct Moultrie describes

appears somewhat analogous to unfair business practices. Compl.

¶¶ 9–11. And the Court “is not aware of any language in Dodd-

Frank explicitly providing for a private cause of action for

unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.” Beider v.

Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 465,

472 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Parker, 2024 WL 4251730, at *2

(dismissing complaint because Dodd-Frank created no usable

private right of action). Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank claim is

dismissed.

3 Moultrie gestures toward several other federal statutes in his

opposition brief, including the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the

Fair Credit Reporting Act. Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss 8, ECF No. 22-1.

But a plaintiff may not amend his complaint in his opposition to a motion to

dismiss. Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998).

So, the Court does not consider whether Moultrie has stated a claim under

these statutes.

B. Moultrie’s State-Law Claims

Without the Dodd-Frank claim, this Court will not

exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Although

Cenlar invoked both federal question and diversity jurisdiction

in its notice of removal, it has not shown that diversity

actually exists here. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 7–11. An allegation

of a party’s “residence alone is insufficient to establish

domicile for jurisdictional purposes.” Van Buskirk v. United

Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019). The only

allegation in the notice of removal as to Moultrie’s state of

citizenship is that he is “an individual with offices at Far

Rockaway, New York.” Id. ¶ 7. Even if this established

Moultrie’s place of residence, it does not establish domicile.

Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47-49

(1989). And if it did establish domicile, it would render the

parties non-diverse, because Cenlar is incorporated in New York.

Notice of Removal ¶ 8; see also Bayerische Landesbank v. Aladdin

Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] corporation

is considered a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated

. . . .”).

Therefore, the Court may only review the state-law

claims if it exercises supplemental jurisdiction. However, when

“the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction . . . the district court need not

exercise” supplemental jurisdiction. Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc.

v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025). “Instead, the court

may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state

court.” Id.

It is possible that Moultrie is domiciled somewhere

other than New York (where Cenlar is incorporated) or New Jersey

(where Cenlar has its principal place of business). Notice of

Removal ¶ 8. If that is the case, the Court might have

diversity jurisdiction over the non-federal claims. When a

complaint does not properly allege federal jurisdiction, but

additional allegations could remedy that defect, a court should

dismiss with leave to amend. Absolute Activist Value Master

Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012). So, the

remaining non-federal claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

If Moultrie fails to amend within the next thirty days, the

dismissal will be with prejudice.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed

without prejudice. Moultrie may amend his complaint to allege

diversity jurisdiction within thirty days. If Moultrie fails to

do so, the Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter

judgment and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: July 29, 2025

Brooklyn, New York